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The	   PhD	   programme	   in	   Political	   Studies	   (POLS)	   (30th	   cohort)	   stems	   from	   the	  
collaboration	   of	   four	   universities,	   namely,	   Università	   Cattolica	   del	   Sacro	   Cuore	   di	  
Milano,	  Università	  degli	  Studi	  di	  Genova,	  Università	  degli	  Studi	  di	  Milano,	  and	  Università	  
degli	  Studi	  di	  Pavia.	  The	  University	  of	  Milan	  serves	  as	  the	  administrative	  headquarters	  
and	  provides	  the	  facilities	  for	  most	  teaching	  activities.	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6 
Introduction	  	  
 
This research addresses the concept of the Recognition Process as currently 
advanced by International Relations (IR) theory. 
IR theory while seeking to formulate an alternative explanation to international 
politics based on identity-related issues, called attention back to the process of 
identity formation, which furtherly opened space for the development of the current IR 
formulation of the recognition process.  
In the beginning of 1990s, filo-constructivist IR literature while drawing on recognition 
studies as developed long before in the fields of Political Psychology, Sociology and 
Political Theory, has developed a theoretical framework for recognition process that 
builds on the idea that the process of recognition requires the candidate actors (those 
actors that seek for identity recognition) to comply with the rules and norms of the 
group whose recognition they are longing for.  
Therefore, current IR literature on recognition process expects that a state seeking for 
status recognition will behave in conformity and compliance with international norms 
and rules shared by the international society – which can grant or withhold its 
recognition.  
The IR theoretical framework on recognition process, together with formulations on 
status seeking, constitute the basis for the above mentioned alternative explanation to 
international politics. Indeed, this alternative explanation to international politics 
explains peaceful and conflictual relations as the opposite results of accomplishment, 
or failure, of the social-relational recognition process.  
Yet, these shared expectations of prosocial compliance in the international standing of 
status seekers meets its shortcomings when confronted with status seekers' foreign 
policies that, next to compliant behaviours, perform also non-compliant behaviours.  
This mixed articulation of the international behavioural strategies adopted by status 
seekers underlines the limits of the current framework on recognition process.  
 The thesis addresses this mismatch between the theoretical formulation and 
empirical puzzling observations, and aims at advancing a theoretical framework able to 
give a comprehensive explanation of the compresence of prosocial (complying) and 
antisocial (deviant) behaviours within international politics. 
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The thesis moves from an analysis of the IR literature on identity formation and 
its important component: the process of recognition. Chapter 1 focuses on introducing 
the concept of the recognition process, its related characteristics, and the developed 
alternative explanations to international politics based on the conception of the 
recognition process. Chapter 2 focuses on highlighting the shortcomings of the two 
alternative explanations of international politics based on recognition studies which are 
able to explain the presence of complying or deviant behaviours in the international 
arena but fall short in explaining their compresence. In addition, some alternative 
explanations that attempt to justify the simultaneous observation of prosocial and 
antisocial behaviours are also taken into consideration.  
In Chapter 3 interesting findings from developmental peer relations studies on children 
and adolescents are introduced. After a review of this sociological research field and 
the conceptual and theoretical evolution that took place at the end of the 1990s, the 
research deals with the concepts and findings that can prove useful to IR to close the 
gap between the theoretical conceptualization of the recognition process and the 
empirical observations of interactions within the international arena. The concepts of 
popularity and likeability are introduced and reviewed in their differences as distinct 
constructs – respectively measuring social standing (reputation) and interpersonal 
emotional affection (liking/being liked).  
Moreover, the chapter also focusses on reporting the content of the new findings 
achieved by development-psychological studies which confirm the existence of a link 
between popularity status and both prosocial and antisocial behaviours. The chapter 
analyses the features of this relation which suggests that popularity status is pursued 
by kids and adolescents by combining deviant behaviours with complying behaviours, in 
a functional bi-strategic combination. Attention is also paid to the processes adopted 
by kids to pursue likeability status, this in order to distinguish the two different 
processes which aim at seeking different social statuses. 
The last part of chapter 3 is devoted to the translation of these findings to the IR 
field. The section presents the reader with arguments in favour of the adoption of 
these concepts and findings. Next to the illustration of the advantages, attention is 
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also paid to the risks of borrowing findings from a sociological field, and especially 
from studies specifically developed on kids and adolescents. 
This section devotes also to a specific translation of the concepts introduced in 
chapter 3 – among which popularity and likeability, in primis – and also of the findings 
that were achieved in these developmental studies, and the implications that these 
conclusions have on the current IR formulation of the recognition process.  
The idea according which status seekers perform only conformingly during their status 
seeking process gives way to the assumption that, even in the international arena, 
status seekers that are seeking for reputational status (comparable to popularity status 
for kids) do perform a mixed combination of deviant and compliant behaviours. This 
suggests that it is possible to understand the observation of deviant behaviours 
adopted by revisionist status seekers, as a possible manifestation of deviant behaviours 
that have been adopted functionally (in combination with complying ones) and 
specifically ahead of the status seeking strategy. 
These hypotheses are addressed in chapter 4 which is devoted to the empirical case 
study. The empirical analysis examines the specific case of Italian foreign policy during 
the first half of the Mussolini Government. After having presented the linearity of the 
case study with the intentions of the research, and after a historical contextualization, 
the chapter turns to highlighting the characteristics of the case.  
Attentions is devoted to pointing out the fact that the Italian foreign policy of this 
period was the foreign policy of a status seeker. Building on this, the following 
sections are devoted to a closer analysis of Italian international standing and 
behaviours.  
The chapter is built by reporting historical documentations, speeches and also by 
making reference to secondary literature. 
The analysis turns around some of the most well-known deviant behaviours adopted by 
the Italian government, and aims at highlighting, through historical documentation, the 
intentions behind those behaviours.  
The research is led by the intention to understand if these deviant behaviours have 
been adopted in order to purse Italian great power ambitions (which would confirm the 
functional use of deviant behaviours ahead of status and recognition seeking 
strategies); and also, the circumstances under which these behaviours have been 
implemented (if in combination with compliant behaviours).  
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This investigation is conducted by referring to the historical documentation of public 
speeches, but also by referring at private diplomatic missives exchanged between the 
central government and the Italian representatives abroad. 
From the analysis of this documentation, it emerges that the deviant behaviours 
charactering the Italian international standing in those years were adopted ahead of 
the Italian status seeking process. Italy, being a revisionist (but not revolutionary) 
power, pursued the recognition of its prestige as a great power by adopting behaviours 
that didn't limit to international compliance, but on contrary, insisted on deviant 
behaviours. 
In the conclusion, it is reported that this opens the way to reconception of the current 
IR formulation, and expectations, of the recognition process.  
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Chapter	  1	  
1	  –	  Recognition	  studies:	  the	  transfer	  to	  the	  IR	  field	   	  
 
Recognition studies entered the field of International Relations around the 
second half of the 1990s. The cross-disciplinary transfer was supported and 
implemented primarily by scholars professing their focus on constructivist ontology, be 
it moderate or radical (Geis et al., 2015, 4-5). This "application of recognition as a 
social science concept" (Geis et al., 2015, 4-5) to the IR field built on insights from 
recognition studies that emerged from the fields of Political Theory, Social Philosophy 
and Social Psychology and identified common ground with the typical constructivist 
perspective according to which social interaction has a constitutive (creative) upside, 
even in the realm of international politics1. 
Introducing recognition studies to IR and moving the focus of these studies 
"beyond the purely formal modes of state recognition" took – according to the same 
IR recognition scholars – "a long time" (Geis et al., 2015, 11). The complaint regarding 
this delay refers to the fact that fields of Political Theory and Social Philosophy 
focussed on the social dynamics related to recognition (and misrecognition) long 
before IR scholars slowly started "keeping up with the cross-disciplinary transfer of 
recognition theory to the field of international politics". More specifically, when the field 
of Political Theory started to focus on 'recognition debates', the IR field was still 
experiencing the 'constructivist turn'. A period of time passed before IR scholars as well 
reoriented their interest towards recognition issues (Geis et al., 2015, 9). 
From the constructivist perspective, trailblazers of this strand of research were 
Erik Ringmar (1996, 2002) and Alexander Wendt (1999, 2003)2.  
                                                
 
1	   Geis	   et	   al.,	   2015,	   23:	   "For	   detailed	   treatments	   of	   individual	   recognition-­‐related	   contribution	   in	   International	  
Relations,	   see,	   for	   example,	   Bartelson	   (2013);	   Dimitrova	   (2013);	   Greenhill	   (2008);	   Strömbom	   (2013)	   and	   Wolf	  
(2011).”	  
2	   According	   to	   Brian	   Greenhill	   (2008),	   Ringmar	   and	   Wendt	   represent	   two	   sub-­‐strands	   within	   the	   IR	   recognition	  
studies.	   Both	   sub-­‐lines	   of	   research	   aim	   at	   understanding	   the	   role	   played	   by	   recognition	   within	   international	  
interactions.	  However,	   in	   the	   first	  case,	   the	   line	  developed	  by	  Ringmar	   focusses	  on	  understanding	   the	   relationship	  
between	   struggles	   for	   recognition	   and	   international	   state	   behaviour.	   "Ringmar	   argues	   that	   the	   desire	   to	   have	   a	  
particular	  type	  of	  identity	  recognized	  by	  one’s	  interlocutors	  can	  often	  provide	  a	  far	  more	  compelling	  explanation	  of	  
state	  behaviour	  than	  traditional	  explanations	  that	  focus	  only	  on	  material	  factors"	  (Greenhill,	  2008,	  344).	  Conversely,	  
the	   line	   of	   research	   developed	   by	   Wendt	   makes	   some	   steps	   forward	   and	   focusses	   on	   the	   role	   that	   recognition	  
processes	   play	   at	   the	   international	   level	   specifically	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   "a	   single	   overarching	   collective	   identity"	  
(Greenhill,	  2008,	  345).	  Indeed,	  while	  drawing	  from	  Hegel's	  theory	  of	  recognition,	  Wendt	  moves	  from	  highlighting	  the	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2	  –	  Formulating	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  international	  
politics	  based	  on	  recognition	  studies	  
 
The fact that the introduction of recognition studies to the IR field was initiated 
by constructivist scholars did have consequences on the new IR strand of research. 
Actually, the cross-disciplinary transfer of recognition studies' insights to IR was, from 
the point of view of constructivist scholars, functional to the main IR disciplinary 
division concerning alternative explanations for international politics (Geis et al., 2015, 
5). Indeed, by engaging in the broader IR debate, recognition scholars did note the 
limits of the traditional 'rationalist approaches to international politics' that focus 
attention exclusively on a materialistic explanation of international conflict but overlook 
the role played by other 'non-material factors', among which are the identity-related 
issues. Hence, insights from Political Theory, Social Psychology and Social Philosophy 
were used as a basis to formulate an alternative theory of action within IR that could 
depart from the traditional one focussed on issues of instrumental rationality and 
material interests and focus instead on identity matters. In Wolf's words,  
"Contemporary scholars therefore readily attribute an escalation of a conflict to an 
escalation of risks or to an increased interest in the contested material resources, 
instead of looking for additional incentives rooted in an actor’s identity needs. In 
this way, many social scientists almost habitually take it for granted that once they 
have found a plausible explanation based on material incentives there is no further 
need to look for other motivational factors that might also be involved" (Wolf, 
2011, 132-133). 
Therefore, IR recognition scholars support the need to give more room (in alternative, 
or also next to the traditionally favoured material resources) to "other motivational 
factors", particularly those related to identity and identity formation issues (Greenhill, 
2008). As reported by Michelle Murray (2014),  
                                                                                                                                          
 
importance	   of	   recognition	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   individual	   self	   to	   highlighting	   the	   possible	   consequences	   of	   a	  
recognition	  process	   in	   the	   formation	  of	   a	   collective	   identity	   that	   could	  develop	   into	   the	   'World	   State'	   (see	  Wendt	  
2003,	   Greenhill,	   2008).	   In	   antithesis	   to	   this,	   and	   by	   drawing	   on	   "empirical	   findings	   of	   psychological	   research	   on	  
identity	   formation",	  Greenhill	   (2008)	  builds	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  predictive	  findings	  asserted	  by	  Wendt	  with	  the	  
intent	   of	   downsizing	   the	   "far-­‐reaching	   role"	   assigned	   by	  Wendt	   to	   'recognition'	   –	   see	   Greenhill	   (2008)	   for	   more	  
details.	  	    
This	   research	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   first	   sub-­‐strand	   of	   research,	   the	   one	   developed	   by	   Ringmar	   and	   focussed	   on	   the	  
relationship	   between	   state	   behaviour	   and	   recognition	   politics	   as	   an	   explanatory	   factor	   of	   (peaceful	   or	   conflictual)	  
international	  politics.	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"Unlike dominant rationalist approaches to international politics, which assume 
states are primarily concerned with physical security and maximizing power, 
recognition scholars contend establishing and maintaining an identity is also an 
important dimension of foreign policy" (Murray, 2014, 558). 
Hence, although after a delay, constructivists were able to bring in the recognition 
theory with the intent of establishing an alternative explanation for international peace 
and conflict.  
 
2.1	  –	  The	  need	  to	  assert	  and	  prove	  the	  relevance	  of	  identity-­‐related	  issues	  
and	  its	  consequences	  
 
The fact that IR recognition studies were introduced to IR as part of the main 
disciplinary debate reflected on both the basic assumptions that recognition scholars 
used as a basis for their studies and the evolution of the IR recognition studies itself. 
In particular, the attempt and the need to build an alternative explanation of 
international politics based on identity-related issues required scholars to assert and 
prove the relevance of identity itself. In a first stage of the development of this strand 
of research, this new focus of research was based on and built around the 
juxtaposition of matters of identity and matters of interest. 
Indeed, IR recognition studies were introduced as an alternative to the 
rationalist and materialist approaches. This approach implied that recognition studies 
were used by constructivist scholars as an argument in favour of the relevance of 
identity-related issues and in opposition to the materialist ones that for years have 
induced scholars to adopt (and build around) an antithetical perspective that opposes 
matters of interest to matters of identity. Although this antithetical approach has 
recently started to lose its momentum3 (Geis et al., 2015, 5-6), it nonetheless has 
deeply – and at length – affected the IR literature on recognition.  
                                                
 
3	  Most	  of	  the	  IR	  literature	  on	  recognition	  studies	  draws	  from	  Ringmar's	  and	  Wendt's	  studies	  published	  in	  the	  second	  
half	  of	  the	  1990s	  (see	  for	  example:	  Ringmar,	  1996;	  Wendt,	  1999,	  and	  following	  ones).	  Considering	  that	  both	  authors	  
undertake	  an	  antithetical	  approach	   to	   traditional	   rationalist-­‐materialist	  explanations,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  conclude	   that	  
most	   of	   the	   IR	   literature	   on	   recognition	   tacitly	   implies	   this	   approach.	   However,	   with	   the	   volume	   Recognition	   in	  
International	  Relations:	  Rethinking	  a	  Political	  Concept	  in	  a	  Global	  Context,	  edited	  by	  Fehl	  and	  Kolliarakis	  (2015)	  –	  one	  
of	  the	  most	  updated	  and	  complete	  on	  IR	  recognition	  research,	  which	  has	  the	  aim	  of	  covering	  to	  the	  maximum	  extent	  
the	   internal	   sub-­‐strands	   of	   this	   research	   topic	   –	   this	   antithetical	   perspective	   contraposing	   matters	   of	   identity	   to	  
matters	  of	  interest	  is	  directly	  addressed	  as	  an	  element	  to	  be	  overcome	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  conciliatory	  perspective	  
that	   contemplates	   compatibility	   between	   the	   two	   options	   (see	   below).	   The	   focus	   indeed	   moves	   from	   the	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The adoption of this antithetical perspective finds its rationale in the need for 
the neo-established constructivist perspective to support and prove the relevance and 
validity of identity-related issues as explanatory elements of international politics. This 
need to show that 'identity matters' was built around the formulation of an alternative 
assumption concerning the concept of the self.  
	  
2.2	  –	  Assumption	  1:	  identity	  is	  created	  (instead	  of	  being	  'given')	  	  
 
Recognition scholars build on alternative assumptions, the first of which refers 
to the idea that identity, instead of being 'given', is 'created' and 'formed' through a 
process of social interaction. IR scholars draw on insights emerging from the fields of 
Political Theory, Social Psychology and Philosophy, and in particular, they focus on an 
alternative conceptualization of identity and of the identity formation process – 
abandoning Hobbes in favour of Hegel and Honneth. 
A more-detailed examination reveals that to support the relevance of identity, IR 
recognition scholars draw from social and philosophical concepts of identity formation. 
In particular, these scholars integrate the 'sociological' concept of the self as opposed 
to the 'atomistic' concept of the self as conceived by Hobbes (see Ringmar, 2002, 
120). The sociological concept of the self asserts that identity is not a priori given 
(atomistic) but instead is created and formed through a process of social interaction. 
Therefore, it is important to focus on the process of 'formation of identity', which is 
needed for one to come to exist. It thus follows that the formation of identity 
necessarily comes before the formation and articulation of interests because only after 
one comes to exist (has an identity) can she start building her interests on the basis 
of her identity.  
                                                                                                                                          
 
consideration	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  strengthen	  the	  IR	  recognition	  strand	  of	  research	  and	  to	  deepen	  the	  understanding	  
of	  the	  "politics,	  motives,	  and	  effects	  of	  recognition"	  by	  leaving	  behind	  this	  "overly	  narrow	  and	  oversimplified	  reading	  
of	  the	  concept	  of	  recognition"	  (Geis	  et	  al.,	  2015,	  5-­‐6).	  As	  reported	  by	  Geis	  (et	  al.,	  2015,	  4),	  given	  the	  importance	  of	  
this	   quite	   recent	   and	   underdeveloped	   IR	   strand	   of	   research,	   "political	   conflicts	   over	   claiming,	   granting,	   and	  
withholding	   recognition	   in	   international	   society	   (…)	   should	   become	   a	   central	   subject	   of	   analysis".	  	  
However,	  one	  can	  debate	  whether	  this	  intent	  is	  declared	  but	  achieved	  only	  through	  a	  collection	  of	  different	  works,	  
some	   of	   which	   undertake	   the	   antithetical	   perspective;	   however,	   a	   more	   homogeneous	   structure	   is	   still	   missing.	  
Although	   the	   intent	   of	   overcoming	   this	   antithetical	   perspective	   is	   not	   fully	   implemented,	   it	   is	   appreciably	   the	  
declared	  intent	  to	  do	  so.	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To prove that the formation of identity comes first, then interests, scholars 
move from criticizing the atomistic concept of the self as conceived by Hobbes. For 
example, Erik Ringmar asserts that  
"(…) since the preservation of the self was a right that existed already in the state 
of nature, it follows that selves, for Hobbes, must have existed already before men 
entered into interaction with each other. The self was given by nature and formed 
prior to, and outside of, social life. The self was an atomistic unit, and as such was 
the fundamental building-block from which a theory of society could be constructed 
(Taylor, 1979/1985: 187-210)" (Ringmar, 2002, 118). 
In opposition to this perspective and concept, Ringmar supports the sociological 
concept of the self, according to which the self is created only within social 
interactions. Indeed (by building on Pizzorno, 1986, 367), the author asserts that, 
"We can develop a sense of self only as we come to see our selves as others do, 
and once we learn to take the point of view of the ‘generalized other’. We need 
others to describe us as persons of a certain kind; people who continuously can 
recognize us under a certain description. Only if described, and if recognized, in 
this manner will we be able to keep our selves stable as we move between 
different spatial and temporal contexts (Pizzorno, 1986: 367)" (Ringmar, 2002, 118). 
Therefore, from this perspective, identity loses its atomistic character and becomes an 
object of negotiation. Identity is created and not given; it is negotiated through and 
within social interaction. In Ringmar's words, the self "is created through social 
communication" (2002, 118). Hence, by contesting that identity is given, scholars do 
support the idea that identity must be formed before interests. Again, per Ringmar,  
"It follows, as a point of logic, that questions regarding interests can only begin to 
be discussed once questions regarding identities have been settled, at least in a 
preliminary fashion. It is only once we know who we are that we can know what we 
want. If this point is accepted, a theory of rational action will always come to 
presuppose a theory of how identities are created, established and maintained" 
(Ringmar, 2002, 118). 
The importance of identity with respect to international behaviour is proven by 
challenging the assumption according to which identity is given. Alternatively, claiming 
that identity is created entails that identity itself requires and implies a process of 
identity formation. Thus, identity becomes the object of a process of negotiation that 
occurs through social interaction. Scholars claim that a process of identity formation is 
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necessary for (and comes before) the formation of interests; they come full circle and 
prove the relevance of identity-related issues. 
Based on the above findings, identity and the identity formation process become a 
relevant element to examine and investigate to understand the relationship that exists 
between these identity-related issues and international politics. 
 
2.3	  –	  Process	  of	  identity	  formation:	  the	  role	  of	  the	  self	  and	  of	  the	  others	  
 
By building on Hegel's perspective, scholars outline the process of identity 
formation as composed on the one hand by "a question of the stories that individuals 
tell about themselves" – the proposal and the demand of self-perceived and desired 
identity. On the other hand, there is the complementary process of recognition granted 
by the social group (Ringmar, 2012, 6). 
In Ringmar's words, in this first stage, the actor forms his self-perceived identity in 
solitude and autonomy: "We make up an account, or we make up many, which 
describe ourselves to ourselves" (Ringmar, 2012, 6).  
However, the complementary part becomes necessary due to the limitations of the 
solitary effort in self-identity formation; the solitary efforts yields poor results because 
of the limits of the isolation in which the effort occurs. Indeed, as reported by 
Ringmar, 
"The problem with these self-descriptions is that they often are faulty. Unfettered in 
our fantasies, we are wont to exaggerate our importance and our prospects or, 
alternatively, we are only too ready to accept the accounts, handed down to us by 
society and tradition, of what a person like ourselves is supposed to be" (Ringmar, 
2012, 6).  
The author is quite drastic in asserting the persistent inability of the individual to 
describe his or herself. In fact, Ringmar reports that we might exaggerate, or we might 
be submissive; however, "In either case, we will be mistaken about ourselves" (Ringmar, 
2012, 6). Similarly, even when one can give a "reasonable realistic" description of one’s 
self, the author highlights further limits of the solitary formation of self-identity:  
"Above all, since we can never see ourselves except awkwardly and in fleeting 
moments in a mirror, we have only limited knowledge of what we look like while 
interacting with others" (Ringmar, 2012, 6).  
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Given these limitations of the individual self-concept of self-identity, the 
equilibrating role of the others in the identity formation process is highlighted by the 
author as extremely important for the formation of identity.  
Therefore, next to the initial self-formation of identity, the process of identity formation 
also needs the social-relational part of it. Indeed, as reported by Ringmar,  
"Other people, by contrast, are wont to describe us far more realistically. They are 
unlikely to exaggerate our importance or our looks, but equally, they may be able 
to see potential in us that we have ignored. After all, other people have privileged 
perspective, too: seeing us from the outside, they know far better what we are like 
as social beings (…) identities are created through an interplay of these two 
alternative perspectives. We start by telling stories about ourselves, which we go on 
to test on people around us. We let other people know who we believe we are, and 
they let us know whether or not our account is reasonable. In this way, our stories 
about ourselves are or are not recognized" (Ringmar, 2012, 6). 
Therefore, one can come to exist in a certain self-perceived or self-conceived identity 
only if that same identity is recognized by others as valid and reasonable with respect 
to the candidate identity; therefore, it is confirmed (it is recognized). Under this 
concept, the others have the important role of giving confirmation of the identity and 
existence of the 'candidate' (the identity seeker). It is only this external validation that 
provides confirmation that the self-conceived identity is also 'reflected' from the 
outside, thus confirming its existence.  
In brief, the self-formation of identity is not sufficient; interplay with the rest of the 
social group is required. Actually, the process of identity formation comprises both the 
demand from the identity-seeker and recognition by the social group. 
 
2.4	  –	  Two	  corollaries:	  identity	  is	  essential;	  identity	  is	  relational	  
 
Beginning with the assumption that identity is created and not given paves the 
way for the research to focus on the role that identity and the required identity 
formation process play with respect to international action, behaviour and politics.  
In addition to the assumption asserting that identity requires a formation process, IR 
recognition scholars also introduce two corollaries that are relevant to understand this 
relationship. These two corollaries attempt to shed light on the implications for 
international actions that follow from the fact that identity is formed through a social 
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process. In other words, scholars highlight which effects result from the fact that 
identity requires a formation process – which are the characteristics of this formation 
process.  
Therefore, beginning with the abovementioned sociological assumption of the 
self, scholars conceive identity not only as being 'created' but also as being 
fundamental and relational. 
The first corollary states that the idea according to which identity is fundamental 
means that identity is 'essential for one's existence'. Indeed, this concept builds on the 
idea according to which identity responds to the inherent human desire to distinguish 
oneself from the rest of nature and from other peers (Ringmar, 2002). This desire is 
profound and responds to the concept well expressed by Ringmar, according to which 
"without an identity, we have no idea of who we are" (Ringmar, 2012, 3); therefore, 
identity is fundamental for one's existence and self-identification.  
It is also possible to relate this character of the concept of identity to the 
abovementioned juxtaposition between identity and interests; from the antithetical 
perspective on identity, indeed, the formation of identity is necessary so that the 
formation of interests can build on it.  
This concept strengthens the characteristic of essentiality of identity; indeed, with 
identity this relevant – related in fact to one's existence – it then follows that one will 
long for it. In Ringmar's words, "Identities matter (…). In fact, few things matter more 
than the identities we put together for ourselves" (Ringmar, 2012, 3). 
Together with this profound human desire to come to exist with an individual 
identity, to distinguish one’s self from the rest, identity is also characterized by being 
relational. Identity is relational because it is formed in the presence and due to the 
presences, of other individuals. Therefore, the formation process – implied by the 
assumption according to which identity is created and not given – requires the 
presence (and confirmation) of others for the formation process itself to be completed. 
To give a handy example of the relational character of identity, in his 1996 
publication, Ringmar associates the formation of identity with 'story-telling' that needs 
an audience. From this perspective, story-telling requires the presence of an audience 
because "meaning cannot be created by one individual in isolation from all others; just 
as there cannot be such a thing as a private language, meanings cannot exist only in 
the privacy of one person's mind" (Ringmar, 1996, 80). The basic idea is that no 
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identity exists in solitude. Indeed, the "logic of identity creation", as Ringmar calls it, is 
based on social interaction; "We need to come up with an account that describes us, 
but in addition, we need to have this account accepted by people around us. We need 
to be recognized" (Ringmar, 2012, 3). 
 In fact, the identity formation process and the recognition process go hand in 
hand. In particular, the recognition process (the process through which others give their 
confirmation of the identity of the individual) is a fundamental component of the 
identity formation process that can be completed only in the presence of this second 
component. Given the relational character of identity and identity formation, the 
recognition granted by others is fundamental for the process of identity formation to 
be (successfully) accomplished.  
Actually, "Which stories we can tell and what persons we can become is not 
given by the limits of our imagination, but depends instead ultimately on the validity of 
the descriptions we come up with"4 (Ringmar, 1996, 80). However, this point also 
implies that 'the validity of the description we come up with' is proved by testing it "in 
interaction with the others" (Ringmar, 1996, 80).  
Based on the above, the fact that the others that have the power to confirm or 
disconfirm the 'validity' of the self-conceived identity implies that the process of 
identity formation corresponds to – and is composed of – the process of identity 
recognition; the internally self-conceived identity one comes up with must be confirmed 
(or disconfirmed) by the others. As claimed by Ringmar,  
"we ask our audiences to recognise us as the kinds of persons that our stories 
identify. Only if they affirm the validity of the description have we survived the test; 
only as recognised can we conclusively come to establish a certain identity. In this 
way all stories that we tell about our selves will come to make tacit demands on 
their listeners: 'this is what I am like!', 'recognise me under this description!'5 
(Ringmar, 1996, 81). 
Hence, the 'logic of identity creation' also includes the process of recognition, and this 
process occurs both at the social individual level as much as at the world politics 
level.  
                                                
 
4	  Italic	  in	  the	  original	  text.	  
5	  Italic	  in	  the	  original	  text.	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"States too are coming up with self-descriptions and struggling to have them 
recognized. In fact, the struggle for recognition takes up much of a state's time 
and resources, and it makes states act and interact in specific ways" (Ringmar, 
2012, 3). 
 
2.5	  –	  Assumption	  2:	  recognition	  is	  granted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  constitutive	  
perspective	  
 
It is helpful to introduce in this section the 'declarative' and the 'constitutive' 
perspective concerning the conferral of international statehood, which is typical of the 
international law debate (Ringmar, 2012, 10-11; Oppenheim, 1912, 174). Indeed, within 
the field of international law, discussions focus on whether statehood is conceded 
based on 'constitutive' or 'declarative' requirements (Ringmar, 2012). The declarative 
view requires the candidate-state to possess certain 'qualities' and to respond to 
certain requirements as expected (in that historical moment and space and from that 
specific group) by the rest of the states (society). The basic idea is that "a state is a 
state as long as it fulfils a few minimal requirements"; therefore, according to the 
declarative view, statehood is granted in return for the fulfilment of certain specific 
requirements (Ringmar, 2012, 10).  
Conversely, the constitutive view provides that the key element for the assignment of 
statehood is 'recognition'. Indeed, as reported by Ringmar, from this perspective, "A 
state that is not recognized may exist in itself but never for itself; that is, it has no 
status as subject of international law and diplomacy6" (Ringmar, 2012, 10). Therefore, a 
state might have the requirements of statehood other states have – "a permanent 
population; a clearly defined territory; and a government with the ability to govern 
itself, to defend itself, and to enter into relations with the other states". However, as 
required by the constitutive perspective, to be officially assigned with statehood, it 
must count upon social recognition conferred by the other states in the system 
(Ringmar, 2012, 10). 
It is therefore clear that the 'access threshold' lies not in the abilities of the candidate 
to respond to specific requirements of statehood but rather in the hands of the group 
                                                
 
6	  The	  author	  refers	  to	  Oppenheim,	  1912,	  117;	  cf.	  Kelsen,	  1941,	  605-­‐617.	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that has the power to recognize or misrecognize the candidate and can decide 
whether to accept it as a 'member' of the group of states. Alternatively, it lies in the 
ability of the candidate to induce the group to grant it the desired recognition. 
By borrowing these two concepts and leaving aside the specific elements 
concerning statehood – or statehood in a certain particular historical moment – these 
two concepts can prove useful in analysing the perspective of IR studies on 
recognition.  
 
Given the assumptions underlying this perspective in studies, this strand of 
research (based on the abovementioned assumptions and built from this perspective) is 
in line with the constitutive perspective.  
Indeed, considering that in the previous sections, it has emerged that the 
process of identity formation necessarily requires consensus by the audience, this point 
can be assimilated from the declarative perspective rather than from the constitutive 
one.  
Indeed, assuming that the recognition process is a fundamental part of the identity 
formation process renders the concession of social recognition an essential part of the 
process of identity formation.  
 
2.6	  –	  Implications:	  identity	  drives	  force	  for	  action	  and	  identity	  affects	  
international	  politics	  	  
 
All of these elements reinforce one another's effects; the two corollaries 
referring to elements characterizing identity and identity formation process do interact 
with each other by strengthening their (common) effect. The fact that identity is 
essential, is fundamental for one's existence, and is conceived as being formed 
through social interaction requires that actors, who are longing for their identity to be 
attributed to them, must socially interact to achieve their existential aim – being 
granted their identity. In other words, the desire for identity (to have an identity 
socially recognized and attributed) provokes in the identity-seeking actor7 the start of 
the identity formation process which – given that the identity formation process is 
                                                
 
7	  The	  'identity-­‐seeking	  actor'	  will	  also	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  'the	  candidate'.	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social and relational – includes (or even corresponds to) the identity recognition 
process.  
Therefore, the implications of these assumptions and the related two corollaries, in the 
first case, entail that actors who want to obtain (to be conferred) their desired identity 
are moved to action – because identity is strictly related to existence. In fact, given 
the essential character of identity and therefore given that one must achieve an 
identity to come to (social) existence, to be able to have one’s identity conferred, one 
must interact with others because – conversely – for this identity to be granted and 
conferred, its self-perceived identity must be socially confirmed by others. Otherwise, it 
will have the same meaning as a private language.  
Thus, each actor longing for (social) existence will seek to fulfil the formation 
and confirmation of its identity. Given that 'seeking one's identity’ requires interacting 
with the others, it follows that to arrive at having the identity confirmed requires the 
candidate to start a demand for identity recognition; by the group, a social act of 
recognition is also required for the process to be successfully accomplished.  
Again, the desire and the existential need to have an officially recognized identity 
induce actors to take actions for their identity to be attributed to them; these factors 
induce the actors to seek recognition. Therefore, in the first case, the identity's 
character of essentiality implies that identity is a driving force for action.  
Similarly, the social-relational character of identity formation has implications for the 
social interaction between the identity-seeker and the rest of the group that must 
recognize or misrecognize the desired identity. Indeed, the fact that identity formation 
is social and relational implies that this same character has effects on the way in 
which identity affects international behaviour. Indeed, how identity formation (identity 
seeking and identity recognition) occurs and the dynamics of the identity formation 
process affect international peace and conflict. 
In other words, and to come full circle, once it is proved that matters of 
identity can move to action, it is also possible to claim that identity-related issues are 
good elements to consider when understanding international politics.  
The following sections will be devoted to a discourse on these dynamics and 
of their effects on international politics, as presented in the IR recognition literature.  
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3	  –	  The	  Recognition	  process	  
 
To understand how the identity formation process affects international politics, 
it is important to focus first on understanding how the dynamics of the identity 
formation process as presented for the case of the individual reflect at the 
international level.  
As a second step, it is important to understand how these dynamics of identity 
formation affect international behaviours (and politics). 
 
3.1	  –	  Dynamics	  of	  the	  identity	  formation	  process:	  the	  recognition	  game	  
 
Given that identity is conceived as being social-relational, it follows that identity 
formation requires the participation of the others for the process to be completed. In 
other words, identity formation necessarily occurs in a social environment and 
corresponds with (and is accomplished by) the complementary process of recognition. 
Indeed, for the process of identity formation to be accomplished requires its social 
component – the recognition process. Identity seeking (the demand for identity) and 
identity recognition together form a sort of double-wave process that is 'complete' only 
in the presence of both components. When the identity-candidate seeks its identity, for 
this application to be completed, 'others' must confirm (in which case the outcome is 
successful) or disconfirm (in which case the outcome is unsuccessful) the self-advanced 
and required identity. The others recognize or misrecognize the identity seeker in its 
self-advanced identity; therefore, recognition completes the process of identity 
formation.  
The recognition process corresponds to that component of social interaction 
that is necessary to accomplish the process of identity formation. Indeed, the process 
of identity formation resembles a 'theatrical process'. Similar to actors in the Roman 
theatre who wore a mask (or persona8) when appearing on stage in front of their 
                                                
 
8	   "Persona	   is	   reported	   (by	  Hobbes)	  as	  a	  Latin	  word	  originating	   from	  Roman	  theatre	  and	   refers	   to	   the	  "disguise,	  or	  
outward	  appearance	  of	  a	  man,	  counterfeited	  on	  the	  Stage;	  and	  sometimes	  more	  particularly	   that	  part	  of	   it,	  which	  
disguiseth	  the	   face,	  as	  a	  Mask	  or	  a	  Visard"	   ("Of	  Persons,	  authors,	  and	  Things	  Personated),"	   in	  Hobbes	  1982,	  217	  –	  
Reported	  in	  Ringmar,	  2012,	  7).	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audiences, individuals seeking identity formation and standing in front of their 
audiences carry their identities as though they were theatre masks (Ringmar, 2012, 7). 
"Like a Hobbesian actor, we carry our identities as masks before the audiences we 
address. If the audiences recognize us, we have an identity which we increasingly 
self-confidently, can go on to use, and the persona will be attached evermore 
securely to our face- however, if the audience boos and hisses––if we are denied 
recognition––we have a problem" (Ringmar, 2012, 7). 
 By focussing on this social moment of encounter between the identity seeker 
and his audience, it is possible to better understand the dynamics of the recognition 
process and the consequences they impact the identity-formation process and 
international politics. 
 To focus on this interaction moment, it is possible to refer to Ringmar's 
conceptualization of the so-called Recognition Game.  
In his conceptualization, recognition games are those games that "do not typically 
concern what we can win or lose, but instead who or what we can be" – interaction 
games about identity (Ringmar, 2002, 120).  
In 2002, Ringmar published the paper entitled "The Recognition Game, Soviet Russia 
Against the West", in which he presents the formalization of the interaction process. 
Perfectly in line with the assumptions of the strand of research of IR recognition 
studies, Ringmar begins with the intent of formulating an 'alternative identity-based 
model' that explains international 'questions of war and peace'. Indeed, in his 2002 
publication, the author maintains a distance from those traditional perspectives that 
explain international politics based on interests rather than focussing on matters of 
identity. Ringmar builds on the sociological perspective of the self, which begins with 
the assumption according to which the self is not a priori given but is formed through 
social interaction. Thus, he arrives at a conclusion that "mutual recognition is a 
precondition for rational calculations to be possible in the first place" (Ringmar, 2002, 
119).  
The author, indeed, defines the 'Recognition Game' by strictly linking it to 
'identity' issues and by challenging "Hobbes’s atomistic concept of the self". Grounding 
instead on Hegel's conceptualization of the state of nature9, Ringmar advances the 
                                                
 
9	  The	  author	  himself	  refers	  to	  Hegel,	  1807/1977:	  111–19;	  Kojève,	  1947/1980:	  11–12.	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idea that "the first game in which human beings engaged in the state of nature must 
have been a recognition game and not a prisoner’s dilemma". Hence, "It could not 
have concerned the satisfaction of interests but must instead have concerned the 
recognition of identities" (Ringmar, 2002, 120).  
The Hegelian concept of state of nature also refers to a context of conflict (in line 
with Hobbes), but the object of the contention is related to identity. Rather than 
concerning the 'distribution of utilities', it concerns – according to the author – "who 
should have the right to impose what description on whom"10.	  
Drawing from Hegel's recognition game, Ringmar frames an alternative interaction 
game11 in which identity's mutual recognition is fundamental to arriving at a stable and 
peaceful outcome and in which its absence might lead to instability and war.  
More specifically, the author traces the 'recognition game' as a game with two players 
(A and B), two possible strategies for each (recognize or non-recognize) and four 
possible outcomes. The four possible outcomes represent, if viewed from A's 
perspective, four possible stages of the recognition game, as shown in Figure 1 
(Ringmar, 2002, 119-122).  
 
Figure 1 – Ringmar's Recognition Game 
 
A / B Recognized Non-recognized 
Recognized Peace (4) 'Master' (3) 
Non-Recognized 'Slave' (2) War (1) 
 
Considering the game from A's perspective, the possible outcomes include a situation 
of "mutual non-recognition" that is described as an unstable outcome characterized by 
war – outcome n. 1 in Figure 1 (Ringmar, 2002, 121). The instability of this situation is 
                                                
 
10	  "This	  is	  how	  the	  master	  is	  separated	  from	  the	  slave,	  the	  superior	  being	  from	  the	  inferior"	  (Ringmar,	  2002,	  120).	  
11	   Therefore,	   to	   focus	   on	   a	   theory	   of	   'how	   identities	   are	   created,	   established	   and	   maintained',	   and	   aiming	   at	  
formalizing	  this	  theoretical	  framework	  into	  what	  he	  defined	  the	  "Recognition	  Game",	  the	  author	  maintains	  a	  distance	  
from	  the	  other	  formalizations	  of	  interactions	  that	  are	  built	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  state	  action	  is	  motivated	  by	  'the	  
quest	  for	  pay-­‐offs'.	  He	  challenges	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  the	  research	  for	  pay-­‐offs	  that	  motivates	  players	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  
game	  (Ringmar,	  2002,	  118).	  For	  instance,	  the	  author	  maintains	  a	  distance	  from	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  in	  line	  with	  
both	  the	  classical	  prisoner	  dilemma	  game	  and	  "some	  more	  benign	  form	  of	  cooperation	  games"	  (Ringmar,	  2002,	  117).	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deep and existential because it concerns the identities of both actors. In particular, 
both actors refuse to grant recognition of the other's identity. This extremely unstable 
situation could find an end "through the demise of one of the combatants" or "if one 
party decides to give in to the other’s claim to superiority" (Ringmar, 2002, 121-122).  
Other unstable situations can emerge when the two players elect opposed strategies, 
for example, when one of them recognizes the other but without being recognized. 
Indeed, when A, recognizing B, "is not recognized under its own description", an 
unstable situation follows (outcome n. 2 in Figure 1). In this situation – according to 
the author – because A is not recognized in its self-advanced identity, it then becomes 
the 'inferior' part in the relationship with B – by recalling Hegel's language, the "slave". 
In this situation, a possible solution could be found in the fact that A has some 
'incentive to improve' to regain its desired identity (Ringmar, 2002, 121-122).  
"Consider first the situation in which one of the parties, A, is not recognized under 
its own description, while it has to recognize B. Here A is the inferior party whose 
claim to an identity goes unacknowledged. Following Hegel, however, A can improve 
its lot by developing itself and its skills. In sociological terms this is the situation of 
the self-conscious outsider or social upstart who tries to conform as closely as 
ever possible to the rules which govern life in a certain social setting. By 
conforming to the rules he makes it possible for others to recognize him as the 
kind of person to whom these rules apply" (Ringmar, 2002, 122). 
 
Similarly, in parallel, when A is granted its own self-advanced identity but chooses not 
to recognize B in its proposed identity, then "B can be described in whatever terms A 
likes". From these conditions, a situation follows in which – according to the author – 
A is in a 'superior' position with respect to the misrecognized B. Again, in Hegelian 
terminology, A is the "master". In this situation (represented as outcome n. 3 in Figure 
1), A, as a "superior party", can "determine, and enforce, the rules of the game" 
(Ringmar, 2002, 122). The author expands upon this specific outcome and arrives at 
formulating an "alternative, non-rationalistic theory of hegemonic decline" (Ringmar, 
2002, 122). More specifically, by building on Hegel, the author outlines a situation in 
which the perceived advantage enjoyed by A does not last in the 'long run'. This 
occurs because, although A can "reap disproportionate benefits from its superiority" in 
the initial stages, "the recognition it is given will be useless, since it is provided by an 
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inferior. Lacking a true sign of respect, A will start to deteriorate" over time (for more 
details, see Ringmar, 2002, 121).  
Finally, when starting from one of these two unstable situations, "The logic of 
the interaction between the players will sooner or later bring the game to an end. The 
players will either eliminate one another or grant one another recognition on their own 
preferred terms" (Ringmar, 2002, 122). Therefore, in the latter case (represented by 
outcome n. 4 in Figure 1), in which each player recognizes the other, the most stable 
and desirable outcome of the interaction-game has finally been reached. According to 
the author, the situation, which is described as a condition of peace and equality, 
represents a 'satisfactory outcome' to both actors. Indeed, 
"It is an improvement for the previously inferior player who now finally manages to 
establish himself as an equal partner, but it is also an improvement for the 
previously superior player who now finally gets the respect he craves. A situation of 
mutual recognition is hence a stable outcome that need not be changed" (Ringmar, 
2002, 122). 
Therefore, the author can support the idea according to which international 
politics is not only about matters of interest but also about matters of identity. 
According to this logic, states not only pursue their ‘national interest’ but also – and 
before anything else – seek to establish identities for themselves" (Ringmar, 2002, 116). 
The author proves the important role played by 'identity' at the level of world politics 
by giving it a key role in his formalization of recognition games.  
 
3.2	  –	  Importance	  and	  meaning	  of	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition	  
 
When the recognition process confirms the self-advanced identity, the identity 
formation process is successfully accomplished, and the self-advanced identity is 
recognized as credible and legitimate; the identity-seeking actor is recognized and 
approved as legitimate in its identity (Suzuki, 2008). The process of identity formation 
is successfully accomplished because both its components are present. 
In contrast, when the recognition process does not confirm the self-conceived identity 
of the identity-seeker actor – in other words, when the audience's external view does 
not correspond to or does not confirm the self-perception of the identity-seeking actor 
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– then a disconnect emerges between the anticipated identity and the externally 
assigned identity.  
When the identity-seeking actor is denied recognition, the process of identity 
formation for the individual remains partial and incomplete. This situation represents a 
problematic situation for both the misrecognized actor and the society in general. 
Indeed, the misrecognized actor experiences a 'traumatic' situation; "To be denied 
recognition is a traumatic experience. We feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our 
pride is injured, we have lost our status and our face12" (Ringmar, 2012, 7). Given the 
importance of having an identity and given the fundamental character of identity, 
misrecognition tears apart an essential and vital desire that concerns existence. In a 
similar situation, the misrecognized actor can undertake whatever action needed to 
obtain (gain or regain) its needed and essential identity (for social existence). 
The above highlights the link between matters of identity and international state 
behaviour. States are moved to international action by identity-related factors; indeed, 
identity is so important that it moves states to action. This situation of instability 
opens the way to different options, but before focussing on the options, it is necessary 
to focus on the momentum of misrecognition as it is conceived and presented in the 
literature.  
It is important to understand what it means to have recognition withheld. Two 
possible interpretations appear to be advanced by the IR literature; the interaction 
between the candidate and the audience is conceived on the one hand as 
unidirectional and on the other hand as bidirectional (reciprocated). 
The unidirectional perspective assumes that the audience has no possibility of 
expressing itself beyond the capacity to accept or reject the identity advanced by the 
candidate. Indeed, from this perspective, the identity-seeking actor approaches the 
process of identity formation by presenting to the audience his self-conceived identity. 
The identity-seeking actor presents the others with his self-perceived identity, and (as 
conceived by the identity formation process) asks the audience to recognize it – to 
confer on him that same identity and to confirm the validity of his self-advanced 
identity. From this perspective, the audience can only accept and confirm the 
                                                
 
12	  "This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  individuals	  but	  also	  for	  states.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  people	  identify	  with	  their	  states––and	  they	  
do––they	  will	  demand	  redress".	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suggested identity, or, conversely, they can reject the identity but without interfering at 
all with its 'reformulation'. For example, the candidate's proposed identity is voted 
down with no additional comments that might convey the audience's opinion on the 
candidate. The candidate’s identity is rejected. For a certain (non-specified) period, he 
experiences a sort of vacuum of identity because his own identity is refused and no 
other indication pertaining to his identity is given.  
The literature appears to refer to this option in particular in the 2012 publication by 
Ringmar, in which he asserts,  
"To be denied recognition is a traumatic experience. (…) Doing nothing is not an 
option: we cannot be without being described, and unless we are recognized, we 
have no social identity". 
From this perspective, misrecognition creates a situation in which the misrecognized 
actor is described as being without a social identity; although one continues to exist, 
socially he still has no recognized or accepted image. The denial of recognition implies 
an absence of identity in toto. If not the advanced identity, then no other identity is 
momentarily assigned to the candidate, who suffers a complete deprivation of social 
identity. 
 Conversely, analysis from the reciprocal perspective on misrecognition 
understands and conceives the interaction between the candidate and the audience. 
This process of recognition (and misrecognition) is a bilateral interaction in which the 
audience's role is not limited to confirming or rejecting the candidate's self-advanced 
identity but rather also includes the capacity and possibility of expressing a further 
evaluation of the candidate that reproduces the external view that the audience has 
on the candidate. To give an example of this option, it is possible to imagine a 
situation in which the candidate presents himself in front of the audience declaring 
what he believes about himself (which according to himself is his own identity). If the 
audience shares that same idea about his identity, they can confirm the advanced 
idea. However, when the audience has a different perception and view of the 
candidate's identity, the audience can express its disagreement. That is, the candidate 
according to the audience is something different from the advanced identity (the 
advanced identity is rejected). He is not exactly what he believes he is; he might be 
less of this and more of that (the audience's perception of the candidate's identity is 
advanced).  
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From this perspective, the identity advanced by the candidate is de facto rejected, but 
the candidate is not left with a complete absence of identity. In this situation, although 
there is a disagreement – the mismatch between the identity advanced by the 
candidate and that observed by the audience – there is no vacuum of identity.  
The candidate is not left with a complete absence of identity because memories from 
previous interactions can emerge as guidance on the situation of a mismatch or 
because the audience expresses its opinion on for example the candidate's identity.  
The verdict of the audience is not limited to accepting or rejecting but instead is more 
articulated. The candidate must face the opinion and verdict of the audience and 
decide what to do with it (for example, whether to accept it, to adopt it, or to revise 
his initial proposal). I will go back to the available options later. However, what is 
relevant is now how to understand what Ringmar meant when talking about the 'denial 
of recognition'. It appears plausible (a point confirmed by the author himself in his 
previous publications) that the most prevalent option is rejection.  
 Indeed, by comparing the two options, it is possible to assert that the first is 
more a simplified version of the social recognition process. Only a supposed a-
historical interaction, or the first interaction ever between a newcomer and its 
audience, could constitute a situation in which after a rejection of the advanced 
identity a complete absence of identity and description for the candidate can follow.  
No social vacuum of identity could be possible in reality because there would be 
historical precedents of interaction between the candidate and the audience; their 
previous definitions of identities would be used as guidance in the case of rejection of 
the newly or finally advanced identity. 
Therefore, it appears plausible to believe that 'denial of recognition' means 
disagreement (mismatch) on the advanced identity, which by the audience can be 
reported as an attempt to downplay the candidate's advanced identity. Given the 
competitive system, rarely would it occur in the international system that a state is 
spontaneously conferred a higher identity or status without its request. 
Confirmations of this understanding also emerge from the literature itself. Indeed, 
Ringmar himself in his 1996 publication, when considering the unfortunate situation in 
which actors are not granted their self-advanced identity – that is, when they are not 
granted recognition – refers to this situation by wondering,  
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"What will happen, then, if our right to self-description is denied us? What are we 
going to do if we cannot establish our selves as those particular kinds of selves 
that our stories describe?" (Ringmar, 1996, 82). 
Again, we encounter another confusing expression; indeed, if taken literally, it appears 
that the author is associating the withheld recognition with the deprivation, for the 
candidate, of the right to 'self-description'. However, if self-description refers to the first 
component in the process of identity formation, the internal, individual formation of the 
self-perceived and conceived identity, it would be difficult for an external actor to 
deprive the individual of this rather internal and personal process – unless the external 
actor takes away the individual’s self-determination, that is, his internal ability to think. 
The right to self-description (self-formulation of identity) cannot be denied or taken 
away because self-description is an internal process over which an external audience 
has little or no power. 
Indeed, as Ringmar himself specifies in his 2012 publication, when referring to the 
identity (and statehood in particular) of states:  
"(…) statehood depends instead on recognition. A state that is not recognized may 
exist in itself but never for itself; that is, it has no status as a subject of 
international law and diplomacy. Again there is a close parallel here to individual 
human beings. A human being is surely a human being even if unrecognized by 
others, yet it is only through recognition that she becomes a person in Hobbes's 
sense, that is an actor with an identity" (Ringmar, 2012, 10). 
Similarly, an actor that is not recognized in its self-advanced identity nonetheless 
continues to exist in itself. 
Therefore, once it is established that the deprivation of the right to self-description has 
a more general meaning, we can understand this meaning when focussing on the 
second part of the sentence that explicitly clarifies that the problem is related to the 
individual being impeded from actualizing and putting into effect his own self-advanced 
identity. 
This finding confirms that a situation in which the audience misrecognizes the 
candidate does not automatically deprive the candidate of his mere existence and 
therefore is related to the capacity to react or counter-react. In contrast, 
misrecognition opens the way to a situation of potential disagreement between the two 
sides: a situation of instability because the audience disputes the identity presented by 
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the candidate. Consequently, this 'dispute' requires (and opens the way to) further 
interaction to find a (possibly shared) solution.  
Before focussing on this further interaction following misrecognition, in the next 
section we will focus on presenting the possible reasons that might induce social 
audiences to neglect recognition of candidates. 
 
3.3	  –	  Role	  and	  value	  of	  misrecognition:	  recognition	  requires	  misrecognition	  
 
Ringmar (2014) calls for more attention to be devoted to 'practices of non-
recognition'. The author argues that based on the idea according to which next to 
recognition, non-recognition is not unrelated; it does not occur by chance but rather is 
necessary to maintain high the value of a distinction between members and non-
members. There is a need to distinguish, exclude and demarcate.  
According to the author, the practices of non-recognition deserve more 
attention; indeed, whether practices of recognition are used to 'affirm sameness', 
practices of non-recognition are complementary to the practices of recognition to 
demarcate the inside from the outside of the group. These practices exist because the 
process of demarcation cannot be limited to a process of becoming aware of 
similarities; it requires an aspect of distinction from 'the rest'. Indeed, "it is through 
exclusion, after all, that the exclusivity of a membership club is best maintained". When 
everyone is admitted, then the group does not exist anymore; its boundaries are 
inclusive to the point of losing their raison d'être. 
"It was through practices of recognition, affirming sameness, and through practices 
of non-recognition, affirming difference, that international society came to constitute 
itself as such" (Ringmar, 2014, 447). 
Indeed, whereas in other publications, the author referred to reasons one might 
not be granted recognition, justifying the denial based on an 'unsuitableness' of the 
candidate, he here refers to the need a group has to limit the extension of its 
membership 1) to adequate candidates and 2) to generally limit access because 
"As Groucho Marx famously noted, once everyone is admitted on equal terms, 
membership loses its social prestige (Marx 1995, 321). In this alternative scenario, 
recognition takes place not between a master and a slave, but between a group of 
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masters who provide an identity for themselves by exaggerating the features that 
separate, and thereby distinguish, them from others. They recognize each other as 
superior because of their differences from everyone else" (Ringmar, 2014, 447). 
This need for exclusion explains the fact that there is not necessarily a declarative 
logic in the denial of recognition to a candidate:  
"There is no reason, for example, why the already established members of 
international society cannot refuse to admit non-members, no matter what they do 
to improve themselves. It is through exclusion, after all, that the exclusivity of a 
membership club is best maintained" (Ringmar, 2014, 447). 
If, 'no matter what they do to improve themselves', the candidates can be refused 
recognition, this marks a distance from the 'declarative' view on the requisites for the 
assignment of recognition. Recognition is not necessarily assigned based on the 
presence (or absence) of certain requisites, but it is conferred based on a decision.  
 This outline of the situation is perfectly in line with what Suzuki referred to as 
the 'political character' of recognition: "the process of admitting a new member into 
the social grouping of ‘legitimate great powers’ is quite often a subjective and political 
process. Indeed, the historical record shows frequent instances of states which 
arguably had a better claim to membership being excluded, and vice versa" (See Bull; 
Buzan) – (Suzuki, 2008, 48). 
  
 Whether misrecognition is the result of an intentional choice consistent with a 
genuine intention to keep a high standard level of a certain group's membership or 
the result of a more malicious intention to commit a deliberate act of 'political' 
exclusion, no matter its origins, once it is issued, it opens the way to the 
abovementioned (potential situation of instability). The candidate and the audience 
have different opinions and ideas on the candidate's identity; how can this situation 
evolve?   
This situation of potential instability opens for scholars and practitioners the need to 
understand the interaction between the candidate and the audience following 
misrecognition. In the next section, we will report two interpretative frameworks adopted 
by recognition studies to frame and outline the interaction between the candidate and 
the audience in a similar situation.  
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4	  –	  Understanding	  international	  relations	  through	  the	  recognition	  
process	  
 
The recognition process is a fundamental component in the process of identity 
formation. Without recognition, the process of identity formation is not complete and 
has no social effect. In its absence, the identity as self-conceived by the individual has 
the same meaning as a private language; it remains private and cannot reach the 
external reality. Misrecognition implies that the individual is trapped in his own internal 
perspective without being able to reach the external and social dimension.  
Given the frustration emerging from this 'failure' related to the mismatch between the 
candidate's identity and the one assigned to him by the audience and given also the 
relevance of having been attributed an identity (a socially recognized one), options to 
react or potential remedies to this situation of potential instability open up. As 
mentioned above, a further interaction follows the situation of instability. The 
recognition studies literature has framed this interaction in two interpretative 
frameworks. The first outlines the situation more 'simplistically' by focussing exclusively 
on the options of recognition or misrecognition as adopted by the audience. The 
second interpretative framework focusses on a more detailed analysis of the possible 
reactions that the candidate can implement in response to the audience’s decision on 
recognition or misrecognition. 
 
4.1	  –	  Interpretative	  framework	  1:	  The	  International	  Politics	  of	  Recognition	  
 
Directly quoting Geis (et al.), "One of the main questions in recognition-related 
IR studies is thus whether and how the misrecognition of states or other collective 
actors promotes violent conflict and, vice versa, whether and how recognition fosters 
peaceful relations" (Geis et al., 2015, 13). 
This quotation helps to understand directly the perspective from which situations of 
instability due to misrecognition are viewed. Indeed, similarly to the interaction 
formalized by Ringmar in the Recognition Game conceptualization, the main divide is 
located on the couplet of the two strategies available to actors: to recognize or to 
not-recognize. By examining the interaction from the candidate’s point of view, a 
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situation in which recognition is conferred will accomplish the candidate’s requests for 
identity formation and favour its positive and peaceful behaviour towards the others 
and the international society itself. Conversely, a situation in which the candidate is 
not granted its identity will make the candidate dissatisfied with the situation and can 
induce it to fight for its identity; thus, misrecognition is said to foster international 
conflict.  
This perspective characterizes the strand of research that focusses on the 
'international politics of recognition'. This perspective on studies is based on the idea 
according to which recognition fosters peaceful relations, whereas misrecognition 
fosters conflict and, always based on the above, arrives at formulating suggestions of 
normative policies – suggesting for example favouring recognition, disfavouring 
misrecognition, with the hope of favouring international peaceful relations.  
  
However, this perspective maintains a focus on the society (the main actor) in 
which the candidate is the only object of all that occurs; if society grants recognition, 
it is able (it has the power) to foster peaceful reactions and relations. Conversely, if it 
withholds recognition, it is fostering conflict. In both cases, however, the decisive 
'power' lies in the audience's hands; society has the power to impose which identity on 
whom and therefore to decide the development of international relations. 
The next section will be devoted to a more detailed examination of the 
dynamics of misrecognition.  
 
4.2	  –	  Interpretative	  Framework	  2:	  options	  for	  possible	  reactions	  to	  
misrecognition	  
 
More articulated than the international politics of recognition framework, 
Ringmar and Shogo Suzuki discuss in more detail the options available to a state that 
is not recognized, that is, is not granted recognition of its self-advanced identity.  
 
In Identity, Interest and Action (1996), Erik Ringmar tries to outline the picture 
of the 'possible course of action that opens to the candidate after the verdict of 
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misrecognition of his identity'. Ringmar schematizes these options into three possible 
ones. 
Both the first and the second options view the candidate as accepting the audience's 
verdict on his identity. In both situations, the candidate accepts that the description of 
his identity as advanced by him might be 'wrong', or at least that the one advanced 
by the audience might be a better description. In these two situations, the options 
available to the candidate include the following: in the first case, he accepts and 
internalizes the 'description' advanced by his audience13. Similarly, in the second case, 
although accepting the verdict and description of the audience, the candidate focusses 
on 'rethinking' and reformulating his own identity and description to include those 
elements of his identity that were revealed during – and emerged from – the 
interaction with the audience14. Both options relate to a situation in which the 
candidate accepts the sentence of the audience concerning his identity and tries to 
align his image to the description (of him) given by the audience, works on himself 
and internalizes it, or rethinks his self-conceived identity. These options differ negligibly 
and can be overlapped into one. 
The third option presented by the author portrays a situation in which the 
candidate rejects the audience's verdict in toto. The candidate indeed refuses the 
definition of his identity as formulated by the audience because he is convinced that 
his self-conceived description is better (correct or more realistic) or at least because 
he is convinced that the audience's description does not fit his identity.  
In this situation, the fact that he rejects the external description advanced by the 
audience places in front of him the need to find a solution to the disagreement 
emerging from this interaction. This need is also strengthened by the fact that – as 
part of the assumptions underlying this perspective on studies – he, as anyone else, 
must have a public identity. The author reports that  
"The third option, however, is to stand by our original story and to try to convince 
our audiences that it in fact does apply to us. Thus while the first two options 
                                                
 
13	  Directly	  quoting,	  "	  The	  first	  option	  we	  have	  already	  discussed:	  to	  accept	  the	  descriptions	  that	  others	  apply	  to	  us,	  to	  
internalise	   them	  and	   to	  make	   them	  ours.	  Perhaps	   those	  others	   -­‐	  our	  potential	  peers,	   colleagues	  or	   friends	   -­‐	  were	  
right	  about	  us	  after	  all,	  perhaps	  we	  overestimated	  our	  worth,	  our	  skills	  or	  our	  looks"	  (Ringmar,	  1996,	  82).	  	  
14	  Directly	  quoting,	  "rethink	  our	  descriptions	  of	  our	  selves	  and	  come	  up	  with	  a	  new	  story	  that	  better	  corresponds	  to	  
the	  facts	  as	  they	  have	  been	  revealed"	  (Ringmar,	  1996,	  82).	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mean that we accept the definitions forced upon us by others, the third option 
means that we force our own definition upon someone else" (Ringmar, 1996, 82). 
When 'standing by his original story', the candidate chooses disagreement with the 
audience's verdict (as reported above). Therefore, the solution to this mismatch comes 
in the form of an imposition of the candidate's self-conceived identity on the audience. 
The effort to impose his self-conceived identity can take different forms, as the author 
indeed continues: 
"There are of course many ways in which to convince people that they are wrong 
about us. We may try to plead with them perhaps, yet mere words are probably 
not going to get us very far. What we typically do instead is to act; only through 
action can we provide the kind of final, decisive, evidence that proves the others 
wrong. The action will be there for everyone to see and as such it will be an 
irrefutable manifestation of our character; our action will encroach upon our 
detractors and force them to reconsider their views" (Ringmar, 1996, 82). 
The options that emerge from this writing are to plead or to take action; although 
both are minimally outlined15, and the pleading option is not further elaborated, the 
two options presented in opposition provide an idea of the framework.  
This first outline helps to focus attention on a first distinctive element with 
respect to which it is possible to classify the options. Indeed, the options can be 
separated into two main branches concerning the candidate's reaction to 
misrecognition. On the one hand, the misrecognized actor accepts the audience's 
(divergent) verdict and description about his identity and aligns himself with it. On the 
other hand, he rejects the audience's different opinion of him and commits to trying to 
impose his self-advanced definition on the audience. 
To accept or to reject the verdict could also be expressed as 'agreeing' or 
'disagreeing' with the verdict. The candidate accepts the verdict in the sense that he 
agrees with it and decides to peacefully align to its content. Conversely, the candidate 
rejects the audience's description in the sense that he disagrees with that verdict (that 
diverges from his own idea of himself). 
                                                
 
15	  It	  is	  not	  exactly	  clear	  what	  the	  author	  means	  when	  referring	  to	  action.	  The	  word	  could	  refer	  to	  'violent	  action'	  as	  in	  
the	   case	   study	   addressed	   in	   this	   publication	   (Sweden	   joining	   the	   Thirty	   Years	  War	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   establishing	   its	  
identity	  as	  a	  'modern	  European	  country').	  Alternatively,	  it	  could	  refer	  in	  general	  to	  the	  abovementioned	  need	  of	  the	  
constructivist	  scholars	  to	  articulate	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  of	  action	  focussed	  on	  identity-­‐related	  issues;	  the	  need	  
to	  have	  an	  identity	  assigned	  (the	  proper	  one)	  induces	  actors	  to	  'action'.	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A similar outline (with a few modifications) is presented by the same author in 
his 2012 publication, in which he again outlines three possible options. In this case, 
the first option nonetheless concerns a situation in which the candidate accepts the 
audience's verdict on his identity and the need to live with it. According to the author,  
"When faced with a denial of recognition, (…). The most obvious alternative is to 
give up; to accept that others are right about us and that we cannot be the 
person we thought we were. Our stories, clearly, do not apply to someone such as 
ourselves. This is the situation a state faces in the wake of a loss in a war or 
some similar calamity. As a result it is, for example, no longer possible to lay claim 
to a status as a "super", "great", or a "colonial" power. Instead the state in 
question has to come up with an alternative self-description and re-branding itself 
as something else. Such a reconsideration of one's role is often a long and painful 
exercise, and there is of course no guarantee that the new identity we come up 
with will be recognized either" (Ringmar, 2012, 8). 
Leaving aside the details of the example advanced by the author, this first option 
recalls the first two options described in the 1996 publication. Indeed, it appears that 
the 'give up and live with it' option incorporates both of the first two options as 
presented in 1996; the author accepts the audience's verdict, he gives up and accepts 
that the others are right about him, and he re-brands his image on the basis of the 
elements emerging from the audience's description. Somehow, to re-frame his identity 
according to the audience's verdict, he must also internalize that description and 
adapt to it. Therefore, in this first option, the candidate ultimately accepts the need to 
agree with the audience's description of him and aligns with it.  
Although the first option recalls the first two options as presented by the author in 
1996, the second option presented in 2012 introduces instead a new element for the 
case in which the candidate accepts the verdict of the audience. Indeed, in addition to 
accepting the verdict of the audience, the candidate will also commit to trying to 
improve his identity. Directly quoting Ringmar, who describes the second option as 
follows,  
"The second option is to accept the verdict of the audience but to stick to our 
stories and insist that we can live up to the self-description they contain. This 
means embarking on a program of self-reformation. The offended state will have to 
do whatever it takes to be accepted on its preferred terms––develop itself 
economically, adopt the required political institutions, improve its educational 
system, and so on. Once this task is completed, the ugly duckling can go back to 
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its detractors as a beautiful swan, hoping to finally be recognized as the state it 
always presumed to be" (Ringmar, 2012, 8). 
Ringmar introduces this option, stating that it pertains to the group of options in which 
the candidate accepts the audience's verdict ("The second option is to accept the 
verdict of the audience"). However, some confusion is created by the subordinate 
clause of this phrase: "but to stick to our stories and insist that we can live up to the 
self-description they contain". The candidate accepts the verdict that contains a 
description of him that is different from his own but nonetheless 'sticks to his own 
description'. Indeed, two possible interpretations could be given to the fact that the 
candidate insists that he can live up to the self-description as presented by him but 
also accepts the audience's verdict. 
 In one of the possible interpretations, these two elements are contradictory. 
Indeed, differently from those cases in which the verdict is accepted and in which the 
candidate commits to internalize the external description and/or to align with it, in this 
case, the candidate is said to accept the verdict but not abandon his own description, 
insisting instead on living up to his self-description.  
Therefore, 'to stick to our decision' from this perspective can mean that, although 
respecting the audience's verdict, the candidate nevertheless maintains a sort of self-
confidence about his self-advanced description. Hence, the candidate insists with the 
audience that his own description is the right one and that, although he respects the 
audience's verdict (he accepts it), he can nonetheless prove to the audience that they 
are wrong about him. Indeed, from this perspective, the audience made a mistaken 
evaluation because he is actually able to 'live up' to the identity he attributed to 
himself, and he insists on doing so (sticks to it) to convince the others that they are 
wrong. 
However, this interpretation is not confirmed by the second part of the outline of this 
situation; indeed, Ringmar continues his description of the second option available to 
the misrecognized candidate by referring to a process of 'self-reformation' that brings 
the ugly duckling to transform himself into the beautiful swan. Therefore, it emerges 
that the candidate's insistence is not only addressing the audience (to prove them 
wrong) but is also addressing himself. Indeed, once the candidate presents himself with 
the identity of the beautiful swan and the audience turns down this identity (they 
neglect that he actually has this identity), then – from this perspective – he accepts 
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this verdict; he accepts that he is not yet a swan and decides to work to achieve that 
(desired) identity. 
This latter interpretation appears to be in line with the situation as described by the 
author. According to Ringmar, the second option available to the misrecognized 
candidate concerns a situation in which the candidate is said by the audience not to 
correspond to the self-advanced identity. The candidate accepts that the audience is 
right on this point, but, because he desires to reach his self-advanced identity – to be 
able to respect it and to have it (publicly) assigned – he nevertheless makes an effort 
himself to achieve it; he undertakes a process of self-reformation. 
 When selecting this option from the 'agree/disagree' choice, according to the 
author, the candidate agrees with the audience that he is not (or is not yet) a swan; 
he accepts this verdict. However, a new element is introduced in this option because, 
although agreeing on his mismatch with the self-advanced identity, the candidate does 
not turn towards aligning with the audience's description. Indeed, instead of re-phrasing 
his own description in line with the audience's verdict, he works on himself to fulfil his 
own idea of himself and be publicly recognized as such; he commits to reaching his 
desired identity (the self-advanced one). 
A new element is introduced by this second option, which concerns 'change'; it also 
refers to a particular modality to achieve this change. Indeed, change refers to an 
attempt by the candidate to change his own situation (his own identity) by changing 
himself while being respectful of the audience's opinion. 
 The third option presented in the 2012 publication leans towards options in 
which the candidate rejects the audience's verdict because he disagrees with the 
audience's description of his identity. As described by the author, 
"A third option is to stand by our stories without reform and instead to fight for 
the self-descriptions they contain. The task here is to convince our detractors that 
they are mistaken about us and to force them to change their minds. Violence may 
work badly in interpersonal relations, since you cannot force someone to respect or 
love you. In international relations, however, the use of force has greater use and 
similar threats are often successful. A state that is not taken seriously can go to 
war to prove its importance, and for a group fighting for its "national 
independence," violence is often the only available option" (Ringmar, 2012, 8). 
What the candidate in this instance rejects is the duty to adapt to (and align with) the 
audience's description of him. He disagrees with the non-matching description given by 
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the audience [for reasons that can vary] and is firmly convinced that his own identity 
is 'correct' and that he can already live up to it. As in the third option of the 1996 
publication, he decides to 'stand by his own identity'.  
In this situation, the candidate is convinced that the self-advanced identity applies to 
him, and for this reason he is not available to make any adjustment or any reform; he 
is instead ready to directly confront the audience and to 'fight' (to struggle) for his 
identity to be recognized also externally. The aim of this struggle is to convince the 
audience that they are wrong, to induce them to change their minds about him and to 
convince them to accept the candidate in his self-advanced identity (accept that the 
candidate corresponds to the self-advanced identity).  
In Ringmar's own words, "The task here is to convince our detractors that they are 
mistaken about us and to force them to change their minds" (Ringmar, 2012, 8). 
Again, at this point, as in the third option of the 1996 publication, from this non-
matching situation a new issue emerges – how does he prove the audience wrong? 
How does he convince them to change their minds? 
The terminology used by the author to refer to this situation provides a clear insight 
into his orientation on the point; indeed, there is no coincidence in the words reported 
thereafter: "Violence may work badly in interpersonal relations, since you cannot force 
someone to respect or love you. In international relations, however, the use of force 
has greater use and similar threats are often successful" (Ringmar, 2012, 8).  
It appears, therefore, that in his 2012 publication, Erik Ringmar conceives this third 
option as one in which the candidate fights, (violently) conflicting with the audience to 
impose his originally self-advanced identity. 
It is possible to reunite all of these options into a single table (Figure 2) 
divided along two main branches according to acceptance (A) or rejection (B) of the 
audience's verdict.  
Figure 2: Possible options in case of misrecognition 
A) Candidate accepting the audience's verdict B) Candidate rejecting the audience's verdict 
[A] Accepting audience's verdict [B] Rejecting audience's verdict 
(1) Give up (2) Self-improve (3) Plead (4) Fight 
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Moreover, another interesting description – that might give a further description 
and explanation of option 3 'to plead' the audience (as conceived by Ringmar, 1996) – 
should be included here. It is developed by Shogo Suzuki (2008). By building on the 
interaction game formalized by Ringmar in 2002, he outlines, in his own publication of 
2008, the description of a situation that can directly contribute to better articulate the 
'plead' option of Figure 2 (option 3) or at least could introduce another relevant 
option to the current outline. 
In his 2008 publication, Suzuki, beginning with the category of 'legitimate great 
power'16, develops and advances the category of 'frustrated great power'. Briefly, a 
'legitimate great power' is a power that is legitimately recognized in its great power 
status and identity. It is granted its self-perceived identity (namely, the identity of a 
great power) and is treated as such; indeed, it is "recognized by others to have, and 
conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties" 
(Suzuki, 2008, 47 – quoting Bull, 1995, 196). 
A 'legitimate great power' is 'accepted' as such when the following two conditions 
occur: 
"First, the newcomer’s recognition as a member of this exclusive social grouping 
takes place when it is treated as a social equal by the existing members. Second, 
the new member needs to be accorded the same constitutional privileges of other 
‘legitimate great powers’" (Suzuki, 2008, 47-48). 
In contrast to this situation in which the candidate is granted the recognition of its 
self-perceived identity, there is the situation in which recognition of the candidate’s 
self-advanced identity is withheld17. It is in this latter case that the category of 
'frustrated great power' proves its relevance; indeed, a frustrated great power is a 
power that is not recognized in its own identity. According to the author,  
"(…) 'frustrated great powers' (…) have two characteristics. First, they believe they 
have been refused social equality with other ‘legitimate great powers’ in the course 
of their interactions with their peers. Second, ‘frustrated great powers’ are states 
that are not given the privileges associated with ‘legitimate great power status’, and 
                                                
 
16	   The	   author	   develops	   the	   definition	   of	   'legitimate	   great	   powers'	   by	   building	   on	   Garry	   Simpson's	   definition	   of	  
'legalised	  hegemony'.	  See	  Suzuki,	  2008,	  47,	  and	  Simpson	  2004,	  68.	  
17	  The	  author	  advances	  three	  possible	  factors	  that	  interfere	  with	  the	  process	  of	  recognition.	  See	  p.	  48.	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perceive a mismatch between their own expectations and the actual ‘constitutional 
privileges’ they are (or are not) accorded" (Suzuki, 2008, 49). 
Once we have clarified that 'frustrated great powers' are those powers that are 
frustrated in their identity ambitions because they have been misrecognized and by 
leaving aside the specific elements characterizing the 'club' of great powers and great 
power status, we can move to a second observation.  
Suzuki thus founds and builds the main contribution of his article; a frustrated 
power that suffers misrecognition can commit to "persuading and convincing its peers 
that it possesses the necessary attributes to be recognised as such" (Suzuki, 2008, 
50). 
How the author outlines this specific option becomes relevant to the current research. 
Indeed, he maintains that this specific effort of persuasion 'can often take the form of 
a recognition game'. Directly quoting,  
In the context of ‘legitimate great power’ status, a ‘frustrated great power’ can 
persuade its peers that it should be accorded this position by following two steps. 
First, as ‘a state is defined as a great power to the extent that it conforms to the 
social discourse that defines great power status at any particular time’,(18) it needs 
to identify the collective social norms and rules which govern ‘legitimate great 
power’ identity. Second, the ‘frustrated great power’ must then persuade its peers 
that it is worthy of this status. This often takes the form of a ‘recognition game’. 
As Ringmar notes: 
this is the situation of the self-conscious outsider or social upstart who tries to 
conform as closely as ever possible to the rules which govern life in a certain 
social setting. By conforming to the rules he makes it possible for others to 
recognize him as the kind of person to whom these rules apply" (Suzuki, 2008, 
50 – quoting Ringmar, 2002, 121-122). 
Suzuki makes a particular use of the expression 'recognition game' that refers to 
neither the complex game of interactions concerning the identity-formation process nor 
the formalized interaction of the recognition process as advanced by Ringmar. Instead, 
it is used as a synonym of the 'process of persuasion' that the candidate might 
undertake. It therefore refers to one of the options available to the candidate.  
Again, while overlooking this specification, what is important in this section is how the 
author outlines this option. In reaction to a situation in which the candidate is 
                                                
 
18	  The	  author	  refers	  to	  Hobson,	  Sharman,	  2005,	  87.	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misrecognized in his own identity, he can commit himself to 'persuading and 
convincing' the audience of his suitability for the self-conceived identity by 'conforming 
– as closely as ever possible – to the norms and rules which govern the legitimate 
great power identity'19.  
This is a situation in which the candidate will commit itself to following the socially 
accepted rules; similar to the 'self-improve' option, it will follow a pro-social (society-
friendly) path on which it will attempt to convince the audience of its suitability by 
following social rules. However, in this situation – and here is the relevant distinction – 
dissimilarly from the 'self-improve' option, the candidate disagrees with the audience's 
verdict. Indeed, whether or not in the 'self-improve' option the candidate recognizes 
that it is not yet ready and decides to work to achieve its aimed identity, in this 
specific situation, the candidate is describing having a clear idea of its identity. Indeed, 
it is said to 'believe that it is being refused a socially equal treatment' and therefore 
perceives a mismatch between its expectations (based on its own concept of its 
identity) and how it is actually treated20.  
It is the perception of this mismatch, this being aware of the existing gap between how 
it feels and how it is treated, that locates this option under the branch of options in 
which the candidate disagrees with the audience's verdict21. 
Therefore, the new element brought in by this outline is the concept of an 
option in which, although disagreeing with the audience's verdict, the candidate 
nevertheless exerts efforts to convince them not by taking action and using violence 
but by 'following the rules'. 
                                                
 
19	  Although	  not	  highlighted	  by	   the	  author,	  a	  distinction	  must	  be	  specified	  between	  Suzuki	  and	  Ringmar	  when	  they	  
refer	  to	  the	  'rules	  and	  norms	  to	  be	  adopted	  as	  closely	  as	  possible'.	   Indeed,	  Ringmar's	  quotation	  reported	  by	  Suzuki	  
refers	  to	  "rules	  which	  govern	  life	  in	  a	  certain	  social	  setting",	  whereas	  Suzuki	  is	  referring	  to	  "the	  collective	  social	  norms	  
and	  rules	  which	  govern	  ‘legitimate	  great	  power’	  identity"	  (emphasis	  added).	  
20	   The	  element	  of	   'frustration'	   can	  be	   viewed,	   in	  one	   case,	   as	   a	  manifestation	  of	   the	  perception	  of	   the	  mismatch.	  
However,	  in	  a	  more	  'serious	  situation',	  the	  element	  of	  frustration	  can	  be	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  constant	  frustration	  of	  
the	  attempt	  to	  be	  recognized	  –	  what	  Suzuki	  described	  as	  follows:	  "(…)	  for	  some	  states	  fulfilling	  the	  criteria	  needed	  for	  
entry	  can	  seem	  like	  chasing	  a	  floating	  target,	  and	  this	  only	  adds	  to	  their	  sense	  of	  annoyance"	  (Suzuki,	  2008,	  49).	  
21	  Similar	  and	  helpful	   is	   the	  concept	  of	   'status	   inconsistency'	  used	  by	  scholars	   to	   identify	   the	   relationship	  between	  
'structural	  inequalities	  in	  international	  politics'	  and	  conflict	  (Volgy,	  Mayhall,	  1995,	  68).	  Status	  inconsistency	  is	  defined	  
as	   a	   situation	   "when	   a	   strong	   incongruence	   exists	   between	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   achievement	   and	   the	   recognition	  
accorded	  to	  that	  achievement"	  (Volgy,	  Mayhall,	  1995,	  68).	  We	  may	  borrow	  this	  expression	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  aftermath	  
of	  the	  misrecognition	  by	  the	  audience	  and	  rejection	  of	  the	  misrecognizing	  verdict	  by	  the	  candidate.	  Indeed,	  in	  such	  a	  
situation,	   the	   candidate	   perceives	   an	   inconsistency	   between	   its	   self-­‐perceived	   identity	   and	   that	   which	   the	   public	  
actually	  ascribes	  to	  him.	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Finally, I refer also to Larson and Alexei Shevchenko (2010) who, by drawing on 
Social Identity Theory, conceived three possible strategies of 'identity management'. 
The two authors identify three possible "identity management strategies", namely social 
mobility, social competition and social creativity (Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 67).  
The first aims at "joining the elite club". It consists of adopting and replicating 
the rules of the group (Ivi, 71), and it can be performed when there are "permeable 
boundaries" to access the elite group. The second option, social competition, instead 
occurs when there are "impermeable boundaries" and the 'status hierarchy is perceived 
as illegitimate'. In this case, the state adopting this strategy will attempt to 'challenge 
the hierarchy in its area of superiority' (Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 72). By contrast, the 
third option, social creativity, occurs in a situation in which the status hierarchy is 
considered 'legitimate' and 'stable'; therefore, the state, instead of directly competing 
with the hegemon, tries 'to achieve prominence outside the arena of geopolitical 
competition' (Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 67, 73). 
Before moving to a closer analysis of options 3 and 4, I will focus in the next 
section on analysing some of the characteristics of analytical frameworks 1 and 2.  
	  
4.3	  –	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  interpretative	  frameworks	  
 
As mentioned above, the two interpretative frameworks are not antithetical; they 
outline the same situation by focussing on different levels. The first interpretative 
framework focusses indeed on the options available to the audience to recognize or 
misrecognize the candidate and relates this choice to possible outcomes at the level 
of international politics (recognition fosters peaceful cooperation, whereas 
misrecognition fosters conflict). Similarly, but in a more articulated fashion, the second 
framework of analysis focusses instead on the possible options available to the 
candidate in reaction to recognition or misrecognition. This second framework can 
explain the relationships between recognition and peaceful cooperation on the one 
hand and misrecognition and conflict on the other hand, and can outline and show 
the in-between processes that might lead to those results. 
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4.3.1	  –	  Division	  line:	  recognition–misrecognition	  or	  acceptance–rejection	  
 
According to the first interpretative framework, it appears that the problem of 
instability is automatically caused by the withholding of recognition. Indeed, as reported 
above, the main division is usually located in the distinction between recognition and 
misrecognition. Perfectly in line with this, the predictions of the 'international politics of 
recognition' are based on the following couplet: recognition fosters peaceful relations, 
whereas misrecognition fosters conflictual relations.  
However, as has emerged in the previous section – with a more in-depth observation 
of the options available to the candidate in response to recognition or misrecognition 
when interacting with the audience – the real instability problem is not originated by 
the recognized-misrecognized binomial but is instead related to the candidate's 
reaction to being recognized (or misrecognized). According to a second interpretative 
framework that focusses more on the role of the candidate in the interaction, 
instability is certainly more probable under misrecognition (instead of recognition). 
However, in this situation, the balance is tipped by the candidate's reaction to this 
situation. The real problem does not emerge when the candidate is misrecognized but 
when the misrecognized candidate disagrees with the audience's verdict and decides to 
reject it, in which case he might decide to opt for violent means to impose his own 
identity.  
The case in which the candidate agrees with and accepts the audience's verdict 
and the alternative case in which he rejects the verdict because he disagrees with it 
lead to different situations and different options within them. Indeed, in the former 
case, the available options are generally peaceful – the candidate accepts the verdict, 
internalizes it, and rebrands himself according to it (option 1), or in the more 
articulated case, he develops the ambition to achieve a higher status, but always 
peacefully (option 2). However, in the latter situation, the case in which the candidate 
disagrees with the audience, a more critical (potentially unstable) situation opens up. 
The real potential for instability is located here; the candidate can choose to pursue 
his recognition by peaceful and compliant means (option 3) or by aggressive and 
violent means (option 4). 
Therefore, the real critical juncture in which a situation might turn towards 
peaceful cooperation or towards conflictual relations lies in the alternative between 
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options 3 and 4, when the candidate must choose whether to opt for complying 
behaviours or to adopt instead conflictual behaviours. This critical moment will be the 
focus of further analyses in the upcoming sections. 
 
4.3.2	  –	  Options	  are	  alternative	  and	  exchangeable	  
 
A common feature to both of the interpretative frameworks is that both 
explanations are based on a shared perspective that views options as alternatives to 
one another.  
In the case of the 'International Politics of Recognition' perspective, options (to 
recognize or to misrecognize) are presented as opposed alternatives; the audience 
must decide on one of the two and cannot mix them. In line with this, reactions and 
consequences to this choice are also opposed alternatives. Cooperative behaviours 
and, accordingly, peaceful relations follow the politics of recognition. Conversely, 
aggressive behaviours and conflictual relations follow the politics of misrecognition.  
Similarly, although addressed in more detail, when focussing on the perspective 
of the candidate, the available options generate opposite alternatives. Specifically, once 
confronted with the misrecognition by the audience, the candidate must choose what 
to do. The options available to it are 'alternatives' to one another; indeed, the 
candidate can choose whether to accept the verdict or reject it – whether to agree or 
disagree with the audience. Once it decides to accept the verdict, it can choose 
whether to 'give up' – accept and live up to the audience's description (option 1 in 
figure 2) – or to commit to a self-improving process that requires effort and energies 
(option 2 in figure 2). These two options are alternatives, although they derive from 
the same initial situation (the candidate accepting the audience's verdict), and both 
imply cooperative relationships.  
However, the fact that the options are alternatives is even more evident in the case in 
which the candidate decides to reject the audience's verdict. Indeed, in this case more 
than the previous ones, the candidate will be confronting polar options; to convince 
the audience of his suitability to his own identity, it must choose whether to do so by 
complying (option 3 in figure 2) or fighting (option 4 in figure 2). More than in the 
previous case, these two options lie on opposite sides and require different policies to 
be implemented. Indeed, going to war or subjecting itself to the (formal and/or 
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informal) normative structure of the group, require and imply different efforts (we will 
return later to this point). 
However, although these options are presented as alternatives, they are also 
described as 'incremental' or interchangeable, meaning that the candidate can decide 
to move from one choice to the other. To give some non-exhaustive examples, the 
candidate can indeed decide to accept the verdict of the audience and choose option 
1 or option 2 and might decide to move its strategy from one choice to the other. 
That is, it might begin by trying to achieve a certain status (option 2) and then decide 
to downsize its ambitions by accepting the verdict of the audience and conforming to 
it (option 1), and vice versa. Similarly, it can decide to reject the audience's verdict 
and begin trying to convince the audience of his validity (option 3) but move to option 
4 (conflictual relations), or decide to give up and conform to the verdict of the 
audience (option 1 or 2). This interchanging of options can proceed in an increasing 
or decreasing direction – from 'give up and live with it' (option 1), to 'fighting' (option 
4) – or vice versa from (option 4 to option 1). The choice could also follow no 'real 
order'; in other words, the candidate has these options at his disposal and for 
example can choose which one to pick, which one to begin with, and which others to 
continue with22. (Later, we will focus on why the candidate might opt for one choice or 
another.) 
Similar features also characterize Larson and Shevchenko's (2010) concept of 
the three possible strategies of 'identity management'. Indeed, the three options – 
social mobility, social competition and social creativity – are also alternative options 
and are described in the following terms:  
"they are ideal types indeed elements of each can be found in a particular 
county's foreign policy, nevertheless, the strategies have different goals and tactics 
(…) so that prevalence of one of the three, alters a state's foreign policy" (Larson, 
Shevchenko, 2010, 75). 
                                                
 
22	   The	   reasons	   one	   may	   move	   from	   one	   to	   the	   other	   are	   interesting.	   This	   refers	   in	   particular	   to	   those	   cases	   of	  
frustration	   (Suzuki,	   2008;	   Wolf,	   2014,	   2008;	   Volgy,	   Michal,	   1985)	   in	   which,	   by	   using	   the	   language	   of	   formal	  
interaction,	   games	   can	   be	   assimilated	   into	   a	   repeated	   game	   of	   interaction	   in	   which	   the	   candidate	   is	   constantly	  
confronted	  with	  misrecognition	  'no	  matter	  what	  he	  does	  to	  improve	  himself'	  (option	  2)	  or	  in	  which	  he	  convinces	  his	  
audience	  of	  his	  suitability	  for	  a	  certain	  identity	  by	  complying	  and	  self-­‐socializing	  to	  social	  (formal	  and	  informal)	  norms	  
(option	  3).	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From this perspective, conceiving cooperation and competition as alternative 
strategies with different goals and tactics implies that not only strategies in themselves 
are alternatives but also the related aims and tactics are opposite alternatives (this 
element will be further developed in the next sections). Therefore, we once more face 
an alternative and opposed framework of cooperative and competitive behaviours. 
Indeed, in this case, 'adopting and replicating' rules – implementing a conforming 
behaviour (in line with option 3) – or challenging the status quo via conflictual 
competition and assertiveness (in line with option 4) are also alternative options that 
remain un-combined even in the third strategic option because it refers to competitive 
behaviours but only in dimensions other than the geopolitical arena.  
	  
4.4	  –	  Mismatched	  misrecognition:	  the	  critical	  juncture	  of	  cooperative	  or	  
competitive	  relations.	  Adopting	  complying	  or	  competitive	  strategies?	  	  
 
As mentioned in section 4.3.1, the critical juncture in which interaction between 
the candidate and the audience may turn towards relationships of peaceful 
cooperation or towards conflictual relationships occurs in the 'crossroad' between 
option 3 and option 4. This moment is when the candidate, who is disagreeing on the 
misrecognition received from the audience, must decide whether to commit to adopting 
peaceful, cooperative, complying behaviours (option 3) to convince the audience to 
change its mind or to pursue violent and conflictual means (option 4).  
Because option 3 corresponds to the option formulated by Suzuki (2008) and is 
not clearly mentioned23 by Ringmar (1996, 2002, 2012), who initially conceived the 
formulation of the social interaction for recognition, it might appear that option 3 is 
atypical or not in line with the framework of recognition studies.  
Section 4.4.1, will focus on highlighting the rationale of this option, which proves that it 
is perfectly in line with the framework of recognition studies; thus, the aim is to 
highlight why candidates might decide to adopt this option. Afterwards, section 4.4.2 
                                                
 
23	  Option	  3	  as	  formulated	  by	  Suzuki	  (2008)	  –	  in	  which	  the	  candidate	  complies	  with	  social	  rules	  –	  is	  similar	  to	  one	  of	  
the	  two	  interpretations	  of	  option	  2	  as	  formulated	  by	  Ringmar,	  in	  which	  the	  candidate	  accepts	  the	  verdict	  but	  decides	  
to	  self-­‐improve	  to	  achieve	  its	  aimed	  identity.	  See	  section	  4.2.	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will focus on highlighting why candidates might choose to adopt competitive strategies 
in reaction to mismatched misrecognition. 
 
4.4.1	  –	  Rationale	  for	  adopting	  cooperative	  strategy	  (option	  3)	  in	  reaction	  to	  mismatched	  
misrecognition:	  recognition	  process	  is	  social-­‐relational	  
 
The third option, as formulated by Suzuki, stipulates that results are highly 
important in the outline of the options available to the candidate. Thus, although it 
might appear an 'atypical' strategy to react to a situation of misrecognition and 
mismatch, it is nonetheless possible to highlight its rationale and its relationship with 
the assumptions of the entire strand of research.  
Indeed, as mentioned in the previous section, the assumptions constituting the basis of 
this strand of research concern the idea that identity is fundamental and that it is 
formed through a social process. Identity is created, fundamental and relational.  
In particular, by focussing on identity's relational character, it is possible to understand 
the rationale of this third option.  
The outline of options available to the candidate in reaction to recognition or 
misrecognition, as conceived by Erik Ringmar (1996, 2012 – see section 4.2), considers 
the candidate able to decide whether to convince the audience to change its verdict 
by 'pleading' or by using force (Ringmar, 1996). However, with respect to these two 
options, the author himself reports that, whereas "mere words are probably not going 
to get us very far," the other possible option "is to act" – given that "only through 
action can we provide the kind of final, decisive, evidence that proves the others 
wrong" (Ringmar, 1996, 82).  
Given this formulation, it can appear that in a situation of misrecognition (and 
disagreement), the candidate will opt for conflictual means to impose its identity on 
the audience and that this option is the most effective one.  
However, the option described by Suzuki adds something more to the 'pleading' 
option and contends that in a situation of misrecognition and disagreement, it is still 
possible to develop peaceful relations. This occurs precisely because, given that the 
status is socially conferred, any actor in any situation will require final confirmation by 
society, and he must 'persuade' them. However, although persuasion can take different 
forms, that recognition is needed (perceived as fundamental) and is conceded by 
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society itself (through a social-relational interaction) that creates a sort of reassuring 
guarantee; to have the audience's recognition, one must 'conquer' it. One has a better 
chance of obtaining it by currying favour with – by appeasing – the audience. Indeed, 
because the final approval arrives from society, it makes no sense not to commit to 
appeasing it.  
In contrast, the effort to be recognized without trying to appease the audience, or 
even worse, committing to fighting against it (to obtain social recognition) implies 
something similar to an attempt to become king that includes killing each and every 
potential subject. The risk is that this aggressive attempt irritates them and induces 
them to withhold recognition. 
 That final approval derives from others – the fact that an identity can be 
formed only through the social process of recognition – assigns to society (the 
audience) a sort of 'intrinsic power of coercion' that reflects in this reassuring 
guarantee confirmation that "the allure of attaining status within the dominant 
normative structures in international society appears to be surprisingly strong"24 
(Suzuki, 2008, 60). 
That recognition is a social process (is socially conceded) guarantees that any attempt 
to obtain it should be socially based; therefore, it should be pursued within social 
boundaries.  
 
4.4.2	  –	  Reason	  for	  adopting	  a	  competitive	  strategy	  (option	  4)	  in	  reaction	  to	  mismatched	  
misrecognition:	  peer	  rejection	  
  
Given the basic assumptions previously reported – according to which identity is 
important to the point of 'moving to action', but it is also formed and confirmed 
through social interaction, which implies that whereas identity remains 'fundamental' 
(needed), obtaining one requires seeking it within social boundaries – it is expected 
that any actor seeking identity through the process of social recognition, even in a 
situation of misrecognition and disagreement, should still commit to pursuing its 
                                                
 
24	  Perfectly	  in	  line	  with	  this	  point,	  the	  author	  concludes	  his	  paper	  by	  claiming,	  "[T]he	  findings	  of	  this	  article	  suggest	  
that	  the	  ‘productive	  power’	  of	  international	  society	  exerts	  a	  much	  more	  powerful	  influence	  on	  state	  behaviour	  than	  
realists	  suggest,	  and	  deserves	  closer	  scrutiny.	   It	   is	  here	  where	  the	  study	  of	  ‘recognition	  games’	  can	  be	  of	  particular	  
utility"	  (Suzuki,	  2008,	  60).	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recognition 'within the dominant normative structures in international society' – because 
society has the power to grant or withhold recognition.  
Therefore, it can appear that option 3 (cooperative, complying strategy) is the most 
reasonable option; given that the recognition process requires the consensus of the 
audience, why should the candidate risk the success of this process by challenging 
and threatening the audience with a conflictual strategy?  
Nevertheless, option 4 is also conceived as an option by recognition scholars. 
Therefore, how can candidates adopt conflictual strategies? When and why, according 
to the literature, do candidates opt for option 4? 
To find an answer to these questions, we can return to the literature and in 
particular to Ringmar's formulations of the conflictual option. 
A further analysis of the option described by Ringmar and of the case study presented 
by the author in his 1996 publication can help to better understand the reason for the 
decision of the candidate to resort to conflictual behaviours. In his publication, the 
author focusses in particular on explaining why Sweden undertook this same decision 
in 1630 by deciding to go to war against the armies of the Habsburg emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire (Ringmar, 1996). 
 The final explanation can be found (in a summarized version) in the description 
that the author provides about the possible options available to the candidate (in 
reaction to misrecognition).  
Ringmar25 stipulates that an available option, in reaction to misrecognition, consists of 
standing 'by one's own story' and that this option can be pursued by trying to 'plead 
the audience'. However, when considering that (in some situations) "mere words are 
probably not going to get us very far," then in those situations, the candidate might 
opt for 'action'26 to convince the audience that they are wrong about him. 
Let us focus on the sentence according to which, during a recognition process, 
'mere words may not get the candidate very far'. This description recalls the idea that 
social interaction aiming at a successful accomplishment of the recognition process 
might not work properly (by not taking the candidate very far). Therefore, based on 
this description, when the social recognition process jams (becomes stuck), when 
                                                
 
25	  As	  reported	  in	  section	  4.2.	  
26	  Action	  is	  meant	  as	  a	  synonym	  of	  violent	  action	  (see	  section	  4.2)	  –	  Ringmar,	  1996.	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peaceful-complying options available to the candidate do not work properly, when they 
do not (and never will) take the actor to a successful accomplishment of the 
recognition process, then, in a similar situation, the candidate can and will resort to 
'action' to impose its identity on the audience. In other words, under this concept of 
the recognition process, conflict is an option when cooperation does not (properly) 
work – that is, when it does not provide any solution. 
 Let us focus on the case of Sweden as presented by Ringmar. Erik Ringmar, in 
his 1996 publication, has as a primary intention to demonstrate the relevance of 
identity-related issues as explanatory factors for international interactions by taking the 
antithetical view that contraposes identity matters to matters of interest (see section 
2). Indeed, this case study focusses on answering the question 'why did Sweden join 
the war in 1630?' The given answer refers to – and proves – the essential role played 
by matters of identity. Indeed, stated in few words, in 1630, "Swedes go to war in 
defence of their national identity" (Ringmar, 1996, 145). 
Deliberately leaving aside the debate on the relevance of identity vs interests (see 
section 2), what is interesting in this section is the historical process that brought 
Sweden to decide to go to war to defend its national identity, instead of opting for 
other means. Let us focus on this choice.  
First point: from what Ringmar reports, it clearly emerges that Sweden initially 
(and for quite some time) did attempt to 'play by the rules' (Ringmar, 1996). Indeed, 
the historical moment preceding the decision for war is described by the author as a 
"formative moment" for the international system overall and for Sweden in particular. 
Formative moments are meant by the author as "periods when meanings are contested 
and fought over with the help of all sorts of rhetoric and propaganda"; moments of 
reinvention of symbols; and "times when new identities can be made and established" 
(Ringmar, 1996, 85-86). Again, formative moments are characterized by two 'paradoxical 
features': they are (1) moments of 'unprecedented freedom,' and (2) moments of 
'conformism and rule-following' (Ringmar, 1996, 86). 
In line with the above, the Renaissance – described by the authors as "a time of 
exceptional poetic creativity and a time of conventionalism and self-discipline" 
(Ringmar, 1996, 170) – can be considered a 'formative moment' for the entire system.  
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Indeed, the inclination towards 'conformism and rule following' (typical of formative 
moments) characterized the entire historical context at the internal or international 
level. Indeed, as the author reports,  
"the very same people who took such pride in their powers of self-creation quickly 
and voluntarily subjected themselves to the coercive rules of la courtoisie. A 
parallel process of self-fashioning took place at the inter-state level, we said. (…) 
To this end various codes of conduct were developed in relations between states 
also, and those princes who told the most fancy stories about their countries also 
came to submit themselves to the demands of the new conventions. In the 
Renaissance two such main sets of rules emerged: the body of international law 
and the code which regulated diplomatic conduct"27 (…) 
Although not all princes actually paid attention to these rules, they were clearly 
important to those princes who sought to gain membership in inter-national society, 
and a state which was yet to be recognised as a legitimate actor was likely to be 
a particularly conscientious ruler-follower" (Ringmar, 1996, 170, 172) 
Therefore, in this particular historical moment, Sweden proved herself to be conscious 
of the importance of following rules – given that the mechanism of the recognition 
process is characterized by and requires 'rule following'. Indeed, the author reports 
that  
"This, at least, was the case of Sweden. King Gustav Adolf took a strong personal 
interest in matters of law and he was an avid reader of legal treaties. According to 
reports, he spent some time every day 'studying ancient and modern authorities on 
the subject', and especially 'the work of Grotius, and in particular his tractatus De 
jure belli ac pacts'. The king, we are told, 'always carried his Grotius with him'; he 
was said to rest his head on the book at night, to keep it in his saddle bag during 
the day, and a copy of the treatise was found in the royal tent after his death" 
(Ringmar, 1996, 172). 
 
Second point: given these premises, it is not clear why Sweden had to abandon 
complying behaviours in favour of harsh conflict.  
 
Again, the mechanism that emerges from the abovementioned descriptions is 
founded on (and perfectly replicates) the social-relationship assumptions of recognition 
                                                
 
27	  See	  Ringmar	  1996,	  170	  and	  following	  pages	  for	  a	  deeper	  description	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  new	  rules.	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studies. Indeed, the identity formation process, as in this specific case study, requires 
and suggests 'playing by the rules' (Ringmar, 1996). 
This confirms that rules have indeed a fundamental role; they are fundamental for the 
candidate as much as for the audience. Indeed, by focussing on the perspective of the 
audience, when the audience is facing a 'demand for recognition,' rules prove useful 
as benchmarks for orienting on the judgement and final decision. Rules are helpful to 
the audience's judgement: "In order to simplify these judgements a rule of some kind 
is very helpful"; indeed, rules are useful for both "the classification of actions" and for 
"the classification of the people who perform them" (Ringmar, 1996, 86).  
Indeed, rules help to set a standard for actions to allow the audience "to draw 
conclusions regarding the person who performed it". Rules also (2) help in 
differentiating "the kind of behaviour that is considered 'wrong' from the kind of 
behaviour that is considered 'right' but also (…) identify the class of actors to whom 
the rule itself applies" (Ringmar, 1996, 86). In conclusion, on the basis of this 
'paradoxical features', rules "can be relied on to determine who belongs to a certain 
group and who does not" (Ringmar, 1996, 86). 
 Therefore, given the important role that rules play in orienting the audience's 
judgement, it is clear that they are also important for the candidate: 
"Social upstarts are likely to be very good rule-followers, not primarily because they 
fear punishment in accordance with the rule if they fail, but because they want to 
be identified as members of the group where a particular rule applies" (Ringmar, 
1996, 86).  
The above implies that "[f]or someone who aspires to be recognised by others it is of 
course crucial to learn how to play by these rules", because "[W]e must show those 
who are already well established and universally recognised that they have reasons to 
count us as one of their kind" (Ringmar, 1996, 86). 
  
 Therefore, given that it is clear that the mechanism of the recognition process 
(according to the recognition studies literature) requires the candidate to follow rules, 
and given that Sweden did follow rules until then, it remains unclear what went wrong 
with this process. When and why did the recognition process mechanism jam, causing 
Sweden to opt for war? Ringmar helps us find an answer; indeed, he reports that  
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"It would not be difficult to write the history of Sweden from the year 1521 to the 
year 1630 as a story of continuous insults, slights and humiliations directed against 
the country and its kings" (Ringmar, 1996, 178). 
Therefore, despite all of the efforts undertaken by Sweden28, "the foreign audiences 
remained difficult to impress". This result implied that when the lower point of this 
'humiliation' was reached – "After the Lubeck affair, relations with the emperor entered 
a new phase (...) bridges had been burned" – Sweden turned to war (adopted option 4) 
to impose its identity on the international audience (Ringmar, 1996, 181, 184). 
This decision to move from option 3 to option 4 was made and justified in terms of 
the need to react to misrecognition. Indeed, Ringmar reports that the king, although 
considering the reasons for the 'disrespect', finds that 
"we have not shown ourselves as strong as other nations and our reputation has 
suffered as a result; we have been treated with disrespect by foreigners and 
exposed ourselves to all the whims and capriciousness of fortune. Our enemies will 
dominate and suppress us unless we act in a manly and resolute fashion" (Ringmar, 
1996, 182). 
Therefore, given this situation of misrecognition and disrespect, "the emperor's 
repeated humiliations required a more forceful response. Only through action could 
Gustav Adolf prove that he indeed was a legitimate actor on the world stage" 
(Ringmar, 1996, 186). 
The outcome of this mismatch and disagreement was that "[i]n 1630 Gustav Adolf took 
his country to war in order to force the Austrians to grant the recognition they had 
failed to grant freely" (Ringmar, 1996, 186). 
  
 We can move to the third point, by highlighting how the reasons that actors 
move from option 3 to option 4 are now quite clear:  
"recognition was denied under humiliating circumstances and that the Swedes acted 
- went to war - in order to demonstrate the validity of their self-description, to 
prove that their own descriptions of themselves did indeed apply to them" (Ringmar, 
1996, 145). 
                                                
 
28	  See	  Ringmar,	  1996,	  178-­‐184	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  efforts	  undertaken	  by	  Sweden	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  rules.	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Certainly, as the author concludes in his analysis, this decision was made in defence 
of identity and under the influence of matters of identity29. However, what is of more 
interest here is the fact that conflictual strategy is conceived as occurring in reaction 
to misrecognition and mismatch, and as 'secondary to' (and following) the failure of 
the complying option.  
Therefore, this analytical framework explains conflict (option 4) as the result of 
peer rejection30: Nevertheless, the adoption of conflictual strategies due to peer 
rejection can have two interpretations. In one case (by borrowing from studies on 
cognitive theories of emotions), it is possible to focus on the fact that when that 
candidate is withheld with recognition from his peers, he will perceive frustration 
(humiliation and so on) and might instinctively react to such acts of disrespect by 
retaliating against the perpetrators. In the other case, this same situation can be 
interpreted by resorting to cost-benefit calculations and considering that, in the same 
situation, the candidate might rationally understand that the cooperative option is not 
working properly and that it will not gain him the successful accomplishment of 
recognition. Therefore, he will rationally choose conflictual means (option 4) as a 
better strategy and a means to finally achieve the desired recognition by imposing it 
on the audience31. 
 	  
                                                
 
29	  Versus	  the	  relevance	  of	  rational	  interests,	  indeed	  the	  author	  wonders,	  "Why	  indeed	  would	  this	  poor,	  economically	  
backward	  and	  sparsely	  populated	  country	  on	  Europe's	  northern	  fringe	  ever	  decide	  to	  wage	  war	  against	  the	  Habsburg	  
Emperor	  in	  Vienna,	  the	  mightiest	  ruler	  on	  the	  continent?"	  –	  see	  Ringmar,	  1996,	  11.	  	  
30	  Meant	  as	  rejection	  from	  or	  misrecognition	  by	  peers.	  This	  concept	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  'frustrated	  powers'	  
adopted	  by	  Suzuki	   (2008).	   Indeed,	  a	   frustrated	  power	   is	  a	  power	   from	  which	   is	  withheld	   its	  self-­‐advanced	   identity.	  
According	   to	   the	   author,	   "(…)	   'frustrated	   great	   powers'	   (…)	   have	   two	   characteristics.	   First,	   they	   believe	   they	   have	  
been	  refused	  social	  equality	  with	  other	  ‘legitimate	  great	  powers’	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  interactions	  with	  their	  peers.	  
Second,	  ‘frustrated	  great	  powers’	  are	  states	  that	  are	  not	  given	  the	  privileges	  associated	  with	  ‘legitimate	  great	  power	  
status’,	  and	  perceive	  a	  mismatch	  between	  their	  own	  expectations	  and	  the	  actual	  ‘constitutional	  privileges’	  they	  are	  
(or	  are	  not)	  accorded"	  (Suzuki,	  2008,	  49).	  
31	  A	  third	  option	  could	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  phrase,	  "we	  have	  not	  shown	  ourselves	  as	  strong	  as	  other	  nations	  and	  our	  
reputation	  has	  suffered	  as	  a	  result”	  (Ringmar,	  1996,	  182).	  This	  third	  option	  corresponds	  to	  the	  role	  theory	  concept;	  
see	  section	  2.2.2/ii).	  It	  could	  be	  debated	  that	  Sweden	  did	  not	  go	  to	  war	  because	  the	  other	  (peaceful)	  options	  failed	  
and	  no	  other	  option	  was	  available	  but	  because	  'fighting'	  could	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  the	  identity	  
that	   Sweden	  was	   aiming	   at.	   In	   other	  words,	   if	   Sweden	  wanted	   to	   be	   granted	   statehood	   as	  were	   all	   of	   the	   other	  
European	  powers,	  and	  if	  'fighting'	  is	  a	  capability	  that	  all	  European	  states	  must	  have,	  then	  Sweden	  was	  not	  responding	  
to	   the	   requirements	   until	   the	   moment	   it	   started	   implementing	   the	   characteristics	   typical	   of	   European	   states.	  
Therefore,	   fighting	   is	   not	   related	   to	   'somehow'	   entering	   the	   group;	   it	   is	   not	   a	   means	   to	   enter	   but	   rather	   a	  
requirement	  to	  respond	  to	  –	  to	  adopt	  (see	  chapter	  2,	  section	  2.2.2	  (ii).	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4.5	  –	  Conclusion:	  alternativeness	  and	  incompatibility	  of	  behavioural	  
options	  
 
To draw conclusions, two elements emerge from the previous sections: (1) the 
mechanism of the recognition process is described as a process that suggests and 
requires social conformity and complying behaviours32 such that, (2) when this process 
does not work properly, actors can turn towards conflictual behaviours. 
                                                
 
32	   Therefore,	   this	   option	   can	   be	   assimilated	   with	   the	   process	   of	   'socialization':	   the	   candidate	   is	   required	   and	  
suggested	   to	   socialize	   himself	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   internalizing	   formal	   and	   informal	   rules	   of	   the	   group	   and	   the	  
system.	  Socialization	  is	  indeed	  a	  process	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  recognition	  process	  to	  be	  positively	  accomplished.	  
When	   the	   field	  of	   International	  Relations	  began	   incorporating	   the	   concept	  of	   socialization,	   the	   latter	  underwent	  a	  
disjoint	   development	   (briefly	   summarized	   in	   the	   following).	   This	   disjunction	   appears	   to	   have	  persisted	   for	   a	   long	  
time	   because	   in	   2001,	   Kai	   Alderson	   still	   complained	   that	   IR	   scholars	   “use	   the	  metaphor	   of	   ‘state	   socialization’	   in	  
mutually	  incompatible	  ways”.	  Indeed	  –	  he	  continues	  –	  “there	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  what	  it	  is,	  who	  it	  affects,	  or	  how	  it	  
operates”	  (Alderson,	  2001,	  416).	  The	  author	  also	  suggests	  the	   idea	  that	  scholars	  from	  this	  field	  embark	  “from	  very	  
different	   starting	   point”	   and	   arrive	   at	   –	   according	   to	   him	  –	   “a	   bewildering	   variety	   of	   definitions”	   (Alderson,	   2001,	  
416).	  However,	  notwithstanding	  these	  apparently	  different	  paths	  followed	  by	  socialization	  concept	  in	  IR,	  a	  common	  
point	  to	  all	  of	  these	  paths	   is	  that	  socialization	  refers	  to	  adaptation	  to	  –	  and	  adoption	  of	  –	  formal	  or	   informal	  rules.	  	  
This	  basic	  definition	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  social	  roots	  of	  the	  concept.	  Indeed,	  by	  returning	  to	  social	  studies,	  we	  might	  find	  
a	  parsimonious	  (and	  clearer,	  less	  confused)	  concept	  of	  the	  socialization	  process.	   	  	  
Indeed,	   most	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	   'socialization	   process'	   are	   grounded	   in	   a	   Long	   and	   Hadden	   sociological	  
conceptualization	  of	  the	  socialization	  process	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985).	  The	  two	  authors	  give	  a	  definition	  of	  socialization	  
that	  is	  framed	  by	  undertaking	  "the	  perspective	  of	  group	  members"	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  45);	  socialization	  is	  indeed	  
meant	   as	   the	   act	   of	   the	   group	   that	   is	   'socializing'	   (training/preparing)	   the	   candidates.	   Therefore,	   from	   this	  
perspective,	  "the	  aims	  of	  socialization	  are	  to	  create	  persons	  who	  can	  sustain	  confidence	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  requisites	  
of	  membership	  and	  to	  incorporate	  them	  into	  membership.	  Socialization	  consists	  of	  action	  taken	  toward	  those	  aims”	  
(Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  45).	  Therefore,	  socialization	  corresponds	  to	  the	  set	  of	  actions	  of	  'creation'	  and	  'incorporation'	  
undertaken	  by	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  towards	  the	  candidates;	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  members	  peruse	  the	  objective	  of	  
'creating'	   new	   members	   –	   therefore	   the	   aim	   is	   prosocial	   and	   non-­‐competitive.	   Creating	   new	   members	   means	  
preparing	  candidates	  that	  can	  positively	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  requisites	  of	  the	  group	  (and	  that	  they	  can	  
and	  should	  obtain	  membership).	  	   	  
It	   follows	   that	   the	  effort	  of	   'creating	  new	  members'	  undertaken	  by	   the	  group	   is	   composed	  of	   two	   forms	  of	  action	  
which	   the	  authors	   refer	   to	  as	   'showing'	   and	   'shaping'	   (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  45).	  Both	  showing	   and	  shaping	   aim	  at	  
bringing	   the	   candidates	   to	   the	   point	   of	  meeting	   the	  membership	   requirements,	   which	   are	   conceived	   as	   being	   of	  
three	   types:	   knowledge,	   competence	   and	   commitment.	   Directly	   quoting	   the	   authors,	   "“The	   conferral	   and	  
continuation	  of	  membership	  in	  any	  group	  rests	  on	  the	  plausibility	  of	  three	  assumptions	  about	  the	  members'	  relation	  
to	  these	  requisites:	  (1)	  that	  they	  know	  and	  understand	  the	  requisites;	  (2)	  that	  they	  are	  competent	  and	  skilled	  in	  their	  
use	  and	  application;	  and	  (3)	  that	  they	  are	  committed	  to	  following	  them	  as	  guides	  for	  action.	  In	  most	  cases,	  members	  
actually	  will	  possess	  the	  requisite	  knowledge,	  skill,	  and	  commitment,	  but	  strictly	  speaking,	  their	  possession	  is	  not	  the	  
determining	  factor	  in	  becoming	  or	  remaining	  a	  member.	  Membership	  status	  itself	  is	  an	  attribution	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  members'	  confidence	  that	  the	  novice	   in	  question	  possesses	  these	  qualities,	  whatever	  the	  case	   in	  fact.	   If	  novices	  
can	  sustain	  members'	  confidence	  that	  they	  meet	  the	  requisites,	  they	  may	  slip	  in	  with	  less	  than	  supposedly	  required.	  
If	  they	  cannot	  sustain	  such	  confidence,	  even	  those	  who	  meet	  or	  exceed	  the	  requisites	  may	  not	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  
group”	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  43).	  Both	  'showing'	  and	  shaping	  combine	  with	  the	  three	  types	  of	  requisites.	  Indeed,	  by	  
focussing	  on	  'showing',	  this	  action	  of	  'creation'	  (preparation	  of	  candidates	  to	  become	  members)	  consists	  of	  displaying	  
the	   membership	   requirements.	   It	   can	   indeed	   combine	   with	   all	   requirements	   (of	   knowledge,	   competence	   and	  
commitment).	   Indeed,	   with	   respect	   to	   'showing'	   activity,	   the	   authors	   write,	   “For	   the	   knowledge	   requirement,	  
members	  present	  their	  world	  to	  novices.	  To	  display	  skill	  and	  competence,	  members	  demonstrate	  how	  to	  enact	  and	  
accomplish	  the	  requirements.	  Finally,	  to	  show	  what	  is	  entailed	  in	  commitment,	  members	  hold	  novices	  accountable	  to	  
the	  stipulations	  of	  their	  social	  world”	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  45).	   	  
Therefore,	   group	  members	   show	   to	   candidates	   both	   the	   list	   of	  membership	   requirements	   and	   how	   to	   enact	   and	  
implement	   these	   requirements.	  With	   respect	   to	   the	   second	   action	   of	   the	   activity	   of	   'creation'	   of	   new	  members,	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Therefore, in this concept, the two strategies are alternatives or follow one another, 
and they are, and remain, different and alternative strategies.  
A similar concept can also be found in the characteristics of the three possible 
strategies of identity management conceived by Larson and Shevchenko (2010). In 
particular, the passage from 'social mobility' and 'social competition' is related to the 
difficulty, or impossibility, for the actor to join the elite club because of 'impermeable 
boundaries'. This difficulty in smoothly adopting and replicating the rules of the group 
might induce the actor to compete against the group – given that the 'status hierarchy 
is perceived as illegitimate' (Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 71-72). 
 Finally, given these premises, it is possible to highlight that recognition studies 
can grasp the manifestation of one strategy per time. This point will be further 
developed in the next chapter.  
 
 	  
                                                                                                                                          
 
shaping	   is	   described	   as	   follows:	   “Socializing	   agents	   also	   work	   to	   foster	   conformity	   to	   group	   expectations	   among	  
novices.	   This	   shaping	   activity	   consists	   of	   the	   application	   of	   sanctions,	   both	   positive	   (rewards)	   and	   negative	  
(punishments),	  to	  novices'	  behavior”	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  45).	  	   	  
Therefore,	   while	   members	   commit	   to	   preparing	   the	   candidates	   for	   membership	   (e.g.,	   showing	   and	   shaping),	  
candidates	  are	  required	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  socialization	  process	  as	  much	  as	  possible	  –	  and	  as	  best	  as	  possible	  –	  and	  to	  
adapt	   as	   best	   they	   can	   to	   the	   rules	   and	   requirements	   displayed	   by	   the	   group	   as	   membership	   requirements.	  
Therefore,	   a	   socialization	  process	   that	  harbours	   in	   itself	   the	   characteristics	  of	   an	  education	  process	   (see	  Danziger,	  
1972)	  also	  encompasses	  the	  main	  social-­‐relational	  features	  of	  the	  recognition	  process	  as	  conceived	  by	  IR	  recognition	  
studies.	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Chapter	  2	  	  
1	  –	  Recognition	  process	  explaining	  international	  politics:	  
strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  this	  theoretical	  framework	  
 
IR scholars focussing on recognition studies refocussed attention on identity-
related issues and the role of matters of identity in international politics.  
The aim of this new strand of research developed within IR was to formulate 
an alternative explanation for international politics, and researchers contributing to the 
field actually reached this goal. Indeed, when focussing on matters of identity, IR 
recognition studies can explain both peaceful and conflictual relations.  
 Based on this ability to explain by considering the two interpretative frameworks 
previously reported, the International Politics of Recognition (framework 1) explains 
peaceful relations as a direct consequence of recognition (the more recognition, the 
more peaceful relations33) and conflictual relations as a consequence of misrecognition 
(the more misrecognition, the more possibilities of increased conflict34). However, the 
second framework – the one that outlines the range of options available to the 
candidate to react to recognition or misrecognition – can give a deeper explanation of 
the same relations highlighted by the first framework. In addition, the second 
framework reports a relationship between recognition and peaceful cooperation and 
one between misrecognition and conflictual cooperation, but it is also able to highlight 
a relationship between misrecognition and peaceful relations. Indeed, as reported 
above, misrecognition does not automatically, directly, imply conflict. Therefore, by 
adopting the more in-depth perspective given by the second interpretative framework, 
analysis from this perspective helps to focus attention on the presence or absence of 
the match between the audience's judgement (about the candidate) and the 
candidate's self-expectations. The second framework provides a more detailed view of 
the candidate's actions and reactions to situations of recognition or misrecognition, so 
that one can consider the role of the candidate from this perspective with respect to 
                                                
 
33	  Because	  recognition	  fosters	  pro-­‐social,	  cooperative	  behaviours	  by	  the	  candidate	  that	  has	  no	  resentment	  to	  resolve,	  
this	  fosters	  peaceful	  relations.	  	  
34	  Because	  misrecognition	  fosters	  conflictual	  behaviours	  by	  the	  candidate	  that	  may	  develop	  disagreement	  with	  the	  
audience's	  verdict	  and	  resentment.	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the interaction process that role brings to (international) peaceful or to conflictual 
relations.  
We can say that the second framework distinguishes between a stable and an 
unstable context. The stable context occurs when there is recognition by the audience 
or when there is misrecognition from the audience but it is accepted by the candidate, 
who agrees with the verdict. In this case, stability is due to the match between the 
audience's verdict and the candidate's ambitions. Conversely, an unstable context 
originates when misrecognition by the audience is accompanied by disagreement by 
the candidate – which implies a situation of mismatch between the candidate's 
expectations and the audience's verdict.  
Thus, the second interpretative framework relates contexts of stability to an 
outcome of peaceful relations that include both a situation of recognition (in line with 
the prediction articulated by the first analytical framework) and situations in which the 
audience opts for misrecognition, provided the candidate's acceptance of the verdict 
follows this withholding of recognition.  
With respect to instability contexts, the second interpretative framework predicts 
that they might lead to positive or negative behaviours according to how the candidate 
decides to convince its audience (through cooperative or conflictual behaviours) that 
he deserves a certain identity or status. 
Peaceful relations or conflictual relations can follow this situation of instability. Both 
scenarios are explained by referring to the role of matters of identity. Indeed, peaceful 
relations are explained under option 3, the case in which the candidate, misrecognized 
by the audience concerning his self-conceived identity and, although disagreeing with 
this verdict, nevertheless decides to commit to demonstrating to the audience that it is 
worthy of his own identity by behaving in a socially compliant way by adapting and 
conforming to rules as much as possible (Suzuki, 2008; Ringmar, 2002). 
Similarly, within the second interpretative framework, recognition studies can explain 
conflictual relations as a (possible) consequence of the mismatch emerging between 
the view (the verdict) of the audience on the one hand and the view of the candidate 
on the other hand and the decision of the candidate to pursue the confirmation of its 
own identity through violent, conflictual means.  
We mentioned previously that one of the main elements reported as a reason for the 
choice between adoption of cooperative behaviours and competitive ones is related to 
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(perceived) 'peer rejection'. Indeed, when the candidate is continuously denied 
recognition, notwithstanding its efforts or commitment, this situation might create 
resentment in the candidate. However, the situation also induces the candidate to 
understand that the main strategy suggested from a recognition studies perspective 
(the one that follows and reflects the concept of socialization process) is not working 
and that the only available approach is to abandon the prosocial strategy and 
behaviour and to adopt and implement assertive and conflictual behaviours to force its 
identity on the audience. 
 
1.1	  –	  Correspondence	  between	  available	  options	  and	  international	  politics	  
 
The interpretative framework emerging from IR recognition studies meets its 
limits when considering that all of the possible options of interaction outlined by the 
second interpretative framework correspond to actual politics implementable by the 
candidate.  
Indeed, by focussing in particular on options 3 and 4, the candidate that finds itself 
disagreeing with a verdict of mismatch (if the audience refuses it recognition) can – to 
convince the audience that it deserves that specific identity – choose between two 
possible alternatives: comply with the normative system (option 3) or go to war to fight 
against the audience and impose its identity (option 4). These two alternative options 
imply that politics and behaviours that are as much as different and alternative to one 
another, indeed complying with the normative system or going to war, imply antithetical 
strategies and politics difficult to reconcile. 
Indeed, recognition studies, as outlined by the literature, predict that identity 
recognition is an aim that can be achieved through a complying path – which 
corresponds to option 3 – or through a violent and aggressive path – which 
corresponds to option 4. These two paths are characterized by opposed strategies. 
Indeed, if complying behaviour is required to positively and peacefully overcome the 
situation of misrecognition and mismatch, the candidate following option 3 must adopt 
a strategy that includes complying behaviours (instead of conflictual ones). However, 
given that conflictual and aggressive behaviours are indicative of option 4, actors 
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adopting this option must adopt a strategy that implements similar (conflictual) 
behaviours. 
The above implies that option 3 is expected to be manifested through conforming 
behaviours, whereas option 4 is expected to be manifested through a standing that 
includes violent, conflictual, assertive, competitive and deviant behaviours. 
Indeed, when a scholar observes complying behaviours, he will be able to ascribe them 
to option 3; he will deduce that that state has chosen to follow the prosocial and 
peaceful path. Although conflictual behaviours will be observed, the scholar will deduce 
that the actor is adopting (or is going to adopt) option 4 as a means to obtain 
identity recognition.  
Therefore, from this specific perspective, complying behaviours are strictly 
related to option 3 (peaceful means to reach identity recognition), whereas aggressive, 
assertive behaviours are considered a manifestation of option 4.  
This outline of the interpretative framework emerging from recognition studies (as 
developed to date) has implications for and limitations on the capacity of the 
framework itself to interpret and understand international politics.  
Indeed, given that foreseeing the future remains an ambition but not a skill of IR 
scholars (Friedberg, 2005, 8-9; Jervis 1991), scholars can observe how states, or a 
specific state, for example move within the international arena, how they play and 
interact with the others and the system itself, what behaviours do they implement, 
what statements do they make, and what intentions do they declare. 
It is only possible to observe and interpret these (observed) behaviours according to 
the question guiding the investigation. Moreover, when the aim is to understand 
through which path the candidate will attempt to have its identity recognized, 
recognition studies offer us a twofold option; if we observe complying behaviour we 
must be under option 3 (peaceful means and relations). However, if we observe 
conflictual behaviours, we must be under option 4 (corresponding to an intention or 
attempt to violently challenge and fight the audience). 
 
Some conclusions can be drawn from this section: 
1: deciding to obtain recognition by complying or by moving war requires and 
implies two alternative options and related politics.  
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2: from this perspective, according to the recognition literature, complying 
behaviours are related to the final outcome of peaceful relations. Similarly, from the 
opposite perspective, competitive, assertive, aggressive behaviours are related to the 
final outcome of conflictual relations.  
3: cooperative, complying, pro-social behaviours can be interpreted as the 
manifestation of the complying strategy (option 3), and competitive, assertive, 
conflictual behaviours can be interpreted as the manifestation of the conflictual 
strategy (option 4). 
When scholars or practitioners observe cooperative behaviour, they might presume that 
the candidate is adopting option 3; however, when they observe competitive 
behaviours, they can presume that the candidate is adopting option 4.  
4: problems arise when scholars and practitioners observe (together, at the 
same time, within the same foreign policy) manifestations of both cooperative and 
competitive behaviours. In these situations, the theoretical frameworks emerging from 
recognition studies manifest their weakness; they are indeed unable to grasp the 
compresence of both manifestations.  
 
1.2	  –	  Puzzling	  compresence	  of	  cooperative	  and	  conflictual	  relations	  
 
Beginning with the conclusions drawn from the previous section and by 
returning to the strengths and weaknesses of this interpretative perspective, IR 
recognition studies can provide an alternative explanation of international relations and 
politics. Recognition studies can indeed explain both peaceful and conflictual relations; 
they can also explain why the candidate chooses one option or the other (see 'peer 
rejection').  
Therefore, although IR recognition studies can explain peaceful relations, 
conflictual relations and the reasons for the passage from one to the other, this same 
ability of explanation also represents its main weakness. Indeed, this new strand of 
research can explain both peaceful and conflictual relations but only one per time; it 
can explain the presence of one or the other but cannot explain those more complex 
situations of international politics in which both peaceful and conflictual relations 
coexist.  
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Similarly, when examining from this explanatory perspective by focussing on 
foreign policies, recognition studies can explain the clear-cut politics of peaceful 
strategy or conflictual strategies, but they meet their limits when they must grasp a 
more articulated and composed foreign politics in which both strategies are present at 
the same time.  
In other words, the limits and weaknesses of this interpretative framework emerge in 
the situation in which the candidate is adopting both cooperative and competitive 
behaviours at the same time. How can we understand and interpret this situation of a 
compresence of behaviours? 
Being able to understand how to interpret properly the compresence of 
behaviours to avoid making any under- or over-evaluation mistakes is extremely 
important. Being too concessive or too tough with a status seeking (unsatisfied) 
candidate could be a fatal mistake for the entire system, or at least either approach 
might cause avoidable damages.  
For example, when Shogo Suzuki introduces his study on China's attempt to 
pursue the recognition of its identity through a strategy of compliance (Suzuki, 2008), 
when listing positive arguments backing his theory, he also admits and reports 
'negative behaviours' that contrast with this vision and that negatively weight the 
optimistic interpretation according to which China is behaving in conformance with the 
international (normative) system. As reported by the author,  
"At a time when undemocratic regimes are increasingly labelled ‘rogue states’ and 
withheld recognition as legitimate members of a society defined by its ‘democratic 
core’, Beijing’s human rights abuses within its own borders, its military build-up, and 
its reluctance to enforce democratic governance on behalf of international society 
makes China appear to be harbouring revisionist intentions. This can be seen from 
various ‘China Threat’ theses. The result – contrary to classical realists’ predictions 
that a state’s prestige will be enhanced by its growing military clout – is that China 
has increasingly come to resemble a ‘frustrated great power’, dogged and upset by 
deep suspicions that its fellow ‘legitimate great powers’ are ‘unwilling to see an 
independent, powerful, prosperous China stand proudly in the East’.  
  This is not to suggest that Beijing is the sole dissident in the American-led 
‘legitimate great power club’. As French opposition to the war on Iraq demonstrates, 
‘legitimate great powers’ certainly do have scope to disagree with the superpower. 
However, it is worth noting that France does not oppose the society’s fundamental 
goals of democratisation and respect for human rights. The Chinese case is 
qualitatively different in that the PRC has often found itself in fundamental 
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opposition to the norms which denote legitimate membership in international 
society" (Suzuki, 2008, 51-52). 
Once again, how can we understand and interpret similar situations? Can we rest 
peacefully in the hope that status-seeking states that perform conforming and 
complying behaviours next to competitive, assertive ones do not represent a threat to 
the system, or should we worry and adopt counter-measures to prevent potential 
threats? 
In the next section, we will focus on presenting some possible attempts to face 
the compresence of behaviours that attempt to give an explanation that remains 
faithful to the recognition studies' framework. Although recognizing the presence of 
both behaviours, scholars thus attempt to provide explanations that focus on the 
manifestations typical of one of the two strategies but downplay or justify the presence 
of the other manifestations.  
Therefore, rather than explaining the compresence of behaviours, they focus on 
explaining (in terms of matters of identity) the presence of competitive or cooperative 
strategies separately by considering one the main manifestation of intentions and the 
other an 'outlier' element, not valid to be included in the main explanation but that 
only requires justification in other terms.  
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2	  –	  Possible	  (alternative)	  explanations	  of	  the	  compresence	  of	  
cooperative	  and	  competitive	  behaviours	  	  
	  
2.1	  –	  Framing	  the	  compresence	  from	  an	  Optimistic	  or	  a	  Pessimistic	  
perspective	  
	  
Borrowing from Friedberg (2005) we can say that the recognition studies' framework 
can produce both an 'optimistic' and a 'pessimistic' interpretation of the same 
situation. It is here helpful to introduce and explain his interesting and helpful outline 
of the three main IR schools and their internal developments. 
 
2.1.1	  –	  Friedberg's	  outline:	  optimists	  and	  pessimists	  
  
When schematizing the theoretical development of the debate 'over the future of US-
China relations', Aaron Friedberg, in his 2005 publication, begins with reporting that the 
IR 'paradigmatic clashes' are still enduring in the IR field and that they are 
characterizing its development to the point that most analysts studying US-China 
relations "deploy arguments that derive from one or the other of the three main 
camps in contemporary international relations theorizing: liberalism, realism, and 
constructivism" (Friedberg, 2005, 9). The author moves then to introduce an interesting 
and useful finding; he highlights the fact that even between the same 'school' of 
thought, although scholars share the same 'basic analytical premises', they can 
nonetheless arrive at opposed conclusions. Indeed, with respect to US-China relations, 
the author asserts, "[T]hose whose basic analytical premises place them in one of 
these broad schools of thoughts do not necessarily have similar views regarding the 
future of US-China relations" (Friedberg, 2005, 9-10). This implies that "Each of the 
three theoretical schools, in sum, has two variants, one of which is essentially 
optimistic about the future of US-China relations, the other distinctly pessimistic" 
(Friedberg, 2005, 10). Indeed, still referring to US-China relations, 
"On this issue, it is possible to identify liberals who expect confrontation and 
conflict, realists who believe that the relationship will basically be stable and 
peaceful, and constructivists who think that events could go either way (Friedberg, 
2005, 10). 
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With specific consideration of the constructivist perspective, he adds,  
"Although scholars who fall into this broad category have tended to be optimistic 
about U.S.-China relations (and about East Asian international politics more 
generally), the perceptual and ideational factors they emphasize could just as easily 
be invoked to arrive at considerably gloomier conclusions, a fact that some self-
avowed constructivists have been at pains to point out" (Friedberg, 2005, 10). 
Therefore, with specific consideration of US-China relations, it is possible to understand 
that those same elements (the same causal forces and causal mechanisms) that 
allowed analysis from the mainstream constructivists' perspective to favour the 
optimistic conclusions also allowed analysis from the other constructivist perspective to 
arrive at pessimistic conclusions on future US-China relations. In other words, whereas 
analysis from the optimistic constructivist perspective perceives the virtuous circle and 
reassuring guarantee produced by (international) social interaction, pessimist 
constructivists fear the negative effects of social interaction. This perspective does 
consider that social interaction can reinforce the dangerous loop of mutual suspicion 
and insecurity.  
Therefore, analysis from the mainstream optimistic constructivist perspective, 
according to which 'social interaction' can self-strengthen the system because it allows 
'widely held beliefs' to be shared and to evolve (and again to be re-shared and so on, 
in a self-reinforcing mechanism) must compete with the 'pessimistic' constructivist 
perspective. Indeed, constructivist pessimists view the same causal forces (identities, 
strategic culture and norms) and causal mechanisms (social interaction) as the optimist 
constructivists do but from a different perspective; they thus arrive at opposite 
conclusions.  
Therefore, there are two possible conclusions based on the claim asserting, 
"Constructivists believe that repeated interactions can actually change the underlying 
beliefs, interests, and material categories of those who participate in them" (Friedberg, 
2005, 35).  
First, the transformation (the change) referred to in this phrase could be a positive 
change; indeed, from the optimistic perspective, social interaction favours the reduction 
of for example suspicion and insecurity by consequently favouring peaceful and 
cooperative relations and consequently bringing positive change. This optimistic 
perspective is accompanied by a confidence in the virtuous circle represented by the 
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'mutually reinforcing mechanism' between 'social participation' and self-socialization. 
That is, the more the state participates in international social interaction (via regional 
and global institutions), "the more the beliefs and expectations of its leaders will come 
to conform to the emerging universal consensus that those institutions embody" 
(Friedberg, 2005, 36). 
However, in the second and opposite case, the change brought by social interaction 
results in a negative change in which it is exactly the likely social interaction to 
sharpen suspicion and insecurity, producing a vicious circle that by fostering mutual 
suspicion also favours conflictual relations within the international system (Friedberg, 
2005, 34-39).  
  
2.1.2	  –	  Friedberg's	  outline	  applied	  to	  recognition	  studies	  
 
This perspective and the outline of this double-spirit that characterizes the 
constructivist perspective prove useful and valid beyond the specific case of US-China 
relations. In particular, it is useful with respect to the limits of the IR recognition 
studies perspective in gathering the complexity of international politics and relations. 
Indeed, adopting this frame of sub-strands of constructivism allows outlining and 
understanding some possible attempts using the IR recognition studies' framework to 
come to terms with the undeniable compresence of cooperative and conflictual 
relations, behaviours and politics. 
 Indeed, this ability to view the same phenomenon and read its positive or 
negative manifestations from an optimistic or pessimistic perspective can be useful in 
particular when addressing the manifestation of more complex and articulated 
international relations and foreign policies.  
Given that the mechanism of social recognition, as framed by recognition studies, can 
predict both international peace and war, in the presence of both manifestations of 
peaceful and conflictual relations, authors can focus on one or the other half of 
observable manifestations. 
Indeed, in situations in which both cooperative and competitive behaviours are present, 
being able to highlight the prevalence of one above the other helps scholars and 
practitioners to frame a more graspable situation.  
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Therefore, scholars and practitioners can adopt an optimist or pessimist perspective by 
focussing primarily on the manifestation of complying or competitive behaviours, 
respectively. 
However, this approach to grasping and understanding a situation requires (and 
induces) scholars to both (1) tend to simplify the situation by focussing (only) on one 
type of manifestation (positive or negative) but nonetheless justify the other half of 
manifestations that would otherwise interfere with the main explanation, and (2) 
develop further and alternative explanations that can intervene with the intent of 
explaining the situation – by justifying it – and explaining the presence of the other 
half of observable behaviours. Therefore, positive elements (manifestations of 
conforming behaviours) are downplayed when the main interpretation is pessimistic, and 
vice versa; negative behaviours are downplayed or justified when the principal 
interpretation is optimistic. 
 
2.2	  –	  Downplaying	  and	  justifying	  the	  compresence	  of	  cooperative	  and	  
competitive	  behaviours	  
 
Drawing on the framework built by Friedberg (2005) helps us to outline possible 
interpretations of the compresence of cooperative and competitive behaviours.  
Indeed, given that, to impose their identity on the audience, frustrated powers (the 
misrecognized candidate) can turn to complying strategies (option 3) or to violent 
action and conflictual strategies (option 4); when scholars and practitioners face the 
presence of both strategies, they attempt to understand this compresence by adopting 
an optimistic or a pessimistic perspective. In the first case, from an optimistic 
perspective, they might consider the compresence as though it were a manifestation of 
complying behaviours typical of option 3, accompanied by negative behaviours that, 
although typical of option 4, still in the interpretation are not considered representative 
of conflictual intentions but rather outlier manifestations. The second interpretative 
option, the pessimist perspective, supports the compresence of behaviours as a 
prevalence of negative aggressive behaviours that clearly manifest strategy 4, with an 
anomalous presence of positive behaviours that are not symptomatic of option 3 but 
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that could simply be considered outliers within the strategy of aggressive and 
conflictual behaviour.  
Therefore, optimistic or pessimistic framings are used as a means of focussing on one 
of the two manifestations, downplaying or justifying the presence of the other 
manifestations by resorting to other terms.  
In particular, in this last case, given that option 4 should be leading to conflict 
and war, the positive behaviours can be explained as a 'cover story' adopted during 
preparation for conflict or as 'collateral' manifestations of behaviours that are irrelevant 
with respect to the strategy chosen and implemented to obtain identity recognition.  
In contrast, option 3 plus negative behaviours is more difficult to explain and justify. 
Indeed, given that the prevalence of option 3 should be reassuring with respect to the 
evolution of international relations, it is thus difficult in a similar situation to trust that 
the manifestation of those negative behaviours is not relevant and can be ignored and 
justified in other terms. Underestimation or overreactions are possible mistakes that 
could be made in similar situations. 
The next sections will be devoted to an analysis of these two options. 
 
2.2.1	  –	  Downplaying	  the	  presence	  of	  cooperative	  behaviours	  next	  to	  competitive	  
behaviours	  
  
By focussing initially on the situation in which the candidate has decided to 
adopt conflictual politics as a strategy to gain identity and recognition, the presence 
of cooperative behaviours next to conflictual behaviours is almost irrelevant in the eyes 
of pessimist recognition scholars.  
 
(I)	  –	  Understanding	  the	  prevalence	  of	  competitive	  behaviours	  by	  introducing	  the	  
concepts	  of	  status	  quo,	  revisionist	  or	  revolutionary	  approaches	  
 
According to Suzuki (who supports that frustrated powers have incentive to turn 
to complying strategies), the problem concerns the fact that "The literature has tended 
to treat ‘frustrated great powers’ as synonymous with ‘revisionist powers’, with Hitlerite 
Germany and Imperial Japan being prime examples" (Suzuki, 2008, 59). 
The conceptual triad status quo, revisionist, revolutionary is useful in helping to 
frame the problem from another perspective. This triplet has been employed in 
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different combinations; indeed, it can define powers, intentions or approaches. Status 
quo powers are powers that aim to preserve the status quo of the system; therefore, 
they have status quo intentions and apply status quo approaches (strategies and 
behaviours). At the extreme opposite, revolutionary powers are powers that aim at 
overturning the entire system (revolutionary intentions) and commit to completely 
changing it (revolutionary approaches). However, in between the other two options, 
revisionist powers aim at introducing revisions to the system (intentions) and apply 
revisionist approaches to reach this scope. 
This triplet of concepts has been used to foster the debate between realists 
and constructivists35, but it also characterizes both perspectives. Indeed, by leaving 
aside the realist-constructivist divide, it is possible to focus on the divide characterizing 
                                                
 
35	   The	   issue	   of	   'revisionism',	   as	   presented	   by	   Geldenhuys	   (2004),	   can	   be	   more	   generally	   placed	   within	   a	   larger	  
understanding	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  rising	  powers.	  Indeed,	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  bipolar	  system,	  the	  debate	  concerning	  
the	   emergence	   of	   rising	   powers	   underwent	   an	   evolution;	   it	   passed	   from	   trying	   to	   understand	   whether	   the	  
emergence	   of	   new	   powers	   in	   the	   system	   was	   more	   or	   less	   possible	   to	   –	   once	   more-­‐concrete	   signals	   of	   power	  
redistribution	  started	  to	  be	   identified	  –	   focussing	  on	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	   implicit	   intentions	  of	  potential	   rising	  
powers.	  	  
The	  practical	  relevance	  of	  this	  analytical	  and	  predictive	  need	  has	  induced	  authors	  to	  address	  the	  possible	  scopes	  of	  
ambitions	  of	  potential	  rising	  powers	  by	  classifying	  some	  possible	  'types	  of	  rising	  powers'	  based	  on	  their	  satisfaction	  
and	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  status	  quo.	  	   	  
Indeed,	  what	   generally	   emerges	   from	   the	   literature	   is	   the	  possibility	   of	   identifying	   a	   continuum	   that,	   ideally,	   goes	  
from	   'absolute	   satisfaction'	   to	   'absolute	   dissatisfaction',	   along	   which	   it	   is	   possible	   (with	   a	   bit	   of	   simplification)	   to	  
identify	  three	  types	  of	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  international	  system,	  depending	  upon	  the	  states'	  degrees	  of	  satisfaction	  
and	  the	  related	  scopes	  of	  their	  ambitions.	  Moving	  along	  this	  continuum	  by	  taking	  the	  start	  from	  the	  'satisfied'	  pole,	  
the	  first	  type	  of	  international	  standing	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  "status	  quo	  state".	  This	  term	  refers	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  
the	  status	  quo	  state	   is	  satisfied	  with	  the	   international	  system.	  This	   type	  of	  state	  does	  not	  constitute	  any	  source	  of	  
threat	  to	  the	  system,	  because	  its	  aim	  is	  to	  maintain	  and	  perpetrate	  it	  (Friedberg,	  2005,	  26-­‐27;	  Johnston,	  2003).	  On	  
the	   opposite	   end	   of	   this	   continuum,	   one	   could	   identify	   the	   extreme	   case	   that	   refers	   to	   those	   states	   that	   are	  
completely	  unsatisfied	  with	   the	  status	  quo	   (or	  very	  close	   to	   that	  point)	  and	  that	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  "revolutionary"	  
states	  because	  they	  seek	  to	  completely	  overthrow	  the	  existing	  system	  (Friedberg,	  2005,	  26).	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  middle	  
range	  of	   this	   continuum,	  one	  could	   identify	  a	   type	  of	  power	   that	   is	   'partially'	  unsatisfied	  with	   the	   status	  quo.	  This	  
state	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  "revisionist"	  power,	  and	  its	  aims	  are	  to	  'partially'	  revise	  the	  status	  quo.	  Indeed,	  these	  are	  
"states	   that	   seek	  marginal	   adjustments	   to	   the	   status	   quo	   rather	   than	   fundamental	   change"	   (Friedberg,	   2005,	   27).	  	  
This	   outline	   becomes	  more	   articulated	   when	   specifying	   that	  marginal	   adjustments	   could	   change	   in	   content	   or	   in	  
degree.	   A	   change	   in	   content	   implies	   that	  marginal	   adjustments	   could	   refer	   to	  material	   power	   distribution,	   social	  
status	  distribution,	  and	  or	  to	  the	  normative	  content	  –	  the	  "system	  of	  international	  rules	  and	  institutions"	  (Friedberg,	  
2005,	  26),	  whereas	  a	  change	  in	  degree	  implies	  aiming	  at	  a	  more	  or	   less	  marginal	  amendment	  to	  the	  system.	  Some	  
examples	  of	  these	  variants	  could	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  literature:	  	   	  
Indeed,	  by	  drawing	  on	  Ross	  (1997),	  Friedberg	  refers	  to	  China	  as	  a	  "conservative	  power",	  meaning	  a	  "cautious	  power	  
with	   limited	   aims"	   (Friedberg,	   2005,	   27).	   China	   can	   be	   so	   defined	   when	   considering	   that,	   although	   not	   yet	   a	  
completely	  satisfied	  status	  quo	  power,	   its	  revisionist	  aims	  remain	  very	  limited.	  "The	  concrete	  changes	  to	  the	  status	  
quo	   that	  China’s	   leaders	   seek	  are,	  arguably,	   comparatively	   limited:	   the	   reintegration	  of	  Taiwan	  with	   the	  mainland,	  
rectification	  of	  some	  disputed	  borders,	  and	  the	  acceptance	  by	  the	  international	  community	  of	  its	  claims	  to	  portions	  
of	  the	  South	  China	  Sea"	  (Friedberg,	  2005,	  27).	  	   	  
Conversely,	  as	  reported	  by	  Johnston	  (2003),	  Schweller	  conceives	  that	  revisionist	  states	  "will	  employ	  military	  force	  to	  
change	   the	   status	   quo	   and	   to	   extend	   their	   values"	   (Johnston,	   2003,	   9;	   Schweller,	   1994,	   105).	  Moreover,	   another	  
(harsher)	  example	  is	  given	  by	  Robert	  Gilpin,	  who	  identifies	  in	  the	  'distribution	  of	  power',	   'hierarchy	  of	  prestige'	  and	  
"rights	  and	  rules	  that	  govern	  or	  at	  least	  influence	  the	  interactions	  among	  states"	  three	  components	  that	  "revisionist	  
states	  seek	  to	  fundamentally	  alter"	  (Gilpin,	  1981,	  34;	  in:	  Johnston,	  2003,	  10).	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the constructivist perspective itself. Regardless of whether, for realists, the driving force 
is represented by material power and systemic pressure, for constructivists, the driving 
force is represented by 'intentions' (Suzuki, 2008). A state can have status quo, 
revisionist or revolutionary intentions. Distinguishing the three situations can be 
particularly difficult, considering that elements characterizing the two extremes (status 
quo and revolutionary) might also characterize the in-between option (revisionism). 
 
Therefore, the problem is that unsatisfied powers that are facing misrecognition 
in a situation of mismatch are usually considered revisionist powers that have 
revisionist aims and perform revisionist approaches. This finding implies that these 
powers are considered potential threats to the system and that the reaction to their 
international standing might be too strong for the situation, fostering escalation (in 
addition to insecurity)36.  
However, what are revisionist approaches? To understand this question, it is 
useful to recall Geldenhuys' (2004) definitions of 'political deviance' (meant as an act) 
and of 'political deviant' (meant as an actor).  
The author, by building on sociological theories of deviance37, studies "Deviant Conduct 
in World Politics" (2004). Keeping in mind that labelling 'deviant behaviours' and 
                                                
 
36	  Indeed,	  Suzuki	  continues	  highlighting	  the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  a	  continuous	  attempt	  to	  predict	  threats:	  "Nowadays,	  
these	   debates	   typically	   take	   the	   form	   of	   a	   cottage	   industry	   that	   seeks	   to	   predict	   the	   future	   challengers	   to	   the	  
American	  hegemonic	  order	  and	  prescribe	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  should	  deal	  with	  them"	  (Suzuki,	  2008,	  59).	  	  
37	  Beginning	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  any	  organized	  society	  (from	  the	  level	  of	  individuals	  to	  the	  international	  level)	  
runs	  its	  affairs	  "according	  to	  rules"	  (Geldenhuys,	  2004,	  13),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  arrive	  at	  considering	  also	  that	  both	  formal	  
and	   informal	  rules	  create	  expectations	  of	   'predictability'.	   Indeed,	  "Whether	  written	  or	  unwritten,	  rules	  bring	  order,	  
regularity	  and	  predictability	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  groups.	  These	  norms	  or	  standards	  of	  behaviour	  prescribe	  ways	  in	  
which	  things	  should	  be	  done,	  or	  proscribe	  what	  may	  not	  be	  done"	  (Geldenhuys,	  2004,	  13).	   	  
The	  establishment	  of	  rules	  naturally	  calls	  for	  conformity,	  but	  it	  also	  by	  default	  implies	  the	  possibility	  of	  violations.	  This	  
process	  relates	  to	  prescriptions	  and	  proscriptions;	  rules	  also	  "provide	  for	  punishment	   in	  the	  case	  of	  violations"	  (Ivi,	  
13).	   Indeed,	  notwithstanding	  the	   incentives	   to	  conform	  to	  and	  respect	   rules,	   'infringement'	  of	   rules	  does	  occur,	  as	  
reported	  by	  the	  author,	  both	  at	  the	  individual	  and	  international	   level.	  "There	  are	  compelling	  reasons	  for	  states	  and	  
individuals	   alike	   to	   respect	   codes	   of	   conduct.	   Among	   other	   things,	   such	   observance	   ‘is	   psychologically	   fulfilling,	  
efficient,	  and	  carries	  the	  rewards	  of	  compliance	  and	  avoids	  the	  punishments	  of	  deviance’.	  Even	  so,	  there	  have	  always	  
been	  states	  –	   like	   individual	  human	  beings	  –	   finding	   justifications	   for	   infringing	  standards	  of	  behaviour	   that	  others	  
expected	  them	  to	  uphold"	  (Ivi,	  13).	    
When	   'infringement'	   occurs,	   provided	   sanctions	   become	   relevant;	   however,	   the	   options	   of	   punishment	   vary	   from	  
"mild	  censure	  to	  expulsion	  from	  the	  group"	  (Ivi,	  13).	  This	  variety	  of	  options	  is	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  rules	  –	  together	  
with	  conformity	  and	  violation	  –	  cannot	  be	  separated	   from	  the	  context	  of	   society;	  hence,	  deviance	   (meant	  as	   rule-­‐
breaking	  behaviour	  –	  behaviour	  that	  is	  not	  in	  accordance	  with	  rules	  or	  social	  norms)	  is	  "created	  by	  society".	  Indeed,	  
the	   author,	   by	   drawing	   on	   Becker's	   sociological	   theory	   of	   deviance	   (Becker,	   1973),	   reports,	   "'deviant	   behaviour	   is	  
behavior	  that	  people	  so	  label’;	  whether	  an	  act	  is	  deviant	  depends	  on	  how	  others	  respond	  to	  it"	  (Ivi,	  14).	  Again	  directly	  
quoting	  Becker,	  “deviance	  is	  not	  a	  quality	  of	  the	  act	  the	  person	  commits,	  but	  rather	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  application	  
by	  others	  of	  rules	  and	  sanctions	  to	  an	  ‘offender’”	  (Ivi,	  14).	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identifying deviant actors can be a political issue (and a political power), the important 
relationship between social behaviours and social context nevertheless leaves a strong 
imprint on the definition of "political deviance" at both the individual and international 
levels. Indeed, it is by building on the idea that deviance is 'created by society' and 
depends upon its being or not being labelled that the author arrives at defining 
political deviance as "direct and explicit acts that ‘challenge the social order’" (Ivi, 14). 
Indeed, "deviant conduct is defined in terms of a departure from accepted norms of 
behaviour" (Ivi, 50). This departure can occur for specific social groups or for society 
as a whole, both at the level of individuals and at the level of international politics. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
The	   role	   played	   by	   the	   social	   context	   is	   even	   more	   visible	   when	   considering	   (as	   reminded	   by	   the	   sociology	   of	  
deviance)	  that	  "social	  rules	  are	  the	  creation	  of	  specific	  social	  groups"	  and	  that,	  given	  the	  'high	  differentiation'	  of	  and	  
within	   social	   groups,	   this	   point	   implies	   the	   possibility	   of	   identifying	   transgressive	   behaviours	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
norms	  set	  by	  a	  society	  'as	  a	  whole'	  or	  to	  the	  norms	  pertaining	  to	  sub-­‐groups.	  Indeed,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  author,	  "(…)	  
societies	   are	   ‘highly	   differentiated’	   along	   class,	   ethnic,	   occupational	   and	   cultural	   lines.	   The	   problems	   they	   face	   in	  
dealing	  with	  their	  environment	  and	  the	  history	  and	  traditions	  they	  carry	  with	  them	  result	  in	  groups	  often	  not	  sharing	  
the	  same	  rules.	  This	  causes	  disagreement	  about	  the	  kinds	  of	  behaviour	  considered	  proper	  in	  any	  given	  situation.	  (…)	  
Since	  there	  are	  in	  practice	  many	  cultures	  and	  publics,	  nonconformity	  may	  amount	  to	  the	  transgression	  of	  standards	  
set	  by	  a	  subgroup	  or	  subculture,	  not	  those	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole"	  (Ivi,	  15).	   	  
Therefore,	   the	   identification	   of	   'deviant	   behaviours'	   is	   related	   to	   the	   society	   itself,	   to	   time	   (in	   a	   certain	   historical	  
moment	   a	   certain	   norm	   can	   be	   more	   or	   less	   relevant),	   and	   also	   to	   'social	   power'.	   Indeed,	   "'social	   power'	   can	  
determine	  who	  defines	  who	  as	  a	  'deviant'"	  (Ivi,	  16).	  For	  this	  reason,	  "the	  identity	  of	  the	  actor	  that	  commits	  deviation"	  
is	  also	  relevant	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  "variation	   in	  responses	  to	  acts	  of	  nonconformity".	   Indeed,	  actors	  that	  are	  more	  
powerful	  within	  the	  community	  can	  enjoy	  "greater	  ‘deviant	  opportunity’	  than	  the	  powerless	  and	  also	  encounter	  less	  
social	  control	  than	  their	  weaker	  counterparts"	  (Ivi,	  15-­‐16).	  	  	  
This	  all	  is	  also	  valid	  at	  the	  international	  level	  and	  for	  states.	  Indeed,	  the	  sociological	  theories	  of	  deviance	  "also	  speak	  
to	   the	   behaviour	   of	   states	   and	   non-­‐state	   groups"	   (Ivi,	   13).	   Therefore,	   deviance	  within	   international	   politics	   is	   also	  
'created	   by	   society',	   depends	   upon	   the	   social	   context	   and	   time,	   and	   is	   strongly	   affected	   by	   'social	   power'.	  	  
With	  respect	  to	  sanctions	  and	  reactions	  to	  deviance	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  not	  only	  "deviant	  conduct	  may	  invite	  
more	   than	   verbal	   censure,	   extending	   to	   tangible	   punitive	  measures	   such	   as	   diplomatic	   and	   economic	   sanctions".	  
However,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   for	   the	   author	   to	   adjust	   this	   preceding	   theoretical	   perspective	   by	   considering	   the	  
distinction	  between	  “’true'	  deviants”37	  and	  “'nominal'	  deviants”	   (Ivi,	  15).	  What	  distinguishes	  one	   from	  the	  other	   is	  
that,	   whereas	   in	   both	   cases,	   they	   "manifestly	   violate	   common	   standards	   of	   behaviour",	   the	   'true	   deviant'	   goes	  
through	   international	  censure	  and	  punishment,	  whereas	  the	   'nominal	  deviant'	   (largely	   for	  reasons	  related	  to	  social	  
context	  and	  social	  power)	  is	  able	  to	  escape	  it	  (Ivi,	  15).	  Furthermore,	  the	  author	  revises	  this	  categorization	  by	  adding	  a	  
third	  category	  that	  distinguishes	  the	  case	  of	  'nominal	  deviant'	  states	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  international	  censure	  while	  
escaping	  serious	  international	  punishment	  and,	  conversely,	  the	  case	  of	  'nominal	  deviant'	  states	  that	  can	  escape	  both	  
punishment	  and	  international	  censure.	  Directly	  quoting	  the	  author,	  "The	  hierarchy	  does	  not	  cater	  for	  the	  reality	  that	  
some	  states	  breaking	   international	  norms	  are	  not	   the	   targets	  of	   serious	   international	  punishment.	  These	  could	  be	  
described	   as	   nominal	   deviants.	   Consider	   the	   case	   of	   China,	  whose	   ‘pervasive	   and	  unremitting’	   violation	  of	   human	  
rights	  norms	  has	   led	  critical	   commentators	   to	  brand	   it	  a	   rogue	  or	  pariah	  state.	  Various	  aspects	  of	  China’s	  external	  
conduct	   have	   also	   caused	   concern,	   in	   at	   least	   the	   US.	   (…)	   Yet	   China	   has	   not	   been	   subjected	   to	   the	   kinds	   of	  
punishment	  meted	  out	  to	  other	  errant	  states.	  The	  obvious	  explanation	  for	  this	   inconsistency	  or	  double	  standard	   is	  
that	   China	   is	   too	   large,	   powerful	   and	   influential	   in	   the	  world	   arena	   to	   be	   subjected	   to	   the	   indignities	   and	   risks	   of	  
punishment	   for	  unbecoming	  conduct.	  None	  of	   the	   ‘real’	  deviant	  states	  of	  our	  case	  studies	  carried	  the	  same	  global	  
clout	  as	  China	  and	  they	  thus	  lacked	  the	  same	  immunity	  from	  punishment"	  (Ivi,	  46-­‐47).	  Again,	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
third	  category,	  "other	  nominal	  deviant	  states	  that	  have	  clearly	  violated	  commonly	  accepted	  standards	  of	  behaviour	  
but	   have	   escaped	   international	   punishment	   or	   even	   mild	   censure"	   (Ivi,	   46-­‐47).	   The	   author	   also	   mentions	   Saudi	  
Arabia,	  Turkey,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  as	  possible	  examples	  (Ivi,	  46-­‐47).	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From the above, it follows that the 'political deviant', as an actor, is reported being 
"likely to be characterized as someone who is irresponsible, unwilling to ‘play the 
game’ by the established rules, stigmatized, and dishonoured, and might be labelled a 
‘pariah’38" (Ivi, 14).  
Defining the 'political deviant' as irresponsible and unwilling to play the game provides 
a slight idea of what the concept of political deviance assumes. Indeed, defining 
political deviance as acts directly and explicitly challenging the social order implies 
that the lack of will in playing the game entails an effort in 'challenging the social 
order'. 
This is well rendered also in the characterization of international political deviants; 
indeed, the author writes, 
"It is in the nature of political deviants, we have noted, to challenge the prevailing 
social order. Several deviant states, our case studies will show, are deeply 
dissatisfied with the prevailing international order and wish to see it changed 
(Geldenhuys, 2004, 22). 
Beginning with these considerations, he also applies "the concept of international order 
to the existing distribution of power in world politics and the accompanying rules or 
conventions of behaviour" by acknowledging that "international orders are not neutral 
in their consequences for states; some can benefit more than others from existing 
international arrangements". He comes full circle by maintaining, 
"States that view the prevailing international order as inequitable and damaging to 
their interests typically wish to change the status quo. Adopting what is known as a 
revisionist approach"39 (Geldenhuys, 2004, 22-23). 
                                                
 
38	  "The	  term	   ‘pariah’	   is	  a	  British	  corruption	  of	   ‘paraiyar’,	  one	  of	   the	   lower	  castes	   in	  southern	   India	   from	  which	  the	  
British	   colonialists,	   during	   their	   long	   occupation	   of	   India,	   drew	  most	   of	   their	   household	   servants.	   Since	   then,	   the	  
British	  and	  other	  Westerners	  have	  used	  ‘pariah’	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘the	  lowest	  of	  the	  low,	  an	  utter	  social	  outcast	  among	  his	  
own	   kind’	   or,	   more	   generally,	   ‘(a)ny	   person	   (or	   animal)	   of	   a	   degraded	   or	   despised	   class’.	   In	   scholarly	   work	   the	  
designation	   ‘pariah’	  has	  been	  applied	   to,	  among	  others,	   cities,	   a	   social	  underclass	  and,	  perhaps	  most	   famously,	   to	  
Jews	   in	   the	   diaspora.	   Several	   international	   politics	   scholars	   employed	   the	   term	   pariah	   state	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	  
years.	   Although	   ‘pariah’	   has	   since	   lost	   much	   of	   its	   earlier	   popularity	   as	   a	   label	   for	   errant	   countries,	   it	   is	   still	  
occasionally	   used	   in	   this	   fashion	   to	   refer	   to,	   for	   instance,	   Israel,	   Iraq,	   Libya,	   Sudan,	   Serbia	   and	   North	   Korea"	  
(Geldenhuys,	  2004,	  1-­‐2).	  See:	  Geldenhuys,	  2004,	  1-­‐4.	  
39	   The	   author	   redefines	   the	  notion	  of	   revisionism	   "to	  make	   it	  more	  helpful	   in	   understanding	   some	  deviant	   states’	  
responses	  to	  international	  order".	  He	  refers	  to	  three	  types	  of	  revisionism:	  (1)	  "Orthodox	  revisionism,	  occurring	  within	  
the	  existing	   framework	  of	   ideas	  and	  relations,	   is	  aimed	  at	  restoring	  the	  dissatisfied	  state’s	  previously	  held	  place	  or	  
status	  in	  the	  international	  hierarchy	  or	  at	  least	  giving	  the	  challenger	  an	  improved	  position	  in	  the	  global	  pecking	  order	  
(as	   with	   Imperial	   Germany	   and	   Imperial	   Japan	   before	   World	   War	   I	   and	   Germany	   again	   after	   the	   War)".	   (2)	  
"Revolutionary	   revisionism	   challenges	   the	   entire	   set	   of	   assumptions	   and	   organizing	   principles	   of	   the	   international	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From the above, a strict relationship emerges between deviant behaviour (the 
manifestation of the conduct that departs from the 'accepted norms of behaviours') 
and the implied aim of this behaviour (namely, challenging the system). Therefore, one 
can conclude that those who perform deviant behaviours aim at revising the system.  
 
A consideration can be advanced at this point: the concept of international 
order, applied to the concept of deviance, implicates a correspondence (overlap) 
between the manifestation of the behaviour and the implied purposes that are 
assumed lying behind those behaviours. Indeed, when a deviant behaviour is performed 
or observed from this perspective, a revisionist intention can be assumed. 
 
2.2.2	  –	  Justifying	  the	  presence	  of	  competitive	  behaviours	  next	  to	  cooperative	  behaviours	  
 
In contrast, when adopting an optimistic perspective, the manifestation of both 
cooperative and competitive behaviours can be framed as the presence of positive 
cooperative behaviours (given that intentions are positive and peaceful) with the 
presence of negative behaviours, which can be justified in other terms. We introduce in 
the next sections some possible justifications for the (com)presence of negative 
behaviours next to the positive manifestations of the positive intentions of the status-
seeking candidate. 
	  
(I)	  –	  Mistakes	  in	  the	  implementation	  process	  	  
  
 As reported above, the mechanism of the recognition process resembles the 
mechanism of a socialization process and requires the positive conformation of the 
candidate to the formal and/or informal rules of the society to which he is trying to 
adhere. However, as reported by Long and Hadden (1995) in their description of the 
socialization process itself, during the process of adaptation to rules as implemented 
                                                                                                                                          
 
system	   (the	   Soviet	   Union	   after	   1917,	   and	   Libya	   and	   Iran	   more	   recently).	   For	   them,	   justice	   requires	   that	   the	  
established	  order	  –	  characterized	  by	  subordination	  and	  exploitation	  –	  be	  overthrown	  or	   transformed".	   (3)	   "Radical	  
revisionism,	   which	   falls	   between	   the	   other	   two	   forms,	   is	   geared	   towards	   both	   self-­‐advantage	   and	   reform	   of	   the	  
system	  (illustrated	  by	  the	  earlier	  mentioned	  propagation	  of	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order).	  (…)	  Paradoxically,	  
many	  of	   the	  states	   taking	  a	   revisionist	  position	  on	   the	  prevailing	  world	  order	  are	  at	   the	  same	  time	  the	  staunchest	  
defenders	  of	  some	  of	   its	  basic	  precepts.	  (…)	  The	  liberal	  conception	  of	  world	  order,	  with	   its	  emphasis	  on	  intra-­‐state	  
justice	  (based	  on	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights),	  is	  anathema	  to	  most	  deviant	  countries"	  (Geldenhuys,	  2004,	  23).	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by the candidate, he – although conscious of the complying requirements of the 
process – might commit mistakes in the implementation of the process of adherence 
and compliance to (formal or informal) rules and norms. 
Indeed, leaving aside the situation in which the candidate is 'unwilling' to comply40, it is 
possible to consider that the candidate, when willing to comply with the mechanism of 
'socialization' and compliance as required by the recognition process, might be unable 
to comply, or might commit mistakes while genuinely attempting to comply. 
Similar mistakes can be manifested through the adoption of behaviours that are 
perceived by the audience as 'negative' or competitive. 
 
(II)	  –	  Gaps	  between	  the	  social	  world	  of	  socialization	  and	  the	  real	  world 	  
  
 By referring to Long and Hadden's (1995) conceptualization of the socialization 
process, it is always possible to find another explanation for the 'anomalous' presence 
of negative behaviours next to the manifestation of positive behaviours (symptomatic of 
positive, complying intentions). 
 When Long and Hadden (1995) outline their reconception of the socialization 
process (see section 4.5.1), they emphasize that during the process of socialization as 
applied by the group on the candidates, and particularly during the process of 
'creation', when the members of the group are 'showing' to candidates the specific 
content of the membership of the group – when they are showing the 'cultural' aspects 
and 'social organizational' aspects of the group41 – a process of 'simplification' of this 
same content occurs. Indeed, as the authors report,  
“What members show novices displays the requisite of group life, but it does not 
exactly duplicate the actual world of the members, even that small part passed on 
in socialization. Socializing agents highlight selected features of the requisites, 
emphasize some at the expense of others, exaggerate some, and elaborate others 
less than fully. This is inevitable, for socialization requires some abstraction and 
crystallization of the members' world, the full complexity of which can be neither 
                                                
 
40	   A	   similar	   situation	   is	   not	   understandable	   under	   the	   optimistic	   perspective	   because	   the	   candidate	   is	   proving	  
'negative'	  intentions.	  	  
41	  Culture	   is	  defined	  as	   follows:	  “Consisting	  of	  a	  system	  of	   rules	  putatively	  shared	  by	  all	  members,	   the	  culture	  of	  a	  
group	  constitutes	  a	  set	  of	   integrative	  principles	  around	  which	  members	   forge	  a	  common	  bond	  and	  carry	  out	   their	  
activities”.	  Social	  organization	  is	  said	  to	  consist	  "of	  a	  system	  of	  social	  positions	  by	  means	  of	  which	  groups	  divide	  their	  
tasks	  and	  differentially	  allocate	  them	  among	  member”	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985,	  42).	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shown in the time available nor comprehended by newcomers. From the members' 
point of view, therefore, socialization shows a somewhat distorted picture of the 
group's culture and organization. But for novices, this distortion is virtually all that 
is available, and that fact inevitably creates some adjustment problems and 
generational differences between members and novices which change the group 
even as it is sustained” (Long, Hadden, 1985, 45). 
This process of simplification of the content ("abstraction and crystallization of the 
members' world") is presented as necessary because it is impossible to replicate 
perfectly the complexity of the real world of the group. However, this same 
'simplification' can create a 'gap' between the content of the real world of the group 
and the 'image' that is 'shown' to candidates as a bearing for the process of 
socialization. This 'distorted picture of the group's culture and organization' is the only 
element available for the candidates' orientation, implying that the candidates will 
adhere to it as much as possible. Once they have completed the socialization process, 
they will find themselves facing the reality of the so-called 'real world' of the group, 
which is different from the distorted image that was given to them. Therefore, the 
candidates, once having entered the group, must adapt and adjust themselves to the 
'real reality of the group' – to the real culture and organization of the group.  
 In addition to this first gap, the authors identify another possible gap between 
the process of socialization and the real world of the group. In particular, the authors 
claim that in situations in which the group is wide, the process of socialization can be 
'institutionalized' in a self-existing reality that exists within the group and that includes 
the presence of 'socializing agents' addressing the process in the name of the rest of 
the group. Indeed, directly quoting, the authors highlight that  
“Creating and incorporating differ from members' primary activities. That is, 
socialization has its own unique culture and social organization which constitute a 
separate social world of socialization distinct from the social world of members. It 
is crucial to keep the distinction in mind, for many events of socialization, and 
some of its putative outcomes as well, take their character from the world of 
socialization, not the world of members. The more differentiated the socialization 
process from life as a member and the longer its duration, the more well 
developed and distinct the social world of socialization will be, and the more likely 
it will exert an independent influence on novices' behavior. The more elaborated 
this world of socialization, in turn, the greater the need to socialize both novices 
and socializing agents for it, so that they will know how properly to socialize and 
to be socialized” (Long, Hadden, 1985, 46). 
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Therefore, this parallel coexistence of the real world and the 'social world of 
socialization' that can develop its own 'culture and social organization' constitute 
another possible gap in the process of socialization.  
 Given these two gaps, it is evident that once the candidate has completed the 
process of selection and joined the real world of the group, he or she must address 
the 'adjustment problems' and readapt to the real content of culture and social 
organization characteristic of the group (and not of the process to join the group).  
 Something similar can be found in the analysis made by Jozef Bátora (2013). 
By studying Slovakia's process of membership in NATO, the author finds that the 
behaviour that the candidate displays during the process of gaining membership is 
different from the behaviours that the candidate adopts once it becomes a member. In 
particular, the author highlights that during the selection process, candidates avoid 
adopting non-complying behaviours because they are evaluated specifically on their 
compliance with the institution's standards and policies. However, upon gaining 
membership, the candidates allow themselves also to adopt non-compliant behaviours 
to promote 'specific interests'.  
Indeed, the author reports that  
"While prior to membership, countries are recognized for their compliance with 
NATO standards and policies, upon membership countries get the opportunity to 
promote specific interests legitimately and may seek recognition via non-compliance 
with NATO mainstream. (…) While prior to membership recognition was achieved by 
compliance and identification with NATO standpoints, policies and actions, upon 
membership, recognition is achieved by differentiation from these patterns" (Bátora, 
2013, abstract). 
Although the author in his articles primarily highlights the 'powerful source of 
conditionality' represented by the process of recognition, it is extremely interesting for 
us to note instead that this work confirms, at the international level, what Long and 
Hadden have identified at the social level. In recognition processes occurring in the 
international arena, we can also find gaps between the process of socialization and 
the real world of the group. 
 Therefore, to conclude, this gap and the consequently needed process of 
'adjustment' to the real world can be identified as a possible explanation of the 
presence of the negative, non-complying behaviours – as supported by Bátora himself 
(2013). 
 
 
79 
In other words, the candidate follows certain requirements during the process of 
admission to the group. These requirements oblige him to behave prosaically. This 
point is also perfectly in line with the fact that the process of socialization and the 
process of recognition are both conceived as characterized by social-relational 
features; therefore, they are presented as being prosocial. Once it has overcome the 
access threshold of the membership to the group, the former-candidate (new-member) 
must readapt its knowledge of the behaviours that are required and admitted in the 
group. In this specific situation (once a member), it must join the group in the 
available behaviours depending upon its aims and intentions – and depending upon the 
group itself. Therefore, according to a report by Bátora (2013), when the new member 
wants to pursue its own interests, it can do so by performing non-compliant 
behaviours. The candidate can seek recognition by performing non-compliant 
behaviours (Bátora, 2013). 
 
 This finding highlighted by Bátora (2013) is interesting and opens new room for 
further studies that focus on the compresence of behaviours in certain institutions. 
However, this perspective leaves aside the explanation of the compresence of 
behaviours observed specifically during the process of socialization to a certain group. 
Moreover, this perspective reinforces the mainstream idea according to which 
recognition processes as much as socialization processes require prosocial behaviours 
to be socially accomplished. 
 
(III)	  –	  Role-­‐theory	  perspective	  
 
Another possible approach to framing the presence of deviant behaviours next to 
conforming ones is by analysing with more attention the prescription of the recognition 
game and in particular by focussing on the identification of the norms and rules to 
which one should conform. 
More specifically, the two authors who define and characterize the 'recognition game' 
as largely about conforming to rules and norms – Ringmar in the first instance and 
Suzuki by directly drawing on his work – appear to refer to two different types of 
norms.  
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In particular, when defining the recognition game, Ringmar asserts that the case of a 
state that wants to improve its social position is, "in sociological terms",  
"the situation of the self-conscious outsider or social upstart who tries to conform 
as closely as ever possible to the rules which govern life in a certain social setting. 
By conforming to the rules he makes it possible for others to recognize him as the 
kind of person to whom these rules apply" (Ringmar, 2002, 121-122). 
Therefore, in Ringmar's view, a state that is seeking status improvement (the candidate) 
should conform to "the rules which govern life in a certain social setting". Conversely, 
Suzuki, although directly quoting this same sentence by Ringmar, qualifies norms 
differently a few lines before the quotation. Suzuki writes, 
"In the context of ‘legitimate great power’ status, a ‘frustrated great power’ can 
persuade its peers that it should be accorded this position by following two steps. 
First, as ‘a state is defined as a great power to the extent that it conforms to the 
social discourse that defines great power status at any particular time’, it needs to 
identify the collective social norms and rules which govern ‘legitimate great power’ 
identity. Second, the ‘frustrated great power’ must then persuade its peers that it is 
worthy of this status. This often takes the form of a ‘recognition game’. As Ringmar 
notes: 
this is the situation of the self-conscious outsider or social upstart who tries to 
conform as closely as ever possible to the rules which govern life in a certain 
social setting. By conforming to the rules he makes it possible for others to 
recognize him as the kind of person to whom these rules apply" (Suzuki, 2008, 
50; quoting Ringmar, 2002, 121-122). 
Therefore, although in this case, the recognition game is also about conforming to 
rules, the fact that Suzuki qualifies them as (1) "the social discourse that defines great 
power status" and (2) "the collective social norms and rules which govern ‘legitimate 
great power’ identity" (Suzuki, 2008, 50) originates an important distinction from 
Ringmar's characterization that is worthy of further analysis.  
 
Going by order, Ringmar's qualification of the rules with which one must comply as 
"rules governing life in a certain social setting" suggests that he is referring to both 
the formal and informal rules that govern life in a certain social setting – namely, 
those rules that are agreed between the actors. In the international arena, these rules 
can be identified with international law in general, costumes and more in particular 
with common norms and principles characterizing a specific historical context. 
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Conversely, Suzuki is referring to something different when he refers to the social 
discourse (that defines great power status) or again when he refers to the 'collective 
social norms and rules' that govern the identity of legitimate great powers. Both 
expressions refer to the set of features that are commonly recognized as 
characterizing the identity of legitimate great powers. The key word signalling the 
difference between the two authors is precisely "identity".  
Referring to the rules and norms that constitute the 'identity' of a certain social status 
(the legitimate great power status in this specific case) implies an indirect reference to 
'role theory'42. 
Within this sociological theory, "status" refers to the social position of an individual, 
and "role" refers to the 'set of behaviours, that within a certain society, are attributed 
to a certain social status'. Therefore, each status has its own set of roles, and it can 
have more than one single set of roles – in which case it is referred to as a 'complex 
of roles', which also bears the risk of producing, within the same status, contrasting 
expectations of behaviour (Ghisleni, Moscati, 2001, 43-48). 
However, what is relevant here is that the identity of a certain social status is given by 
the roles that are attributed to (and expected from) that specific status.  
 
 By returning to Suzuki's work and in particular to the clarifications that he 
makes about the 'social discourse that defines great power status', it is possible to 
find similarities between how he presents it and the social theory of roles. Indeed, the 
social discourse (that defines great power status) is presented as being a condition 
that is necessary to meet to be "defined as a great power". Its content is qualified as 
a combination of mutual recognition, institutional privileges and institutional 
responsibilities. 
Therefore, the 'rules' to which a status seeker should conform correspond instead to 
the set of roles constituting the identity of the pursued status. In the specific case of 
'frustrated great powers' seeking great power status, because the identity of great 
powers comprises both duties and rights, the compresence of 'rights' next to 'duties' 
might explain 'negative' behaviours performed by status seekers, next to positive ones. 
                                                
 
42	  See	  also	  Thies,	  2010.	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 In more detail, in this case, the process of recognition is strongly affected by 
the characteristics attributed to the identity of great powers. For instance, great powers 
status is characterized – together with (1) large material (i.e., military, economic, 
territorial, and demographic) power and (2) special social status 'commonly' and 
'reciprocally' recognized by peers and inferior powers – by (3) a combination of special 
rights and duties. The 'rights' refers to the 'privileges' of having the possibility, because 
of the corresponding material capacity, of influencing both society and its rules. The 
'duties' refers to the 'obligation' of being held responsible to uphold the norms of the 
society (Suzuki, 2008). Indeed, great powers are 'great' in their ability to mould the 
international normative content – although they are recognized as having this special 
status only in exchange for their being responsible for upholding and protecting the 
norms and the system itself. 
Furthermore, with particular consideration of this third point, the compresence of 
'duties and responsibilities' together with 'special rights' and the "power to weaken the 
normative structures of the society" (Suzuki, 2008, 47) might explain a mixed 
performance by 'frustrated great powers'. Indeed, if great powers are recognized as 
having the attributes of both 'duties and rights', then should states seeking great 
power status – given that they must imitate the identity of that specific status –perform 
both components. 
However, two criticisms can be addressed towards this possible interpretation. In the 
first case, this interpretation could explain assertive behaviours only in the case of 
states that are seeking great power status. However, it does not explain the situations 
in which this same phenomenon is performed by states’ simply seeking a 'higher' 
status – referring to those situations in which a candidate is attempting to improve its 
position with respect to the one in which it is currently recognized. 
In the second case, returning to Suzuki's work, it is possible to highlight that he, 
himself, contradicts the abovementioned possible explanation. Indeed, with respect to 
the combination of 'duties and rights' attributed to legitimate great powers, he 
specifies that greater attention should be focussed on the component of duties, 
initially by the great powers themselves and subsequently by 'frustrated great powers'. 
With respect to the first case, he writes, 
"To consolidate their institutional privileges, the ‘legitimate great powers’ have had 
to exercise caution in imposing their privileges upon the smaller powers, and ensure 
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that ‘legalised hegemony [is] introduced gently or surreptitiously’. (…) This also 
means that ‘legitimate great powers’ are expected – at least in theory – to be 
‘status quo’ powers that do not attempt to radically alter the balance of power or 
seek to overthrow the moral fabric of international society at the expense of other 
members" (Suzuki, 2008, 47). 
This cautious perspective also persists when it is about the process of recognition, 
which states that are seeking great power status undergo. Again quoting Suzuki,  
"So how can a ‘frustrated great power’ attempt to become a ‘legitimate great 
power’ today? To examine this process, we first need to examine the ‘social 
discourse’ which defines this status in contemporary international society. It will be 
recalled that ‘legitimate great powers’ enjoy mutual recognition as equals with one 
another, institutional privileges, and responsibilities to collectively uphold the core 
norms of international society. For a ‘frustrated great power’, the last characteristic 
becomes particularly important in its ‘recognition game’, as being seen as a ‘good 
citizen’ that is willing to protect and propagate the rules of the society may 
become a crucial means by which it can demonstrate its worthiness as a ‘legitimate 
great power’.  
This requirement for ideological conformity has acquired greater importance in the 
post-Cold War international society under American unipolarity. (…) In this normative 
environment, the ‘legitimate great powers’ have now been given a new opportunity 
to fulfil their responsibilities of actively promoting and enforcing the rules for 
‘legitimate membership’ of international society. Crucially, these new duties now 
reflect the society’s dominance by the West, and entail the promotion of ‘good 
domestic governance’ towards ‘illiberal’ or ‘rogue’ states. (…) As a consequence, the 
other ‘legitimate great powers’ have been co-opted and are increasingly expected to 
play a partnership role in imposing or advocating this new ‘standard of civilisation’" 
(Suzuki, 2008, 50). 
To summarize, states seeking great power status are also expected to focus primarily 
on the performance of great powers' duties. Candidates are indeed, according to the 
author, required to perform as 'good citizens'. Therefore, for a candidate seeking great 
power status, the content of that specific status consists of both positive and negative 
roles ('duties' and 'rights'). However, the process of socialization to the status's role is 
framed (and suggested) as requiring exclusively behaviours that are compliant with 
duties only – with the prosocial role-component of the status itself. 
This process implies that candidate states seeking great power status should and are 
expected to perform exclusively 'good citizen'-style behaviours. Any possible 
manifestation of negative-assertive behaviours is indeed appointed and postponed to 
after the candidate's accomplishment of the great power status. Indeed, once the 
candidate is recognized as a great power he must behave thusly, but during the 
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process of recognition – during the process of status seeking – he must behave as a 
'good citizen'.  
This approach to framing the recognition process (in exclusively positive terms only) 
reduces, once again, the opportunity to frame and explain the presence of negative 
behaviours during the process of socialization – even to great power status. Indeed, 
during the recognition process, it would be odd to observe the manifestation of 
negative, assertive behaviours next to the exclusively compliant ones – as required and 
suggested.  
Therefore, it is even more difficult to understand and explain the coexistence of 
deviant and conforming behaviours observable in the international standing of status 
seekers. 
 
2.3	  –	  Conclusions	  
 
The fact that recognition studies on their own are unable to gather the 
compresence of positive and negative behaviours and that the additional adoption of 
further explanations that consider the presence of both but that instead of 'explaining 
the compresence' focus on justifying the presence of the second component leaves for 
the development of further analyses that aim at explaining the observed compresence 
of behaviours within the same policy and during a recognition-seeking process.  
Here lie the interests of this research, which is guided by the intent to understand the 
compresence of conforming and deviant behaviour within the international standing of 
a status seeker, both of which behaviours are observed during the recognition process. 
The aim of this research is not limited to finding a justification for the 
presence of the 'other' type of behaviour. Rather, it aims to find an analytical 
framework that can specifically explain the compresence of both behaviours.  
The intent of this research is not to put aside the interpretative framework that has 
emerged from recognition studies but to integrate that framework with a further option 
that focusses understanding on the compresence of behaviours.  
Ahead of this intent, in the next chapter, some interesting findings that have 
emerged from studies on children's behaviour will be introduced as a basis for a 
possible analytical framework that might be able to close the gap of the recognition 
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studies. The new framework might give a comprehensive explanation, able to include 
the manifestations of both positive and negative behaviours.  
 	  
 
 
86 
Chapter	  3	  
 
1	  –	  A	  new	  perspective:	  looking	  at	  the	  IR	  theoretical	  framework	  on	  
recognition	  process	  from	  the	  updated	  perspective	  of	  child	  
developmental	  psychology	  	  
 
From IR literature on recognition process and status seeking literature emerges 
that there are two types of strategies available for the accomplishment of the status-
seeking process and to obtain recognition. These possible strategies are 
complying/cooperative (prosocial) strategy on the one hand and competing/competitive 
(antisocial) strategies on the other. Moreover, from IR literature on recognition and 
status seeking emerges the existence of a clear-cut separation between the two 
options of behaviours, in fact, fundamental characteristic to this outline is that the two 
options are conceived as diametrically opposite options. These two alternative options 
of international behaviour are indeed interpreted as a manifestation of opposed 
intentions of cooperation/compliance on one side and competition on the other. 
Similarly, they are also seen as manifestations of opposite cooperative or competitive 
foreign policies, also implying opposite intentions towards the social group. 
Moreover, the imperatives of the recognition process, as outlined by filo-
constructivist IR scholars from 1990s on, suggest that status seekers should conform 
as closely as possible to the norms and rules of the group whose recognition they are 
seeking for (Suzuki, 2008; Ringmar, 2002). It is on these basis that Suzuki highlights 
the "strong allure" of norm conformity in order to accomplish status seeking in 
international system43 (Suzuki, 2008, 50). In other words, this perspective asserts that 
the recognition process is best accomplished through the implementation of norm 
conforming behaviours44. Under this perspective, one should expect to observe 
behaviours that conform and comply with the group's social norms and expectations. 
                                                
 
43	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  under	  this	  current	  theoretical	  formulation,	  when	  observing	  international	  candidates	  seeking	  
for	  status	  recognition,	  one	  should	  expect	  to	  encounter	  behaviours	  that	  are	  solely	  conforming	  to	  and	  complying	  with	  
the	  group's	  social	  norms,	  rules	  and	  expectations.	  	  	  
44	  To	  insist	  on	  the	  point,	  the	  more	  articulated/complex	  formulation	  of	  recognition	  game	  (as	  reported	  in	  framework	  
2),	   which	   takes	   into	   consideration	   the	   possible	   reactions	   available	   to	   status	   seeker	   candidate,	   outlines	   that	  
complying/confirming	  behaviour	  is	  a	  strategy	  that	  is	  still	  available	  also	  in	  case	  of	  misrecognition.	  In	  this	  case,	  opting	  
for	  confirming	  behaviour	  is	  a	  signal/attempt	  to	  peacefully	  convince	  the	  audience	  to	  concede/grant	  the	  recognition.	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Therefore, according to this perspective, it is possible to assert that in the IR 
conception of recognition process, prosocial strategy (norm confirming and complying 
behaviours) results being the best strategy for positively accomplishing the status 
recognition process (Suzuki, 2008, 50).  
Conflictual/competitive behaviours are instead presented as the available strategy in 
case the social recognition process jams or gets stuck. 
As emerged from the previous chapters, the current IR theoretical framework developed 
from recognition studies, manifests its shortcomings when dealing with composite 
foreign politics of status seekers. In fact, the current framework on the international 
process of recognition is not able to comprehensively understand and explain the 
compresence of deviant behaviours next to complying behaviours.  
This all creates some difficulties in understanding more complex, articulated and not 
clear-cut foreign policies in which elements of both behavioural strategies may be 
present. Therefore, the current IR theoretical framework, together with its 
complementary alternative explanations (see chapter 2), are not able to find a possible 
ratio behind the compresence of different behaviours this because, at the basis of this 
IR theoretical framework, there is a traditional conception that conceives complying 
and deviant behaviours as opposed, antithetical, and incompatible. 
 
1.1	  –	  The	  IR	  traditional	  perspective	  on	  dichotomous	  antisocial-­‐deviant	  
behaviours:	  its	  characteristics	  and	  origins	  
 
With regard to the origins of this assumption, it is the case to report that this 
traditional conception, cornerstone of the IR theoretical framework on recognition, has 
been, for many years, the prevailing one in many other fields. Therefore, it is 
indisputable that this traditional conceptualization of the relations between prosociality 
and antisociality was still the prevailing perspective when – around the second half of 
1990s, after the constructivist turn – IR scholars turned to other disciplines in order to 
restore, within the IR field, the importance of issues related to identity and recognition 
(Geis et al., 2015). Since, IR scholars were drawing from other fields which shared this 
same traditional perspective, it therefore appears explainable the reiteration of this 
traditional assumption.   
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Yet, what is intriguing here is that, only a few years after IR literature expanded its 
horizons towards cross-disciplinary borrowings from political theory, social philosophy, 
and social psychology, social psychology itself underwent a groundbreaking theoretical 
and conceptual drift that transformed the entire discipline and revolutionised precisely 
this traditional perspective that used to assume incompatibility (dichotomy) in the 
relations between prosociality and antisociality (Mayeux et al., 2011; Smith, 2007; Ladd, 
2005).  
In the updated perspective, as will be outlines in the following pages, not only 
prosocial and deviant behaviours are compatible in their combined adoption, but it is 
also identified a socially adaptive and functional role of deviant behaviours with regard 
to status seeking. Moreover, with specific regard to popularity status seeking, empirical 
observations confirm the adoption of a bistrategic combination of deviant and 
complying behaviours – aimed at the attainment of higher levels of social-reputational 
status. 
Therefore, IR scholars not only arrived at recognition studies with a certain 
delay, but they also had the misfortune of drawing from a version of social psychology 
that, in a few years, was going to be profoundly revised.  
What could have been interpreted as a limitation of the IR theoretical concept on 
recognition process, however, has turned into a theoretical shortage of the same. In 
fact, the implications underlying the articulate conclusions achieved in social 
psychology suggest that overcoming the assumed incompatibility between prosociality 
and antisociality, would open, for the IR literature as well, the possibility to understand 
– or at least the necessity to investigate – the compresence of complying–cooperative 
behaviours and assertive–deviant behaviours within the foreign policy of an international 
status seeker.  
Notwithstanding this potentiality, this updating process hasn't taken place yet so 
that the current IR literature persists on building on the traditional perspective of the 
role of deviant and antisocial behaviours. Therefore, what could have been an 
unfortunate coincidence, constituted the basis for IR's theoretical shortcomings. 
However, it is also possible to identify various reasons that can explain the 
complication experienced by IR literature in further enlarging its cross-disciplinary 
borrowings. In fact, as further dealt in chapter 1, IR's failure to update to these new 
findings can be understood if considering that IR scholars in the 1990s, while 
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introducing these cross-disciplinary concepts and findings to the field, strongly felt the 
pressure to extensively justify the adoption of these alternative explanatory elements. 
Hence, while (from 1998 on) social psychology redefined itself from its foundations, 
updating to similar ground-breaking changes would have implied for IR scholars the 
necessity to completely ri-question the foundations of their recent borrowings. This all, 
in a moment when these recent borrowings were already questioned themselves, or at 
least strongly perceived as under scrutiny. Hence, it is not difficult to imagine that, in 
a similar situation, IR literature found little or no space for an additional and broad 
revision of those insights and formulations that – just a few years before and with a 
certain difficulty – were derived from social psychology. 
Moreover, another hindrance can be found in the fact that, given the revolutionary 
scope of the 1998–updated findings, the field of social psychology itself spent many 
years in further investigating these results and their substantial implications (Cillessen, 
et al., 2011). This implies that these revolutionary conclusions, being for many years 
under an ongoing process of investigation, may have been perceived as unfinished. 
Nevertheless, however explicable these difficulties may be, still IR's missing 
update of the new perspective on the relation between prosociality and antisociality 
specifically produced the current shortcomings characterizing the IR theoretical 
framework on the recognition process.  
 
1.2	  –	  The	  introduction	  of	  findings	  achieved	  by	  child	  developmental-­‐
psychology	  studies	  
 
Given the current scenario of IR theory on recognition procces, this chapter will 
turn to concepts and constructs pertaining to the field of developmental psychology, 
focussed on child and adolescents peer relations studies which undertake an 
evolutionary perspective. The reason these studies are here introduced relates to the 
fact that, interestingly in contrast to this IR formulation, recent findings achieved by 
evolutionary developmental psychology show and confirm that there is a more complex 
relation between aimed social status and behavioural strategies.  
More in detail, it emerges that the best strategy for the accomplishment of status 
seeking depends on the type of status which is aimed. Indeed, given that there are 
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different types of status, the best strategy for the accomplishment of a certain type of 
status depends itself on the type of status which is aimed. In fact, social psychologists 
arrived at identifying a distinction in the processes necessary to obtain high likeability 
status on one hand, and high popular status, on the other hand (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a; Pellegrini, 2008; Hawley 1999a; 2002; 2003a, 2003b). The popularity process – 
differently than the likeability process which requires the adoption of complying 
behaviours – entails a (contextual) combination of complying and deviant behaviours. In 
other words, in order to gain or maintain popularity, deviant–antisocial behaviours are 
needed in combination with complying–prosocial behaviours.  
Therefore, the socio-psychological literature, in its updated perspective, asserts that 
best strategy for the attainment of reputational status (comparable to status in IR), is 
a functional combination of complying and deviant behaviours.  
These findings reached by developmental scholars support the utility for IR 
literature to draw from peer relations studies. Indeed, these insights emerging from 
developmental psychology support the necessity for IR literature to investigate a more 
nuanced outline of the relations between aimed–status and associated behavioural 
strategies. This would allow a more nuanced understanding of the compresence of 
complying and deviant behaviours in international interactions. 
 
1.3	  –	  Advancing	  useful	  terminological	  clarifications	  
 
In conclusion and before focussing on the next sections, it is here necessary to 
anticipate some terminological clarifications, given that the milestone at the basis of 
the 1998 turning point in the peer relations studies consisted in the definitive 
disentanglement of the misused term of 'popularity'.  
This thesis adopts the nomenclature advanced by Cillessen and Marks (2011) 
who – considering that peer relation scholars have advanced and used different 
nomenclatures to refer to the two different types and constructs of 'popularity'45 – 
                                                
 
45	  In	  more	  detail,	  Parkhurst	  and	  Hopmeyer	  (1998)	  adopted	  the	  couplet	  "sociometric	  popularity"	  (aka	   likeability)	  and	  
"perceived	   popularity"	   (aka	   popularity).	   This	   nomenclature	   has	   been	   criticized	   by	   Cillessen	   and	  Marks	   (2011,	   30).	  
They	  emphasized	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  continuously	  having	  to	  qualify	  the	  term	  popularity	  and	  the	  bias	  created	  by	  the	  
incorrect	   use	   of	   the	   terms	   sociometric	   in	   opposition	   to	   perceived,	   given	   that	   'perceived	   popularity'	   is	   actually	  
assessed	  through	  sociometric	  methods.	  “To	  suggest	   that	   ‘perceived’	   is	  not	   ‘sociometric’	   is	  confusing	  as	  well,	  when	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prefer the labels of 'popularity' and 'likeability' to the other alternatives. In particular, 
leaving further details to the upcoming sections, likeability when referring to dimensions 
of social acceptance, and popularity when referring to reputational status. Furthermore, 
with regard to the alternative labels, the two authors propose to adopt as synonyms 
for likeability the terms "acceptance or preference (depending on how it is measured)". 
Conversely, they advance that simply the term 'popularity' can be used to refer to the 
'dimension of social standing' referring to popular status (Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 31).  
In line with these recommendations, this research also follows the authors suggestion 
to relabel, when possible, the adoption of the term 'popularity' that was made under 
the 'traditional sociometric classification system' (when it was used as a synonym of 
likeability/acceptance), with updated alternative labels as 'acceptance', 'social 
acceptance' or likeability itself (Cillessen and Marks, 2011, 29-31).  
Therefore, to avoid further confusion, in this research the term popularity will hereafter 
be used, when possible, exclusively to refer to reputational, popular status 
(measurements of most/least popular peers in the group), and the term likeability will 
be used to refer to dimensions and assessments of social acceptance (measurements 
of most/least liked peers in the group).  
Finally, additional basic conceptual and terminological points of reference will be made 
when necessary to address the reader’s orientation and understanding of the field of 
research on peer studies and developmental psychology. 
                                                                                                                                          
 
sociometric	  methods	  are	  used	  to	  assess	  both”	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  30).	  Adjustments	  to	  these	  problems	  presented	  
by	   this	   couplet	   have	  been	  proposed	  by	   some	  authors,	  who	   advanced	   "alternative	   terms	   for	   perceived	  popularity"	  
such	  as	  "judgmental	  popularity	   (Babad,	  2001),	  reputational	  popularity	   (Prinstein	  &	  Cillessen,	  2003),	  and	  consensual	  
popularity	  (de	  Bruyn	  &	  Cillessen,	  2006a)"	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  30).	  However,	  as	  reported	  by	  Cillessen	  and	  Marks,	  
"Such	   terms,	  however,	  do	  not	   solve	   the	   somewhat	  problematic	  use	  of	   the	   term	   sociometric	  popularity"	   (Cillessen,	  
Marks,	  2011,	  30).	  Thus,	  given	  the	  problématiques	  related	  to	  this	  nomenclature,	  this	  research	  will	  avoid	  as	  much	  as	  
possible	  this	  couplet.	  Other	  terminologies	  that	  have	  been	  used	  include	  prosocial	  popularity	  (for	  likeability)	  and	  peer-­‐
perceived	  popularity	  (for	  popularity).	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2	  –	  Developmental	  psychology	  on	  peer	  relation	  studies	  and	  the	  
twofold	  1998-­‐turn:	  discovering	  the	  distinctions	  between	  
popularity	  and	  likeability	  statuses 
 
The insights according to which popularity is related to prosocial and antisocial 
elements were based on the conceptual clarification and distinction between popularity 
and likeability and strictly related to the empirical assessments that proved that the 
two constructs – popularity and likeability – were related to different attributes and 
expectations. These two elements, which came out contemporarily in 1998, constituted 
for peer relations research, two fundamental cornerstones that represented a divide for 
the upcoming orientation of peer relations studies. 
The 1998 turn comprises two main points: (1) a new conceptualization of the 
popularity construct, which until then was considered a synonym for the construct of 
likeability. Since, popularity was finally examined alongside the construct of likeability, it 
emerged that the two constructs are different. (2) A new understanding of the relations 
existing between likeability and popularity concepts on the one hand and antisociality 
on the other hand was finally introduced and was incorporated into the peer relations 
studies literature. 
 
2.1	  –	  From	  ambivalence	  towards	  conceptual	  distinction:	  likeability	  and	  
popularity	  conceived	  as	  correlated	  but	  different	  constructs	  
 
This section will specifically focus on the first step of the 1998 turn; indeed, it 
will revise the passage from the terminological and conceptual overlap between 
popularity and likeability towards the final distinction into two different constructs. 
It will be possible to follow the passage from conceptual overlapping towards the final 
clarification and distinction reached in 1998 by following the historical evolution of the 
sociometric methods and how both terms and concepts were adopted over the years. 
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2.1.1	  –	  Ambivalence	  at	  the	  terminological	  level	  
 
To understand the conceptual distinction introduced within peer relations 
studies at the end of the 1990s, it is necessary to move from understanding the long-
lasting and confused relationship existing between peer relations studies and the terms 
and concepts of 'popularity'. 
As reported by William Bukowski (2011), the term 'popularity' entered the scholarly 
literature at the beginning of the 20th century, but it was not associated with a specific 
conceptualization or definition. Thus, the term 'popularity' was used for many years in 
a general and flexible sense and was loaned to different concepts and constructs. 
Indeed, as reported by Bukowski himself, "The word popularity (…) was taken from 
common usage and inserted into the vocabulary of peer relations without much 
thought about the construct it was meant to represent" (Bukowski, 2011, 9). 
 
2.1.2	  –	  Methodological	  level:	  the	  1998	  evolution	  of	  the	  sociometric	  methods	  
 
To make this discourse more understandable, it is possible to retrace this 
overlap (and its clarification) by focussing in particular on the sociometric methods 
adopted within peer relations and their evolution. By specifically focussing on the 
sociometric methods – adopted within peer relations studies due to its 'ability to 
assess peer group structure'46. Indeed, sociometric methods are adopted by peer 
relations studies to assess members' "peer status in classrooms and schools"47 
(Cillessen, Marks 2011, 27; DeRosier, 2008; see also: Kupersmidt, De Rosier, 2004; 
Cillessen, Bukowski, 2000; Coie, et al., 1982).  
Moreover, one of the most interesting elements here lies in the fact that within 
sociometrics, 'assessing members' peer status' does not refer to one single type of 
status. Instead, it can refer to different categories of status that can be assessed by 
                                                
 
46	   "By	   comparing	   liking	   and	   disliking	   nominations,	   researchers	   can	   distinguish	   a	  member’s	   place	  within	   the	   social	  
structure"	  (DeRosier,	  2008).	  
47	  Sociometrics	   is	   reported	  to	  have	  various	  advantages	   for	   this	   function.	   Indeed,	  sociometrics	   is	  said	  to	  be	  a	  highly	  
reliable	   and	   valid	  methodology,	   given	   that	   the	   evaluation	   that	   is	   obtained	   through	   this	  methodology	   is	   based	   on	  
multiple	  informants.	  This	  point	  refers	  to	  the	  numerous	  respondents	  that	  can	  coincide	  with	  all	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  
peer	  group	  or	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  it	  (see	  Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  33-­‐34).	  Furthermore,	  sociometrics	  is	  also	  characterized	  
by	   'increased	   sensitivity	   to	   variations	   within	   a	   specific	   group	   context'	   (DeRosier,	   2008;	   see	   also:	   Kupersmidt,	   De	  
Rosier,	  2004;	  Cillessen,	  Bukowski,	  2000;	  Coie,	  et	  al.,	  1982).	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focussing on different 'dimensions' (aspects) of social interactions occurring within the 
studied peer group. Indeed, producing a different ranking of the same group based on 
the different types of status that are considered might be possible.  
Therefore, it is also possible to state that sociometrics allows the assessment 
of various structures existing within a peer group according to the various categories 
of status that can be examined. Indeed, when examining a specific social unit, peer 
relations researchers can focus on 'a wide variety of aspects (dimensions)48' of the 
interactions occurring within the peer group. 
To link sociometrics to 'popularity' issues, among the types of statuses that can 
be assessed through sociometric methods, likeability and popularity are among the 
possible options. 
 
Therefore, beginning with the consideration that sociometrics allows assessing 
group social structures according to the observed aspects (dimensions) of peer 
interactions and considering that sociometric methods have been adopted by peer 
researchers from the 1930s on (Cillessen, Marks, 2011), it is once more possible to 
highlight that the focus on aspects (dimensions) of peer interactions did vary through 
the years. The long process sociometric methods have undergone beginning in the 
1930s is marked in particular by two moments that occurred in the last decades of 
the 20th century – the first in 1982 and the second in 1998. 
Although this research is interested in the final version that emerged from the 1998 
turn, to understand the current status of peer research, it is necessary to understand 
its roots and their evolution. Therefore, in the following sub-section, we will focus on 
                                                
 
48	   Directly	   quoting	   DeRosier	   (2008),	   "Within	   a	   given	   social	   unit,	   researchers	   have	   examined	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  
dimensions	   that	   typically	   fall	   within	   one	   of	   three	   broad	   categories:	   social	   behavior;	   social	   support;	   and	   liking.	  
Antisocial	   interactions	   (e.g.,	   aggression),	   prosocial	   interactions	   (e.g.,	   cooperation),	   and	   social	   connectivity	   (e.g.,	  
withdrawal)	  are	  commonly	  assessed	  social	  behaviors.	  For	  example,	  researchers	  may	  measure	  the	  amount	  of	  conflict	  
that	   occurs	   within	   a	   friendship	   or	   how	   socially	   isolated	   a	   child	   is	   within	   a	   peer	   group.	   In	   contrast,	   social	   support	  
research	   focuses	   on	   the	   functional	   attributes	   of	   a	   relationship,	   such	   as	   trust,	   intimacy,	   and	   aid.	   For	   example,	  
researchers	   may	   examine	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   members	   of	   a	   clique	   provide	   companionship	   and	   advice	   for	   one	  
another.	   	  
Numerous	  studies	  have	  been	  devoted	  to	  assessing	  the	  level	  of	  liking	  within	  a	  social	  unit.	  In	  large	  part,	  this	  emphasis	  is	  
based	  on	  evidence	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  liking	  versus	  disliking	  significantly	  impacts	  social	  behavior	  as	  well	  as	  a	  broad	  
array	  of	  functional	  outcomes	  ranging	  from	  self-­‐esteem	  to	  delinquency	  to	  use	  of	  mental	  health	  services.	  In	  a	  cyclical	  
fashion,	   liking,	   social	   support,	   and	   social	   behavior	   influence	  one	  another	  over	   time.	   For	  example,	  poor	   social	   skills	  
interfere	   with	   the	   formation	   of	   social	   support	   networks	   and	   decrease	   liking	   within	   the	   peer	   group	   that,	   in	   turn,	  
decreases	  opportunities	  to	  practice	  social	  skills	  with	  peers	  and	  exacerbates	  social	  behavior	  problems".	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aspects of the 1982 traditional method, which can be said to constitute the basis 
upon which the 1998 conceptual disentanglement was built.  
Historically, it is possible to report that in the 1982 model, in the traditional 
classification system, the term 'popularity' is conceived as a synonym for 'acceptance' 
and 'social preference' because the term 'popularity' in the Coie at al. (1982) 
procedure does not refer to a specific variable or construct. Instead, it is used as a 
label indicating a set of variables that are adopted to "index a child’s general liking-, 
disliking-, and status-based experiences with peers" (Bukowski, 2011, 4; Cillessen, Marks 
2011). This usage of the term popularity is not limited to the Coie et al., procedure; 
indeed, it was the standard in both studies accomplished before 1982 and those 
published thereafter that applied this accepted procedure (Cillessen, Marks 2011). 
The fact that the label of popularity was used as a synonym for likeability – 
and how it can represent terminological inaccuracy – does not constitute a problem 
per se until we consider that in some other studies, popularity was meant as its 
second meaning – as a specific variable assessing reputational status.  
This terminological confusion was favoured by two elements: first, the term popularity 
was interchangeably used to refer to both constructs and measurements (popularity 
and likeability). Second, it strongly contributed to the fact that the two concepts have 
never been addressed conjointly. This point prevented scholars from addressing a 
contemplated choice of terminology and the related conceptualization, thus allowing 
the confusion to occur. 
 The problem was highlighted clearly and officially in 1998. Indeed, the 
disentanglement was made officially clear in 1998 when – in correspondence with the 
publication of Kathryn LaFontana and Antonius Cillessen, which will be further 
considered later – Jennifer Parkhurst and Andrea Hopmeyer published their study in 
which, after a long period of terminological overlapping in which the two concepts have 
remained separate, "sociometric popularity [namely likeability], typically conducted by 
developmental psychologists, and reputational, dominance-based popularity [namely 
popularity], typically carried out by sociologists" were finally and for the first time 
assessed within the same research (Mayeux et al., 2011, 79). 
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This study aggregates fourth and fifth grades as a social unit and asks 
respondents "about peers they liked the most and the least and about peers they saw 
as popular and unpopular"49 (Mayeux et al., 2011, 80; Cillessen, Marks 2011, 28). In 
other words, when investigating the various aspects of social interactions, the Parkhurst 
and Hopmeyer study is not limited to likeability (most/least liked), as is true with the 
Coie at al. (1982) procedure; it also focusses on assessing popularity (most/least 
popular).  
As mentioned above, it was precisely the fact that the two constructs were addressed 
conjointly that allowed authors to clearly distinguish between the two and highlight that 
they were officially addressing two different constructs (likeability and popularity) that 
referred to two different measurements (being liked and being popular). 
 
To address the understanding of the 1998 turn and clarification, the next 
section will focus on presenting the 1982 status using the traditional method but 
highlighting three main elements: (1) the aspect/s (dimension/s) of social interaction 
that the method examines; (2) for each aspect of interaction, what sociometric 
dimensions are assessed, and how are they measured; and (3) what sociometric status 
types emerge from these assessments, based on which it is then possible to assess 
the group's social structures.  
Furthermore, following this analysis, specific attention will be devoted to the underlying 
content related to the term and concept of 'popularity' in this specific version of 
sociometric methods. Figure 3 will be used to render features of the method 
accessible under a simplified version. 
 
(I)	  –	  Sociometrics	  in	  1982:	  assessing	  likeability	  through	  the	  standard	  sociometric	  model	  
 
For sociometrics, 1982 was the year in which Coie, Dodge and Coppotelli 
(finally) introduced a "standard sociometric procedure and a method of classifying 
children into sociometric status groups"50 (Cillessen, Marks 2011, 28). 
                                                
 
49	  Emphasis	  added.	  
50	  This	  procedure	  can	  also	  be	   referred	   to	  as	   the	   'Coie,	  Dodge	  and	  Coppotelli	   (1982)	  method'	  or	   'Coie	  at	  al.	   (1982)	  
procedure'	   (Cillessen,	  Marks	  2011,	  27-­‐28;	  Coie	  et	  al.,	  1982).	  Furthermore,	   this	  1982	  method	  can	  be	   referred	   to	  as	  
'traditional'	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  updated	  method	  employed	  following	  the	  1998	  turn	  (Cillessen,	  Marks	  2011,	  28).	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The institution of this procedure had the advantage of introducing a standard 
sociometric procedure and method that, as reported by Cillessen and Marks, "was 
subsequently used rather consistently in research for over two decades" (2008, 27).  
To better understand the procedure and its terminological system, it is possible to 
retrace the abovementioned different aspects of sociometrics as developed in this 
specific 1982 method.  
With respect to the three main elements that help us understand this 
procedure, when focussing on the first one – the various aspects of social interactions 
that can be studied under peer research – the Coie at al. (1982) procedure is based 
only on measurements of the dimensions of likeability. 
In other words, the procedure requires peer members participating in the study to 
identify the peers that according to them fit two specific categories: most liked and 
least liked (Cillessen, Marks 2011, 27-28; Coie et al., 1982). 
The second element is that with respect to the sociometric dimensions of likeability 
that are assessed through this process of nominations, this method entails a process 
of counting the nominations received for both categories, this for each of the 
participants – followed by a standardization of the counting. This allows each 
participant to be assigned a personal score "on four continuous sociometric 
dimensions" that, in this specific method, are labelled (1) acceptance, (2) rejection, (3) 
(social) preference, and (4) (social) impact (Cillessen, Marks 2011, 27-28; Coie et al., 
1982). Each dimension is the result of a counting or calculation. In further detail, as 
reported by Cillessen and Marks,  
«Acceptance is the number of “liked most” nominations received. Rejection is the 
number of “liked least” nominations received. Preference is the acceptance score 
minus the rejection score. Impact is the sum of the acceptance and rejection 
scores» (Cillessen, Marks 2011, 27-28). 
Finally, with respect to the third point, concerning the sociometric status types,  based 
on the counting of nominations – and after specific cut-offs51 – each participant can 
be assigned to some sociometric status types that in the Coie at al. (1982) procedure 
are divided into five types of status. The traditional sociometric status categories are 
thus explained by Cillessen and Marks:  
                                                
 
51	  Reported	  by	  the	  authors	  as	  "often	  ±	  1	  SD"	  (Cillessen,	  Marks	  2011,	  28).	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«“popular” (high preference; liked by many, disliked by few), rejected (low 
preference; disliked by many, liked by few), neglected (low impact; neither liked nor 
disliked), controversial (high impact; liked by some and disliked by others), and 
average (average on all four dimensions)"» (Cillessen, Marks 2011, 28). 
By keeping in mind that it is possible to assess different types of status, it can be 
concluded that this 1982 classification system allows assessing the structure of a peer 
group with respect to these five status categories. 
 
Figure 3: Coie, Dodge and Coppotelli (1982) method 
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(II)	  –	  1998	  turn:	  Likeability	  and	  Popularity,	  two	  different	  constructs	  indicating	  two	  
different	  status	  types	  
 
As previously done for the Coie and colleagues (1982) method, it is possible to briefly 
retrace also here the three main points that are helpful to understand the use that 
Parkhurst and Hopmeyer (1998) made of the two concepts.  
Indeed, when comparing it to the Coie and colleagues (1982) method, it is possible to 
highlight that, with respect to the first point – the various aspects of social interactions 
that can be studied under peer research – as seen in Figure 4, the 1998 method, in 
addition to likeability, also focusses on aspects of popularity. Indeed, when adopting 
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this new method, studies collecting sociometric data nominations also include next to 
'most liked' and 'least liked' nominations for 'most popular' and 'least popular' 
(Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 27-29).  
This method implies that with respect to the second point, a fifth sociometric 
dimension is added to the abovementioned four traditional ones. Therefore, the new 
sociometric dimensions, next to the traditional acceptance, rejection, preference and 
impact – which (as reported in Figure 4) are measured as mentioned for the 1982 
method – also list popularity. There are two possible options to assess the sociometric 
dimension of popularity: by summing the standardized number of nominations for 'most 
popular', or by subtracting the number of 'least popular' nominations from 'most 
popular' nominations – "popularity minus unpopularity nominations" (Cillessen, Marks, 
2011, 28). 
Given the long-lasting mixing of terms, it is important here, as reported by Cillessen 
and Marks, to emphasize that the dimension of popularity is a further and different 
one with respect to the dimensions of acceptance and preference. Indeed, directly 
quoting the authors,  
"Acceptance and preference are dimensions of likeability, derived from peer 
nominations of who is most and least liked. Popularity is a dimension of power, 
prestige, or visibility, derived from nominations of who is most and least popular" 
(Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 28-29). 
From these considerations derives the conclusion that the dimension of popularity – 
meant as a dimension of social status given by power, prestige or visibility and not as 
a dimension of likeability – is  
"conceptually closer to the traditional sociometric dimension of social impact 
defined previously as the sum of “liked most” and “liked least” nominations 
received, which is also an indicator of how socially visible someone is in a group, 
irrespective of the valence of the behavior that attracts others’ attention" (Cillessen, 
Marks, 2011, 28-29). 
Thus, when moving to the third element of the analysis of sociometric methodologies – 
the variety of sociometric status types – it is possible to highlight that, as in the 
previous cases, the 1998 sociometric method introduces the new popular status next 
to the above-listed statuses (accepted – which in the 1982 method was referred to as 
'popular' – rejected, neglected, controversial, and average).  
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Figure 4: 1989 method (update of the Coie, Dodge and Coppotelli (1982) method) 
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2.1.3	  –	  Constructs	  of	  Likeability	  and	  Popularity:	  measuring	  two	  different	  types	  of	  status	  
through	  emotional	  and	  reputational	  judgements	  
 
Among the abovementioned, by focussing in particular on the accepted and 
popular status types, it is possible to highlight that these types of statuses are the 
result of two different typologies of measurement. Indeed, in the first case, the status 
of an accepted (highly liked) peer is "the result of individual judgements of likeability" 
                                                
 
52	  Under	  the	  traditional	  sociometric	  method,	  it	  was	  referred	  to	  with	  the	  label	  'popular'.	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given by the other peers. These judgements are qualified by Moreno (1934) as 
"emotional judgements"53 because, as reported by Cillessen and Marks, they result from  
"an individual’s private sentiments of attraction or repulsion about another that are 
not necessarily shared with the group or by the group. The resulting likeability 
scores (acceptance or preference) in a sociometric assessment are composites of 
these sentiments. If many participants in a classroom or grade nominate a certain 
peer as someone they like (and not as someone they dislike), this person is well 
accepted or highly preferred in this group. This is a summary or composite of 
individual liking and disliking judgments rather than a consensus that is explicitly 
communicated or discussed in the group" (Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 30). 
In contrast, judgements concerning popularity do not concern private emotional feelings 
but are an individual report concerning 'reputation' and reflect a shared perception; 
indeed, Cillessen and Marks continue, 
"Popularity judgments are not private sentiments but rather reputational judgments. 
They are not summaries of personal attractions or repulsions; they are a general 
consensus of who is most popular and least popular as seen by everyone in the 
peer group" (Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 30-31). 
This implies that popularity, measuring power, prestige or visibility, is a dimension of 
the individual's social standing within the group and that the status of 'popular within 
the peer group' refers to these evaluations. 
 
Therefore, to conclude the focus on the methodological evolution of 
sociometrics, the 1998 update established a clear separation between the constructs of 
popularity and likeability and the related diverse types of statuses – popular status in 
one case and accepted status in the other.  
  
                                                
 
53	  Emphasis	  added.	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2.2	  –	  Likeability	  and	  popularity	  conceived	  as	  two	  different	  constructs	  with	  
different	  associations	  	  
 
Beginning with the acquired awareness of the distinction between the constructs 
of popularity and likeability and their respective correspondence to two different types 
of status (popular status and accepted status), it is possible to turn now to the new 
understanding of the relationships existing between these two status types and the 
social expectations and associations related to the two constructs. 
Indeed, the second cornerstone achieved by peer relations studies at the end of the 
20th century concerns a strictly related feature and implication to the just-mentioned 
conceptual distinction. Indeed, together with the awareness of the fact that popularity 
and likeability are two different constructs referring to two different social-relational 
aspects, dimensions and statuses, at the end of the 1990s, it finally is incorporated 
into the scholarly literature together with the finding that popularity and likeability are 
related to different associations and social expectations. As reported by Cillessen and 
colleagues,  
"Since the 1990s, a growing number of studies from a variety of fields have 
illuminated the distinction between being liked (our old definition of popularity) and 
being socially powerful. Our understanding of the various forms of high status, how 
they are alike and different, and how they fit into the ecology of the social group 
has been greatly improved by the efforts of these researchers" (Cillessen et al., 
2011, xi). 
In other words, once it was demonstrated that popularity and likeability refer to two 
different types and measurements of social status – one related to visibility, prestige 
and status (popularity) and the other concerning personal-emotional relationships 
(likeability) – the other step reached by peer relations studies at the end of the 1990s 
entails the investigations of the qualifications that peer members attribute to and 
acknowledge as characterizing both the popular status and the accepted (highly liked) 
status. 
Insisting on this point – whereas likeability (disregarding the misleading 
terminology that has been adopted to indicate it) has traditionally been associated 
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with prosocial attributes54 – it was only in relation to a clear separation of the concept 
of popularity (from the concept of likeability) that the longstanding intuition according 
to which popularity is also "associated with some negative behaviours and outcomes" 
was finally investigated and confirmed by empirical data (Cillessen, Marks, 2011). 
Indeed, it was finally confirmed that popularity is different from how it was traditionally 
conceived – "a thing to be desired and indicative of positive adjustments and 
commendable social skills" (Mayeux et al., 2011, 79). 
What is groundbreaking in this instance is the fact that whereas likeability, as is 
traditional, continues to be associated with positive attributes, the new construct of 
popularity (considered a dimension of visibility and prestige) is instead associated with 
both positive and negative elements. Therefore, the 'dark side' of popularity finally 
came to the attention of scholars (Mayeux, 2011).  
   
2.2.1	  –	  1998	  studies	  that	  officially	  opened	  the	  way	  to	  research	  on	  the	  dark	  side	  of	  
popularity	  
 
This turning point was reached thanks to two studies that were conducted 
separately by two research teams and both published in 1998. One is the 
abovementioned research by Parkhurst and Hopmeyer that linked together sociology 
with sociometry. The other one is the study conducted by Kathryn LaFontana and 
Antonius Cillessen, which focussed instead on investigating the qualifications of the 
attributes related to the various social statuses.  
Going by order, a relevant role for these conclusions is played by the abovementioned 
study conducted by Parkhurst and Hopmeyer. This study not only supported and 
proved the distinctiveness of likeability and popularity constructs55 but also gathered 
empirical data that confirmed that likeability (acceptance) is associated with positive 
attributes "like kindness and trustworthiness" (Mayeux et al., 2011, 80) and that 
popularity is "linked to both positive and negative attributes" (Mayeux et al., 2011, 80). 
                                                
 
54	  To	  give	  some	  examples,	  prosocial	  behaviour,	  low	  levels	  of	  aggression,	  good	  social-­‐cognitive	  and	  emotion	  regulation	  
skills,	  kindness,	  and	  trustworthiness	  (Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  79).	  
55	  In	  the	  original	  study,	  authors	  refer	  to	  likeability	  and	  popularity	  respectively	  as	  "sociometric	  popularity"	  and	  "peer-­‐
perceived	  popularity"	  (Parkhurst,	  Hopmeyer,	  1998;	  Mayeux,	  2011,	  79-­‐81).	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Equally interesting is the 1998 study, conducted by LaFontana and Cillessen 
and based on a different methodology ("a simple vignette study"), that arrived at 
consistent conclusions56. In this case, the two authors – while intent in investigating the 
associations and social expectations related to the status category of 
likeability/acceptance57 by replicating the established relation between socially accepted 
peers and the positive expectations ascribed to them by group members – found out 
that children associated to their popular peers both positive and negative attributes 
and expectations (Mayeux et al., 2011, 80). Therefore, whereas likeability, as 
                                                
 
56	  The	  LaFontana	  and	  Cillessen	  (1998)	  study	  was	  intended	  to	  investigate	  the	  content	  associated	  with	  the	  traditionally	  
accepted	  social	  status	  category	  of	  likeability/acceptance	  (traditionally	  referred	  to	  as	  'popularity'	  –	  see	  above,	  Figure	  
4).	   Indeed,	   this	   study	  was	  aiming	  at	   replicating	   the	   traditional	   finding	  according	   to	  which	   "children	  had	  universally	  
positive	   expectations	   about	   socially	   accepted	   peers"	   (Mayeux,	   et	   al.,	   2011,	   80).	   However,	   the	   results	   obtained	   by	  
these	  findings	  contrasted	  with	  expectations;	  this	  because	  final	  results	  were	  divergent	  from	  previous	  and	  traditionally	  
accepted	  conclusions	  within	  peer	  relations	  studies.	  As	  reported	  by	  Mayeux	  and	  colleagues,	  "The	  children’s	  responses	  
showed	   that	   their	   stereotypes	   of	   popular	   peers	   were	   a	   combination	   of	   positive	   and	   negative	   attributes	   and	  
expectations,	   including	   reports	   of	   getting	   along	   well	   with	   others	   but	   also	   having	   hostile	   intent	   toward	   peers"	  
(Mayeux,	  at	  al.,	  2011,	  80).	  	   	  
These	   findings	   confirm	  and	   further	   strengthen	   the	   results	   achieved	  by	  Parkhurst	   and	  Hopmeyer;	   they	   confirm	   the	  
"mixed	   nature	   of	   popularity"	   by	   finally	   giving	   scholarly	   space	   to	   considerations	   concerning	   the	   "dark	   side"	   of	  
popularity	   (Cillessen,	   Marks,	   2011,	   27;	   Mayeux	   et	   al.,	   2011,	   79).	   Indeed,	   once	   more,	   "studies	   with	   children	   and	  
adolescents	  have	  shown	  that	  popularity	  is	  associated	  with	  some	  negative	  behaviours	  and	  outcomes".	   	  
The	  above	  implies	  that	  "the	  anecdotal	  perception	  of	  popularity	  as	  a	  mixed	  bag	  is	  confirmed	  by	  empirical	  data	  in	  the	  
child	  and	  adolescent	  literature"	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  27).	   It	   is	   interesting	  to	  highlight	  that	  two	  studies	  that	  were	  
separately	   conducted,	   adopted	   different	   methodologies	   and	   aimed	   at	   different	   intents	   obtained	   similar	   and	  
reinforcing	  results.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  achievement	  of	  these	  findings	  might	  sound	  less	  surprising	  when	  considering	  that	  
for	  a	  long	  time,	  similar	  hints	  had	  been	  part	  of	  the	  common	  knowledge	  and	  'anecdotal	  perception'	  that	  has	  historically	  
perceived	   and	   described	   the	  popular	   status	   as	   a	   "mixed	   blessing",	   thus	   upholding	   the	   idea	   that	   "popularity	   is	   not	  
always	  good"	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  26-­‐27).	   	  	  
Therefore,	  when	  it	  was	  officially	  claimed	  in	  1998	  that	  popularity	  (distinguished	  from	  likeability)	  was	  a	  "dual-­‐natured	  
construct",	   instead	   of	   being	   a	   complete	   surprise,	   the	   discovery	   “made	   intuitive	   sense	   to	   many	   researchers	   who,	  
looking	  back	  to	  their	  own	  middle	  school	  days,	  certainly	  had	  memories	  of	  the	   ‘in’	  crowd”	  (Mayeux,	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  80;	  
Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  27).	   	  
It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  report	  that	  peer	  relations	  research	  undertaken	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  did	  manifest	  different	  hints	  
confirming	   the	  anecdotal	  perception	  and	  anticipated	  the	  1998	  groundbreaking	   insights;	   see	   for	  example	  Boorman,	  
1931;	   Hermans,	   1931;	   Jennings,	   1937;	   and	   Tryon,	   1939	   (Cillessen,	   Marks,	   2011,	   29).	   Therefore,	   the	   two	   studies	  
published	   in	   1998	   (and	   the	   following	   ones	   that	   were	   outlined	   according	   to	   these	   findings),	   joined	   the	   "small	   but	  
growing	  literature	  suggesting	  that	  popularity	  is	  not	  a	  universally	  positive	  thing"	  (Mayeux,	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  80).	   	  
The	   long-­‐lasting	   terminological	   confounding	   that	   has	   characterized	   peer	   relations	   literature	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   has	  
hindered	   an	   official	   acceptance	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   construct	   of	   popularity,	   differently	   from	   the	   construct	   of	  
likeability,	  has	  a	  dual	  nature	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  27).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  marginalization	  
of	   this	   peer	   relations	   literature,	  which	  was	   already	   suggesting	   that	  popularity	   is	   associated	  with	  both	  positive	   and	  
negative	  behaviours	  and	  outcomes	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  27;	  Mayeux,	  2011,	  80).	   	  
However,	  1998	  was	  ultimately	  when	  the	  "mixed	  nature	  of	  popularity"	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  27)	  clearly	  emerged,	  
opening	  the	  way	  for	  further	   investigation	  in	  this	  direction.	   Indeed,	  due	  to	  the	  confirmed	  distinction	  between	  social	  
acceptance	   and	  popularity	   (and	  by	   beginning	  with	   it),	   different	   studies	   have	   focussed	  on	   further	   investigating	   the	  
relationship	  between	  likeability,	  popularity	  and	  both	  prosocial	  and	  antisocial	  behaviours.	  
57	  This	  traditional	  social	  status,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  Coie	  et	  al.	  method	  of	  1982	  was	  labelled	  as	  'popularity'	  –	  as	  reported	  
above	  in	  Figure	  3.	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traditionally, continues to be associated with positive attributes58, popularity – 
considered as a distinct construct, dimension of visibility and prestige – is instead 
associated with both positive and negative elements.  
These shared findings that relate popularity to both prosocial and antisocial 
associations, are not so surprising if considering that during all the 20th century, 
similar hints have been part of the common knowledge and 'anecdotal perception' that 
has historically perceived and described the popular status as a "mixed blessing", thus 
upholding the idea that "popularity is not always good" (Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 26-27).  
Therefore, when it was officially claimed in 1998 that popularity (distinguished from 
likeability) was a "dual-natured construct", instead of being a complete surprise, the 
discovery “made intuitive sense to many researchers who, looking back to their own 
middle school days, certainly had memories of the ‘in’ crowd” (Mayeux, et al., 2011, 
80; Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 27). 
Moreover, during all the 20th century, this anecdotal perception of the dual 
nature of popularity status was also accompanied by various studies that did manifest 
different hints confirming this anecdotal perception and anticipating the 1998 
groundbreaking insights; see for example Boorman, 1931; Hermans, 1931; Jennings, 
1937; and Tryon, 1939 (Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 29). Therefore, the two studies 
published in 1998 joined the "small but growing literature suggesting that popularity is 
not a universally positive thing" (Mayeux, et al., 2011, 80). 
In fact, the groundbreaking contribution made by both the 1998 studies consisted in 
the clarification of the distinction between the two constructs of popularity and 
likeability – which retrospectively allowed to better understand all these previous 
insights.  
It is therefore strengthened the notion according which the abovementioned 
long-lasting terminological confounding that has characterized peer relations literature 
has, on the one hand, hindered an official acceptance of the fact that the construct 
of popularity, differently from the construct of likeability, has a dual nature (Cillessen, 
Marks, 2011, 27). On the other hand, it also has contributed to the marginalization of 
those (already minor) studies which (during all the 20th century) have been suggesting 
                                                
 
58	  To	  give	  some	  examples,	  prosocial	  behaviour,	  low	  levels	  of	  aggression,	  good	  social-­‐cognitive	  and	  emotion	  regulation	  
skills,	  kindness,	  and	  trustworthiness	  (Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  79).	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that popularity is associated with both positive and negative behaviours and outcomes 
(Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 27; Mayeux, 2011, 80).  
Hence, it was finally in relation to a clear separation of the concept of 
popularity (from the concept of likeability) that the longstanding intuition according to 
which popularity is also "associated with some negative behaviours and outcomes" was 
finally investigated and confirmed by empirical data (Cillessen, Marks, 2011).  
On these basis, 1998 was ultimately when the "mixed nature of popularity" 
(Cillessen, Marks, 2011, 27) clearly emerged, opening the way for further investigation 
on the social expectations and associations related to these two constructs of 
popularity and likeability. Thanks to these further studies, the 'dark side' of popularity, 
strongly, came back to the attention of scholars (Mayeux, 2011). Therefore, by 
establishing this clear distinction of constructs, the two 1998 studies paved the way for 
a deeper investigation and a further understanding of the relationship existing between 
likeability, popularity and both prosocial and antisocial behaviours59. 
 
  
                                                
 
59	  Given	  the	  newness	  of	  these	  studies,	   it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  research	   is	  represented	  by	   investigations	  
aiming	   at	  more	   nuanced	   understanding	   of	   the	   associations	   between	   the	   two	   types	   of	   high	   status	   (popularity	   and	  
likeability)	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  aggression	  –	  conceived/considered	  as	  representative	  of	  deviant,	  antisocial	  attitudes	  
and	   behaviours.	   indeed,	   emerging	   studies	   focussed	   both	   on	   attributes	   and	   behaviours;	   both	   elements	   are	  
investigated	  through	  open-­‐ended	  studies	  that	  aim	  at	  gathering	  an	   idea	  of	  the	  attributes	  and	  behaviours	  that	  peers	  
identify	  as	  associated	  to	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  status	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3	  –	  Further	  studies	  investigating	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  status-­‐
behaviour	  relation.	  Focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  deviant	  and	  antisocial	  
behaviours	  
  
Once Parkhurst-Hopmeyer and LaFontana-Cillessen opened the way to the new 
perspective, a new wave of developmental studies followed. Among the variety of 
studies, what this research is interested in are particularly those studies that focussed 
on the relationships existing between likeability and popularity statuses and various 
forms of sociality and antisociality (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2004). More specifically, we are 
interested in the findings concerning the relationships between popularity and prosocial 
and/or antisocial attributes, this in order to understand the behavioural strategies 
associated to the different types of status.  
The final intent is to highlight and investigate the link between the compresence of 
complying and deviant behaviours and the process of recognition. 
However, this need is also unintentionally reflected by the orientation and needs of the 
peer relations research itself; indeed, once the new path of research within 
developmental peer relations studies was opened, scholars devoted their investigations 
to the assessment of the relationships existing between the two types of status (social 
acceptance/ likeability and popularity) and their related attributes.  
In most cases, specific attention was devoted to the antisocial attributes 
(related to likeability and popularity). 
This is perfectly in line with the fact that developmental social psychology has always 
harboured a deep concern about social harmony, social reforms and social 
improvements (Smith, 2007, 74-75). Indeed, most of the attention of the traditional 
studies focussed on likeability measurements that were specifically addressed towards 
identifying social rejection (see Figures 3 and 4) to understand its relationships with 
social incompetence and maladjustment, such as 'risk taking' and social deviance (for 
example, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and school dropping). 
 During the investigation of possible elements that can obstruct social harmony 
directly or indirectly, scholars did focus their attention on various attributes related to 
likeability and popularity. Some studies focussed on investigating relationships existing 
between likeability, popularity and other social behaviours and/or attributes. For 
example, studies were conducted on investigating relationships with behavioural and 
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academic risk (see: Mayeux et al., 2011, 88-90) and with social behaviours such as 
bullying and defending behaviours (see: Mayeux et al., 2011, 90). Similarly, studies have 
investigated the implications of popularity for friendships and romantic relationships 
(see: Mayeux et al., 2011, 92-94). Moreover, when reversing the perspective, interesting 
studies have also been conducted directly on "investigated the correlates of popularity 
by simply asking children and adolescents to list attributes they feel are characteristic 
of popular peers" (Mayeux et al., 2011, 91).  
Because this orientation within the field is quite recent, the variety of investigations 
can be considered wide with respect to the number of studies conducted. Therefore, 
the number of investigations per type of investigated attribute is quite small – with an 
exception being the number of studies directly asking students to qualify the correlates 
of popularity, which is growing. 
It emerges that, among this variety, the favourite investigated attribute is 
aggressiveness in its various forms. Indeed, as reported by Mayeux and colleagues 
(2011, 83), "The bulk of the research establishing discriminant validity between social 
acceptance and popularity has focussed on their associations with various forms of 
aggression". 
 
3.1	  –	  Aggressiveness	  meant	  as	  social	  deviance:	  investigating	  antisociality	  by	  
focussing	  on	  forms	  of	  aggressiveness	  
 
It is possible to focus on aggressiveness as a form of antisocial behaviour and retrace 
the findings of peer relations research that investigated the associations between 
likeability/social acceptance, popularity and these forms of, as they are traditionally 
called, antisocial behaviours. 
 First, referring to aggressiveness implies referring to different types of 
aggressive behaviours among which 'physical aggressiveness' is only one type. Indeed, 
next to physical aggression (measured in some studies as "start fights, say mean 
things, and/or tease others"), it is also possible to include relational aggression – 
measured in some studies as "keep others from being in the group during activities or 
games," "ignore or stop talking to other kids when they are mad at them" (in fifth 
grade), "ignore others or spread rumours about them when they are mad at them" (in 
 
 
109 
sixth grade), "ignore others or spread rumours about others when they are mad at 
them," and "try to keep others who they do not like from being in their group" (from 
seventh until ninth grade) – see Cillessen, Mayeux (2004, 151). 
Scholars have also distinguished aggressive behaviours on the basis of its being 
proactive or reactive. Examples of proactive aggressive behaviours is bullying behaviour 
used by the students 'to attain dominance as they enter a new social group' (Pellegrini 
et al., 2011a, 127; see also Pellegrini, Bartini, 2001, Pellegrini, Bartini, Brooks, 1999; 
Rodkin et al., 2000). While an example of reactive aggressive behaviours is behaviour 
usually adopted by kids who are victims of bullying behaviour and who react by 
adopting aggressive behaviour (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 127). 
Given that this research is not interested in specific types of aggressiveness but 
is instead interested in the role that antisocial behaviours have within social 
interaction, hereafter, the terms aggressiveness, aggression (and similar) will be 
adopted with a wide and general meaning that includes all of the different forms of 
aggression. Thus, the distinction between types of aggression will be minimal, but more 
discussion follows on the features of antisociality characterizing this type of behaviour. 
 
3.2	  –	  Presenting	  the	  traditional	  perspective	  of	  the	  status-­‐behaviour	  relation	  
  
Once these clarifications are made, it is possible to pursue the findings 
reached by developmental peer relations studies concerning the social role of 
aggressiveness. However, to understand these findings and their scholarly context, it is 
here necessary to first recall the traditional perspective shared among traditional 
developmental peer relations studies. Indeed, from the traditional perspective – before 
the 1998 turn – antisocial behaviours of aggressiveness were conceived as maladaptive 
and symptomatic of social incompetence (maladjustment).  
Therefore, the next section will focus on understanding the reasons why child 
psychology used to conceive complying and deviant behaviours as opposed, 
antithetical, and incompatible. The section, will focus on understanding the components 
characterising the child psychology's traditional conception, its origins and the 
elements fostering the widespread acceptance and adoption of this traditional 
perspective.  
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3.2.1	  –	  Characters	  of	  the	  traditional	  conception:	  incompatibility	  between	  complying	  and	  
deviant	  behaviours,	  and	  different	  assessments	  of	  the	  social	  functionality	  of	  deviant	  and	  
complying	  behaviours	  
 
The traditional perspective that conceives complying behaviours as opposed to 
deviant behaviours builds on two main elements. On the one hand, there is the 
asserted incompatibility between the two types of behaviours, that implies a clear and 
strong dichotomy between the two, that result as not convergent nor compatible. On 
the other hand, while deviant and complying behaviours are separated, they are also 
assigned with, opposite, assessments on their social performances – their abilities to 
properly perform within the social group. In fact, the conceived incompatibility between 
complying and deviant behaviours – at the basis of this traditional conception – is 
itself combined with a further underlying character that, while equating deviant 
behaviours with socially maladaptive and incompetent behaviours (Smith, 2007, 74-75), 
it also specularly equates complying behaviours with socially competent and functional 
behaviours. The identification of these two, separate, links – between deviance–
maladjustment on one hand and compliance–social competence on the other – also 
implies that adopting deviant behaviours is seen as "lacking social skills" (Smith, 2007, 
65), while on the opposite, adopting complying behaviours is understood as a 
manifestation of 'having social skills'.  
For a better understanding: although the significance of 'social incompetence' 
may be intuitive, still it is possible to gather a stronger understanding by accounting 
the definition that Rubin, Bukowski and Parker (1998, 644) provided for social 
competence. The three authors conceive social competence as "discrete behaviors that 
lead children to solve social tasks or achieve social success" (quoted in: Aikins, 
Litwack, 2011, 141). It follows that 'maladjustment' is consequently conceived as a 
"disharmony between the individual and the social relations in which he [the child] 
must live" (Smith, 2007, 75; quoting the U.K. Underwood Report of 1955, Report of the 
Committee on Maladjustment Children). 
In other words, the couplet social competence, social incompetence refers to the 
presence or absence, within the individual, of the ability to properly interact and 
integrate within its social context.  
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Keeping this in mind, it is now even more evident that associating deviance with social 
maladjustment and social incompetence implies that, when observed, manifestations of 
deviant behaviours are understood as signals of an individual's inability and deficit in 
understanding social context and the related, required, and socially admitted 
behaviours. Again, while deviant behaviours are socially incompetent and maladaptive, 
complying behaviours are, on the other hand, behaviours that manifest the social 
competence of the individuals that adopt them.  
Thus, coming full circle, it follows that there is no attributable ratio to observed 
compresence of both behaviours. Indeed, the abovementioned incompatibility between 
prosociality and antisociality is corollary to this further, and widely shared, traditional 
dichotomy between the two types of social behaviours. 
To conclude, in a similar outline, the adoption of aggressive behaviours – and 
more in general deviant or anti-social behaviours – represents a socially dysfunctional 
strategy, a strategy that, when implemented, has no social competent or adaptive 
function. This is asserted on the bases of the fact that the implementation of deviant 
behaviours has no positive social impact or outcome – this given that deviant 
behaviour is exclusively associated to social incompetence and maladjustment. 
Specularly to the dysfunctionality of deviant behaviours, and given the assumption 
according which individuals adopting prosocial–complying behaviours are capable of 
properly moving within the social context, it follows that complying behaviours harbour 
instead a socially functional and adaptive role.  
   
3.2.2	  –	  Origins	  of	  the	  traditional	  perspective:	  the	  ideological	  and	  ameliorative	  approach	  
 
In order to further understand the characters of the traditional perspective, and 
in particular the implied dysfunctionality associated to deviant behaviours, it is 
necessary to turn to the context in which this perspective originated. In fact, a case 
can be made that the traditional dichotomy and incompatibility between complying and 
deviant behaviours originated directly from the ideological and ameliorative approach 
that pervaded child studies and child psychology disciplines since their foundation. 
The next section will focus on illustrating the social and historical context in 
which child studies and child psychology rose, and also on outlining the contents and 
implications of the ideological and ameliorative approach itself.  
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Moreover, the following section will underline the consequences that the ideological–
ameliorative approach had on the articulation and conceptualization of the traditional 
perspective on deviant and complying behaviours. 
As reported by Smith (2007, 75), "Child study followed by child psychology 
developed in an ideological context of social reform, metal hygiene, and social 
engineering [ethos]", this because in general both the 19th century and the 20th century 
were characterized60 by social reforms, the majority of which were directed at children 
(Fagan, 1992, 236, reported in Smith, 2007, 75). 
By focussing on child psychology, it is possible to report that these studies 
originated – both in Europe (UK) and in Northern America (US and Canada) – strictly 
'bounded up with other practical disciplines and hopes of social reform and 
improvement' (Smith, 2007, 74). Insisting on the point, and directly quoting Smith, the 
author reports that, 
"Universal and compulsory schooling was coming to these developing industrialized 
countries [UK, North America], and the new discipline of child study was intimately 
involved in both documenting normal patterns of behavior, and in diagnosing and 
dealing with patterns that proved difficult for schooling, or more generally for 
behavior in line with social reform aspirations" (Smith, 2007, 74). 
Therefore, the original intent of this approach was to identify those behaviours that 
could have represented a challenge for the society; this with the aim of reforming or 
at least reducing their disruptive effects on the society. In fact, the premises on which 
child psychology was founded grounded on the aspiration of accomplishing an efficient 
society with efficient social institutions – among which it possible to mention schools 
(Smith, 2007, 75). Corollary to these ambitions, was the willingness to 'improve 
children' in order to make them "behave in accordance with the wishes of social 
reformers" (Smith, 2007, 75). In fact, as Smith continues, the main ambition is that 
"They [the children] should behave well in school, and not engage in deviant or 
antisocial behaviours" (Smith, 2007, 75). 
                                                
 
60	  The	  19th	  century	  in	  its	   later	  years,	  and	  also	  due	  to	  the	  historical	  context	  related	  to	  the	  two	  World	  Wars,	  the	  20th	  
century	  mainly	  in	  its	  beginning.	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Hence, these 'societal concerns'61 constituted an ideological and ameliorative 
approach that pervaded the discipline of child psychology for almost all the 20th 
century (Smith, 2007, 74-77). This ideological-ameliorative approach is well resumed by 
Cora Bussey Hillis, who reports the guiding idea characterizing traditional child 
psychology: "If research could improve corn and hogs, it could improve children" 
(Smith, 2007, 75; quoting Parke 2004, 2; quoting Sears, 1975). 
 When implemented, these ideological and ameliorative premises, resulted in a 
concern with "practices of investigation, diagnosis and reformation of maladjusted and 
delinquent children"62 (Smith, 2007, 75). As a consequence, these antisocial behaviours 
were seen as symptoms of social deviance and therefore were addressed as 
behaviours to be isolated and eradicated from those social behaviours an individual 
was allowed or encouraged to implement.  
In fact, in accordance with this orientation, "the difficult child was gradually 
reconceived in terms of maladjustment" (Rose, 1985, 165; quoted in Smith, 2007, 75), 
thus generating the abovementioned assumption that on one hand equates (and 
associates) deviant behaviours to social maladjustment and incompetence, and 
complying behaviours to social competence, while on the other hand it separates 
prosocial–complying behaviours from deviant–antisocial behaviours thus creating a 
strong dichotomy among the two. 
 
3.2.3	  –	  Conceptual	  shortcomings	  result	  of	  the	  ideological	  and	  ameliorative	  approach:	  
confounding	  socially	  undesirable	  with	  socially	  incompetent	  behaviours,	  and	  overlapping	  
individual	  to	  social	  benefit	  
 
The ideological and ameliorative approach – the abovementioned engineering 
ethos, that aimed at attaining a functional society – which permeated child studies and 
child psychology since their establishment, has entailed a widely shared confusion 
between different underlying meanings associated to the concept of 'deviance' (Smith, 
2007, 73-78).  
                                                
 
61	  The	  expression	  'societal	  concerns'	  is	  adopted	  by	  Parke	  (2004,	  2;	  quoted	  by	  Smith,	  2007,	  75).	  
62	  In	  fact,	  with	  specific	  regard	  to	  the	  UK	  case	  and	  its	  strict	  relation	  with	  the	  mental	  hygiene	  movement,	  it	  is	  between	  
1920s	  and	  1930s	  that,	  as	  implementation	  of	  this	  approach,	  juvenile	  courts	  and	  child	  guidance	  started	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  
UK	  (Rose,	  1985;	  reported	  in	  Smith,	  2007,	  75).	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With this regard, Smith (2007) and Sutton (et al., 1999a; 1999b), identify that child 
psychology studies where mostly built on a widely shared confounding between the 
notions of socially undesirable behaviours with that of socially incompetent behaviours 
(see, Smith, 2007, 73, 77-78).  
More in detail, on the one hand, socially undesirable behaviours correspond to those 
behaviours that, being 'deviant from social norms', contrast with the societal concerns 
and interests of the society, and therefore are not sought-after by the society itself 
(Smith, 2007, 73).  
While, on the other hand, socially incompetent behaviours are those behaviours whose 
implementation is dysfunctional within the society. Incompetent behaviours, in fact, 
manifest the individual's incapacity to adopt socially functional behaviours – which may 
be directly related to the individual's deficiency in properly understanding the 
surrounding social context, as much as its inability to properly interact with this same 
context (Smith, 2007, 73). 
Therefore, confounding and overlapping these two notions, implies that scholars 
in the traditional perspective couple socially deviant behaviours – those behaviours 
deviating from social norms, thus 'socially undesirable' – with an additional connotation 
of developmental deviance, thus implying social dysfunctionality and maladjustment in 
the performing individual (Smith, 2007, 73). 
A case in point is represented by the interpretation traditionally assigned to 
aggressive behaviours (in all its various forms), which are conceived as socially 
undesirable since they represent a problem for social groups. However, the main issue 
is that, given the founding societal concerns and engineering ethos, in the traditional 
perspective the observation of aggressive behaviours in children is associated to social 
maladjustment, social incompetence or as a reaction to social rejection (Smith, 2007).  
Implication to this is that deviant behaviours – "different from the norm or from 
accepted standards"63 accepted by the social group – are automatically assumed being 
socially dysfunctional.  
 This all reflects the fact that the traditional perspective overlaps the society's 
interests – which aim at accomplishing social efficiency – with the individuals' personal 
interests (Smith, 2007, 73-78). Evolutionary oriented peer relations studies have proved 
                                                
 
63	  Definition	  of	  'deviant'	  given	  in	  the	  Encarta	  World	  English	  Dictionary,	  quoted	  in	  Smith,	  2007,	  78.	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that the individual benefit may not coincide with the social benefit and also that there 
is a distinction between what is desirable for the society and what is actually 
successful in the social context. This because, evolutionary oriented peer relations 
studies have proved that the adoption of deviant/aggressive behaviour although 
remains socially undesirable, still it has proved to be socially functional and competent. 
 
3.2.4	  –	  The	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  the	  traditional	  perspective	  and	  its	  contributing	  
factors:	  the	  scientific	  isolation	  of	  child	  and	  psychological	  studies	  
 
This traditional conception, in all its components, has been influential and 
widely accepted until the end of the 20th century. In fact, it was only in recent times 
that this traditional dichotomy and incompatibility between complying and deviant 
behaviours – and its related association of deviant behaviours to social maladjustment 
and of complying behaviours to social competence – has been challenged both 
theoretically and empirically, thus opening the way to the articulation of a revised 
perspective on the relation between deviant and complying behaviours (Smith, 2007, 
65).  
In investigating and retracing the factors that contributed to the widespread 
acceptance of the traditional perspective, it is possible to identify both the 
abovementioned social engineering ethos informing child studies and also a long 
lasting "concern to establish child psychology as a scientific discipline in its own right" 
(Smith, 2007, 76) which implied an extended isolation of child studies from other 
disciplines. In fact, both Peter Smith (2007, 74-77) and Parke64 (2004), highlight the 
role played by this protracted isolation of the child psychology discipline, and conclude 
that this "eagerness to achieve respectability as a science" (Parke, 2004, 4; quoted in 
Smith, 2007, 76) kept child psychology away from cross-disciplinary insights deriving, 
for example, from evolutionary thinking, sociological thinking, and developmental 
psychology – which "might have helped produce a broader and more reflective 
perspective on this ideological context" (Smith, 2007, 76; Parke, 2004, 4). 
                                                
 
64	  Ross	  Parke	  (2004),	  writing	  about	  the	  70	  years	  of	  the	  SRCD	  (Society	  for	  Research	  in	  Child	  Development),	  reviews	  the	  
decades	  going	  from	  1943	  until	  1963	  (Smith,	  2007,	  76).	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Proof of this –  as mentioned above and as will be further developed in the upcoming 
sections – is the fact that it is only when child psychology and sociology were finally 
compounded, under an evolutionary perspective, that challenging empirical findings 
emerged and as a consequence this traditional (and limited) approach was irreversibly 
overcome.  
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3.3	  –	  Introducing	  the	  updated	  perspective:	  complexity	  and	  contextual	  
interactions	  in	  the	  status–behaviour	  relations.	  	  
 
The traditional perspective began to be challenged when scholars found 
evidence showing that "aggressive behaviour can, in some contexts, be associated with 
popularity status, social skills and social competence"65 (Smith, 2007, 65).  
In the wake of the two 1998 publications and responding to the "wake-up call" that 
consequently reached developmental psychologists, different studies focussing on the 
relationships between aggression, likeability and popularity found further confirmation of 
the idea that aggressiveness has its (contextual) social role and functionality. 
                                                
 
65	   It	   is	   not	  only	  on	   the	  bases	  of	   empirical	   findings	   that	  one	   can	   challenge	   the	   traditional	   assumption	   that	  equates	  
deviant	  (aggressive)	  behaviours	  with	  social	  maladjustment	  and	  incompetence,	  but	  also	  by	  making	  some	  parallels	  with	  
other	   theories.	   In	   fact,	   Peter	   Smith	   (2007)	   reports	   some	   theoretical	   arguments	   that	   question	   this	   assumption.	  	  
Developments	   in	   evolutionary	   theory	   suggest	   that,	   though	   the	   related	   levels	   of	   risk,	   aggressive	   behaviour	   is	   still	  
adaptive	  to	  the	  process	  of	  evolution,	  "or	  else	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  selected"	  (Smith,	  2007,	  70).	   	  
Both	  simple	  and	  more	  sophisticated	  models	  developed	  by	  applying	  game	  theory	  analysis	  to	  animal	  behaviour	  help	  to	  
understand	  that,	  given	  the	  import	  role	  played	  by	  the	  social	  context	  itself,	  "a	  'competent'	  or	  'well-­‐adapted'	  animal	  will	  
certainly	  have	  aggressive	  behavior	  within	  its	  repertoire"	  so	  to	  be	  able	  to	  better	  adapt	  to	  different	  situations.	  In	  fact,	  
when	  Smith	  reports	  that	  "The	  most	  successful	  patterns	  are	  a	  mix	  of	  cooperative	  and	  competitive	  strategies"	  (Smith,	  
2007,	  70)	  –	  this	  means	  not	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  strategies	  within	  the	  same	  social	  context,	  but	  the	  possibility	  for	  
the	  actor	  to	  alternatively	  select	  cooperative	  or	  competitive	  strategies	  as	  the	  most	  adapt	  response	  to	  different	  social	  
environments	  (see	  the	  example	  on	  'hawk'	  and	  'dove'	  strategies	  in	  populations	  of	  doves	  or	  howks;	  Smith,	  2007,	  70).	  
Similarly,	  developmental	  theories	  within	  psychology	  justify	  the	  presence	  of	  aggressive	  behaviours	  by	  relating	  it	  to	  the	  
skill	  development	  process.	  This	  perspective	  sees	  conflict	  situations	  and	  aggressive	  behaviours	  as	  a	  space	  and	  moment	  
in	   which	   individuals	   can	   develop	   important	   'social	   and	   cognitive	   abilities'	   (Smith,	   2007,	   71).	   Critics	   underline	   that	  
some	  of	  the	  skills	  learned	  are	  strictly	  related	  to	  aggressive	  situations	  only.	  For	  example,	  "only	  by	  engaging	  in	  fights	  or	  
other	   forms	   of	   aggressive	   behaviours"	   one	   'learns	   about	   its	   physical,	   verbal	   and	   psychological	   strengths	   and	  
weaknesses'.	  However,	  as	  critics	  underline,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  "these	  skills	  are	  only	  needed	  if	  aggression	  is	  needed"	  
(Smith,	  2007,	  71).	  Still,	  in	  response	  to	  these	  critics,	  developmental	  theorists	  underline	  that	  aggressive	  situations	  allow	  
to	   acquire	   a	   more	   generally	   valid	   set	   of	   skills	   that	   include	   the	   ability	   of	   "understanding	   social	   dynamics	   and	   the	  
thoughts	  and	  emotions	  and	  likely	  plans	  of	  others"	  (Smith,	  2007,	  71).	  	  
Finally,	  Smith	  reports	  that	  studies	  about	  status	  conducted	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  sociological	  theories	  also	  support	  the	  
questioning	  of	  the	  association	  between	  aggressive	  deviance	  and	  maladjustment.	  At	  the	  basis,	  there	   is	  the	  fact	  that	  
"sociologists	   have,	   more	   than	   developmental	   psychologists,	   kept	   apart	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   individual	   and	   the	  
interests	  of	  the	  social	  group	  or	  the	  wider	  society"	  (Smith,	  2007,	  71).	  	  	  
The	   contribution	   given	   by	   the	   sociological	   tradition	   to	   this	   perspective	   can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   'reputation	  
enhancement	   theory'	  which	  highlights	   the	   fundamental	   role	   played	  by	   the	   group's	   context	   in	   qualifying	   the	   social	  
admissibility	  of	  aggressive	  behaviours.	  In	  fact,	  a	  delinquent	  group	  evaluates	  aggressive	  behaviours	  differently	  from	  a	  
non-­‐delinquent	   group	   –	   where	   "antisocial	   behavior	   might	   be	   a	   reason	   for	   exclusion"	   (Smith,	   2007,	   72).	   On	   the	  
opposite,	   in	   a	   delinquent	   context,	   aggressive	   behaviours	   can	   be	   a	   reason	   for	   both	   social	   inclusion	   and	   status	  
enhancement	  (Smith	  2007,	  72).	   	  
A	  further	  argument	  highlights	  the	  possibility	  that	  aggressive	  behaviours	  may	  –	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  no	  other	  
better	   option	   –	   be	   a	   "rational"	   option.	   "This	   could	   be	   the	   case	   for	   youth	   in	   very	   disadvantaged	   environments;	  
conventional	  career	  prospects	  are	  small	  or	  non-­‐existent,	  and	  aggressive	  or	  antisocial	  acts	  may	  provide	  an	  alternative	  
'career	   path'	   that	   offers	   more	   promise	   in	   terms	   of	   money,	   prestige	   and	   opportunity"	   (Smith,	   2007,	   72).	  	  
Furthermore,	   aggression	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   "legitimate	   response	   to	   oppression"	   (Smith,	   2007,	   72;	   see	   also	  
Galtung,	  1969).	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For a review of the studies focussing on aggressive behaviours, it is possible to 
follow Mayeux and colleagues (2011). The authors focus the revision in particular on 
those studies that adopt sociometrics and conceive, define and measure the construct 
of popularity as a dimension of "social visibility, impact and prestige" (Mayeux et al., 
2011, 81).  
According to this revision, it is possible to identify two main tranches of research 
developed in response to the 1998 wake-up call. Mayeux and colleagues report that 
the first tranche of studies, since conducted in the immediate aftermath of the 1998-
revised view, was focused mainly on verifying and identifying the presence (or absence) 
of relations between popularity (and/or likeability) and aggressive behaviours. More in 
detail, these earliest developmental peer relations studies arrived at identifying that 
aggressive behaviours ("overt and relational aggression" in this case) are negatively 
linked with likeability, but they are positively related to popularity – and, as reported 
by Mayeux et al., that the positive relationships in some cases were "quite strong" 
(Mayeux et al., 2011, 83; see: LaFontana, Cillessen, 1998, 1999, 2002; Lease et al., 
2002; Parkhurst, Hopmeyer, 1998; Prinstein, Cillessen, 2003).  
Afterwards, the subsequent tranche of research – undertaken in the beginning of the 
21st century on – while confirming the previous results, focussed on providing a "more 
nuanced view of the links between status and aggression". This was possible partly 
because some of the new research was conducted with longitudinal designs (Mayeux et 
al., 2011, 83; see66: Cillessen, Mayeux, 2004; de Bruyn, Cillessen, 2006; de Bruyn et al., 
2009; Rose, Swensen, Waller, 2004; Sandstrom, Cillessen, 2006)67.  
Therefore, while the first tranche of studies focusses on highlighting (and replicating) 
the existence of a link between aggressiveness and high status, the second tranche of 
studies focussed on formulating an articulated explanation of this link68.  
                                                
 
66	  The	  authors	  also	  mention	  Hawley,	  Little,	  &	  Card,	  2007,	  "which	  found	  a	  nonsignificant	  link	  between	  aggression	  and	  
both	  forms	  of	  status"	  ((Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  83).	  
67	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Lara	  Mayeux	  and	  colleagues	  focus	  specifically	  on	  those	  studies	  that	  conceive	  popularity	  as	  a	  
dimension	  of	  social	  standing	  (characterized	  by	  visibility,	  prestige	  and	  impact),	  however,	  similar	  conclusions	  have	  been	  
reached	  by	  other	   studies	   that	  have	  adopted	   "alternative	  measures	  of	  high	   status",	   among	  which	   is	   social	   network	  
centrality	   (Farmer,	   Rodkin,	   1996),	   or	   again	   by	   adopting	   "clustering	   techniques	   to	   identify	   two	   distinct	   groups	   of	  
popular	  boys:"	  the	  tough	  boys	  and	  the	  model	  boys	  (Farmer	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  
68	   Similarly,	   Gary	   Ladd	   (2005)	  while	   retracing	   the	   evolution	   of	   scholarly	   research	   on	   children's	   peer	   relationships,	  
identifies	   three	  generations	  of	   studies	   that	   are	   allocated	   from	  1900	  until	   1940s	   for	   the	   first	   generation;	  while	   the	  
second	  generation	  locates	  between	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  and	  the	  third	  generation	  considers	  the	  studies	  developed	  from	  
1990s	  until	  present	  days	  (see	  Ladd,	  2005).	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Various studies and researchers contributed to identify the contextual elements 
contributing to the relation between aggressive behaviours and high status. 
The next two subsections will focus on the more complex aspects of the 
status-behaviour link and also on the contextual role played by 'moderators' in the 
relation between status and behaviour.  
 
3.3.1	  –	  Investigating	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  status–behaviour	  relation:	  functionality	  of	  
aggressive	  behaviours	  in	  the'	  social	  dominance	  process'	  and	  in	  the	  'popularity	  process'	  
 
The latest studies from peer relations literature focussed on further investigating 
the relation between status and behaviour, and by doing so they have arrived at 
pointing out the existence of the so-called popularity process – meant as the process 
needed to gain or maintain popular status in the peer group.  
In fact, building on the previously mentioned findings, developmental peer relations 
scholars moved towards a further understanding and outline of the popularity process. 
This second tranche of research on peer relations studies is originally inspired by the 
evolutionary theory and animal behaviour studies and is also built on a parallel with 
(previous) studies investigating the social dominance process – conceived as an 
effective control of resources and high levels of social centrality/visibility69 (Pellegrini et 
al., 2011a; see also Hawley 1999a; 2002; 2003a; 2003b).  
In a few words, investigating the social dominance process it emerges that "the 
most effective strategy would be a balance of prosociality and coercion" (Hawley, 
2003a, 283; see also: Hawley, 1999a; 2002; 2003b). By building on these findings 
concerning the social dominance dimension – reached by developmental psychology at 
the end of 1990s (Hawley, 1999a; 1999b; 2002; 2003a) – peer researchers investigated 
and extended these conclusion to the dimension of popularity status.  
More in detail, Pellegrini, Roseth, Van Ryzin and Solberg (2011) building on this parallel 
arrive at supporting that, similarly to the social dominance process, popularity involves 
a process which is based on a functional combination of prosociality and coercion 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124).  
                                                
 
69	  This	  measure	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  status-­‐rank,	  it	  indeed	  refers	  to	  the	  social	  position/status	  of	  an	  individual	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  other	  individuals	  of	  the	  peer	  group.	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For both processes, this combination of behaviours has been labelled as bistrategic 
combination and its implementers – recalling the studies on social dominance – have 
been referred to as bistrategic resource controllers70, or also as Machiavellians71, 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a; Pellegrini, 2008; Hawley 1999a; 2002; 2003a; 2003b).  
 
(I)	  –	  The	  parallel	  between	  the	  social	  dominance	  process	  and	  the	  popularity	  process	  
 
Pellegrini and colleagues are confident in tracing a parallel between the two 
processes since both popularity and social dominance are two types (two forms) of 
social status72; and in particular since their work is built on the conceptualization of 
popularity as "a form of social dominance"73 (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124). More in 
detail, social dominance is conceived as a type of social status that is characterized 
by 'peer group centrality and control of social resources'74 (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 
124) and popularity is conceived as "a dimension of social standing that is 
characterized by visibility, prestige, and status with peers"75 (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 
123).  
                                                
 
70	  Referring	  to	  those	  children	  or	  adolescents	  who,	  by	  adopting	  a	  combination	  of	  prosocial	  and	  antisocial	  behaviours,	  
are	  able	  to	  effectively	  control	  resources	  in	  the	  peer	  group	  (Hawley,	  2003a;	  Pellegrini	  2011).	  
71	  Patricia	  Hawley	  (2003a)	  recalls	   the	  name	  of	  the	   Italian	  political	  philosopher	  of	  the	  Renaissance	  who	   investigated	  
the	  most	   effective	   power	   strategies	   adopted	  by	   Italian	   states	   to	   gain	   positions	   in	   the	   Italian	   states'	   system	  of	   the	  
Renaissance	  period.	  While	  the	  name	  of	  Machiavelli	   is	  commonly	  associated	  to	  "images	  of	  manipulation	  and	  deceit"	  
(Hawley,	  2003a,	  282),	  Hawley	  herself	  clearly	  states	  that	  "Machiavelli's	  name	  is	  invoked	  here	  because	  his	  philosophy	  
appears	   to	   describe	   the	   behaviour	   of	   socially	   dominant	   pre-­‐schoolers	   (Hawley,	   2002)	   and	   adolescents	   (Hawley,	  
Littler,	  &	  Pasupathi,	  2002)"	  (Hawley,	  2003a,	  283).	  In	  fact,	  while	  the	  original	  outline	  of	  the	  bistrategic	  combination	  is	  
actually	   inspired	  by,	  and	  builds	  on,	  evolutionary	  theory	  and	  animal	  behaviour	  studies,	  yet	   the	  confirmation	   in	  peer	  
relations	  studies	  that	  "the	  most	  effective	  strategy	  would	  be	  a	  balance	  of	  prosociality	  and	  coercion"	  somehow	  recalls	  
the	   conclusions	   achieved	   by	  Machiavelli	   while	   observing	   the	   interactions	   of	   Italian	   states	   in	   Renaissance	   (Hawley,	  
2003a,	  283).	  
72	   They	  both	  are	   related	   to	  dimensions	  of	   'social	   standing'	   and	   refer	   to	   the	   individual's	   social	   ranking	   in	   the	   social	  
hierarchy	  of	  its	  peer	  group.	  	  
73	  Pellegrini	  and	  colleagues	  focus	  on	  studies	  that	  "link	  aggression	  with	  popularity,	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  
dominance"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  124).	  	  
74	   Pellegrini	   and	   colleagues	   define	   social	   dominance	   as	   a	   process	   which	   is	   related	   to	   popularity	   and	   "that	   is	   the	  
product	  of	  naturally	  occurring	  differences	  in	  resource	  control	  status	  among	  members	  of	  the	  group"	  (emphasis	  added	  
–	  Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  123;	  see	  also:	  de	  Waal,	  1986;	  Hawley,	  1999a;	  Pellegrini,	  2008).	  In	  this	  definition	  'resource	  
control	  status'	  refers	  to	  the	  status	  (the	  rank	  among	  peers)	  that	  an	  individual	  has	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  ability/capacity	  to	  
control	   social	   resources.	   Therefore,	   social	   dominance	   refers	   specifically	   to	   the	   social	   status	   (social	   rank)	   that	   an	  
individual	  is	  assigned	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  access	  to	  resource	  control.	  
75	  Moreover,	  both	  popularity	  and	  social	  dominance	  are	  associated	  to	  physical	  and	  relational	  aggressive	  behaviours	  
(Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  Pellegrini	  2008;	  Hawley,	  2003a;	  2002;	  1999a).	  In	  fact,	  Pellegrini	  and	  colleagues	  organize	  their	  
work	  by	  focussing	  around	  the	  'role	  of	  aggression	  in	  social	  dominance	  and	  popularity'	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  124).	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Building on the results of the studies on social dominance76 (Hawley, 2003a, 283; 
Pellegrini 2008), and focussing on the functional role of coercive behaviours both in 
social dominance and popularity, Pellegrini and colleagues support that, 
"Research that is influenced by an evolutionary orientation has explained the 
functional dimensions of aggression in terms of social dominance. According to this 
work, a combination of aggressive and affiliative strategies predicts peer group 
centrality and control of social resources [dimensions of social dominance]. We 
suggest that popularity involves similar processes, reflecting a behavioural style that 
simultaneously incorporates prosocial skills and effective use of aggression" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124). 
The key implication of these findings for the field of developmental psychology 
itself is represented by the groundbreaking affirmation of the functional and adaptive 
role of aggressive/coercive behaviours. In fact, the assertions advanced by Pellegrini 
and his colleagues directly challenged the traditional perspective that used to contrast 
"dimensions of peer affiliation, such as cooperative behavior, peer group centrality, and 
popularity […] with aggression" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124).  
It is since the end of 1990s – since when evolutionary-oriented psychology and peer 
relations studies have begun to focus on understanding the "associations between 
aggression and popularity"77 –  that, 
"Accumulating evidence from this research indicates that aggression is positively 
related to dimensions of peer status indicative of social prominence and visibility" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124). 
 
While findings confirming the functional role of aggressive/deviant behaviours 
are important to this research, still the key element emerging from this 
conceptualization of the popularity process is precisely represented by the need for a 
combination of the two behaviours (prosocial and coercive). Moreover, this is also 
strengthened by further findings achieved in social dominance studies which have 
                                                
 
76	  The	  authors	  also	  build	  on	  Schwartz,	  Gorman,	  2011.	  	  	  
77	  Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  124.	  On	  peer	  relations	  studies	  see:	  Cillessen,	  Mayeux,	  2004;	  Hawley	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Rodkin	  et	  
al.,	   2000;	   Schwartz	   et	   al.,	   2006.	   On	   evolutionary	   oriented	   psychology	   see:	   Cairns	   et	   al.,	   1988;	   Hawley,	   1999a;	  
Pellegrini	  2008;	  Vaughn,	  Santos,	  2007).	  
 
 
122 
shown that the implementation of only one of the two strategies (prosociality or 
coercion) are not able or not sufficient to result in social dominance status. 
Therefore, combination is necessary in order to seek for higher status (being it 
popularity status or social dominance status). If used alone/separately (coercive 
controller or prosocial controller) the two strategies result in social status that is not 
social dominance (Hawley, 2003a). 
  
(II)	  –	  Reporting	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  dominance	  process:	  reformulation	  of	  the	  social	  
dominance	  process	  
 
	   Social dominance in its traditional conception has been formulated in terms of 
competition for resource control. In fact, under the traditional perspective, social 
dominance has been associated to competitive and coercive strategies implemented in 
order to gain access to social resources. The ratio at the basis was that, being 
resources limited, individuals must compete (within-group competition) for these 
resources, so that the strategies implemented in order to obtain access to and control 
of the limited resources are competitive and coercive – since they allow direct and 
immediate access to the contended resources.  
"Despite the clear advantages of living and coordinating with others, the fact that 
resources are limited necessitates within-group competition"78 (Hawley, 1999a, 100). 
Therefore, under this traditional perspective, predictors of resource control are 
competitive and coercive behaviours/strategies (Hawley, 1999a, 168). 
The traditional formulation was in line with studies on animal behaviour, it also had its 
extent of explanation of human behaviour, however, as highlighted by Hawley (1999a), 
while it was able to explain pre-scholar children's behaviour, it was not able to explain 
more adult behaviour which was not in line with a tendency of assertive competition 
among peers. Daily evidence induced scholars to reflect on the fact that individuals in 
their adult life tend to avoid aggressive/coercive behaviour – since socially sanctioned, 
or at least not recommended (see Hawley, 1999a). 
This is way, on these basis, and by adopting an evolutionary developmental 
perspective, Hawley (1999a, 99) advances the need to renovate the theoretical and 
                                                
 
78	  Hawley	  makes	  reference	  to	  Darwin	  (1859).	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measurement paradigms of social dominance so that they can reflect specific/peculiar 
human social and cognitive abilities – this because animal behaviour theories are not 
able to take into consideration the role of cooperative/prosocial behaviour. 
Therefore, the first step was made by scholars in the direction of challenging the 
exclusive link that traditionally associated the attainment of social dominance, and the 
control of social resources with competitive and coercive strategies only. 
With the intent to find a solution to these shortcomings in the literature, 
Hawley adopts a strategy-based perspective (Hawley, 1999a, 99): she defines social 
dominance as "differential ability to control resources–without reference to how this is 
done" (Hawley, 1999a, 99). This opens the way for the author to outline an open-
ended investigation of all the possible different strategies adopted by individuals 
(children) to compete with their peers (Hawley, 1999a, 99), being them coercive or 
prosocial.  
In more practical terms, this implied reformulating and defining social dominance in 
terms of 'variability of access to social resources' – "differential ability to control 
resources" – without making any a priori reference to how this attainment of resource 
control status is accomplished. This reopens the possibility to investigate and 
understand the effective processes that bring to status gaining (Hawley, 1999a, 97; 
Hawley 2002). 
As reported by Hawley (2002 168; 1999a; 1999b), this change of perspective mirrors a 
shift from a structural to a functional approach, focussing firstly on the ends and from 
there investigating how those ends are reached, with which means and thanks to which 
strategies. 
This evolution of perspective, was supported by increasing evidence showing that "both 
prosocial and coercive behaviours are related to resource control" (Hawley, 1999a, 97). 
Moreover, both these strategies adoptable to gain resource control, were also 
associated with social competence79. 
 
The result is that Hawley in 1999(a) by surpassing the traditional conception 
that related social dominance to coercive strategies only, advances and supports that 
                                                
 
79	   In	   the	   study	  presented	  by	  Hawley	   in	  1999(a),	   the	   rating	  of	   social	   competence	   is	  made	  by	  parents	   (see:	  Hawley,	  
1999a).	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competition for resources can be also implemented by performing 'prosocial' 
behaviours80. Next to this, in 2002, Hawley by directly addressing the predictors of 
social dominance and by investigating the strategies used by children to control 
resources, finds that both prosocial and coercive behaviours are related to resource 
control (Hawley, 2002). 
Further, association between resource control and both prosocial and coercive 
strategies, furtherly investigated, proved that the most effective strategy to gain high 
status in social dominance is a combination of the two strategies.  
Patricia Hawley, in 2003(a) publishes the results of her open-ended study which aims 
at collecting the qualification of the characteristics associated to "children who varied 
in their use of coercive (aggressive) and prosocial (cooperative) strategies of resource 
control" (Hawley, 2003a; 279). This study is done by addressing a sample of 1700 
children, and collects the qualification through self-reported and other-reported 
qualification of the characteristics. 
Considering that strategies of resource control are coercive and prosocial strategies, 
the study classifies children according to their use of these two possible strategies. In 
fact, based on a self-reported classification of the use of coercive and prosocial 
strategies of resource control, children of the sample were categorized as81 coercive 
controllers (predominantly coercive strategy), prosocial controllers (predominantly 
prosocial strategy), bistrategic controllers (using both coercive and prosocial 
strategies)82. 
                                                
 
80	   Literature	   on	   social	   competence	   "suggests	   that	   successful	   individuals	   achieve	   personal	   goals	   while	  maintaining	  
positive	  relationships"	  (Hawley,	  2002,	  167).	  Next	  to	  this,	  social	  dominance	  literature	  presents	  resource	  control	  as	  a	  
central	  personal	  goal.	  Therefore,	  challenging	  the	  traditional	  perspective,	  "although	  aggression	  and	  coercion	  may	  be	  
one	  means	  to	  attain	  these	  goals	  [resource	  control],	  the	  theoretical	  biology	  literature	  suggests	  that	  prosociality	  may	  
also	  be	  a	  means	  to	  this	  end.	  
81	  Next	  to	  these	  categories	  the	  authors	  also	  uses	  noncontrollers	   (predominantly	  none	  of	  the	  strategies),	  or	  typicals	  
(majority	  of	  children	  which	  fall	  in	  between	  cutoff	  points).	  	  
82	  Moving	  from	  the	  traditional	  perspective	  according	  which	  "positive	  and	  negative	  behaviours	  are	  often	  considered	  
diametrical	  opposites	   in	   the	  developmental	  and	   risk	   literature"	   (279).	  This	  because,	   "aggressive	  behavior	  has	  been	  
traditionally	   considered	   an	   indicator	   of	   psychological	   or	   behavioural	  maladaptation.	   Aggression	   is	   associated	  with	  
peer	   rejection	   (Coie	  &	  Dodge,	  1998;	  Coie,	  Dodge,	  &	  Kupersmidt,	  1990),	   risk-­‐taking	  behaviour	   (Brook	  &	  Newcomb,	  
1995),	   low	   educational	   achievement	   (Brook	   &	   Newcomb,	   1995),	   and	   unemployment	   (Caspi,	   Elder,	   &	   Bem,	   1987;	  
Kokko,	  &	  Pulkkinem,	  2000).	  Most	  developmental	  approaches	   to	  aggression	  preclude	  the	  possibility	   that	  aggression	  
may	   be	   associated	   with	   social	   competence"	   (279-­‐289).	   Applying	   an	   evolutionary	   perspective	   to	   studies	   of	  
developmental	  psychology	  (focussed	  on	  aggression	  –	  see	  Hawley,	  2003a,	  281-­‐282).	  	    
The	  classification	  of	  children	  by	  resource	  control	  strategy	  is	  made	  "by	  using	  cutoff	  points	  on	  the	  dimensions	  of	  self-­‐
reported	  prosocial	  and	  coercive	  strategies	  (see	  Hawley	  et	  al.,	  2002)".	  More	  in	  detail,	  the	  children	  that	  self-­‐reports	  a	  
score	  "above	  the	  66th	  percentile	  for	  one	  strategy	  and	  below	  the	  66th	  percentile	  for	  the	  other",	  is	  considered	  as	  using	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Hawley in her 2003(a) publication demonstrated that, among the categories of coercive 
controllers and prosocial controllers, it was the category of bistrategic controllers 
(Machiavellian) the one which resulted in a 'highly effective resource controller who is 
also able to command a great deal of attention [social centrality] from the group" 
(Hawley, 2003a, 283). 
Indeed, results found that bistrategic controllers, "emerged as possessing positive and 
negative characteristics and, despite their aggression, Machiavellians were socially 
central, liked by peer, socially skilled, and well adjusted" (Hawley, 2003a, 279). 
 
More in detail, discussing the findings, Hawley (2003a, 298) reports that at first 
glance results of patterns of correlations seem to reiterate traditional and well-known 
results in line with the idea according which "all good things go together" (Hawley, 
2003a, 298). In fact, by looking at bivariate correlations, it emerges that "prosocial 
strategies are generally associated with positive characteristics (e.g., agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, social skills) while coercive behavior is associated with negative 
characteristics (e.g., aggression and hostility)" (Hawley, 2003a, 298). 
However, a turning point in the results is represented by the fact that, contrary to 
traditional expectations, both positive and negative characteristics (conscientiousness, 
social self-concept, positive affect, popularity, peer rejection) are not correlated with 
specific resource control strategies. This is to say that, on the one hand,  
"coercive control is not related to conscientiousness, social self-concept, positive 
affect, popularity nor peer rejection, even though common sense or social skills 
deficit perspective would suggest negative correlations should emerge" (Hawley, 
2003a, 298-299). 
And similarly, on the other hand, prosocial control is not correlated to positive 
characteristics only. In this way, the bivariate correlation that separately associated 
positive characteristics with prosocial strategy and negative characteristics with coercive 
                                                                                                                                          
 
"predominantly	  [that]	  one	  strategy	  and	  is	  classified	  as	  such":	  prosocial	  controller	   (>66th	  percentile	  for	  prosocial	  and	  
<66th	  percentile	  for	  coercive)	  or	  coercive	  controller	  (>66th	  percentile	  for	  coercive	  and	  <66th	  percentile	  for	  prosocial).	  
In	  line	  with	  this,	  bistrategic	  controller	  categorizes	  the	  children	  whose	  self-­‐classification	  of	  resource	  control	  strategies	  
"lie[s]	  above	  the	  66th	  percentiles	  for	  both	  strategies".	  	  Similarly,	  noncontrollers	  (or	  subordinates)	  are	  those	  "children	  
scoring	  below	  the	  33rd	  percentile	  on	  both	  [strategies]".	  Finally,	  children	  classified	  as	  typicals	  when	  are	  those	  children	  
which	  "fall	  in	  between".	  This	  category	  contains	  'most	  of	  the	  children'	  and	  is	  also	  used	  as	  a	  "fitting	  comparison	  group"	  
(Hawley,	  2003a,	  283).	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strategy loses its descriptive capacity and deprives scholars of the traditional analytical 
framework.  
"A child's score on these variables [conscientiousness, social self-concept, positive 
affect, popularity, peer rejection] cannot be predicted based on knowing the degree 
to which he or she employs coercive strategies. Nor can one speak to a child's 
hostility or tendency to cheat by knowing his or her employment of prosocial 
strategies because these variables are uncorrelated as well" (Hawley, 2003a, 298-
299). 
The results and implication of this blurring of the traditional correlations, is that, by 
adopting a typological approach, "[a] clearer and more complex pattern emerges" 
(Hawley, 2003a, 299). More in detail, 
"A sizeable subgroup of children who report themselves to be aggressive, and who 
are seen as such by their peers, enjoy positive characteristics and positive 
outcomes if their coercion is balanced by prosociality. That is, aggression and 
deception can be associated with positive outcomes" (Hawley, 2003a, 299). 
These final results prove that children classified as bistrategic controllers (since 
adopting both prosocial and coercive strategies), in self-reported evaluations do "admit 
that they are aggressive (the most aggressive), claim to be hostile, and confess that 
they cheat in school [83]". At the same time this qualification is confirmed by peers in 
peer-reported evaluation. In fact, "Peers also cast them in a similar light and report 
them to be the most aggressive children in the schoolyard [84]". However, and here lies 
the emerging complex pattern, these same children that feature negative characteristics 
and behaviour also qualify as "effective, socially central and are reasonably well liked 
[85]". 
The implication is that the combination of 'getting along' and 'getting ahead' is an 
effective combination for bistrategic controllers who are able to both access resources 
(accomplishment of resource control) and to maintain, to be assigned with a 
recognized high social status (accomplishment of social centrality).  
                                                
 
83	  See	  Figure	  2	  in	  Hawley	  2003a.	  
84	  See	  Figure	  4	  in	  Hawley,	  2003a.	  
85	  See	  Figure	  5	  in	  Hawley,	  2003a.	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In this way, bistrategic controllers (only) are able to accomplish both the two 
strands of social dominance status, power and social status (resource control and 
social centrality). 
In fact, when looking at the results related to children that are classified as coercive 
controllers (Hawley, 2003a, 299) it emerges that while they share with bistrategic 
controllers the negative characteristics – in fact both are pointed out as aggressive, 
cheaters and hostile – "Yet the coercive controllers lack key attributes that may 
distinguish the skilled from the unskilled (i.e., agreeableness, social skills, and 
conscientiousness; [86])" (Hawley, 2003a, 299). On the countrary, bistrategic controllers 
are qualified by both peers and by teachers as skilful, coercive controllers lack 
prosocial attributes related to social skills. 
Considering this difference as attribution of social skills abilities, together with the fact 
that bistrategic controllers "rate themselves supreme on effective resource control [87]" 
then, "it should come as no surprise that bistrategic children enjoy a higher than 
average social self-concept and positive affect" (Hawley, 2003a, 300). 
A similar reasoning is valid when distinguishing between bistrategic controllers and 
prosocial controllers. The first distinction between the two refers to the characteristics 
of behaviour, in fact, as distinct from bistrategic controls who behave also coercively 
("badly"), "In contrast, the prosocial controllers stand out as the most agreeable, 
socially skilled, and conscientious [88]" (Hawley, 2003a, 300). 
 
Therefore, in conclusion, Hawley arrives at demonstrating that, with regard to 
resource control and social dominance status the identified compresence of both 
strategies is more than a simple co-occurrence. Indeed, it is a functional combination 
which allows to accomplish both components of social dominance status: (1) effective 
access to resources (resource control) and (2) recognition of high status by the peers 
of the group (score high in social centrality and attention by the group). 
 
                                                
 
86	  See	  Figure	  1	  in	  Hawley,	  2003a.	  
87	  See	  Figure	  3	  in	  Hawley,	  2003a.	  	  
88	  See	  Figure	  1	  in	  Hawley,	  2003a.	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(III)	  –	  From	  social	  dominance	  to	  popularity:	  the	  popularity	  process	  
 
The outline of the popularity process is achieved by Pellegrini and his 
colleagues through a parallel with the process of social dominance.  
Defining popularity as "a dimension of social standing that is characterized by visibility, 
prestige, and status with peers", social dominance is conceived as "the product of 
naturally occurring differences in resource-control status among members of a group" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 123). Looking at both social elements with an evolutionary 
perspective', the authors identify that popularity and social dominance "are linked 
though a common foundation in the strategic use of aggression" (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a). 
Studies on social dominance, undertaking an evolutionary orientation have highlighted 
the functional role played by aggressive behaviours in (effectively) gaining the control 
of resources in social groups. Therefore, the evolutionary perspective was useful also 
with specific regard to 'popularity', since it allowed to challenge the traditional 
assumption that associated deviant aggressive behaviours to "social cognitive deficits" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 123).  
Indeed, as mentioned above, these findings furtherly challenge the traditional 
perspective concerning the role of deviant behaviours within society in both its 
essential features. Indeed, in the first case, the assumed incompatibility between 
deviant and complying behaviours is overturned by evidence of a higher adaptiveness 
of the bistrategic combination of alternative behaviours89. Next to this, also the second 
component of the traditional perspective – according to which aggressive behaviours 
(and, more generally, socially deviant/antisocial behaviours) are not part of the range 
of socially competent and functional behavioural options – is waved by the confirmed 
social adaptiveness and functionality of deviant behaviours. 
 
 
                                                
 
89	  Variability	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  adaptiveness	  of	  deviant	  behaviours	  has	  also	  been	  found	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  types/	  forms	  
of	   aggressive	   behaviour	   adopted.	   Indeed,	   though	   taking	   into	   consideration	   that	   physical	   aggression	   loses	   its	  
predictive	  capacity	  on	  popularity	  status,	  still	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  report	  that	  “Relational	  aggression	  embedded	  in	  a	  larger	  
behavioral	   repertoire	   that	   also	   includes	   prosocial	   behaviors	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   the	  most	   effective”	   (Puckett	   et	   al.,	  
2008,	  565;	  quoted	  in:	  Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  84).	  See	  Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011.	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(IV)	  –	  Different	  behavioural	  strategies	  for	  different	  social	  goals	  
 
The clear distinction between types of status (likeability and popularity status) 
and its related behavioural strategies has allowed Julie Aikins and Scott Litwack (2011) 
arrive at some of the most interesting research findings that relate behavioural 
strategies to social goals. Indeed, by connecting the constructs of likeability and 
popularity to the concept of social competences – defined as "discrete behaviors that 
lead children to solve social tasks or achieve social success" (Bukowski, Parker, 1998, 
644; Aikins, Litwack, 2011, 141) – the Aikins and Litwack study shows that different 
social competences are required to achieve one or the other of the two social 
statuses (accepted status/likeability vs popular status).  
Departing from the traditional perspective and building on the most recent findings of 
peer relation studies, the two scholars show that on the one side, likeability (social 
acceptance) results being strongly linked to prosocial attitudes. Indeed, directly quoting 
them, "Behavioral attributes that may be part of this conceptualization are 
prosociability, assertiveness, self-control, and successful peer group entry" (Aikins, 
Litwack, 2011, 141). On the other hand, the most popular individuals result being “less 
attentive to group dynamics and enter in a manner that calls attention to themselves, 
their thoughts, and their interests” (Aikins, Litwack, 2011, 143).  
In other words, assertiveness, aggressiveness, and more in general social deviance are 
part of the antisocial competences associated to the behaviours of the most popular 
kids.  
Under this perspective, antisocial competences implemented next to prosocial 
competences are suggestive neither of 'social maladjustment' nor of 'peer rejection' 
(Cillessen, Mayeux, 2004, 147, 160). Conversely, they are indicative of behaviours that 
are socially recognized and accepted as functional for the achievement of popularity 
status. 
Summing up, the relevant point emerging from Aikins and Litwack's 2011 publication is 
that – although it is neither 'absolute' nor unconditional – it is possible to identify a 
link relating likeability (social acceptance) to prosocial behaviours, and popularity to 
both prosocial and antisocial behaviours.  
Building on this, it is possible to conclude that aiming at popularity and aiming at 
likeability (social acceptance) implies aiming at 'two different social goals' (Aikins, 
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Litwack, 2011, 150), which require different behavioural strategies. Indeed, when aiming 
at being highly liked or highly popular, one must implement specific social 
competences which differ from one aim to the other: empirical evidence suggests 
prosocial behaviours when aiming at social acceptance, and a combination of prosocial 
and antisocial behaviours when aiming at gaining (or maintaining) popular status. 
Therefore, fundamental implication to this is that deviant/antisocial behaviours can be 
considered as social instruments available to individuals in order for them to address 
their social goals and social statuses in acquiring popularity status. Thus, the updated 
perspective uncouples the association of deviant behaviours with social maladjustment 
and social incompetence. 
 
(V)	  –	  The	  higher	  adaptiveness	  of	  bistrategic	  combination	  of	  behaviours	  
 
 Aggressiveness is neither presented nor suggested as being social adaptive and 
competent per se but rather in specific contexts and combinations (Smith, 2007). 
Indeed, aggressiveness is found being more effective when paired with prosocial 
behaviours – in a bistrategic combination – rather than when it is adopted singularly. 
Indeed, Hawley herself defines it "most adaptive if it is paired with more-prosocial 
behaviours" (Mayeux et al., 2011, 84; Hawley, 2003). A few years later, perfectly in line 
with these findings and further refining them, Marissa Puckett, Julie Wargo Aikins and 
Antonius Cillessen (2008), when studying a sample of middle school students, 
determined that 
"relationally aggressive adolescents who were also high on leadership, cooperation, 
peer sociability, and social self-efficacy were more popular than their relationally 
aggressive peers who did not possess these qualities"90 (Mayeux et al., 2011, 84; 
Puckett et al., 2008). 
The above implies that a combination of prosocial and antisocial behaviours 
proves more adaptive than the sole implementation of antisocial (aggressive) 
behaviours. Insisting on the point, Mayeux quotes Puckett asserting that “Relational 
aggression embedded in a larger behavioral repertoire that also includes prosocial 
behaviors is expected to be the most effective” (Puckett et al., 2008, 565; quoted in: 
                                                
 
90	  Emphases	  added.	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Mayeux et al., 2011, 84). Therefore, students adopting combinations of pro- and 
antisocial behaviours perform better in popularity than do those students who 
implement exclusively aggressive behaviours. 
Therefore, the most recent findings achieved by peer relation scholars have 
disclosed empirical evidence asserting the functionality and adaptiveness of 
aggressive/deviant behaviours when related to status-seeking of popularity status. Next 
to the proven functionality of deviant behaviours, peer relations studies have also 
found results confirming the higher adaptiveness of a bistrategic combination of 
deviant and complying behaviours.  
 
Yet, both for social dominance and for popularity process, this functionality 
depends from various factors among which the type of status considered (e.g. 
aggression is not functional to likeability) and other factors. As reported by Pellegrini 
and colleagues, 
"Accumulating evidence from this research indicates that aggression is positively 
related to dimensions of peer status indicative of social prominence and visibility. 
The role of aggression in enhancing or diminishing peer status depends on what 
dimension of status is considered on several other factors, including the form of 
the aggression (proactive vs. reactive), the co-occurrence of affiliative behaviours 
such as cooperation and reconciliation with the aggression, the type of social 
situation involved (contest vs. scramble competition), school transitions, and the 
history of the peer group in which the aggression takes place" (Pellegrini, 2011, 
124). 
The next section will focus on a closer analysis of the role played by the moderators 
identified in the peer relations literature (Pellegrini et al., 2011a; Cillessen, Mayeux, 
2007).   
 
3.3.2	  –	  Introducing	  the	  findings	  on	  the	  contextual	  interactions	  in	  the	  status–behaviour	  
relations	  	  
 
The more recent perspective (evolutionary oriented) focuses on understanding 
the empirical findings which highlight an existing association between aggressive 
behaviours and popularity/reputational status (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124-125). The 
results confirm that there are several factors interacting and moderating the relation 
between status and behaviour.  
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Among these factors, the most prominent one is (I) the role played by the type of 
social status which the actor is aiming at. Indeed, the variation in the type of status 
(popularity or likeability) strongly affects the status-behaviour relation. Next to this, the 
role of aggressive behaviours in "enhancing or diminishing peer status depends on 
several other factors" 91 (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124).  
Indeed, another moderating factor is identified in (II) the type of aggressive behaviours 
which are adopted. Indeed, aggressive behaviours are classified as physical or 
relational aggression types, and again as proactive or reactive forms of aggression 
(Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007). Moreover, it is also possible to report on the moderating 
role identified for (III) the co-occurrence (or their absence) of affiliative behaviours such 
as cooperation and reconciliation, when implemented in concomitance with the 
occurrence of aggression.  
Other possible moderatos have been identified in (IV) "the type of social situation 
involved" being it an interaction context characterized by a contest or a scramble 
competition. Next to this, scholars have also identified (V) the moderating effects of 
time and age on social interactions – which are assessed (a) by focussing on school 
transitions (passages from one primary to middle and middle to high-school); (b) by 
observing the continuation of the social interaction – by observing "the history of the 
peer group in which the aggression takes place" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 124); and (c) 
by taking into consideration longitudinal observations of children behaviour (in the case 
of age).  
The next subsections will focus on a closer understanding of these elements. 
All the following observations and conclusions refer to studies which investigate the 
                                                
 
91	   Next	   to	   these	  moderators,	   studies	   focussed	   on	   children	   and	   adolescents	   have	   also	   been	   focussed	   on	   the	   role	  
played	   by	   'gender'	   and	   'age'	   as	   well	   (see	   Cillessen,	   Mayeux,	   2007,	   147-­‐153).	   These	   two	   moderators	   are	   not	  
considered	  in	  this	  research	  because	  of	  their	  little	  contribution	  to	  IR	  literature,	  however,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  report	  that	  in	  
general	  the	  studies	  on	  children/adolescents	  have	  reported	  no	  significant	  gender	  differences	  on	  the	  functional	  use	  of	  
aggressive	  behaviour,	  though	  some	  gender-­‐related	  differences	  have	  been	  identified	  on	  the	  preference	  of	  the	  type	  of	  
aggression	  adopted.	  	   	  
Equally	   interesting	   is	   also	   the	   relation	  between	  age,	   aggression	  and	   status.	   Literature	  on	   children	  and	  adolescents	  
identifies	  a	  complex	  variation	  in	  this	  relation.	  Simplifying	  a	  bit,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  report	  that,	  with	  time	  (along	  the	  years)	  
relational	  aggression	  (see	  types	  of	  aggression)	  is	  associated	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  likeability	  status	  (dislike);	  while	  physical	  
aggression	   has	   proven	   to	   lose	   "its	   power	   to	   predict	   who	   is	   disliked	   and	   rejected	   by	   peers"	   (for	  more	   details	   see	  
Cillessen,	  Mayeux	   (2007,	   150).	  While	  when	   addressing	   age,	   aggression	   and	   popularity	   status,	   it	   has	   emerged	   that	  
both	  physical	  and	   relational	  aggression	  are	  associated	   to	  popularity,	  along	   the	  years.	  See	  Cillessen,	  Mayeux	   (2007,	  
147-­‐153).	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process of accessing/gaining reputational status (being it popularity or social 
dominance) 92. 
 
	  (I)	  –	  The	  status-­‐behaviour	  link	  according	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  type	  of	  status	  
 
Along this third chapter, this issue has already been dealt with in length. 
Putting it in a few words: the role of aggression with regard to social status depends 
on the type of status that is considered. Indeed, developmental psychologists have 
proven that aggressiveness has a positive relation with popularity, and a negative 
relation with the dimension of social acceptance/likeability.  
More in detail, once literature on developmental psychology arrived at a clear 
distinction between likeability and popularity93 and their (different) associations, it 
                                                
 
92	  Peer	  relational	  scholars	  of	  reference	  for	  the	  following	  sections,	  advance	  themselves	  the	  need	  for	  future	  research	  
aimed	   at	   investigating	   the	   "distinction	   between	   accessing	   and	  maintaining	   control	   of	   resources"	   (Pellegrini	   et	   al.,	  
2011a,	  135).	  Furtherly	  supporting	   the	  need	  of	   further	   investigation,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   report	   that	   the	  current	   results	  
available	  on	  this	  issue	  seem	  to	  be	  contradictory.	  Indeed,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  Pellegrini	  and	  colleagues	  assert	  that	  "Both	  
theory	  and	  data	  suggest	  that	  different	  strategies	  are	  invoked"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  135).	  While	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  
Mayeux	   and	   colleagues	   report	   that,	   "the	   interplay	   between	   popularity	   and	   aggression	   is	   likely	   bidirectional,	   with	  
certain	  forms	  of	  aggression	  being	  used	  successfully	  by	  some	  youth	  to	  acquire	  popular	  status	  and	  that	  popularity	  then	  
serving	  as	  an	  instigator	  for	  increased	  aggression"	  (Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  83).	  The	  meaning	  of	  these	  results	  implies	  that	  
aggressiveness	  can	  be	  used	  both	  to	  gain	  popularity,	  and	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  gaining	  popularity	  to	  maintain	  the	  high	  
acquired	   status.	   However,	   this	   contrasts	   both	  with	   results	   on	   the	   co-­‐occurrence	   of	   strategies	   –	   that	   confirm	   that	  
aggression	   is	   effective/functional	   for	   status	   gaining	   only	   if	   followed	   by	   reconciliatory	   strategies	   (see	   below,	  
subsection	   III)	   and	  also	  with	   the	   results	  of	   longitudinal	  data–studies	   that	   report	   that	  aggression,	  after	  being	  highly	  
used	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year	  (when	  the	  phase	  of	  negotiation	  takes	  place),	  aggressive	  behaviours	  then	  decrease	  
during	  the	  year	  (see	  subsection	  V).	  	   	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  discrepancy	  of	  these	  findings,	  addressing,	  Pellegrini's	  claim	  according	  to	  which	  "Both	  theory	  and	  
data	  suggest	   that	  different	  strategies	  are	   invoked"	   (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  135),	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  support	   that,	   this	  
hypothesis	   suggests	   the	   need	   also	   for	   IR	   research/literature	   to	   investigate	   possible	   distinctions	   between	   status	  
seeking	  strategies	  and	  status	  maintaining	  strategies.	  This	  in	  particular	  becomes	  relevant	  in	  the	  case	  of	  'Role	  Theory'	  
interpretative	  framework	  which	  makes	  no	  distinction	  between	  the	  phase	  of	   'gaining'	  status	  and	  maintaining	  status.	  
Supporting	   these	   insights,	   sociological	   literature	   on	   socialization	   process	   (see	   Long,	   Hadden,	   1985)	   confirm	   the	  
distinction	   between	   the	   'selective'	   phase	   in	   which	   candidates	   are	   required	   to	   positively	   respond	   to	   the	   selection	  
process,	  and	  the	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  candidate	  is	  accepted	  and	  enters	  the	  group's	  life.	  The	  two	  authors	  insist	  also	  
on	   the	   possibility	   that	   in	   large	   groups,	   the	   selection	   process	   is	   specifically	   assigned	   to	   a	   part	   of	   the	   group	   and	   is	  
conducted	  with	  specific	  rules.	  This	  brings	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	   'social	  world	  of	  socialization'	  (dealing	  with	  
the	  selection	  process)	  and	  'real	  world'	  of	  the	  group	  life	  and	  interaction.	  Long	  and	  Hadden	  highlight	  the	  'discrepancy'	  
that	  derives	   from	   this	  way	  of	   separately	  managing	   the	   selection	   (socialization)	  process.	   Indeed,	   in	   consequence	  of	  
this,	   the	   newly	   accepted	   members,	   who	   positively	   accomplished	   the	   selection	   process	   and	   met	   the	   admission	  
requirements,	   once	   interacting	  with	   the	   'real	  world'	   of	   the	   group,	   are	   in	   the	   need	   of	   adjusting	   themselves	   to	   the	  
actual	  rules	  social/interaction	  rules	  of	  the	  group	  (Long,	  Hadden,	  1985).	  
93	  Distinguishing	  between	  likeability	  and	  popularity	  helps	  to	  understand	  that,	  while	  likeability	  constitutes	  an	  'index	  of	  
liking	  among	  the	  peer	  group',	  popularity	  is	  an	  index	  of	  "social	  impact,	  visibility,	  and	  reputation".	  This	  conception	  has	  
been	   identified	   into	   two	   variants,	   one	   is	   a	   power-­‐oriented	   definition	   of	   popularity	   status	   –	   in	  which	   popularity	   is	  
considered	   as	   a	   "marker	   for	   social	   power"	   –,	   and	   the	   other	   relates	   popularity	  more	   to	   'social	   network	   centrality',	  
social	  connectedness,	  visibility	  and	  impact	  (see	  Cillessen,	  Mayeux,	  2007,	  144-­‐145).	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clearly emerged that "there are two forms of high status with different behavioral 
profiles" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 145).  
Whether, with regard to high-likeability-status,  
"Aggression is typically not a characteristic of well-liked children (…). Aggression was 
instead strongly associated with peer rejection, or sociometric unpopularity 
[measures of dislike]" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 144; see also Newcomb et al., 
1993). 
On the other side, aggression is among the features reported for high-popular children 
(Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 144). 
Therefore, in line with this, prosocial (norm conforming) behaviour emerged as 
predictive of high likeability. While on the opposite, the key element that allows to 
identify popularity's distinctiveness is the observation of deviant behaviours 
(investigated by focussing on the adoption and manifestation of different forms of 
aggression). 
 
(II)	  –	  Forms	  of	  aggression:	  overt/physical	  vs	  indirect/relational,	  proactive	  vs	  reactive	  
types	  of	  aggression	  
  
Another moderator of the relation between aggression and peer status is of 
course found in the variation of the type of implemented aggression behaviour. 
It is possible to find in the developmental-psychological literature, two main 
distinctions of the forms of aggression: (1) the distinction between overt/physical and 
indirect/relational aggression and (2) the distinction between proactive and reactive 
forms of aggression. 
 
Moving from the distinction between overt/physical aggression and 
indirect/relational aggression on the other, it is possible to report that according to 
the literature, "Overt/physical aggression includes behaviours such as verbal and 
physical assault and is stereotypically associated with boys rather than girls" (Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007, 146). 
On the other side, indirect/relational aggression, 
"(…) includes behaviours that are more covert and are usually aimed at harming 
another person's social status, friendships, or reputation (e.g. Crick, 1996). Some 
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behaviors classified as indirect or relational include malicious gossip, exclusion from 
activities and groups, and giving someone 'the silent treatment' [ignoring]" (Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007, 146). 
Results confirm that 'both forms of aggression are related with low levels of likeability'. 
However, with regard to the relation between popularity and forms of aggression, a 
strong relationship has been found "between both physical/overt and relational/indirect 
forms of aggression and perceived popularity [aka, popularity]" (see Cillessen, Mayeux, 
2004b; LaFontana, Cillessen, 2002; Parkhurst, Hopmeyer, 1998; Prinstein, Cillessen, 
2003; Rose et al., 2004). Nevertheless, it also emerges that "over time physical 
aggression loses its power to predict who is disliked and rejected by peers" (Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007, 150). Therefore, by focussing mainly on forms of relational-aggression, it 
emerges that,  
"Although relationally aggressive youth are typically not well-liked by their peers, 
they are often some of the most socially powerful and influential members of their 
grade and enjoy high levels of social centrality" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 146; see 
also, Cillessen, Mayeux, 2004b, Prinstein, Cillessen, 2003; Rodkin et al., 2000; Xie et 
al., 2002). 
This furtherly strengthens the idea according which, when the social goal of the child 
is more status-oriented (than affiliation-oriented), then the child "may be impervious to 
the level of dislike [his/her] peers have for [him/her]" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 147; 
LaFontana, 2005). 
Among the explanations for this strong relation it is possible to find the one 
advanced by Rose and her colleagues (2004) who assert that,  
"relationally aggressive acts such as threatening to cut friendship ties and excluding 
certain peers from groups and activities allow the perpetrator to covertly rearrange 
the social structure of the peer group in such a way that will enhance their own 
status and visibility" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 146). 
This instrumental and proactive use of relational aggression is also confirmed by 
empirical evidence, indeed Prinstein and Cillessen (2003), investigating 10th grade, find 
an association between popularity and the functional use of aggression ahead of 
social goals achievements.  
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More nuanced results are achieved and presented by Xie (et al., 2002) who "found 
that different forms of relational aggression were used at different stages of social 
conflict"94, this by proving that there may be "an acute awareness of what kinds if 
behaviours will allow them to disrupt the social hierarchy and the balance of the 
affiliations within it, and use it to their own advantage" Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 147). 
In addition to this, and extremely interesting at the social level, is the fact that this 
same 'social awareness', has been found not only in 'savvy youth' but also in young 
preschoolers; 
"[this] is amazing in itself, because it implies that even some very young children 
understand the nature of social power well enough to manipulate their social 
standing, or at least to attempt to" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 147; see also, Crick, 
1997; Crick, Grotpeter, 1995). 
In conclusion, savvy children aiming at social-oriented goals, understand that relational-
aggression may be functional to their aim. 
 
Focussing now on distinguishing aggression on the basis of its being proactive 
or reactive, it is important to report that the literature characterizes proactive 
aggression as an instrumental form of aggression that is used proactively by the actor 
'to attain dominance'. An example is bullying behaviour used by the students 'to attain 
dominance as they enter a new social group' (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 127; see also 
Pellegrini, Bartini, 2001, Pellegrini, Bartini, Brooks, 1999; Rodkin et al., 2000). On the 
opposite, reactive aggression relates to behaviour usually adopted by kids who are 
victims of bullying behaviour and who react by adopting aggressive behaviour95. "These 
youth emerge as frequent victims, provocative victims of bullying but respond 
aggressively when provoked" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 127).  
 The results of the studies focussed on the relation between these two forms of 
aggression and peer status, have always agreed with regard to the fact that reactive 
                                                
 
94	  Xie	  and	  colleagues'	  research,	  confirmed	  that,	  "whereas	  indirect	  and	  behind	  the	  back	  behaviours	  tended	  to	  initiate	  
conflict,	  more	  direct	  verbal	  forms	  of	  relational	  aggression	  were	  used	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  (Cillessen,	  Mayeux,	  2007,	  146;	  
see	  Xie	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  
95	  Also	  called	  as	  'aggressive	  victims,	  bully	  victims,	  provocative	  victims	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  127;	  see	  also	  Schwartz,	  
2000).	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aggression is strictly related to dislike (low levels of likeability), lack of social 
competence and low levels of social dominance.  
An example to this can be found in Pellegrini's (et al., 2011a) focus on "person-
centered analyses (e.g. von Eye & Bogat, 2006) with the intent of examining the 
associations among bullying, social dominance, popularity, and prosocial behavior in 
early adolescence" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 128). This analysis has brought to the 
identification of 'different clusters of bullies and socially dominant youth'. Four possible 
combinations emerged. On the one side, kids identified as bullies, differed between 
those that where high in social dominance (high-bullying/high-dominance) and those 
that where low in social dominance dimensions (high-bullying/low-dominance). Similarly, 
on the other side, kids who did not qualify as bullies (low-bullying) also distinguished 
between low-bullying/high-dominance and low-bullying/low-dominance. 
Evidence regarding to the high-bullying/low-dominance showed that, 
"The high-bullying/low-dominance group appeared to be similar to the aggressive 
victims found in other research (Schwartz, 2000), given that they were frequently 
victimized, low in proactive aggression, and relatively high in reactive aggression. 
Moreover, these adolescents lacked social competence, which is consistent with 
extant theory (Pellegrini et al., 1999). Perhaps as a result of their tendencies toward 
reactively aggressive behavior, the high-bullying/low-dominance group was also 
highly disliked and had few peer-nominated friends (e.g., Dodge, 1991)" (Pellegrini et 
al., 2011a, 128). 
Implications to this are that: reactive aggression, not planned (not strategical nor 
functional to social gaining) results being disliked by peer members. As a consequence, 
those individuals that employ aggressive behaviours only, and in reactive modality, are 
identified as 'lacking social competences'. They do not gain social dominance. 
 Whether, there is agreement on the fact that there is a clear relation between 
reactive aggression and peer rejection (dislike), still there is not the same level of 
agreement on results concerning the relation between "proactive aggression and peer 
status" – which results being more complex.  
The complexity is given by the fact that some studies have concluded that "proactively 
aggressive bullies may be popular only within highly aggressive peer group and less 
popular with other students" (see Pellegrini et al., 1999). Contrasting with this, other 
studies have identified the relation between popularity status and proactively aggressive 
children (see Rodkin et al., 2000), and more recent studies conducted on adolescents 
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have found "very clear positive associations between bullying and popularity, while 
controlling for social preference"/likeability (see Bruyn, Cillessen, 2009 – Pellegrini et 
al., 2011a, 127).  
 
	  (III)	  –	  The	  co-­‐occurrence	  of	  affiliative	  behaviours	  (cooperation	  and	  reconciliation)	  next	  
to	  aggressive	  behaviours	  
 
 Further factors and moderators, other than the types of status and aggression, 
influence the relation between popularity and social dominance. Among them peer 
relations and developmental scholars have identified the role played by the 'co-
occurrence of aggressive and affiliative behaviours' (Pellegrini et al., 2011a; see also: 
Hawley, Little, 1999; Francis, 1988; Strayer, 1980). In fact,  
"Over the years, numerous scholars have concluded that social dominance is not 
simply a matter of “toughness”; rather, children use a combination of aggressive 
and affiliative behaviors (such as cooperation and reconciliations) to control 
resources, such as toys, treats, and peer attention (Hawley, 1999; La Freniere & 
Charlesworth, 1983; Pellegrini, 2008; Rowe, Maughan, Worthman, Costello, & Angold, 
2004; Savin-Williams, 1987; Vaughn, Vollenweider, Bost, Azria-Evans, & Snider, 
2003)" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 129).  
Therefore, the sole implementation of aggressive behaviours, does not result into social 
dominance. By referring to the previous section, it is possible to say that it results into 
the 'high-bullying/low-dominance' combination, which is associated with 'dislike' (low 
likeability) and social incompetence (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 128). Consequently, in 
order for aggressiveness to result into social dominance, it needs to be combined with 
prosocial and affiliative behaviours such as cooperation and reconciliation. Continuing 
with the quotation form Pellegrini and colleagues, 
"Children using both of these strategies—so-called bistrategic resource controllers 
(e.g., Hawley, 2002)—are particularly adept in this regard and, as a consequence, 
enjoy increased levels of peer status, attention, and affiliation (Hawley, 2003; 
LaFreniere & Charlesworth, 1983; Pellegrini et al., 2007; Roseth et al., 2007)" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 129). 
It would be possible to formulate an explanation to 'why aggressive behaviours 
alone are not sufficient for the individual to be also socially appreciated and 
recognized with a high social status/ranking' by recalling the twofold nature 
constituting the dimension of social dominance. Indeed, social dominance in its 
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updates formulation, was composed by both (1) control of resources (resources) and 
(2) social centrality in the peer group (status). 
On these basis, an explanation to this can be advanced by referring to the distinction 
between social dominance relationship (which refers to dyadic encounters at the 
individual level of interaction) and social dominance rank which instead refers to the 
social status rank of an individual with respect to the peer group. 
Moving from this, it is possible to say that in the context of a dyadic encounter, the 
use of aggressive behaviour may result into the possession/gain of the contended 
resource. Using the example of child-A and child-B contenting the use of a swing, if A 
pushes B, A gains the access to the swing (control of the resource). However, when 
moving at the level of social dominance rank (the social position of an individual in 
relation to the entire group), this does not positively influence A's social position. 
Therefore, in order for an individual to be conferred with a high level of social 
status/ranking, it needs to take into consideration also the second component of the 
social dominance index. This second element requires social recognition (legitimization) 
conferred by peers, therefore it obliges individuals to take into consideration the 
importance of social interaction.  
This tacitly implies that social consensus is fundamental for an individual to score high 
in both components of the social dominance index. Otherwise it would qualify high in 
bullying behaviour and low in social dominance.  
Therefore, the conclusion implied by this is that, the exclusive adoption of 
aggressive behaviours decreases (negatively affects) the levels of social status – both 
in the case of social dominance as much as for popularity and likeability. While, in 
order to positively affect levels of popularity status it is necessary to combine both 
aggressive behaviour (to gain resources/power/control) and conciliatory behaviours (to 
gain social affiliation and recognition of high status – legitimization). 
  
Moreover, Pellegrini and colleagues, commit into finding further specifications of 
the status–aggression relation. Indeed, as they highlight, this because "is not sufficient 
to invoke a trait or a combination of traits to explain the co-occurrence of aggressive 
and affiliative behaviors",96 therefore it follows the necessity to better specifying the 
                                                
 
96	  See	  Parten,	  1933;	  Zaccaro,	  2007.	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'recognizable and systemic contextual variations in their use' (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 
129). 
Aiming to clarify the behavioural sequence that relates aggression to social dominance 
and popularity, the authors focus on three elements.  
First, they build on studies investigating 'postaggressive affiliation and reconciliation97 in 
competitive encounters'. The findings reached by these studies support that, 
"The data that do exist [on studies focussed on children postaggression aggression] 
suggest that after dominant children use aggression to control resources in con- 
tests, they follow up with an affiliative strategy" (Pellegrini et al., 2007). 
Secondly, the authors report the results obtained by two studies (Roseth, 2006; Roseth 
et al., 2011)98 which "showed evidence of preschoolers’ reconciliation, with postconflict 
affiliation occurring selectively between former opponents, even after controlling for 
baseline rates of affiliation during free play" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 130). In 
conclusion, the same studies 
Results also showed that reconciliation was positively correlated with preschoolers’ 
social dominance, supporting the view that dominant preschoolers reconcile 
strategically, using postconflict affiliation after winning contests as a way of keeping 
defeated peers as affiliates or simply so the latter will not defame them to peers 
or adults" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 130). 
Implications at the group level: reconciliation allows interpersonal competition (adoption 
of aggressive behaviours at the level of individual interaction) while permitting the 
group to maintain its cohesion at the group level99. 
Finally, the third and last specification of the aggression–status relation, builds on 
studies that investigate "who, in the course of conflict resolution, initiated and who 
                                                
 
97	  Most	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  'postaggression	  reconciliation'	  has	  been	  conducted	  on	  nonhuman	  primates	  (see,	  Aureli,	  
Cords,	   van	  Schaik,	  2002;	  de	  Waal,	  2000).	  However,	   though	   lesser,	   still	   some	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  also	  on	  
children	  as	  well	  (see,	  Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Roseth,	  2006;	  Roseth	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  
98	  Both	  studies	  adopt	  the	  'post-­‐conflict-­‐matched	  control	  method',	  developed	  by	  de	  Waal	  and	  Yoshihara	  (1983),	  and	  
used	  in	  order	  to	  verify	  that	  "If	  postconflict	  affiliation	  is	  to	  be	  linked	  convincingly	  to	  the	  preceding	  aggressive	  bout,	  it	  
must	   also	   be	   shown	   that	   affiliation	   occurs	  more	   often	   after	   competitive	   conflict	   than	   during	   free	   play	   and	   that	   it	  
occurs	  selectively	  between	  former	  opponents	  (de	  Waal,	  2000)"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  130).	  
99	   "At	   the	  group	   level,	   these	   results	   support	   the	  view	   that	   combining	  coercive	   resource	  control	  with	   reconciliation	  
increases	   group-­‐level	   cohesion	   by	   bringing	   former	   opponents	   together	  more	   often	   than	   occurs	   in	   the	   absence	   of	  
competitive	   bouts	   (de	   Waal,	   1986,	   2000).	   In	   other	   words,	   reconciliation	   allows	   interpersonal	   competition,	   even	  
coercive,	   aggressive	   forms,	   to	   enhance	   peer	   affiliation	   by	   allowing	   peers	   to	   negotiate	   interpersonal	   conflict	   while	  
avoiding	  alienation	   (de	  Waal,	  2000;	  Pellegrini,	  2008;	  Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Roseth,	  2006)"	   (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  
130).	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responded to reconciliatory attempts" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a; 2011b100). Results assert 
that dominant children tend to both initiate reconciliation and to respond to other's 
reconciliation101 with a predominance of the first option. Therefore, these results – 
consistent with previous research (see Sutton et al., 1999) – allow to assert that: 
"Dominant children appear to be likely to initiate reconciliations, perhaps reflecting 
their strategic use of prosocial behaviors for resolution of conflicts" (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a, 131).  
Moreover, "The results also showed that initiating reconciliation after dominance 
bouts paid dividends in terms of liking by peers102" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). 
In conclusion,  
"These findings support the claim that high-status children tend to combine 
aggressive resource-control behaviors with initiating reconciliations with defeated 
peers to attenuate damage done to their peer status associated with using 
aggression"103 (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). 
In conclusion, it is possible to report that, similarly to the case of forms of 
aggression104 also in this case it seems that proactive behaviour is perceived as an 
appropriate behaviour for highly socially dominant and popular children105, while missing 
proactivity seems to downgrade the social status in the peer group. 
 
 
 
                                                
 
100	   Disclaimer:	   in	   cases	   where	   'Pellegrini	   et	   al.,	   2011"	   is	   quoted	   or	   referred	   to	   without	   specifying	   "a"	   or	   "b",	   the	  
refenrence/quotation	  refers	  to	  Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a.	  	  
101	  "Both	  dominance	  measures	  were	  significantly	  and	  positively	  correlated	  with	  initiating	  postcontest	  reconciliations	  
(r’s	  =	   .44	  and	   .56,	   respectively)	  and	  with	   responding	   to	  others’	   reconciliations	   (r’s	  =	   .35	  and	   .40,	   respectively).	  The	  
different	   magnitudes	   of	   these	   correlations	   favored	   the	   relation	   between	   dominance	   and	   initiating	   reconciliations	  
over	  dominance	  and	  responding	  to	  reconciliations"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  130-­‐131).	  
102	   "Initiating	   reconciliations	   was	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   social	   acceptance	   (r	   =	   .30),	   but	   responding	   to	  
reconciliations	   was	   not.	   Correspondingly,	   responding	   to	   reconciliations	   was	   significantly	   correlated	   with	   peer	  
rejection	  (r	  =	  .40),	  but	  initiating	  reconciliations	  was	  not"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  131).	  
103	   These	   studies	   are	   conducted	   on	   preschoolers,	   but	   authors	   extend	   their	   conclusions	   to	   adolescence	   as	   well	  
(Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  131).	  	  
104	  See	  above,	  section	  IV	  –	  forms	  of	  aggression.	  
105	   Though	   this	   association	   is	   to	   be	   better	   confirmed,	   see	   section	   "(II)	   –	   Forms	   of	   aggression:	   overt/physical	   vs	  
indirect/relational,	  and	  proactive	  vs	  reactive	  aggression"	  (above).	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(IV)	  –	  The	  type	  of	  social	  situation	  involved:	  contest	  vs.	  scramble	  competition	  
 
Among the moderators that contribute to enhance or diminish the impact of 
aggression on levels of peer status, peer relations literature has also identified the role 
played by the social contest. In particular, the literature has identified two forms of 
competition which "predict variations in aggressive and affiliative behaviors to access 
resources", they are: scramble competition and contest competition (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a, 131).  
With regard to the first one, scramble competition corresponds to a situation in which,  
"resources are abundantly present to the extent that all group members get a 
share (Parker, 2000). Consequently, group members use “low-cost” affiliative 
strategies, such as cooperation, to access resources (Pellegrini, 2008; Pellegrini et 
al., 2007)" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). 
On the opposite, a contest competition corresponds to a situation in which the 
contended recourses are limited, therefore in this social context "there are winners and 
losers, and the winners can 'take all'" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). 
Literature asserts that in the case of scramble competition, being resources 
'abundant and cheap', adopting aggression (that is a 'costly strategy') is not an 
efficient strategy since, given its high costs, its "risks of injury and social sanction 
overweight its benefits" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). While, in situations of contest 
competition, "aggression is more likely than cooperation because it is more likely to 
'pay off'", this because the high costs of this strategy are payed off by the high value 
associated to the contended resources (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131; see also: Parker, 
2000; Pellegrini, 2008; Pellegrini et al., 2007).  
Reviewing relevant studies with regard to behaviour strategies in scramble and 
contest competitions, and behavioural predictors of social dominance (Pellegrini et al., 
2007; Tarullo et al., 2003), the authors conclude that, 
"children’s observed cooperative behavior predicted access to resources in scramble 
competitions but not in contest competitions. (…) These results support the view 
that scramble competitions elicit more affiliation than aggression, whereas the 
reverse might be true for contest competitions. They also support the idea that 
peers’ positive regard for successful resource control may be attributed to the 
strategic combination of prosocial and coercive strategies in different competitive 
contexts" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 132). 
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These findings are also confirmed by studies focussed on situations of contest 
competition in which boys compete for the access to opposite-sex relationships106 (see 
Charlesworth, 1988; Low, 2000; Pellegrini Bartini, 2001; Bukowski et al., 2000; Pellegrini, 
Long, 2007) and also by studies focussed on girls' interactions in transition from 
middle to high school107 (see Cillessen, Mayeux, 2004). School transition is relevant to 
both types of studies (see Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 132). 
 
(V)	  –The	  dynamic	  context:	  investigating	  the	  moderating	  effects	  of	  'time'	  and	  'age'	  on	  the	  
status–behaviour	  relation	  
 
Developmental scholars focussed on peer relations, have underlined the importance of 
not limiting observations to single episodes, indeed "it seems too simple to treat social 
behaviors as isolated variables impacting an outcome" (Pellegrini et al., 2011, 135; 
Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007). Instead, taking into consideration the dynamicity of social 
interaction context better allows to "understand the meaning and function of a 
behavior". Scholars aiming at this, must begin to examine sequences of behavior within 
the dynamic social and behavioral contexts in which they occur, and not simply as 
summary variables aggregated across time" (Pellegrini et al., 2011, 135; Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007). 
For example, as emerged in the case of combination of aggressive with reconciliatory 
strategies,  
"As demonstrated with observations of preschoolers, aggression may be used 
initially to access resources in contests, but within a few minutes the winners of 
these contests affiliate with their peers, often initiating reconciliations with them" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011, 135). 
This is why separately observing each single episode may not allow to gather a 
comprehensive understating of socially interactive processes, which is dynamic.  
In order to positively respond to this issue, both Pellegrini and colleagues and also 
Cillessen and Mayeux, have built their studies on dynamic models (sequences of 
behaviour) developed with longitudinal data (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 135; see Long, 
                                                
 
106	  "[B]oys’	  aggression	  predicted	  their	  being	  nominated	  by	  girls	  to	  a	  hypothetical	  party"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  132).	  	  
107	   "[G]irls’	   use	   of	   relational	   aggression	   before	   the	   transition	   from	   middle	   to	   high	   school	   predicted	   their	   higher	  
popularity	  status	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  high	  school"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  132).	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Pellegrini, 2003). Indeed, it is longitudinal data that allow to investigate both the role 
played by time and age on the status behaviours link. 
 
 The moderating role of 'time' has been assessed by focussing on two specific 
cases: (a) in the beginning of the social interaction, and (b) along its continuation. 
More in detail, the moderating role played by time in the beginning of a social 
interaction has been assessed by focussing on observations of peer-to-peer interaction 
in situations of school transitions ("from primary to middle school and from middle to 
high school"). While the moderating role played by time on the continuation of the 
social interaction has been assessed by focussing on observations of the entire 
school-year – in order to investigate the "history of group formation" (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a, 133-134). 
Next to time, the last part of this section will also focus on (c) specific observations of 
'age' and its effects on status-behaviour link. 
 
 (a) With regard to school transitions observations (see, Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007; 
Pellegrini, Long, 2001; Savin-Williams, 1987), results confirm that there is an increase 
of aggression in the passage (transition) to a new school, which decreases along the 
year. Moreover, in the cases of studies conducted both on preschoolers (Pellegrini et 
al., 2007; Roseth et al., 2007; Roseth et al., 2011) and also on adolescents (Savin-
Williams, 1987; Pellegrini, 2008) it was found that in both cases,  
"[the] use of aggression during such transitions is an important predictor of social 
reputation. From this perspective, it is probably the case that aggression is 
strategically used to establish dominance in new social groupings, and once 
dominance is established, rates of aggression decrease" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 
133). 
Adding to this, studies that examined 'predictors of social dominance during group 
stabilization' (see Pellegrini, Bartini, 2001), have confirmed that at the beginning of the 
6th grade (a case of school transition) it is the 'aggressive behaviours (and not 
 
 
145 
affiliation) that predict measures of social dominance in the first term'108 (Pellegrini et 
al., 2011a, 134; see Pellegrini, Bartini, 2001). 
 
(b) With regard to the continuation of peer-to-peer social interactions along the 
school year, Pellegrini and colleagues (2011a) have taken into consideration 'the way 
pre-schoolers' social dominance and reconciliation correlated with social acceptance" 
(Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 134). Results of this investigation led the authors to confirm 
that, 
"During the fall term, reconciliation correlated positively with indicators of disliking 
by peers and social impact. Thus, high visibility in the fall seemed to come at the 
cost of social rejection. By the spring term, however, a positive correlation between 
reconciliation and friend nominations emerged. We hypothesized that decreasing 
coercion, ongoing high rates of affiliative behavior, and a history of reconciliation 
combined dynamically to buffer the effects of aggression and enhance peer liking. 
Supporting this view, being liked in the spring did not come at the cost of 
preschoolers’ dominance. In fact, social dominance was positively associated with 
acceptance by peers across both fall and spring terms" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 
134). 
In other words, and considering that in the studies taken into consideration by 
Pellegrini and his colleagues (2011a) aggressive behaviour tended to be adopted at the 
beginning of the year, and at the beginning of new school programmes (first year of 
middle-school or high-school) the above-reported findings imply that aggressive 
behaviour results soon into social dominance (and high popularity) but it takes more 
time for the aggressive individual to recover on measures of social acceptance (liking).  
 
(c) With regard to age, some studies have also taken into consideration the 
role played by the variation of the age of children/adolescents, arriving at the 
conclusions that along the years, relational aggression (see types of aggression) keeps 
being associated with low levels of likeability status (dislike), while physical aggression 
tends to lose "its power to predict who is disliked and rejected by peers" (for more 
details see Cillessen, Mayeux (2007, 150). Instead, when addressing the interaction 
between age, aggression and popularity status, it has emerged that, while years pass 
                                                
 
108	  "In	  the	  spring	  of	   the	  6th	  grade,	  both	  measures	  of	  affiliation	  [self-­‐	  and	  diary	  reported]	  and	  only	  one	  measure	  of	  
aggression	  (diary	  report)	  predicted	  social	  dominance"	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  134).	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by, both physical and relational aggression keep being associated with popularity 
(Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 147-153).  
 
To conclude these sections, it is possible to report that, thanks to more recent 
research which has identified the moderators of the status-behaviour link, "we know 
much more about the relationship between multiple forms of aggression and multiple 
status types" and also about the role of several other moderating factors (Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007, 136). Investigations on children's peer relations proved useful in 
confirming and outlining the (contextual) functional role of aggressive behaviours. 
indeed, depending on the social context and on the type of status sought for, 
"aggression in the peer system can function as an adaptive behavior that allows youth 
to achieve important social goals" (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007, 136).  
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3.4	  –	  Conclusions:	  discovering	  the	  socially	  functional	  roles	  of	  deviant	  
behaviours	  and	  updating	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  status-­‐behaviour	  relation	  
 
The 1998 turn, brought developmental scholars to discover that there are 
different types of status, which are related to different behavioural strategies. At the 
end of the 20th century, peer relations studies on children have arrived at outlining a 
more nuanced articulation of the complex – and contextual – relation between status 
and behaviours, this by focussing on understanding and furtherly investigating the 
effective role of aggressive behaviours in social interactions among kids. The results of 
these investigations, discovering a socially functional role of deviant/aggressive 
behaviours, directly led to challenging and updating the traditional conception of the 
status-behaviour relation in favour of a more complex outline of this relation.  
More in detail, the traditional perspective on the role of aggressive behaviours in social 
interaction has been tackled in both its components: on the one hand, the 
incompatibility of the behavioural options (compliance and deviance), and on the other 
hand, the assumed association of complying behaviours with social competence and of 
deviant behaviours with social incompetence and maladjustment. 
Empirical evidence of these studies, undertaking an evolutionary perspective, has shown 
that aggressive behaviour can – in some cases – be socially adaptive, since it can be 
strategic and functional to both gaining popularity and strengthening status109. 
These results do not imply that aggressiveness is functional and socially adaptive per 
se, but rather that it is functional only if properly (strategically) used in specific 
contexts, for specific status seeking. Related to this, Smith (2007) has stated that, 
                                                
 
109	  Among	  the	  nuanced	  details	  emerging	  from	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  studies,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  report	  findings	  on	  the	  
direction	   of	   the	   causal	   path	   linking	   aggression	   to	   popularity	   status.	   Indeed,	  whereas	   Cillessen	   and	  Mayeux	   (2004)	  
"found	  support	  for	  a	  model	   in	  which	  gains	   in	  popularity	  predicted	  subsequent	   increases	   in	  aggressive	  behavior".	   In	  
line	   with	   this,	   Rose,	   Swensen	   and	  Waller	   (2004)	   also	   "found	   evidence	   for	   both	   causal	   paths	   in	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	  
investigation	  of	  popularity	  and	  aggression:	  Relational	  aggression	  predicted	   increases	   in	  popularity	   for	  seventh-­‐	  and	  
ninth-­‐grade	   girls,	   and	   popularity	   predicted	   increased	   relational	   aggression	   for	   both	   boys	   and	   girls.	   Relational	  
aggression	   and	   popularity	   were	   found	   to	   reciprocally	   influence	   each	   other	   in	   a	   third	   study	   of	   middle	   schoolers	  
(Puckett,	  Aikins,	  &	  Cillessen,	  2008).	  Thus,	  the	  interplay	  between	  popularity	  and	  aggression	  is	  likely	  bidirectional,	  with	  
certain	  forms	  of	  aggression	  being	  used	  successfully	  by	  some	  youth	  to	  acquire	  popular	  status	  and	  that	  popularity	  then	  
serving	  as	  an	  instigator	  for	  increased	  aggression"	  (Mayeux	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  83).	   	  
The	  meaning	  of	  these	  results	  is	  that	  aggressiveness	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  having	  a	  bidirectional	  interplay;	  indeed,	  it	  can	  
be	   used	   both	   (1)	   to	   gain	   popularity,	   and	   (2)	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   gaining	   popularity	   to	  maintain	   the	   high	   acquired	  
status.	  	  
However,	  other	  authors	  underline	  the	  need	  to	  directly	  investigate	  the	  differences	  in	  behavioural	  strategies	  occurring	  
between	  gaining	  status	  and	  maintaining	  status	  (Pellegrini	  et	  al.,	  2011a).	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"aggressive behaviour has adaptive functions in nonhuman species and in humans. The 
adaptiveness of aggression is conditional and depends on context" (Smith, 2007, 80).  
It is possible to interpret this contextuality as referring to both the variability of the 
social context110 and also the variability of the social status aimed at. Indeed, empirical 
evidence has shown that different types of status are associated to different 
behavioural characteristics and also to different behavioural strategies.  
Specularly, by looking at the status-behaviour relation while focussing on behaviours: 
the exclusive implementation of compliance resulted being predictive of high levels of 
likeability status, the exclusive adoption of deviance resulted being predictive of peer 
rejection111, while a bistrategic combination of socially compliant and socially deviant 
behaviours resulted being predictive of high levels of popularity status112. 
 What emerges from these conclusions is that behavioural strategies vary on the 
basis of the aimed status, and therefore that aiming at popularity status or aiming at 
likeability status implies for kids the need to adopt and implement different types of 
status seeking behavioural strategies. 
 
3.4.4	  –	  From	  aggressiveness	  back	  to	  deviance	  meant	  as	  social	  undesirability	  
 
As reported above, a greater part of developmental peer relations studies has 
been focussed on addressing aggressive behaviours. Indeed, most part of the findings 
and conclusions here reported derive from studies which have been focussed on 
investigations of various types of aggression. Aggressive behaviours have been adopted 
as a lens through which to understand and interpret the existing relationships between 
status types and associated behaviours. indeed, studies on aggression and 
aggressiveness have allowed to understand the distinction between popularity and 
likeability status types and their related behavioural strategies. 
                                                
 
110	   	  Aikins	   and	   Litwack	   (2011)	  underline	   the	   importance	  of	   "group	   context"	  which	  alters	   the	   'value'	  of	  behaviours.	  
Indeed,	   as	   reported	   by	   the	   authors,	   "[a]nother	   factor	   in	   the	   effects	   of	   particular	   behaviors	   on	   acceptance	   and	  
popularity	   is	   group	   context.	   Peer	   group	   norms	   and	   expectations	   influence	   how	   behavior	   is	   perceived.	   Prosocial	  
behaviors	   that	   lead	   to	  peer	  acceptance	  may	  not	  be	   the	  valued	  behaviors	   that	   lead	   to	  popularity	   in	   the	  same	  peer	  
group"	  (Aikins,	  Litwack,	  2011,	  143).	  
111	  Peer	  rejection	  is	  here	  meant	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  social	  dysfunctionality/incompetence,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  non-­‐highly-­‐liked	  
nor	  highly-­‐popular	  kids.	  
112	   Vice	   versa,	   the	   three	   social	   dimensions	   (likeability,	   peer	   rejection	   and	   popularity	   are	   found	   associated	   with	  
features	  of	  the	  respective	  behavioural	  strategies.	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Thus, it can be concluded that studies on aggressiveness have generally 
interpreted aggressive behaviours as representative of antisocial behaviours; indeed, 
aggression is one form of behaviour that is explicitly 'deviant' from accepted norms 
and rules – socially deviant. Therefore, on these basis, antisociality is conceived, and 
here meant, as a form of social deviance – a departure from social rules and 
norms113.  
Building on this, it is possible to transfer the findings related to specific types 
of antisociality, such as aggressiveness, to the more general concept of antisociality. 
Therefore, antisociality and antisocial behaviours are those behaviours that are socially 
deviant insofar as they are socially undesirable. Moreover, antisocial behaviours when 
being socially deviant nonetheless prove social competence – functional and adaptive 
within social interaction – according to the social context.  
 
In addition to this further distinction, it is the case to report (and share) the 
concern shown by Peter Smith (2007, 73) in also distinguishing between scientific 
assessment of 'the correlates of aggressive behaviours' and their potential functionality, 
and conversely endorsing or 'taking a moral stance' on it. Indeed, on the one hand, 
scholars have no intent to approve or to endorse aggressive (or antisocial) behaviour. 
On the other hand, they simultaneously present social incompetence in place of social 
interest and undesirability results being restrictive to a proper understanding of social 
and developmental behaviour. Indeed, quoting the author,  
«Of course, individual episodes of aggressive behaviour may be socially 
incompetent, and some individuals may be more aggressive than is good for them. 
But just because too much aggression or the wrong kind of aggression can 
sometimes be bad for an individual, does not justify labelling all aggressive 
behavior as "incompetent"» (Smith, 2007, 78). 
To conclude, with no intent to speak in absolute terms, particularly given that the 
adaptiveness of aggressive behaviours is contextual and strongly related to a 
bistrategic combination with positive (non-aggressive) behaviours, socially deviant 
behaviours do not automatically qualify as socially incompetent (as has traditionally 
                                                
 
113	   To	   clarify,	   expressions	   such	   as	   positive	   behaviours	   and	   negative	   behaviours	   are,	   respectively,	   synonyms	   for	  
prosocial	   (complying)	   and	   antisocial	   (socially	   deviant)	   behaviours.	   In	   line	   with	   these	   meanings,	   'cooperative	  
behaviours'	  and	  'assertive	  behaviours'	  are	  also	  meant	  as	  synonyms	  of	  social	  conformity	  and	  deviance.	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been done within developmental studies) but might instead correspond (according to 
the social context) to socially competent and successful behavioural strategies.  
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4	  –	  From	  kids	  to	  states:	  transferring	  concepts	  and	  findings	  from	  
developmental	  psychology	  to	  the	  IR	  theoretical	  framework	  on	  
recognition	  process	  	  
 
This chapter opened by pointing out the shortcomings of IR conception on 
recognition process. Aiming to find possible solutions to those shortcomings, the 
central parts of the chapter has focussed on reporting about some of the most 
interesting findings achieved in developmental psychology which precisely address the 
shortcomings characterizing IR literature. Extensive sections have been devoted to 
report the characteristics, developments and findings of developmental psychological 
studies.  
It is now time draw the strands together and fit the findings about children peer 
relations into IR-appropriate terminologies and concepts, this in order to close the gap 
of the IR formulation of the recognition process.  
 
4.1	  –	  On	  risks	  and	  advantages	  of	  borrowing	  from	  social	  developmental	  
psychological	  literature	  
  
Certainly, caution is fundamental when endeavouring to apply to state actors those 
insights and findings drawn from studies focussed on social-individual levels and 
strongly imbued by human nature features (Stolte, 2015, 29).  
However, IR literature, being a somehow recent field, has a long-standing tradition of 
building on other field's foundations and insights. This is why it is possible to identify 
an almost inherent analogy between individuals and states (Stolte, 2015, 29; see 
Markey, 1999, 162; Mercer, 1955; Wohlforth, 2009; Wendt, 2004). 
The 'state as a person' analogy has been historically adopted by political philosophers 
and political scientists in order to explain the behaviour of states in the international 
arena. This, as reported by Stolte114 (2015, 30), has resulted in the fact that nowadays, 
"It is not only common to ascribe human characteristics like rationality, identities, 
interests, beliefs, or even feelings like fear or security to states (Wendt 2004:289), 
                                                
 
114	  Stolte	  supports	  the	  advantages	  of	  adopting	  'motivational	  factors	  of	  status	  seeking'	  from	  the	  social-­‐individual	  level,	  
in	  order	  to	  theorize	  about	  the	  motives	  of	  state	  behaviour.	  See	  Stolte,	  2015,	  30).	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but also virtually all models of state behavior—be it the rationalist model of profit- 
and security-maximization or the social–constructivist model of norm-driven 
behavior—are based on findings from research on individual human behavior" 
(Stolte, 2015, 30). 
While not having intents to transfer to the IR field all human nature features 
characterizing children and adolescents still, joining this long-lasting tradition of state 
as a person analogy, the following section will focus on cautiously translating the most 
useful concepts and findings emerged from developmental psychological studies, into 
IR-suitable concepts and insights. This in order to update the IR conception on 
recognition process.  
 
4.2	  –	  Useful	  concepts	  to	  borrow:	  translating	  and	  adapting	  concepts	  of	  
developmental	  psychology	  for	  the	  IR	  field	  
	  
This section constitutes an endeavour to bring the most useful concepts 
encountered in the developmental psychology literature closer to the concepts 
constituting the IR literature. This, in order to establish the bases upon which to 
translate to IR also findings achieved by peer relations scholars.  
As stated above, leaving behind the specific features of human interactions and 
of children in particular, this section will turn to those concepts which constitute the 
basis of the groundbreaking conclusions achieved by peer relations scholars. Precisely, 
the following section will focus on translating into IR-suitable concepts those notions 
which are constitutive of the evolutionary–developmental psychological studies. Among 
these basic notions it is possible to indicate (1) the groundbreaking distinction between 
popularity and likeability status types. Another constitutive element of peer relations 
studies is constituted by (2) the advanced specifications concerning the notion of 
deviance, and next to this, also the definitions of compliance and deviance behaviours. 
In this section, (3) attention will also be paid to the moderating role of the variable of 
context and time115 for the status-behaviour relation. Finally, next to the importance of 
                                                
 
115	  The	  variables	  of	  age	  and	  gender	  which	  ware	  mentioned	  in	  child	  developmental	  psychology	  are	  omitted	  from	  the	  
effort	  to	  translate	  useful	  concepts	  to	  IR.	  This	  because	  they	  are	  features	  peculiar	  to	  human-­‐social	  environment,	  that	  
attempting	  to	  translate	  them	  to	  IR	  literature	  would	  represent	  a	  stretch	  of	  specific	  concepts	  and	  features.	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translating to IR the basic notions of peer developmental psychological studies, it is 
also important (4) to translate the findings achieved by the developmental studies. 
Therefore, this last section will focus on reporting to IR the contents of peer 
relations studies, and also on underlying their implications to IR theoretical 
formulations of the recognition process and it related status seeking strategies.  
 
4.2.1	  –	  Different	  types	  of	  status:	  transferring	  likeability	  and	  popularity	  to	  IR	  literature	  
 
In order to transfer to IR, the different types of status that were developed in peer 
relations literature, it is important to focus on two main points: first, the distinction 
between the constructs of popularity and likeability, and secondly, the implications of 
this distinction with regard to the conceptualization of the status seeking behavioural 
strategies. 
Moving from the first point, as constantly underlined in this chapter, the 
updated perspective of peer relations studies builds on the discovered distinction of 
the difference between popularity and likeability. Indeed, the main update in the 
discipline took place precisely when, in 1998, scholars definitively underlined that the 
traditional notion of popularity (meant in general terms) was implying two different 
constructs of social status: the one of likeability and the one of popularity (in its 
updated conception). Popularity status and likeability status are found being two 
different constructs with different associations, and different behavioural profiles 
(Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007).  
Next to this, it is important to also remind that the updated conceptions of popularity 
and likeability refer to two different measurements. Indeed, likeability refers to what has 
been labelled as an 'emotional judgement' – a personal opinion (private sentiment) of 
'attraction or repulsion' towards a peer in the group. The main distinctive feature of 
this measurement, is that opinions of likeability do refer to individual's opinion and do 
not represent the general opinion (shared perception) of the group (Cillessen, Marks, 
2011; see also Moreno 1934). Indeed, assessments of the 'most liked' in the group are 
obtained as the sum of individual opinions. 
Conversely, assessments of popularity status refer to the so called 'reputational 
judgements', meaning with this that they are individuals' reports which account for the 
shared perception of the group. In other words, assessments of popularity given by an 
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individual does not refer to the personal opinion, but refers instead to the shared 
opinion of the group. Indeed, this measurement is defined as 'reputational' since it 
constitutes the evaluation of an individual's social standing in the group (Cillessen, 
Marks, 2011). A clear example can be given by recalling that while the dimension of 
likeability is assessed with questions as 'who do you like the most/least'; the 
dimension of popularity is investigated by asking individuals to report 'who is the 
most/least popular in the group' (Cillessen, Marks, 2011). 
In a few words, the main distinction among the two constructs is that, likeability is the 
result of the sum of individual opinions about peer group members concerning 
personal judgements of attraction/repulsion, while popularity status refers to 
assessments of social standing obtained through individual accounts reporting on 
peer's social impact on the group (as perceived by the group). Being more precise, 
assessments of social standing include the underlying indexes of 'visibility, prestige and 
status with peers' that constitute the popularity status (Cillessen, Mayeux, 2007; 
Pellegrini et al., 2011a). 
In conclusion, the second important element to be considered here is the main 
implication to the distinction between popularity and likeability. Indeed, building on the 
distinctiveness of these two status types, scholars have developed a clearer and more 
nuanced understanding of the two corresponding behavioural strategies. Indeed, to be 
clearer, peer relation scholars have underlined that the two different status types also 
correspond to two different social goals, implying with this that aiming at one or the 
other status types requires very different status-seeking strategies. Indeed, while high 
scores of likeability are obtained through prosocial and complying behaviours, high 
levels of popularity status are obtained through the bistrategic combination of 
prosocial (socially complying) and antisocial (deviant) behaviours. 
 
 Let's now focus on the translation of these elements and conclusions to IR. 
This endeavour encounters a precise problematic. Indeed, the IR literature – perfectly in 
line with the fact that is still adopting the traditional perspective of status-behaviour 
relation – still deals with one single (and general) notion of international status which 
can be assimilated to the one of popularity status. This is to say that IR literature has 
not clearly distinguished between simil-likeability and simil-popularity concepts of status, 
 
 
155 
but implicitly adopts the concept of international status as an equivalent of the 
developmental–psychological notion of popularity status. 
The abovementioned problematic becomes evident when considering that, while the 
general IR concept of international status resembles the popularity status type as 
conceived by peer relations scholars, still IR literature has associated to this general 
concept of international status a status seeking behavioural strategy which instead 
closely recalls the behavioural strategy that peer relations scholars have identified for 
the likeability social goal. In a few words, international status is conceived as a 
reputational status concerning social standing (similarly to popularity status), but it is 
also associated with exclusively complying behavioural strategies, which instead 
correspond to the behavioural strategy associated to status-seeking for the likeability 
social goals. 
 Having clarified this problematic, it is now possible to turn to the translation of 
likeability and popularity concepts into IR-suitable notions. The point of departure for 
this endeavour is the abovementioned fact that IR literature refers to international 
status in terms similar to popularity as adopted in developmental psychological studies.  
Indeed, even though the articulation of the IR concept of international status has been 
characterized by a rich debate focussed on understanding the main variables and 
components constituting the index of this dimension; still the different variants included 
in this debate correspond to the notion of popularity status. More in detail, the IR 
debate conceives the notion and dimension of international status in terms of 
hierarchy of social status, as much as in terms of prestige, reputation and resource 
control – or in more IR-adapt language: material power (see for example, among the 
others, Stolte, 2015, 26-29; Larson, Shevchenko, 2010; Johnson, 2007; Hobson, 
Sharman, 2005; Miller, 2003; Markey, 1999; Wohlforth, 1993; Gilpin, 1981; Bull, 1977). 
However, all these variants are closely related to the dimension of popularity status. 
popularity is indeed conceived as the social standing of an individual in the group, 
and precisely this social standing derives from social prestige, social power and social 
visibility (Pellegrini et al., 2011a). Similarly, in IR literature it is possible to refer to 
international status as "the rank or standing in the hierarchy of the group" (Stolte, 
2015, 27). 
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 Once pointed out that the IR dimension of status corresponds to the 
psychological-developmental concept of popularity status, it is the case to turn to the 
specific dimension of likeability and it its IR equivalent. 
We support here that the IR literature has, at least indirectly, addressed IR equivalents 
to likeability. Possible examples could be addressed in the notions of attraction, social 
and cultural affinities, special relationships, and similar. However, this list is not 
complete nor exhaustive, this because, such effort exceeds the main intents of this 
research. Indeed, it sufficiently meets the intentions of this research, to assess that IR-
version of likeability refers to direct and intersubjective opinions that international 
actors develop among each other. For this reason, the IR-notion of likeability can be 
generally addressed as an 'affinity' between two states. 
 To conclude, it may seem that extending to the IR field the dimensions of 
likeability and popularity – which peer relations literature has defined as 'opinions' and 
'judgements' (emotional judgements or reputational judgements) – is excessive or a 
conceptual stretch. However, the main point here is that these dimensions refer to 
evaluation of the status and the social interactions. While this has some specificities in 
the social level, still it is possible to identify evaluation about international status and 
interactions also in the international level. Indeed, leaders, as representatives of a 
state, constantly tend to position their state in the international social hierarchy, 
according to the status dimension and also publicly report about their international 
relations, their allies and 'enemies'.  
Therefore, though not collected through surveys (as happens for kids' opinions in peer 
relations studies) still, interactions in international politics have always built on similar 
displays of 'judgements' and opinions given by one state about itself and the others. 
Moreover, in support of this, it is also possible to report that peer relations 
studies are not limited to directly inquiring kids' opinions, indeed, it is possible to 
identify four commonly assessed 'sources of information' that have traditionally been 
used to study and evaluate peer relations. These sources can be qualified as follows. 
First, self-report is the evaluation that requests individuals, members of the studied 
social unit, to self-evaluate 'the state of their own peer relations'). Second, peer-report 
is the evaluation that requests individuals, members of the studied social unit, to 
report their own evaluation of the peer relations occurring between other members 
within of the same social unit. Third, evaluations are labelled other-report when they 
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request that adults, non-peer members of the studied social unit (such as teachers, 
parents, and counsellors) evaluate the state of the peer relations of one (or more) of 
the individuals who are members of the studied social unit. Finally, the fourth method 
of evaluation of peer relations is called observation and refers to evaluation conducted 
by an 'impartial third party who is trained to evaluate the interactions' and who does 
so by observing interactions by adopting a direct (real-time) or deferred (through taped 
archives) observational method116 (DeRosier, 2008; see also: Kupersmidt, De Rosier, 
2004; Cillessen, Bukowski, 2000). 
Though, peer relations studies have a specific methodology in order to assess 
peer status in classrooms and schools117 (see, Cillessen, Marks, 20122, 27), and given 
that nothing similar has yet been developed in the IR field, in order to temporarily 
close this gap, it is possible to gather self- and peer- reports by analysing public 
speeches of states' representatives in which international status issues are addressed.  
Next to this, IR scholars and analysts' foreign policy analysis could be assimilated to 
the other-report and observation methods of gathering information about international 
relations and status. 
 
 
                                                
 
116	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   self-­‐report,	   all	   of	   the	   other	   methods	   for	   evaluating	   relationships	   are	   referred	   to	   as	  
alternative	  sociometric	  measures	  (Cillessen,	  Marks,	  2011,	  25,	  27).	  
117	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  report	  about	  two	  main	  methodological	  options	  adopted	  to	  evaluate	  interactions	  (according	  to	  the	  
abovementioned	   source	   of	   information	   that	   has	   been	   adopted),	   namely:	   (1)	   rating	   scale	   questionnaires	   and	   (2)	  
sociometric	  methods.	  	   	  
The	   first	  methodology	   concerns	  questionnaires	   that	   report	   'descriptive	   items	   that	   are	   rated	  along	  a	   certain	   scale'.	  
This	   methodology	   is	   mostly	   used	   in	   combination	   with	   self-­‐report	   and	   other-­‐report	   sources.	   Indeed,	   a	   possible	  
example	  is	  a	  questionnaire	  that	  asks	  the	  respondent	  to	  evaluate	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  'Never'	  to	  'Always'	  whether	  and	  how	  
much	  a	  specific	  individual	  of	  the	  peer	  group	  (who,	  in	  the	  self-­‐report	  case,	  can	  coincide	  with	  the	  respondent	  himself)	  
has	  been	  a	  'troublemaking	  friend'	  (DeRosier,	  2008;	  see	  also:	  Kupersmidt,	  De	  Rosier,	  2004;	  Cillessen,	  Bukowski,	  2000).	  	  
With	   respect	   to	   the	   second	   case,	   sociometrics	   is	   a	   methodology	   that	   is	   mostly	   used	   with	   peer-­‐report	   sources	   of	  
information.	   It	   requires	   individuals	   who	   are	   members	   of	   the	   studies	   social	   unit	   (peer	   group)	   to	   nominate	   those	  
among	  their	  peers	  who	  better	  match	  'specific	  social	  descriptions'.	  For	  example,	  the	  respondent	  might	  be	  required	  to	  
nominate	  those	  members	  of	  the	  peer	  group	  who	  according	  to	  him/herself	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  'fight	  a	  lot'	  –	  in	  
further	  detail,	   for	  every	   'specific	  social	  description',	   the	  number	  of	   'peer	  nominations'	   received	  by	  each	  member	   is	  
summed	  ('totaled')	  and	  'standardized	  across	  the	  nominating	  group'	  (DeRosier,	  2008;	  see	  also:	  Kupersmidt,	  De	  Rosier,	  
2004;	  Cillessen,	  Bukowski,	  2000;	  Coie,	  et	  al.,	  1982).	  	   	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   type	   of	   investigation	   is	   to	   assess	   the	   social	   functioning	   of	   each	  member	   of	   the	   group	   in	   relation	  
('relative')	  to	  the	  social	  functioning	  of	  the	  entire	  peer	  group	  –	  the	  author	  mentions	  the	  following	  example:	  "Thus,	  a	  
given	  member’s	   social	   functioning	   is	   assessed	   relative	   to	   that	   of	   the	   entire	   peer	   group	   (e.g.,	   highly	   aggressive)"	  –	  
(DeRosier,	  2008;	  see	  also:	  Kupersmidt,	  De	  Rosier,	  2004;	  Cillessen,	  Bukowski,	  2000;	  Coie,	  et	  al.,	  1982).	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4.2.2	  –	  Transferring	  deviant	  and	  complying	  behaviors	  to	  the	  IR	  field:	  clarifications	  on	  the	  
conceptions	  of	  deviance	  and	  aggressiveness	  	  
 
Previous sections of this chapter have built on the distinction between social interests 
and individual interests. Next to this, also the findings achieved in peer relation–
developmental psychology studies had a fundamental relevance. Indeed, according to 
these findings deviant behaviours prove having a functional and adaptive role. Building 
on both these two components, have allowed to argument on the distinction between 
'what is socially desirable' and 'what is socially competent and successful'118.  
Recalling that there is no necessary correspondence between what is socially desirable 
and what is actually successful and competent – both for social interactions and within 
social context – helps to remind that the concept of deviant behaviour is meant (in the 
updated conception of peer relation studies) as socially undesirable behaviour, and not 
as socially incompetent behaviour. Indeed, while socially incompetent behaviours are 
behaviours which manifest the actor's lack of social skills, deviant–undesirable 
behaviours are behaviours which deviate from social norms, and which may also prove 
being socially competent (according to the social context of interaction). 
 Next to this, another important specification which must be advanced with 
regard to the concept of deviance, concerns, on the one side, its relation to 
aggressiveness and on the other side, also the distinction between physically 
aggressive behaviours and aggressive behaviours in general.  
Moving from the first one, with regard to deviance and aggressiveness it is possible to 
recall, as mentioned above, that developmental psychologists have conducted their 
investigations of the status-behaviour relation mainly (but not exclusively) by focussing 
on investigations of the effects that aggressiveness plays on this relation. Therefore, 
aggressive behaviours have been adopted as the lenses through which to investigate 
the status-behaviour relation.  
The second component of this advanced clarification on deviance and aggressiveness 
specifically concerns the fact that the notion of aggressiveness is not meant as 
physical aggression. Instead, it is meant in more general terms, this because it largely 
addresses different types of aggression, among which is possible to identify also 
                                                
 
118	  See	  previous	  sections	  and	  Smith,	  (2007).	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relational types of aggression – that indicates forms of malicious gossiping, exclusion 
from activities, silent treatment, etc. aimed at harming the opponent's social status, 
friendships and reputation. 
 All these clarifications are useful when committing to translate the concepts of 
deviant and complying behaviours to IR. Indeed, it is necessary to insist on the fact 
that similarly as for social deviance, in the IR literature as well, deviant behaviours do 
not necessarily coincide with acts of war or aggression. This because, war or acts of 
aggression in international politics can also have a non-deviant character. Indeed, not 
only an act of war can be complying with international laws, but also, joining a 
coalition in war can also be perceived as socially due.  
Therefore, in line with the specifications advanced for the developmental psychological 
studies, also for IR it is necessary to stress that deviant behaviours are those 
behaviours which can be defined as socially undesirable – since contrasting with 
(deviating from) social norms and rules, they can be military related, but not every 
military action is a deviant behaviour. Moreover, IR deviant behaviours, not only are not 
necessarily physical or directly aggressive behaviours119, but also there are other types 
of spoiler behaviours that can be addressed as such.  
This directly challenges the current IR theoretical formulation of recognition game 
which confusedly contraposes complying behaviours120 to conflictual behaviours. This 
terminological vagueness may give the impression that the opposite behaviour to 
complying is 'going to war' (Ringmar, 1999; 2002). However, going to war may be a 
way for the status seeker to prove its abilities in complying to war standards. 
Therefore, it is extremely important to highlight the relation between deviance and 
aggression, and also the distinction between socially undesired and socially 
incompetent behaviours. 
Before giving some possible examples of deviant and complying behaviours, it is 
also possible to report on the relative and contextual value of deviance and 
conformity definitions. Indeed, the endeavour to transfer the concepts of deviant and 
complying behaviours encounters difficulties in advancing some historically stable 
                                                
 
119	   It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   recall	   that,	   deviant	   behaviours	   can	   be	   proactive	   or	   reactive,	   and	   that	   peer	   relations	  
literature	  has	  asserted	  that	  only	  proactive	  deviance	  is	  related	  to	  popularity	  status.	  	  
120	  See	  chapter	  1:	  the	  plead/convince	  option	   is	  presented	  as	  alternative	  to	  the	  fight/go	  to	  war	  option	  (Suzuki,	  2008;	  
Ringmar,	  2012;	  2002;	  1996).	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examples of deviant and complying behaviours. This mainly because complying and 
deviating from rules and social norms harbours in itself the constant permutation of 
both international context and social rules.  
Acts that can be considered deviant in a certain historical moment may regain 
acceptability in another, and vice versa, acts that can be considered as compliant in a 
certain historical period or social context, may be perceived as deviant in other 
situations.  
Notwithstanding the fugacity and contextual value of these examples, it is possible to 
recall some examples of complying and deviant behaviours. These examples are drawn 
from literature on SIT – social identity theory, which asserts that "a state has three 
different strategies at its disposal in order to improve its status. The possible tactics 
for status enhancement include (1) social mobility, (2) social competition, and (3) 
social creativity" (Stolte, 2015, 31).  
Given that social mobility and social competition are respectively conceived as a 
complying strategy and as an assertive strategy to gain status, it is possible to recall 
some examples from these two behavioural strategies.  
Examples for complying status seeking strategies,  
"include West Germany’s and Japan’s search for recognition at the club of “civilized 
states” through the renouncement of offensive military force and the adoption of 
liberal democracy after the end of post–World War II occupation by the United 
States" (Stolte, 2015, 33; Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 10).  
On the other side, examples of socially deviant (undesired) behaviour can include, 
among the others, "traditional geopolitical rivalry like competition over spheres of 
influence, or arms racing", or also, "military demonstrations or military interventions 
against smaller powers in order to demonstrate military capabilities". Other possible 
examples recall "North Korea’s recurring atom bomb tests" and also – advancing an 
historical example – "Germany’s competition with other Great Powers for its 'place in 
the sun' and the size of its battleship fleet" (Stolte, 2015, 33; Larson, Shevchenko, 
2010, 13.).  
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4.2.3	  –	  Transferring	  other	  moderating	  factors	  to	  IR:	  focussing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  social	  
context	  and	  time	  
 
(I)	  –	  On	  the	  role	  of	  social	  context	  
 
Focussing on the role played by the social context, in which interactions take 
place, it is possible to recall that the developmental psychology literature identifies two 
main types of social competition: content competition and scramble competition. To 
distinguish between the two, it is possible to remind that scramble competitions 
concern abundant resources, which are easily accessible through cooperative 
behaviours (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). While, on the opposite, contest competitions 
concern scarce resources, therefore, the high value of the contended resources favours 
aggressive-competitive behaviours (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 131). 
The endeavour to transfer these notions to the International Relation's field, 
and in particular the attempt to relate them to status seeking in the international 
arena, meets a route that is already marked out.  
Indeed, the IR literature has already advanced debates on the scarcity and abundance 
of social status. With this specific regard, it is possible to mention Larson and 
Shevchenko, (2010) who contest the zero-sum game conception of status, and Hirsch 
(2005) who instead supports it.  
Fred Hirsch (2005) defines international status as a 'positional good' and the status 
seeking competition as a zero-sum game. Under this perspective, states acquire 
international status at the expenses of other's loss. In opposition to this, Larson and 
Shevchenko (2010, 69) build on the idea that "status is based on a group's standing 
on some trait valued by society". To this, they also add that there can be multiple 
traits upon which to be evaluated,  
"SIT [social identity theory] introduces an important modification to this prevailing 
zero-sum conception of status by pointing out that groups have multiple traits on 
which to be evaluated, so that comparisons among them need not be competitive. 
The availability of multidimensional comparisons underlies social creativity" (Larson, 
Shevchenko, 2010, 69). 
With regard to this debate it is important to recall the distinction between status as 
the identification of international social rank of states, and a more general conception 
of 'identity'. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the 'multiple traits on which to be 
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evaluated' advanced by Larson and Shevchenko's (2010) do not pertain to the 
reputational international status (social ranking) but instead constitute and represent 
another possible type of status (meant in general terms), which can be identified next 
to the IR versions of likeability and popularity types of status. 
As reported by the authors themselves,  
"[In contrast to social competition,] social creativity does not try to change the 
hierarchy of status in the international system but rather tries to achieve pre- 
eminence on a different ranking system" (Larson, Shevchenko, 2010, 74). 
Therefore, when referring to status meant as international social ranking (a specific 
type of status) it is difficult to exceed the contest competition framework.  
In support of this, if not wanting to assert that status is a scarce resource for which 
states tend to compete, it is still possible to recall here that Ringmar (2014), in 
addressing the important roles of misrecognition. underlines also its role in 'maintaining 
exclusivity of the membership club' (Ringmar, 2014, 447 – see chapter 1). Indeed, 
Ringmar insists on the fact that misrecognition is functional to demarcating between 
member and non-members, this because 'once everyone is admitted on equal terms, 
membership loses its social prestige' (Ringmar, 2014, 447). Therefore, by extension, if 
everyone is classified as the internationally most popular (with higher social 
standing/status) then this classification would lose its role. 
To conclude, it is possible to support that international social ranking (reputational 
status), if not properly a zero-sum game, it at least corresponds to a classification 
which grades international (peer group) members by including some as the one with 
higher status (in peer relations terms: the most popular) and excluding some others – 
the one with lower international status (in peer relations terms: the least popular). This 
because international social status refers to a hierarchical classification of social status 
ranking.  
 
(II)	  –	  On	  the	  role	  of	  time	  
 
Scholars addressing the status-behaviour relation in developmental studies (focussed 
on children) have investigated the role played by time variables on this relation by 
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taking advantage of the characteristics of academic school year. Indeed, the analysis 
have focussed on two specific moments. The school transition121 moment has been 
addressed as a possibility to observe the first moments of the social interaction 
among kids, while the entire school year has been addressed as an opportunity to 
make long-term observations on the continuity of social interactions122.  
 In this case, the endeavour to transfer these notions to the International 
Relation's field meets the difficulties created by the fact that in the international arena, 
there is no identical correspondence to the school year term, and particularly to the 
traditional 'beginning of the academic year' – which is instead possible to identify in 
the school context. Indeed, while the school year term constitutes a natural structure 
which repeats on regular basis, and in which it is possible to identify a beginning, 
continuation and conclusion, this is not the same for the international environment, 
which instead may represent more of a continuous context of negotiation. 
However, it is still possible to focus on the essential features characterizing 
peer relations studies on school kids and their observations of specific school year 
moments. Indeed, the beginning of the year and school transition123, represent the 
moments in which 'groups are being formed' and in which takes place the negotiation 
of dominance and popularity status (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 135; see also Cillessen, 
Mayeux, 2007). 
Therefore, when moving to the international relations system and its interactions, 
though it is not possible to clearly identify a yearly recurring beginning of the year, 
still it is possible to identify 'historical phases' in which states tend to concentrate the 
negotiation or renegotiation of the international dominance system and popularity. 
These phases can be identified as corresponding to important changes underwent by 
the system. Examples can be found in situations as, after an important regional or 
global war, when there is the rise and/or decline of important actors in the system – 
in which situation, the rising power or the other actors of the system have the 
possibility to seek for a renegotiation of the international status-hierarchy. Other 
                                                
 
121	  School	  transition	  is	  when	  students	  pass	  from	  primary	  to	  middle	  school	  and	  from	  middle	  to	  high	  school.	  
122	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  variable	  of	  'age'	  identified	  in	  developmental	  studies	  is	  not	  reported	  to	  IR	  literature.	  
123	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  year	  refers	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  each	  academic	  year,	  while	  school	  transition	  refers	  to	  the	  page	  
from	  one	  educational	  stage	  to	  the	  other,	  e.g.:	  moving	  from	  primary	  to	  middle	  school.,	  etc.	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possible examples may be represented by the constitution and institutionalization of 
important international organizations, institutions, treaties etc. which may be seen and 
treated as the possible arena in which to negotiate for status recognition – given their 
feature of reflecting at the international institutional level the status distribution. 
In line with this, it is also possible to report here Ringmar's conception of 'formative 
moments', defined as those "times when new identities can be made and established" 
(see chapter 1; Ringmar, 1996). Therefore, also in IR it is possible to identify specific 
moments of negotiation of identities and status.  
 Peer relations scholars have stressed the importance of observing social 
interaction by focussing on 'sequences of behaviour', this because social interactions 
are dynamic and cannot be well represented "as summary variables aggregated across 
time" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 135). Indeed, as reported by the authors, "it seems too 
simple to treat social behaviors as isolated variables impacting an outcome" this 
because, for example, "[a]s demonstrated with observations of preschoolers, aggression 
may be used initially to access resources in contests, but within a few minutes the 
winners of these contests affiliate with their peers, often initiating reconciliations with 
them" (Pellegrini et al., 2011a, 135). 
Therefore, it is better to use dynamic models with longitudinal data (Pellegrini et al., 
2011a, 135; see Long, Pellegrini, 2003), this also for IR studies focussed on understand 
social interaction and to model social interactive processes. 
 
(III)	  –	  On	  combination	  
 
Results from peer relations studies present quite detailed and specific findings on the 
type of combination and on its timings. In the observations of kids behaviour, first 
comes the deviant behaviour, then follows a reconciliation attempt, actively advanced 
by the deviant kid, and specifically oriented towards the same victim of the first 
deviant act.  
These elements will be kept into consideration when observing international interaction 
among states, but since this research is aiming at advancing the idea that there is a 
combination of behaviours, which is implemented in order to exploit its functionality, 
the following empirical analysis on the historical case study will not be too strict in 
trying to identify precisely this same timing of the bistrategic combination of 
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behaviours. This also by taking into consideration that international interactions among 
states do not take place in a school environment, and do not follow the timings of 
school year.  
Indeed, given that in the international arena it is not possible to identify a 
specific moment equivalent to 'the beginning of the school', and that we are always 
observing interactions that relate to preceding interactions. In a similar context, in IR, 
each behaviour is following previous ones and it is also the antecedent of future 
interactions. Moreover, this implies that it is also difficult to identify a moment when 
most of the negotiation for status takes place. For kids this moment takes place at 
the beginning of the year and at the end of the first semester is possible to already 
possible to have an idea of the hierarchy within the group. But, since states are 
inserted in an environment of endless interaction, it is more complex for IR to find a 
precise sequence between deviance and affiliative/reconciliatory behaviours.  
Therefore, what is important is that deviant behaviours are implemented ahead of 
reputational status seeking and that they are mixed with complying behaviours; and 
that they are more generally inserted in a status quo attitude (instead of a 
revolutionary). The intent is to make some changes, but not revolutionize the system. 
Thus, as much as trying to precisely identify the IR equivalent to the 'beginning of the 
year' and to the academic year itself, it is also too restrictive to exclusively look for a 
precise equivalence between the abovementioned characters of the bistrategic 
combination.  
The main point for this research is indeed the fact that international social standing 
(IR-popularity) may be aimed at through the implementation of both complying and 
deviant behaviours; yet, should it be possible to identify the presence of a specific 
combination of deviant and affiliative behaviours, it would be a further confirmative 
element for this research. 
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4.3	  –	  Advancing	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  
behavioural	  options:	  Introducing	  to	  IR	  the	  concepts	  of	  social	  deviance,	  
socially	  undesirable	  behaviours	  and	  the	  functionality	  of	  deviant	  behaviours	  
	  
4.3.1	  –	  Introducing	  to	  IR	  the	  distinction	  between	  socially	  undesirable	  and	  socially	  
incompetent	  behaviours	  
 
The current IR conception of recognition process maintains that the recognition 
process is best accomplished through the implementation of norm conforming 
behaviours. Drawing from child development–psychological studies allows to see that 
this insistence on the "strong allure" of norm conformity (Suzuki, 2008, 50; see also 
Stolte, 2015) comprises, in IR literature, an overlap of socially desirable behaviours with 
socially functional behaviours. 
International society has, of course, the need to maintain order and stability, therefore 
it is in the international social interest to discourage social deviance, but this does not 
necessarily correspond to the individual interests of status seekers. Moreover, it also 
does not necessarily portray the actual outline of the international recognition process. 
Indeed, this tendency has hindered the need to identify those behaviours that 
empirically prove being socially functional and adaptive though being socially deviant. 
Here lays one of the main shortages of the IR literature: the need to comprise in the 
outline of the recognition process not only what is socially expected and 
recommended but also what is effectively implemented by international actors in order 
to seek for the accomplishment of recognition process.  
Empirical observations of blurred, mixed, foreign policies reveal and suggest that 
there must be something more than the clear-cut outline of the recognition process in 
exclusively compliant terms. This solicits the need – for IR literature as well – to 
accomplish investigations which distinguish between what is suggested by the society 
and what is actually implemented in the international interaction aiming at status 
recognition – so to be able to identify the actual recognition process and its 
behavioural strategies, though these strategies may be socially undesirable. 
This implies that it is important for IR scholars to distinguish if an international deviant 
behaviour can be addressed as socially undesirable or as socially incompetent – this 
because in international system too, some socially undesirable behaviours may still 
prove being socially competent.  
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4.3.2	  –	  On	  the	  behavioural	  spectrum:	  introducing	  the	  concept	  of	  deviant	  behaviours	  next	  
to	  the	  option	  of	  conflictual	  behaviours	  
 
In the current conceptualization of the recognition process, IR scholars 
counterpose peaceful compliance to conflictual, or even violent, interaction (see 
Ringmar, 1996 and 2012).  
This emerges by looking, for example, at Ringmar's studies (see chapter 1). The author 
asserts once the audience has misrecognized the candidate in his self-advanced 
identity, the candidate can (1) accept this verdict and live with it, (2) accept the 
verdict and start a programme of self-reformation in order to improve, or (3) stand by 
his own identity and try to convince the audience that this images actually applies to 
him (Ringmar 1996; 2012).  
Focussing on the last option, its aim is to convince the audience that they are wrong 
and force them to change their minds. The main issue is understanding how does this 
convincing effort takes place. 
The author outlies a dichotomy that on the one side see the option 'to plead' 
which, in Ringmar's own words, is related to a strategy that implies the 
adoption/implementation of words – "mere words are probably not going to get us 
very far" (Ringmar, 1996, 82). In 2008 and while building on Ringmar's work, Shogo 
Suzuki furtherly details this pleading option by stressing the persistence of an 
obligation, also existing for great power candidates, to behave as good citizens. Great 
power candidates can indeed convince their peers to grant them the recognition as 
great powers, by 'conforming as closely as possible to social rules and norms (Suzuki, 
2008, 50).  
Therefore, the first extreme of this dichotomous couplet refers to social compliance, 
and also stands for cooperation and peaceful international relations124.  
At the other opposite of this dichotomous couplet it is possible to find a more 
articulated option – which goes from some general mentions of conflictual behaviours 
to more direct references to violent conflict and war. 
Going by order, Ringmar, in 1996, mentions a more general option which provides the 
necessity of tacking action. He reports that, 
                                                
 
124	  See	  chapter	  2,	  the	  International	  Politics	  of	  Recognition.	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"(…) We may try to plead with them perhaps, yet mere words are probably not 
going to get us very far. What we typically do instead is to act; only through 
action can we provide the kind of final, decisive, evidence that proves the others 
wrong. The action will be there for everyone to see and as such it will be an 
irrefutable manifestation of our character; our action will encroach upon our 
detractors and force them to reconsider their views" (Ringmar, 1996, 82). 
In 2016, Ringmar outlines this second component of the dichotomy in more defined 
terms by describing it as "to fight for the self-descriptions" (Ringmar, 2012, 8). This 
fighting option explicitly refers to violent fighting – going to war125.  
 Therefore, in the current perspective on recognition process, literature provides 
that options available to status seekers looking for recognition are to comply or to 
fight.  
These two options are very distant in a possible spectrum of behaviours, and this 
distance is also revealed by the ratio behind the two choices (see chapter 1, section 
4.4). Indeed, while compliance and norm conformity are presented as a socially natural 
path to follow in order to obtain the recognition of status within social boundaries – 
this because status is social and relational (see chapter 1). On the other side, the 
acting/fighting option is presented as a reaction to social rejection by the audience 
and more in general as an option for situations in which the recognition process has 
failed and is stuck126.  
As reported in chapter 2, current IR theory on recognition process reads the foreign 
policies in the international scenario with a very stark and dichotomous interpretative 
perspective. If observed behaviours are cooperative and compliant, then they must refer 
                                                
 
125	  He	   indeed	   insists	   that,	  "Violence	  may	  work	  badly	   in	   interpersonal	   relations,	  since	  you	  cannot	   force	  someone	  to	  
respect	  or	  love	  you.	  In	  international	  relations,	  however,	  the	  use	  of	  force	  has	  greater	  use	  and	  similar	  threats	  are	  often	  
successful.	  A	  state	  that	  is	  not	  taken	  seriously	  can	  go	  to	  war	  to	  prove	  its	  importance,	  and	  for	  a	  group	  fighting	  for	  its	  
"national	  independence,"	  violence	  is	  often	  the	  only	  available	  option"	  (Ringmar,	  2012,	  8).	  	  
126	  It	  may	  seem	  that	  in	  the	  Larson	  and	  Shevchenko	  (2010)	  outline	  of	  the	  SIT-­‐inspired	  identity	  management	  strategies	  
(social	  mobility,	  social	  competition	  and	  social	  creativity),	  the	  social	  competition	  option	  has	  a	  more	  nuanced	  content	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  acting/fighting	  options	  outlined	  by	  Ringmar.	  The	  two	  authors	  indeed	  describe	  competition	  as	  an	  
option	  which	  refers	  to	  rivalry,	  an	  attempt	  "to	  equal	  or	  outdo	  the	  dominant	  group	  in	  the	  area	  on	  which	   its	  claim	  to	  
superior	  status	  rests.	   In	  international	  relations	  where	  status	  is	   in	  large	  part	  based	  on	  military	  and	  economic	  power,	  
social	  competition	  often	  entails	  traditional	  geopolitical	  rivalry,	  such	  a	  competition	  over	  spheres	  of	  influence	  or	  arms	  
racing"	  (Larson,	  Shevchenko,	  2010,	  72).	   	  
Though	  this	  description	  of	  social	  competition	  option	  is	  more	  nuanced	  than	  a	  direct	  mention	  of	  violent	  conflict,	  still	  
the	  reasons	  behind	   its	  possible	  adoption,	  as	   reported	  by	   the	  authors,	   still	   retraces	   the	  ones	  presented	  by	  Ringmar	  
(1996;	   2012).	   Indeed,	   social	   competition	   is	   an	   option	   status	   seeking	   actors	   undertake	   when	   elite-­‐group	   has	  
impermeable	   boundaries	   for	   candidate	  members	   (which	   corresponds	   to	   a	   case	   of	   peer	   rejection)	   and	   the	   case	   in	  
which	  the	  candidate	  "regard	  the	  higher-­‐status	  group's	  position	  as	  illegitimate"	  (Larson,	  Shevchenko,	  2010,	  72).	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to a status quo state. Therefore, the interpretative perspective can be optimistic (in 
Friedberg' terms – see chapter 2). While if, on the other case, the observation of 
assertive, challenging behaviours recalls possible threatens of overturning in the system. 
In this latter case, the interpretative perspective is pessimistic. 
This interpretative framework has a too clear-cut variety of options in which 
everything that is not a 'complying behaviour' is automatically placed in its alternative 
option, which is quite large and tends to fall back towards violent conflict. 
 
This all is to underline the need for a more nuanced outline of this behavioural 
spectrum, in which the alternative to compliance is not conflict and war, but instead is 
its opposite: non-compliance, or in other words, social deviance.  
Again, deviance meant as deviance from norms and rules (non–compliance). Deviance 
meant as deviance from social expectations, and deviance meant as deviance with 
respect to what is socially desirable.  
Deviant behaviours can be undesirable with respect to social interest, but can still 
prove being socially function within social interaction.  
This is why, behind the compliance option and before the fighting option it is 
necessary to identify other behavioural options that are not the result of the 
candidate's final backlash provoked by the failure of the recognition process, neither 
the manifestation of a hidden desire to overturn the status quo. 
Literature on child developmental psychology shows that there can be socially deviant 
and undesirable behaviours which still fall within boundaries of social interaction – and 
IR literature needs to identify them. 
 
  
 
 
170 
4.4	  –	  Conclusions	  and	  implications	  
 
Coming full circle, the introduction into the IR field of findings derived from child 
developmental psychology proves helpful in suggesting that IR literature should (1) 
distinguish between types of status which are aimed by status seekers; (2) adopt the 
conception of deviant undesirable behaviours and (3) distinguish between aims (status 
seeking) and means with which it is possible to achieve these aims.  
Indeed, peer relations literature has suggested that there are different behavioural 
strategies for different types of status, and this is particularly important to underline 
that observed behaviours do not necessarily represent symptoms of the individual's 
intentions towards the social group. This because the different types of behaviours are 
instrumental to the social goals, and therefore deviant behaviours can be adopted as 
means – functional when combined with complying/prosocial behaviours – in order to 
obtain popularity status.  
These peer relations studies have indeed shown that there are different types of status 
(likeability status and popularity status) which represent different social goals and entail 
different behavioural strategies.  
More in detail, while the observation of exclusively compliant behaviours proves 
predictive of likeability status; specularly, the observation of exclusively deviant 
behaviours is predictive of peer rejection. However, the observation of a bistrategic 
combination of deviant and affiliative behaviours is instead predictive of high levels of 
social standing (popularity status). 
Therefore, these empirical findings assert that status seekers aiming at reputational 
status, adopt a behavioural strategy consisting in a bistrategic combination of 
complying and deviant behaviours. 
This all allows to overcome the dichotomous perspective that used to approach 
the analysis of international foreign policies by opting for an optimistic or a pessimistic 
perspective. In this way, under this updated perspective, it is possible to go beyond the 
need to separate between complying behaviours on one side and 
competitive/conflictual behaviours on the other.  
Observed behaviours do not directly represent the intentions underlying the state's 
foreign policy, instead they should be considered under a more comprehensive 
perspective in which they result being instruments at the service of status seeking 
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strategies; moreover, their implementation varies on the bases of the type of status 
aimed at. 
 This opens to the possibility of understanding the more mixed foreign policies 
implemented by status seekers.  
Findings from peer relations studies suggest that, compliant behaviours only are 
predictive of high levels of social acceptance; the adoption of deviant behaviours only 
is predictive of social rejection, while the adoption of deviant behaviours in 
combination with complying and reconciliatory behaviours is predictive of high levels of 
reputational status (popularity among kids).  
Therefore, updating the current IR conception on recognition process, this research 
advances that, similarly, the observation of exclusively compliant foreign policies is 
symptomatic of a state seeking for international social acceptance (namely, likeability), 
while the compresence of both complying and deviant international standing can be 
the manifestation of a functional combination aiming at international social standing 
(namely, popularity). 
Specular implication to this is that status seekers states, when seeking for high levels 
of international social standing (reputational status), achieve this social goal by 
implementing a combination of complying and deviant behaviours.  
This also means that, the recognition of this specific type of status – international 
social standing – is not chased through the adoption of exclusively compliant 
behaviours (as advanced by the current literature), but instead it is pursued through 
the combination of complying and deviant behaviours, and deviant behaviours are 
adopted within the boundaries of social interaction.  
Moreover, insisting on the role of deviant behaviours, similarly to the insufficiency of 
compliant behaviours in order to obtain reputational status, the exclusive adoption of 
deviant behaviours is equally inadequate in order to obtain high levels of reputational 
status. 
It follows that, deviant behaviours are not always the manifestation of social 
maladjustment, neither they always represent symptoms of overturning intentions. This 
because, it may be that they are adopted in functional combination ahead of the 
recognition of international popularity status. 
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Therefore, peculiarity of this advanced perspective is that the final aim of this 
way of implementing deviant behaviours – in combination with complying behaviours 
and while aiming at international social standing status – does not correspond to an 
intent of overturning or challenging the system, but instead has to be understood 
within the frame of status seeking behavioural strategies.  
This thesis arrives at advancing that, building on the most recent child developmental 
literature, we don't expect status seekers, seeking for international social status, to 
behave only conformingly. Instead we expect reputational-status seeker to aim at the 
recognition of their status by combining both deviant and complying behaviours, this 
with the intent of remaining within the boundaries of social interaction127.  
In the next section, the case study of Italian foreign policy under the Mussolini 
government will be presented and analysed to verify the validity of this update to IR 
recognition theory. 
 
 
  
                                                
 
127	   These	   conclusions	   do	   not	   necessarily	   facilitate	   the	   scholars	   and	   analysts'	   task	   to	   outline	   the	   international	  
interactions	   into	   a	   simplified	   analytical	   framework.	   Indeed,	   the	   outline	   on	   recognition	   process	   emerging	   from	   this	  
research	   is	  more	  articulate	  and	  nuanced,	   and	   this	   is	  what	   allows	   to	  have	  a	  more	  detailed	  understanding	  on	  more	  
mixed	  and	  nuanced	  foreign	  policies.	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Chapter	  4	  	  
 
1	  –	  Research	  design	  
 
Chapter 3 was devoted to outlining this specific interpretative framework: guided by the 
intent to understand the compresence of conforming and deviant (prosocial and 
antisocial) behaviours. Insights drawn from child and adolescent developmental peer 
relations psychological studies suggest that there are different types of behavioural 
strategies for different types of social goals (status seeking). More in detail, peer 
relation studies show that (1) behavioural strategies implementing only compliant 
behaviours are predictive of high levels of social acceptance (likeability); (2) the 
exclusive implementation of deviant behaviours is predictive of peer rejection and bully 
behaviour; (3) the most effective strategy in order to gain social reputational status is 
a bistrategic combination of aggressive and affiliative behaviours.  
On these basis, it is possible, on the theoretical level, to advance that similarly 
to children interactions, the observation of a compresence of complying and deviant 
behaviours in the international arena may manifestation (and part) of a status seeking 
strategy. 
In chapter 4 we will now turn to an empirical verification of these theoretical findings. 
Indeed, the refinement of IR concepts obtained by drawing on psychological child 
development literature is useful to better understanding the interactions taking place in 
international politics within recognition processes.  
Therefore, the hypothesis guiding this chapter is that the observation of deviant 
behaviours next to complying ones in the foreign policy of a reputational-status seeker, 
instead of being symptomatic of social maladjustment or threatening intentions (as the 
current IR conceptions of recognition process and status seeking would suggest), may 
represent the manifestation of a bistrategic approach to the recognition of status 
seeking128.  
                                                
 
128	  It	  is	  important	  to	  advance	  that,	  it	  is	  behind	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  research	  to	  focus	  on	  evaluating	  and	  analysing	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  possible	  strategies	  here	   identified.	  Therefore,	  the	  analysis	  conducted	   in	  
this	  chapter	  will	  not	  aim	  at	  understanding	  whether	  the	  strategy	  implemented	  to	  obtain	  status	  seeking	  was	  effective	  
or	   not,	   but	  will	   focus	   instead	   on	   understanding	  what	   type	   of	   strategy	  was	   adopted,	   and,	   ore	   in	   particular,	   if	   this	  
strategy	  corresponds	  to	  the	  one	  suggested	  in	  chapter	  3.	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1.1	  –	  Requisites	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  case	  study	  
 
To understand this, it is necessary to focus on a case study that meets certain 
important requisites. First, the case study should be a state that is a status seeker 
going through the process of recognition.  
According to the IR theoretical conceptualization of the recognition process, is 
expected to perform complying behaviours in order to accomplish this process. 
Therefore, the second requirement for the selection of the case study is that in its 
foreign policy, along with the complying behaviours, the selected state should also 
perform deviant behaviours, which appear as anomalous if interpreted within the 
current theoretical framework and conceptualization of IR recognition process.  
This implies looking for a state that is officially aiming for international prestige (status 
seeker) and that, instead of being exclusively compliant and conforming performs also, 
apparently, anomalous deviant behaviours. 
Implicit but important: a social group is required, which implies a social context 
at the basis of the observed recognition process. Therefore, the case selection should 
consider that the status seeker must interact with an international society – the more 
this society is identifiable, the better it is able to demarcate the possible rules and 
norms that may be violated (deviated) by the candidate's deviant behaviour. Moreover, 
in this way it is also possible to identify the audience itself, with which the candidate 
is interacting and whose recognition is seeking for129.  
Other important requisites concern more practical issues, such as the possibility 
of accessing the decision-making process that lies behind the observed international 
behaviours. Indeed, next to the need to select a status-seeking state that performs 
both prosocial and antisocial (deviant) behaviours, there is also the necessity to select 
a case that is historically completed and that is documented by accessible historical 
documents/files/records. Archival documents will be used in order to retrace the 
decision-making process and thereby to investigate if there is any possibility that 
                                                
 
129	  Related	  to	  this	  point,	  as	  reported	   in	  the	   literature	  (see	  Ringmar	  2002;	  2008)	  recognition	   is	  granted	  both	  by	  the	  
higher	   audience	   and	   also	   by	   the	   smaller	   actors.	   However,	   considering	   that	   the	   status	   seeker	   should	   behave	  
compliantly	   towards	   the	   higher	   audience,	   the	   research	   will	   focus	   on	   identifying	   mainly	   those	   deviant–aggressive	  
behaviours	  addressing	  actors	  of	  the	  higher	  audience.	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international performance of deviant behaviours was intentionally adopted with 
strategic/functional aims. 
 
1.2	  –	  Case	  study	  selection:	  Italian	  prestige	  politics	  under	  Mussolini's	  
government	  
 
This empirical investigation will focus upon the case study of Italian foreign 
policy under Mussolini government. This is a good case study because Italian foreign 
policy under Mussolini, since its very first moment, was oriented towards a prestige 
politics. In the last months of 1922, after Mussolini took the role of Italian Prime 
Minister (PM) and Foreign Minister (FM), the first speeches on foreign policy, held on 
November 16th, 1922 in front of the Italian Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, 
clearly referred to the government's intentions to seek international recognition of 
Italy’s equal role to Great Britain and France. The same perspective on foreign policy 
was replicated ahead of the Lausanne Conference of November 1922, where Mussolini 
insisted on Italy being recognized as equal to its Allies. The desire shown by Italy to 
be recognized as a great power corresponds to the first requisite for the selection of 
the case study.  
Additionally, this case study meets the second requirement in case selection, as 
it is widely recognized and accepted by historians and scholars that Italian foreign 
policy under Mussolini's government was characterized by fits of temper, which scholars 
have usually related to different reasons among which internal politics, ideological 
issues related to fascism, or to Mussolini's personal character or inexperience. These 
behaviours, in the Italian case, represent some anomalous behavior with respect to the 
expectations of the current IR framework on recognition process. Indeed, in a situation 
in which Italy was officially seeking for reputational–status recognition, its international 
standing was not as compliant as possible to social norms and rule, but instead 
manifested patent signals of socially deviant behaviours (in the sense of 'deviant from 
norms and rules'). 
With regard to the third requisite, Italy was part of the League of Nations, 
which constitutes a good orientation in outlining the international social group and the 
related norms and rules with which Italy was expected to comply. This membership, 
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together with the relations with other European countries, and particularly relations with 
Great Britain and France, help to identify an international social background to 
implement as a guideline for identifying internationally complying and deviant 
behaviours. Moreover, Great Britain and France also represent the audience with which 
Italy was interacting in order to be recognized as a peer, and the peer members 
whose recognition Italy was looking for. Indeed, as mentioned above, the staple in the 
Italy's communication on its foreign policy has always been its desire to be recognized 
as equal to (and by) France and Great Britain.  
Lastly, this specific moment of Italian foreign policy is historically completed 
and allows the author to access the documentation that can help retrace the decision-
making behind foreign policy orientation and action. 
Moreover, despite how complex and delicate this case may be, it nevertheless proves 
to be so relevant that numerous historical studies have been conducted on it. This 
secondary literature, which dates from the immediate aftermath of the end of the 
fascist regime to more recent days, positively contributes to this research by providing 
an already articulated series of various alternative explanations to this anomalous 
deviant behaviour (explanations), which will be taken into consideration in this research.  
In conclusion, it is important to specify that, given that this empirical 
investigation aims at analysing a case study that is a status seeker which aims at 
achieving the recognition of its status, still by remaining within the boundaries of social 
interaction. This implies that the analysis needs to consider a historical period in which 
the possibilities of a concrete overturning of system were not included in the 
calculations of the Italian government.  
This clarification recalls Schweller's (1994) study of the concept of 
bandwagoning. The author distinguishes two forms of bandwagoning. One option is 
bandwagoning in order to avoid attacks (as a form of 'appeasement'), and the other 
option is bandwagoning in order to share the split (the opportunistic form of 
bandwagoning for profit). Challenging the idea that states' first concern is to achieve 
greater security, and introducing the idea that states may bandwagon for profit as well 
(1994, 86), Schweller introduces the possibility that a state may decide to pay a high 
price, and take a great risk in order to improve its position in the system (1994, 85).  
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What is interesting, according to Schweller's perspective, is the fact that, with the 
emergence of the Hitlerite German threat, Europe saw the emergence of a serious 
threat to its status quo.  
Therefore, being Italy a status seeker, the rise of Hitlerite Germany, offered to Italy, 
among the others, the possibility to consider whether to opt for gaining from an 
alliance with France and Great Britain or by allying with Germany. Historic 
documentation shows that, though what is usually believed, it took many years to 
Mussolini to accept the concrete possibility of an alliance with Germany (bandwagoning 
for profit).  
A confirmation of the consciousness of this possibility can be found in the fact that, 
for almost all the 1930s, Italy attempted to use its dialogue with Germany as a threat 
to France and Britain in order to convince them both to be more concessive130.  
The perception that at the end of 1920s, the international game was changing in 
favour of what Schweller (1994) named as bandwagoning for profit, is confirmed for 
(at least) the Italian case by historians, who support that the rise of National Socialism 
represented on the international level the rise of a revisionist power that could have 
overturned the European balance. Moreover, the beginning of 1930s, saw in 1931 not 
only the year in which Europe began to suffer the effects of the economic crisis but 
also the year in which Japan – whose socialization to the European Society deserves 
great attention – invaded Manchuria and opened irreversible cracks in the League of 
Nations' system. 
With regard to this historical context, scholars identify, in the Italian foreign policy of 
those years, the first signals of the Italian desire – or at least of the Italian 
calculations on the possibilities131 – to gain from the potential reallocation and 
redistribution of power and relations that could have followed a strong overturning of 
the system (Milza, 2000). 
                                                
 
130	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  remind	  that	  this	  same	  game	  was	  done	  by	  France	  and	  Great	  Britain	  as	  well	  that	  tried	  to	  use	  
the	  card	  of	  the	  Hitlerite	  threat	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  Italy	  to	  cheese	  its	  requests	  (Milza,	  2000).	  
131	   Milza,	   reports	   that,	   though	   Mussolini	   feared	   the	   German	   expansionism	   and	   in	   particular	   its	   ambitions	   of	  
Anschluss,	   still	   "la	  prospettiva	  dell'arrivo	  al	  potere	  dei	  nazisti	   lascia	   intravedere	  una	  ridistribuzione	  dei	   ruoli	  e	  delle	  
forze	   da	   cui	  Mussolini	   intende	   avvantaggiarsi,	   se	   non	   legando	   le	   sorti	   del	   proprio	   paese	   a	   quelle	   della	   Germania,	  
almeno	   approfittando	  della	   fine	  dell'egemonia	   francobritannica	   e	   della	  minaccia	   che	   il	   revisionismo	  hitleriano	   farà	  
pesare	  sulla	  pace	  e	  sull'assetto	  territoriale	  imposto	  dai	  vincitori	  del	  1918	  per	  porsi	  come	  mediatore	  e	  far	  valere	  le	  sue	  
rivendicazioni"	  (Milza,	  2000,	  658).	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Milza (2000) reports that at the end of 1920s, Mussolini left his FM role to Dino 
Grandi this because – in a situation in which Italy hadn't fulfilled its aspirations since 
France and Great Britain were not available to share their dominance with Italy – he 
thought it would have been better to adopt a low profile foreign policy, this while 
waiting for a substantial change in the international arena that would have allowed 
Italy to reopen the dossier of Italian claims. In a similar context, the author continues,  
"L'ascesa del nazionalsocialismo, divenuta evidente dopo le elezioni del settembre 
del 1930, costituiva per l'appunto un segno di cambiamento radicale, giacché 
profilava l'arrivo al potere di una forza politica che faceva della revisione dei 
trattati un punto essenziale del proprio programma e intendeva procurarsi i mezzi 
per porre termine all'egemonia francobritannica" (Milza, 2000, 657). 
With regard to this quotation, it is important to specify that Milza adopts the term 
'revisionism' while overlooking the differences between the Italian revisionism that, at 
least during 1920s, was certainly aiming at pursuing changes in the international 
system (especially with regard to its social standing), but did so by not aiming at 
overturning the system. Italy was revisionist within social boundaries, while the Hitlerite 
Germany manifest itself as an underminer of the system. 
Supporting this perspective, Moscati writes that the Italian revisionism (of 1927) was 
still, subordinated to peaceful means,  
"Dal 1927 in poi, appare chiaro che la politica di Mussolini è ormai impostata sulla 
sua adesione definitiva al 'revisionismo', anche se l'intenzione è di giungere ad una 
revisione dei trattati unicamente per via pacifica" (Moscati, 1963, 111). 
 Therefore, as mentioned above, since the intent is to focus specifically on the 
Italian attempts to pursue prestige politics, but also to look at a prestige politics that 
aimed at obtaining compensations without overturning the system, the periodization of 
the case study will focus on a specific period of the Italian foreign policy (FP) under 
the Mussolini government.  
Obviously the a quo date corresponds with the beginning of Mussolini's government 
itself (October 31st, 1922), after which, as mentioned above, followed clear signals and 
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official declarations of Italian prestige politics, such as the first speeches Mussolini held 
in front of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies on November 16th, 1922132.  
While, with regard to the ad quem date, due to these above-mentioned reasonable 
suspects of the existence of calculations concerning the possibilities of overturning 
events in the international arena, the analysis will have its conclusive date in the last 
years of 1920s. Indeed, 1930 will be considered as the furthest period to be taken 
into consideration.  
 Moreover, in order to contextualize this period, it is also important to recall 
that the Italian commitment to prestige politics lasted for many years, during which 
Mussolini alternated in the role of Foreign Minister with Dino Grandi (from September 
12th, 1929 until July 20th, 1932) and with Galeazzo Ciano, who was in charge as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 11th, 1936 until February 6th, 1943133. 
Since Grandi entered into office as Foreign Minister in 1929, this leads the analysis to 
focus mostly on the previous year, tough, in the final sections, there will be a brief 
analysis also of the characters of Italian foreign policy under the guidance of the 
Grandi-Mussolini couple. 
 Another important element of contextualization concerns instead the first years 
of Italian foreign policy under Mussolini. Indeed, between 1922 and 1929 – years in 
which Mussolini was interim FM – a relevant change is historically identified in January 
1926 when Salvatore Contarini resigned as General Secretary of the Italian Foreign 
Ministry134. It is historically recognized that Salvatore Contarini represented the so-
called traditional Italian diplomacy and that his presence was important to containing 
and limiting Mussolini in his foreign policy decisions, as well as to orienting him 
                                                
 
132	  Following	  these,	  and	  of	  extreme	  value	  and	  relevance,	  are	  the	  declarations	  that	  were	  made	  on	  November	  19th,	  
1922,	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  Territet	  (Switzerland)	  meetings	  organized	  by	  Mussolini	  himself	  ahead	  of	  the	  Lausanne	  
Conference	  of	  November	  1922.	  Indeed,	  on	  this	  specific	  occasion,	  Mussolini	  took	  his	  first	  steps	  onto	  the	  international	  
stage	  by	  officially	  declaring	   that	  his	   intention	  was	   to	  obtain	  equal	   treatment	  of	   Italy	  by	   its	  allies:	  France	  and	  Great	  
Britain	  must	  treat	  Italy	  as	  a	  sister	  and	  not	  as	  a	  servant.	  	   	  
These	  declarations,	  made	  in	  the	  first	  months	  of	  the	  Mussolini	  government,	  while	  Mussolini	  was	  FM,	  are	  important	  for	  
identifying	  the	  intentions	  of	  Italian	  foreign	  policy,	  which	  clearly	  correspond	  to	  obtaining	  recognized	  Italian	  prestige	  in	  
the	  international	  arena.	  	  	  
133	  This	  implies	  that	  Mussolini	  was	   interim	  Minister	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  from	  October	  31st,	  1922	  until	  September	  12th,	  
1929,	  and	  again	  after	  Grandi,	  from	  July	  20th,	  1932	  until	  June	  11th,	  1936,	  when	  Ciano	  followed	  and	  served	  until	  the	  fall	  
of	  the	  regime	  in	  1943.	  	  
134	   The	   General	   Secretary	   of	   Italian	   Foreign	  Ministry	   corresponds,	   in	   this	   case,	   to	   the	   second-­‐highest	   role	   in	   the	  
Foreign	  Ministry	  Office,	   after	   the	   Foreign	  Minister	   –	   a	   position	  which	   in	   this	   period	  was	   held	   by	   Benito	  Mussolini	  
himself	  (1922-­‐1929).	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towards the Italian traditional style of diplomacy (more in line with Sforza and the 
Liberal period), whose foreign policy aimed at maintaining and perpetrating good and 
cooperative relations with neighbours (etc.). by taking into consideration these 
elements, the analysis will focus on identifying possible elements of continuity and 
discontinuity with regard to this issue.  
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2	  –	  Empirical	  investigation	  of	  Italian	  prestige	  politics	  
	  
2.1	  –	  Italy	  is	  a	  status	  seeker	  seeking	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  its	  international	  
prestige	  and	  reputation	  	  
 
The first requisite in the selection of the case study is, as mentioned above, 
the identification of a state that is seeking for the recognition of its status. More in 
detail, the aimed status should be a reputational status. the observed status seeker 
should seek for the recognition of its international social standing.  
With regard to this, Italian foreign policy under Mussolini’s government was 
characterized by ambitions for an Italian international prestige politics. Indeed, Italy 
longed for the recognition of its status as a great power, and this ambition is directly 
related to the international social standing hierarchy.  
It is also possible to report that these Italian ambitions to great power status 
are long-lasting in the Italian foreign policy. Indeed, there is agreement among scholars 
on the fact that, since its reunification, the Italian foreign policy has always been 
characterized by the aspiration to become a great power135. MacGregor Knox (1991) 
points out the main elements that characterize the long-lasting Italian ambition to 
become a great power, 
"La parte della classe dirigente liberale che si interessava alla politica estera 
aspirava a fare dell'Italia una vera grande potenza, che consolidasse il suo 
territorio nazionale reale o presunto, che detenesse un vasto impero coloniale, che 
dominasse il Mediterraneo, e che fosse universalmente rispettata e – meglio – 
temuta"136 (Knox, 1991, 288). 
What emerges is an enduring Italian insistence on the strengthening of its territorial 
possession, on the extension and projection of its authority into an empire with 
colonies137, and also on the importance to dominate the Mediterranean Sea. All 
                                                
 
135	   On	   the	   characters	   of	   continuity	   and	   discontinuity	   of	   the	   fascist	   Italian	   foreign	   policy	   with	   previous	   liberal	  
governments	  see,	  among	  the	  others,	  Bosworth,	  1991b;	  Knox,	  1991.	  	  
136	  See	  also,	  Chabod,	  1971;	  Bosworth,	  1979;	  Curato,	  1982.	  
137	  In	  line	  with	  this	  perspective,	  Bosworth	  underlines	  the	  important	  role	  that	  Italian	  leaders	  assigned	  to	  the	  realization	  
of	  an	   Italian	  Empire:	  "Quasi	  tutti	  gli	  eredi	  del	  Risorgimento	  condividevano	   l'ambizione	  che	   l'Italia	  dimostrasse	   in	  un	  
modo	  o	  nell'altro,	  con	  un	   impero,	  che	  anch'essa	  era	   in	  grado	  di	   fare	  ciò	  che	  avevano	  fatto	   le	  altre	  grandi	  potenze"	  
(Bosworth,	  1991b,	  59).	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elements that, under the Italian perspective, contribute to its role as a great power 
equal to its Allies.  
Building on these premises, it is possible to state that Fascism has 
incorporated these same aspirations138 (Knox, 1991, 287). 
These ambitions were clearly asserted in the first months of Mussolini's assignment as 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.  
To highlight this character of Italian foreign policy, attention will be devoted to 
the declarations made by Mussolini in November 1922 – the first month of his 
government, established on October 31st, 1922.  
In order to understand Italy's first approach to the international arena, this 
section will consider the interview Mussolini released to a correspondent of the Sunday 
Express (London) on the morning of November 3rd, 1922 (Susmel, 1958, 3).139 Following 
that discussion, the section will focus on the speech held in front of the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies on November 16th.140 
As a third element, the section will focus on some of the declarations and interviews – 
together with the press release of November 21st – released ahead and during the 
Territet and the Lausanne Conferences, held in Switzerland from November 19th (in 
Territet) to November 22nd, 1922.141 
Going by order, in the interview that Mussolini released on November 3rd, 1922, 
to a correspondent of the Sunday Express, he leaves no doubt that it is Italy’s 
intention and ambition to be considered and treated as an equal member in the great 
powers club. In fact, the interview, which was also reported by Italian newspapers in 
the following days,142 begins with the following declarations:  
                                                
 
138	  Knox	   reports	   that,	   scholars	  who	  disagree	  on	  other	  points,	   still	   agree	  on	   this	   feature	  of	   continuity	   in	   the	   Italian	  
ambitions	  –	  in	  his	  own	  words,	  "Il	  fascismo	  vestì	  in	  camicia	  nera	  molte	  fra	  le	  ambizioni	  più	  sfrenate	  dell'Italia	  liberale"	  
(Knox,	  1991,	  287).	  	  
139	  The	  interview	  took	  place	  in	  Rome	  at	  approximately	  12.45,	  while	  Mussolini	  was	  returning	  to	  Hotel	  Savoia.	  On	  the	  
same	   occasion,	   and	   right	   before	   the	   interview	   with	   the	   Sunday	   Express,	   Mussolini	   answered	   other	   journalists’	  
questions.	  The	  interview	  released	  to	  the	  Sunday	  Express	  was	  reported	  by	  the	  Italian	  newspapers	  La	  Stampa	  (n.	  262,	  
November	  4-­‐5,	  1922,	  56°)	  and	  Corriere	  della	  Sera	  (n.	  266,	  November	  6,	  1922,	  47°).	  
140	  The	  same	  speech,	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  brief	  declaration	  directed	  to	  the	  Senators,	  was	  given	  by	  Mussolini	  to	  the	  
Senate	  on	  the	  afternoon	  of	  the	  same	  day.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  speech	  given	  to	  the	  Chamber	  
of	  Deputies.	  
141	  The	  conference	  moved	  to	  Lausanne	  from	  the	  20th	  to	  the	  22nd.	  
142	  As	  reported	  above,	  the	  interview	  released	  to	  the	  Sunday	  Express	  was	  reported	  by	  Italian	  newspapers	  La	  Stampa	  
(n.	  262,	  November	  4-­‐5,	  1922,	  56°)	  and	  Corriere	  della	  Sera	  (n.266,	  November	  6,	  1922,	  47°).	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"L'Italia vuol essere trattata dalle grandi nazioni del mondo come una sorella, non 
come una cameriera. Una nuova èra spunta per il mio paese, un'èra di sviluppo. 
Noi non vogliamo pestare sui piedi delle altre nazioni, ma vogliamo insistere sulla 
nostra dignità" (Susmel, 1958, 3).143 
In this interview, Mussolini directly and clearly declares that Italy wants to be treated 
by the other great powers 'as a sister and not as a servant'. 
In line with this declaration on November 16th, 1922, Mussolini illustrates to 
both the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate the perspective that will guide 
Italian foreign policy in his upcoming Ministry.  
In the first presidential speech addressed by Mussolini to the two Chambers, the Prime 
Minister, after having dealt with domestic affairs issues, outlines the first public and 
official overview of the Italian foreign policy his government intends to follow (Susmel, 
1958, 15-25).  
The Minister begins by declaring the importance of foreign policy issues to his 
government and by outlining the fundamental guidelines of the government towards 
international politics. Mussolini states the importance of the respect of the international 
pacta sunt servanda principle:  
"[I] trattati di pace buoni o cattivi che siano, una volta che sono stati firmati e 
ratificati, vanno eseguiti. Uno Stato che si rispetti non può avere altra dottrina" 
(Susmel, 1958 v. 19, p. 18). 
But next to this declaration he also adds the possibility for treaties to be renegotiated, 
and the utility for Italy to renegotiate and revise international treaties when need be.144  
 
This ambivalence towards the international treaties is strictly related with the Italian 
international role and status. Indeed, Mussolini clarifies that Italy's perspectives on 
international politics will pursue national interest and dignity.  
"Per ciò che riguarda l'Italia, noi intendiamo di seguire una politica di dignità e 
utilità nazionale (Vive approvazioni a destra).  
Non possiamo permetterci il lusso di una politica di altruismo insensato o di 
dedizione completa ai disegni altrui. Do ut des. (Vive approvazioni).  
                                                
 
143	   Directly	   quoted	   from	  Opera	  Omnia	   di	   Benito	  Mussolini,	   edited	   by	   Susmel	   and	   Susmel	   (1958).	   The	   interview	   is	  
reported	  with	  the	  title	  "L'Italia	  e	  le	  Grandi	  Potenze".	  
144	  See	  Susmel,	  1958,	  18-­‐19.	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L'Italia di oggi conta, e deve adeguatamente contare. Lo si incomincia a 
riconoscere anche oltre i confini. Non abbiamo il cattivo gusto di esagerare la 
nostra potenza, ma non vogliamo nemmeno, per eccessiva ed inutile modestia, 
diminuirla.  
La mia formula è semplice: niente per niente" (Susmel, 1958 v. 19, p. 19). 
Moreover, he continues, by clarifying that this all is about the Italian position with 
specific regard to the social standing of its Allies, 
"Roma sta in linea con Parigi e con Londra, ma l'Italia deve imporsi e deve porre 
agli Alleati quel coraggioso e severo esame di coscienza ch'essi non hanno 
affrontato dall'armistizio ad oggi. (Vive approvazioni).  
Esiste ancora una Intesa nel senso sostanziale della parola? (…) Quale è la 
posizione dell'Italia nell'Intesa, dell'Italia che non soltanto per debolezza dei suoi 
Governi ha perduto forti posizioni dell'Adriatico e nel Mediterraneo, mentre si 
ripongono in discussione taluni dei suoi diritti fondamentali; dell'Italia che non ha 
avuto colonie, né materia prime ed è schiacciata, letteralmente, dai debiti fatti per 
raggiungere la vittoria comune?  
Mi propongo, nei colloqui che avrò coi primi ministri di Francia e Inghilterra, di 
affrontare con tutta chiarezza, nella sua complessità, il problema dell'Intesa ed il 
problema conseguente della posizione dell'Italia in seno dell'Intesa. (Vivi applausi)" 
(Susmel, 1958 v. 19, p. 19-20). 
Therefore, it emerges that this Italian international standing, and in particular its 
behavioural approach, as reported in the words of his leader, results being directly 
associated to the Italian ambitions. Mussolini himself connects the main elements of 
this speech by hinting that while his foreign policy is peaceful and compliant, still it is 
about Italy's equal social standing. Therefore, this should help to understand the role 
of those apparently negative elements in the Italian behaviour as part of this Italian 
commitment in pursuing its international status, and that they shouldn't be described 
and oversimplified with the negative meanings associated to terms such as 
'adventurous or imperialistic' politics.  
The function of these apparently assertive features is still to be understood within a 
peaceful foreign politics, that coexists with the pursuit of national interest. 
"Una politica estera come la nostra, una politica di utilità nazionale, una politica di 
rispetto ai trattati, una politica di equa chiarificazione della posizione dell'Italia 
nell'Intesa, non può essere gabellata come una politica avventurosa o imperialista 
nel senso volgare della parola.   
Noi vogliamo seguire una politica di pace: non però una politica di suicidio" 
(Susmel, 1958 v. 19, p. 20-21). 
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On this occasion, Mussolini is more formal in declaring his government's intentions 
towards international politics; however, his declaration is still quite direct in confirming 
Italy's intent to be recognized as a great power, and to do so by pursuing some 
autonomy of action – by respecting the international principles and treaties, but also 
by revising treaties when necessary.  
This strongly asserted Italian will, somehow represents a threat to the system, but this 
threat of revisionism is still balanced by the insistence on the peaceful and compliant 
intentions that Italy has towards the system. Indeed, the same intent of revisionism is 
subordinated to the importance of treaties and international principles that, once 
signed have to be respected.  
In this speech Mussolini describes Italy as a state that has good international 
relationships145, knows the rules and respects them, but that will also try to create its 
own space by negotiating on them. Therefore, the intent is to pursue Italian prestige 
by following a peaceful international standing but also by enforcing Italian resoluteness, 
"Vogliamo fare una politica estera di pace ma nel contempo di dignità e di fermezza e 
la faremo"146 (Susmel, 1958 v. 19, p. 22). 
Finally, this section focuses on the declarations and interviews released on 
occasion of the Territet and the Lausanne Conferences held in Switzerland in 
November 1922.  
Merely reporting how the Territet meetings occurred would be sufficient to give a clear 
idea of the Italian ambitions to be internationally recognized as a great power. In fact, 
the Lausanne Conference was planned in order to address issues related to the peace 
in the Middle East, and after some postponements147 (related to the British 
representatives), the Conference was set to occur in Lausanne, in Switzerland, 
beginning on November 20th, 1922. Ahead of this meeting, it was also established that 
on the 19th, the three prime ministers would have a preliminary meeting in Territet, in 
                                                
 
145	   In	   the	   speech,	   he	   lists	   all	   the	   countries	   with	   which	   Italy	   is	   having	   good	   relationships	   (thanks	   to	   treaties,	  
agreements,	  etc.)	  among	  which	  there	  are:	  Switzerland,	  Yugoslavia,	  Greece,	  Spain,	  Czechoslovakia,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  
the	  Baltic	  States,	  Austria,	  Bulgaria,	  Canada	  and	  South	  America.	  He	  also	  mentions	  his	  commitment	  to	  further	  improve	  
Italian	  relations	  with	  the	  US.	  
146	  This	  also	  brings	  him	  to	  underline	  the	  importance	  to	  have	  a	  united	  bloc	  in	  the	  domestic	  level.	  See	  Susmel,	  1958	  v.	  
19,	  p.	  22-­‐24.	  
147	  See	  Mussolini's	   intervention	  in	  the	  second	  Cabinet	  meeting,	  November	  8th,	  1922,	  and	  also	  Mussolini's	   interview	  
released	  to	  French	  journalists	  on	  November	  9th,	  1922;	  in:	  Susmel,	  1958,	  7,	  8-­‐9.	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the south of Switzerland and close to the Italian border. As Gino Berri reported in an 
article published by the Italian Corriere della Sera on November 20th, 1922,148 after the 
establishment of the Territet meeting, the French and British prime ministers requested 
the preliminary meeting to occur instead in Lausanne (Susmel, 1958, 420). What might 
appear as a simple issue of location manifests instead the significance it had with 
regard to social standing and status, if not for all participants, at least for the Italian 
PM.  
The signals that the preliminary meeting and its specific location – closer to 
Italian borders, which required both the other ministers to get closer to Mussolini – 
harboured a deeper meaning and value are confirmed by the declarations that 
Mussolini released right before the arrival of Curzon and Poincare. In an interview149 
that Mussolini released to Italian journalists at approximately 6 pm, Mussolini expresses 
his intention to address the issue of the Italian position in the Entente with the 
following words,  
"È probabile – egli ha detto – che in questo colloquio venga posta la questione del 
blocco dell'Intesa e particolarmente della posizione che in tal blocco occupa oggi 
l'Italia. È necessario precisare – egli ha detto – prima di ogni altra cosa se l'Italia 
nell'alleanza occupa il posto di una serva, di una camerier o quello che spetta ad 
una grande potenza. Prima bisogna intendersi bene fra noi tre, poi cercheremo di 
intenderci con in turchi [NdA: facendo riferimento alla Conferenza di Losanna sulla 
pace in Oriente prevista per il giorno successivo] (Susmel, 1958, 31). 
This declaration constitutes the key perspective under which to look at this event and 
its symbolic importance for Italy's status seeking.  
In fact, although the French and British requests were accepted and the meeting was 
planned and organized to occur in a hotel in Lausanne, still, as Berri wrote, Mussolini 
imposed its will by replying to the shared planning by strongly insisting for the meeting 
to occur in Territet. His insistence imposed that the meeting had to be planned and 
prepared for both locations, and until the last moment, it was not clear where it was 
to take place. The uncertainty was ended by his declaration upon his arrival in Territet: 
"Li aspetto qui" (I will wait here for them to arrive). Indeed, Berri reports that it was 
                                                
 
148	  Corriere	  della	  Sera,	  n.	  278,	  November	  20th,	  1922	  (Susmel,	  1958,	  420-­‐421).	  
149	  The	  interview	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  been	  released	  at	  approximately	  6	  pm	  and	  published	  on	  Corriere	  della	  Sera,	  on	  
November	  20th,	  1922	  (n.	  278,	  47°).	  See	  Susmel,	  1958,	  31).	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very important for Mussolini to host the first meeting with the French and British Prime 
Ministers as close to Italy as possible150 (Susmel, 1958, 420). 
After this imposition by Mussolini, the British PM (George Curzon) and his French 
counterpart (Raymond Poincare) arrived in Territet by train. Welcomed by Mussolini at 
the train station, Lord Curzon is reported to have declared that the two PMs had 
decided to go meet Mussolini to make his acquaintance and talk with him about 
various issues. As reported by Berri, 
"L'on. Mussolini, seguito (…) da altri si reca alla vicina stazione a ricevere i due 
personaggi. L'incontro è stato cordialissimo. Lord Curzon ha dichiarato che i due 
ministri alleati hanno voluto recarsi a Territet incontro all'on. Mussolini per avere il 
piacere di conoscerlo ed intrattenersi con lui sopra varie questioni" (Berri in 
Susmel, 1958, 421). 
After this shaky start, the three prime ministers had a private meeting at the 
Grand hotel des Alpes that lasted almost half an hour, followed by two other sessions 
opened to the heads of delegations and experts. 
As anticipated by Mussolini in his declarations released before the arrival of Curzon 
and Poincare at the train station, it effectively resulted that, in the private meeting, the 
three ministers, under Mussolini's initiative, dealt with the issue of the Italian position in 
the Entente (Berri in Susmel, 1958, 421).  
In fact, the Territet meeting was followed both by an interview released by Mussolini, 
after his arrival in Lausanne,151 to a reporter (special envoy) of the Petit Parisien,152 
and an official press release concerning the content of the private meeting between 
the three ministers. In the interview, the Italian Prime Minister revealed in advance the 
main content of the press release and highlighted the meeting’s value for Italian 
                                                
 
150	  	  "Il	  convegno	  di	  Territet,	  preliminare	  alla	  conferenza	  della	  pace	  in	  Oriente,	  ha	  subito	  una	  serie	  di	  contrattempi,	  alla	  
fine	  dei	  quali	  si	  è	  ritornati	  al	  punto	  fi	  partenza.	  Dopo	  che	  la	  riunione	  a	  tre	  era	  stata	  fissata	  a	  Territet,	   i	  due	  ministri	  
inglese	  e	   francese	  avevano	  chiesto	  che	  avesse	   luogo,	   invece,	  a	   Losanna.	  Così	   sembrava	  che	  dovesse	  avvenire	  ed	   il	  
necessario	   a	   tale	   scopo	   era	   stato	   predisposto	   a	   quell'hotel	   Beau	   Rivage150,	   quando	   da	   parte	   italiana	   si	   insisté	   per	  
Territet.	  Ne	  seguì	  un	  nuovo	  scambio	  di	  telegrammi	  con	  conseguenti	  ordini	  e	  contrordini.	  I	  preparativi	  furono	  fatti	  in	  
tutte	   e	   due	   le	   località	   e	   sino	   a	   ieri	   sera	   [19	   novembre]	   ancora	   non	   si	   sapeva	   quale	   sarebbe	   stata	   la	   prescelta.	  
Mussolini	  arrivato	  disse	  'Li	  aspetto	  qui'.	  Egli	  ci	  teneva	  che	  il	  primo	  ministro	  francese	  e	  il	  ministro	  inglese	  fossero	  suoi	  
ospiti	  e	  così	  è	  avvenuto	  infatti."	  The	  article,	  by	  Gino	  Berri,	  is	  dated	  November	  20th,	  1922,	  early	  morning,	  Territet.	  See	  
Susmel,	  1958,	  420.	  
151	  All	  the	  PMs	  and	  their	  retinues	  moved	  towards	  Lausanne	  right	  after	  the	  preliminary	  meetings	  were	  over	  (Susmel,	  
1958,	  420).	  
152	   Interview	   released	   by	  Mussolini	   to	   a	   special	   envoy/reporter	   of	   the	   Petit	   Parisien,	   on	   November	   19th,	   1922,	   at	  
approximately	  12	  pm;	  published	  by	  Corriere	  della	  Sera	  (n.	  278,	  47°).	  Reported	  in	  Susmel,	  1958,	  32-­‐33.	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prestige politics. In fact, he asserts that the Conference marked a historical moment 
for the Entente, which represents a solution for the European situation and that this 
solution is guaranteed only through the implementation of a perfect equality among 
the allies. In Mussolini's words,  
"Questa conferenza – ha detto l'on. Mussolini – segna una svolta decisiva nella 
storia dell'Intesa, la quale noi non manterremo rigorosa se non spiegandoci 
lealmente e con una collaborazione stretta e franca. Il solo rimedio alla situazione 
attuale è di ristabilire su una base di eguaglianza perfetta l'unità di fronte degli 
Alleati. Bisogna realizzare questa unità di fronte non solo rispetto alla Turchia, ma 
anche alla Germania" (Susmel, 1958, 32). 
Mussolini refers to a 'united front' of the allies that requires an equal treatment of its 
members and implies an equal treatment of Italy with respect to the other great 
powers. 
Moreover, the perspective that Mussolini expresses in the interview also provides a key 
to interpreting the common press release published right after the Territet meeting, on 
the evening of November 19th. The official press release reports that, 
"(Comunicato ufficiale). – Il signor Raimondo Poincaré, l'on. Mussolini e lord Curzon 
hanno avuto stasera una prima conversazione, nella quale si è nettamente 
affermata la loro comune risoluzione di regolare con lo spirito della più cordiale 
amicizia e sulla base di una perfetta uguaglianza fra gli alleati tutte le questioni 
che stanno per essere trattate alla Conferenza di Losanna. Essi domani [20 
novembre] avranno un nuovo colloquio."153 (In Susmel, 1958, 422).  
Following this, on the morning of November 21st, Mussolini released some 
declarations154 to a reporter of Matin, in which he repeats this idea of equality 
between Allies. In fact, talking about the European situation, Mussolini dwells on his 
vision of the (European) united front. In his own words,  
"Non credo alla forza della resistenza dell'Europa centrale; ma credo alle virtù 
possenti della nostra civiltà occidentale se uniremo tutte le nostre forze. Ecco il 
grande fascio della difesa della nostra cultura e della nostra società contro l'odio 
e contro la decomposizione. Il Belgio, la Francia e l'Italia sul continente; L'Inghilterra 
                                                
 
153	  The	  official	  press	  release	  is	  dated	  November	  19th,	  Territet,	  and	  was	  published	  by	   Il	  Popolo	  d'Italia	  on	  November	  
21st,	  1922	  (n.	  279,	  IX).	  See	  Susmel,	  1958,	  422.	  
154	   The	   declarations	   were	   released	   on	   the	  morning	   of	   the	   21st,	   while	   in	   Lausanne,	   to	   a	   reporter	   from	  Matin	   and	  
published	  also	  by	  Il	  Popolo	  d'Italia	  on	  November	  23rd,	  1922	  (n.	  281,	  IX).	  See	  Susmel,	  1958,	  34.	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al loro fianco, che comprende il suo vero interesse: questa è l'alleanza con la 
quale si può resistere alle influenze funeste dell'Oriente" (in Susmel, 1958, 34-35). 
In a similar context, he adds that Italy must enter this alliance as a great power 
among its peers. 
"In questa alleanza l'Italia deve entrare a testa alta, come una grande potenza fra 
eguali e non come la nazione ingannata e delusa del 1919" (in Susmel, 1958, 35). 
On the evening of November 21st, Mussolini released another interview,155 this 
time to Italian journalists, in which he takes the opportunity to stress that after 
Territet, the meeting of the Lausanne Conference is an occasion on which the value of 
Italy's great power status is emerging and is recognized. 
"Che cosa volete sapere? Non posso essere minutamente preciso – ha cominciato 
l'on. Mussolini – ma posso dirvi che oggi ho avuto due importanti colloqui (…). 
Nella conversazione con lord Curzon ci si è avviati verso la realizzazione concreta 
del patto di eguaglianza fra gli Alleati, cui si accennava nel comunicato d'ieri (…). 
Se vi interessa, potete aggiungere che tutti gli uomini politici coi quali ho discusso 
delle questioni internazionali mi sono apparsi animati dal più vivo desiderio di 
accordarsi con l'Italia e dalla disposizione ad un valutamento del nostro paese 
diverso d quello che poteva seguire la situazione di ieri" (Mussolini in Susmel, 1958, 
37). 
It is revealing that this interview was published by the Italian newspaper Il Popolo 
d'Italia with the title "Il Patto di eguaglianza fra gli alleati ribadito" – the reaffirmation 
of the pact of equality (Susmel, 1958, 37).  
Similarly, on November 24th, Il Corriere della Sera reported an interview that Mussolini 
released on the afternoon of November 22nd to a news correspondent from the 
Morning Post (London). The interview was reported with the title "Reciprocità di 
trattamento fra alleati" – equality in the interactions between allies (Susmel, 1958, 39). 
In this interview, Mussolini states that while he recognizes that the Entente constitutes 
a unified front, he is still not satisfied with the position that Italy has within it. 
"Mussolini ha detto che le prime giornate della conferenza [di Losanna] hanno 
avuto almeno un risultato notevole: l'entente presenta ancora una volta una fronte 
unita. Ma l'on. Mussolini non è ancora soddisfatto della posizione dell'Italia 
nell'Intesa. L'unità di fronte non durerà se l'Italia nei prossimi mesi non sarà 
                                                
 
155	  The	  interview	  was	  released	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  November	  21st,	  1922,	  while	  in	  Lausanne,	  to	  Italian	  journalists	  and	  
was	  published	  on	  November	  22nd	  by	  Il	  Popolo	  d'Italia	  (n.	  280,	  IX).	  See	  Susmel,	  1958,	  37.	  	  
 
 
190 
rassicurata su questo punto. Questo ha detto e ha fatto capire Mussolini 
passeggiando su e giù per la stanza: l'unità di fronte è un grande risultato – egli 
ha detto – ma si deve assicurare anche l'assoluta eguaglianza per l'Italia, piena 
reciprocità tra l'Italia e i suoi Alleati. Nulla che sia meno della piena reciprocità può 
bastare" (Mussolini in Susmel, 1958, 39). 
It is also important to report that these declarations cannot be considered as an 
actual and realistic report of the international role and status effectively ascribed to 
Italy; it is enough to compare the distance between the telegraphic Territet official 
press release – in which the recognized equality between Italy, France and Great Britain 
was apparently affirmed – and the more vivid declarations made by Mussolini during 
the Territet and Lausanne Conference. While these declarations cannot be taken as 
accounts of the real situation, they nevertheless perfectly represent and manifest Italy's 
intentions and desire to have its status as a great power recognized156.  
In conclusion, Mussolini's insistence on Italy's desire to be treated with equality 
by the other great powers clearly confirms that Italy was aiming at a prestige politics. 
Moreover, it is also possible to insist on the fact that the aimed status corresponds to 
a reputational type of status this because it clearly concerns Italy's international social 
standing with respect to the social standing of its Allies. Examples can be found in the 
continuous mentions made by Mussolini with regard to the Italian prestige and to the 
necessity of an equal treatment with its Allies. 
Having pointed out that the Italian foreign policy under Mussolini's government 
was a status seeking prestige politics, it is now important to focus on understanding 
how this status seeking aim was pursued, and it is possible to advance that the 
speeches and interviews here analysed suggest that Mussolini's declarations and 
                                                
 
156	   It	  would	  be	   interesting	   to	   consider	   also	   the	   role	  played	  by	   the	   Italian	  narrative	  of	   its	   great	  power	   status.	  With	  
regard	  to	  this,	  Richard	  Bosworth	  reports	  that	  Italy	  was	  treated	  and	  considered	  a	  great	  power,	  not	  because	  of	  its	  real	  
capacity	  (power)	  but	  because	  the	  other	  powers	  accepted	  it	  and	  were	  acquiescent.	   In	  fact,	   in	  general,	   Italy	  was	  the	  
weakest	  among	  the	  great	  powers:	  "L'Italia	  era	  la	  grande	  potenza	  meno	  industrializzata;	  aveva	  le	  risorse	  naturali	  più	  
modeste;	   la	   sua	   costa	   era	   la	   più	   vulnerabile;	   i	   suoi	   piani	   di	  mobilitazione	   erano	   i	   più	   complessi	   ed	   arcaici;	   la	   sua	  
bilancia	   dei	   pagamenti	   era	   la	   più	   debole;	   il	   suo	   commercio	   e	   la	   sua	   finanza	   erano	   i	   più	   timidi	   e	   provinciali;	   la	   sua	  
popolazione	   era	   la	   meno	   numerosa;	   i	   suoi	   tassi	   di	   analfabetismo	   erano	   i	   più	   elevati;	   era	   la	   grande	   potenza	   che	  
spendeva	  meno	  per	  le	  tecnologie	  moderne;	  le	  sue	  masse	  erano	  le	  meno	  "nazionalizzate".	  Anche	  se	  in	  alcuni	  periodi	  
qualcuna	  di	  queste	  generalizzazioni	  poteva	  dimostrarsi	   falsa,	  e	   in	  un	  campo	  o	  nell'altro	   l'Italia	   fu	   sempre	  e	  di	  gran	  
lunga	  la	  grande	  potenza	  più	  debole"	  (Bosworth,	  1991b,	  39).	   	  
Therefore,	  the	  reason	  behind	  Italy	  being	  allowed	  into	  the	  GP	  club	  is	  identified	  by	  the	  author	  in	  the	  narrative	  adopted	  
and	  implemented	  by	  Italian	  leaders,"La	  posizione	  dell'Italia	  dipese	  essenzialmente,	  dall'inizio	  alla	  fine,	  dal	  linguaggio	  e	  
dal	   mito.	   Era	   una	   grande	   potenza	   che	   conduceva	   una	   politica	   estera	   da	   grande	   potenza	   perché	   i	   suoi	   uomini	   di	  
governo	   affermavano	   che	   era	   grande	   e	   perché	   i	   dirigenti	   degli	   altri	   stati	   accettavano	   o	   incoraggiavano	   questa	  
pretesa"	  (Bosworth,	  1991b,	  39).	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intentions of foreign policy clearly contradict with the expectations of current IR theory 
on recognition process that await to see behaviours of norm conformity.  
Mussolini underlines the Italian intention to respect international principles, and on the 
opposite, the intention to revise international treaties (when possible) both aim at the 
Italian intention to gain international standing as a great power. 
This approach to Italian foreign policy, while appears as contradictory according to the 
current perspective on status seeking and recognition process, it represents some first 
signals of a combination of opposed behavioural attitudes implemented in order to 
gain reputational international status. 
The next sections, will focus on a closer analysis of the way in which Italy attempts to 
gain its social standing position under the Mussolini government. 
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2.2	  –	  Italy's	  thunderous	  entrance	  on	  the	  international	  scene:	  the	  Corfu	  
incident	  
	  
The second requisite for the selection of the case study was that the selected 
case has to be a status-seeker that, while complying with social norms and rules as 
suggested by the current studies on recognition process, also performs deviant 
behaviours with respect to shared norms and rules. 
In line with this requirement, this section will be devoted to a review of international 
behaviours implemented by Italy in its international relations, with a specific focus on 
observed and deviant behaviours that have proven difficult to understand according to 
the traditional perspective.  
This review will be broad and non-exhaustive since the main intent is to 
highlight anomalous and deviant behaviours adopted by Italy ahead of its international 
recognition. To discuss this recognition, secondary literature such as historical 
accounts and investigations (undertaken by historians) will be used to identify what 
was considered (and sometimes still remains) as anomalous and deviant behaviour in 
Italian foreign policy. 
Moreover, recalling that kids used to manifest higher levels of deviance at the 
beginning of the academic school year, specific attention will be devoted to Mussolini's 
firs approaches to the international arena. Indeed, even though – as mentioned in the 
previous sections – the international environment does not perfectly replicate the kids' 
interaction environment, and in particular the school environment with its 'beginning of 
the year' moment in which kids use to negotiate for the distribution of status; still it is 
possible to identify a sort of first appearance of the new Italian government on the 
international scene. These first moments are useful to understand the Italian 
international approach and the first impression it attempts to make. 
Therefore, it is possible to begin this analysis by recalling here one of the main 
fits of temper that scholars have identified in the Italian international standing under 
the Mussolini guidance: the Corfu crisis and in particular his assertive reaction to the 
situation. 
The next section will provide a wide historical contextualization, this in order to 
help understanding the observed events and behaviours. A more detailed report on 
events of the diplomatic crisis between Greece and Italy, together with a report of 
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current explanations of these events and in particular of the Italian intransigence. To 
conclude, an alternative reading of Italian behaviour will be advanced, this by building 
on the analysis of diplomatic documents. The analysis will focus on the messages 
Mussolini sent to his collaborators abroad, this with the aim of understanding the 
intentions and objectives of his orders and decisions.  
The intent of this research is to understand if Mussolini implemented these 
assertive behaviours in order to obtain the recognition of Italian great power status. 
This would require that the observed deviant behaviours have to be limited and 
combined with complying/cooperative behaviours.  
This all would confirm that the assertive behaviours were implemented in function of 
status seeking. That deviant behaviours were not deviant per se, but functionally 
deviant ahead of the attainment of the recognition of status seeking. 
 
2.2.1	  –	  Historical	  contextualization	  	  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, at the end of 1922, after Mussolini 
established his government, the Italian Prime Minister committed to publicly declaring 
Italy’s intentions to be recognized as a great power. In this situation, Mussolini – who 
nevertheless was leading an authoritarian regime – devoted attention to also 
highlighting that Italy intended to comply with international treaties.  
Historians report that these reassurances were useful, on the one hand, to positively 
qualify the fascist government in the eyes of international interlocutors. Mussolini 
wanted to present his government as a stable and credible international actor, and at 
the same time, he wanted to avoid the creation of international troubles that would 
have been problematic for domestic politics (see Milza, 2000, 442).  
However, these same declarations of conformity and peacefulness, must be read while 
considering that they were combined with declarations indicating the Italian intentions 
to revise and readapt international treaties [peace treaties] in those cases where they 
did not respect Italy's international value and national interests. As Mussolini declared 
on November 16th, 1922, in front of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, Italy 
would give nothing for nothing; in fact, the guiding principle for Italian international 
politics was the do ut des principle (see Susmel, 1958, 19). 
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This combination of complying and assertive behaviours towards international 
interactions was also replicated in other situations. As an example, right before the 
establishment of his government – specifically, a few days before Italy was to sign the 
treaty of Santa Margherita – while in Udine, Mussolini publicly protested that 'Italy 
should be listened to by other nations of the world' (Papafloratos, 2015, 261). On the 
same occasion, he also openly showed his agreement with those supporters that were 
calling for "Fiume Italiana" and "Dalmatia Italiana" (quoted in Papafloratos, 2015, 261). 
In line with this assertive stance, when Belgrade manifested intentions "to register with 
the Secretary-General of the League of Nations both the Treaties of Rapallo and Santa 
Margherita" – signed by the Italian democratic government mid-October 1922 – 
"Mussolini replied that he would regard that registration as a hostile act" (Papafloratos, 
2015, 261-262). However, contrasting with this attitude, on October 31st, when he 
officially took office as Italian Prime Minister, he also "ordered the fascist of Fiume to 
keep quiet and to create no complications" (Papafloratos, 2015, 261; Milza, 2000, 441-
442; Guariglia, 1950, 12).  
Again changing direction, in the upcoming years, Mussolini's interactions with the city 
of Fiume, and with Belgrade itself, returned to an assertive stance. In fact, in July 
1923, one month before the Corfu crisis broke out, Mussolini came up with the 
proposal to annex the city of Fiume in exchange for other Italian territories (Milza, 
2000, 457). These negotiations concluded in 1924, when Italy and the Kingdom of 
Serbs signed the second Treaty of Rome, in which Italy was officially assigned 
sovereignty over the city of Fiume (Milza, 2000, 457). 
While it would be possible to explain this decision to tone down statements as 
a necessity for the fascist government to reassure international interlocutors (Milza, 
2000, 442), nevertheless, in general, it is also possible to describe Italian foreign policy 
from 1922 until 1926 – when Salvatore Contarini resigned as General Secretary of 
Italian Foreign Ministry – as a prestige politics that also claimed a peaceful and 
compliant attitude towards international politics as established by the victorious powers 
(Milza, 2000, 441-442). In particular, Milza reports that Contarini's experience in foreign 
policy allowed him to impose on the Prime (and Foreign) Minister a foreign policy 
oriented towards international caution and prudence that favoured friendly relations 
with all countries, beginning with Italy's closest neighbours – Yugoslavia and France 
(Milza, 2000, 442). 
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2.2.2	  –	  Events	  of	  the	  Corfu	  incident	  (August–September	  1923)	  
 
In relation to these reports, it is also interesting to consider that in this first 
phase of Mussolini's leadership (which extends from 1922 until 1926) while the main 
orientations of Italian foreign policy are described as positively influenced by the 
experience and farsightedness of the Italian traditional diplomacy, nonetheless it also 
occurred one of the most controversial episodes of Italian foreign policy under 
Mussolini's guidance: the Corfu incident.  
The context in which this episode occurred was constituted by traditionally good and 
friendly relations between Greece and Italy (Papafloratos, 2015, 263). 
Reviewing the events by order, on August 27th, 1923, while in Greek territory, members 
of the Italian delegation participating in the international commission organized by the 
Conference of Ambassadors157 with the aim to officially delineate the Albanian–Greek 
borders were ambushed and killed by unknown persons who escaped into the Albanian 
borderlands – and who have remained unknown until the present day. Among the 
victims were General Tellini and two other Italian officials, together with an interpreter 
and a driver (Papafloratos, 2015, 264). 
In reaction to these serious and difficult events, while the Italian population showed "a 
perfect flare-up of national pride and patriotic sentiment" (Papafloratos, 2015, 264-
265), Mussolini, as Foreign Minister, took an extremely energetic stance. Just two days 
after the accident, on August 29th, he presented the Greek government with an 
ultimatum (Papafloratos, 2015, 265). As reported by Papafloratos (2015), in the 
ultimatum, 
"He assumed, without a proof that the responsibility for the murder belonged to the 
Greeks. The demands made in the ultimatum were extremely severe and the Greek 
government, by common consent outside of Italian circles, could not accept them" 
(Papafloratos, 2015, 265). 
This action was not in line with the suggestions coming from the administrative staff of 
the Italian Foreign Ministry, which instead suggested maintaining a cautious position.158  
                                                
 
157	   The	   Conference	   of	   Ambassadors	   was	   "a	   gathering	   of	   the	   British,	   Italian,	   Japanese	   (and	   sometimes	   Belgian)	  
ambassadors	  in	  Paris	  to	  discuss	  international	  problems	  with	  the	  French	  Foreign	  Minister"	  (Papafloratos,	  2015,	  264).	  
158	   In	  his	  memories,	  Guariglia	  reports	  that	   it	  was	  not	  possible	  for	  the	  diplomatic	  personnel	  to	  orientate	  Mussolini's	  
inflexible	  reaction	  (Guariglia,	  1950,	  28;	  Anchieri,	  1955a,	  376).	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The ultimatum was not only formulated with intimidating style and language but also 
required the Greek government to comply with highly demanding and humiliating 
requests – among which were included the immediate opening of an inquiry to be 
conducted by Italian personnel and the payment to the Italian government of a 
compensation then equivalent to fifty million lire159 (Milza, 2000, 448; see also 
Guariglia, 1950, 12; Anchieri, 1955a, 377-378). 
Moreover, we must not forget the symbolic meaning of presenting a severe ultimatum 
that inevitably recalled the methods adopted by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum sent 
to Serbia in July 1914 (Papafloratos, 2015, 265; Anchieri, 1955a, 378). 
The Greek government replied to this ultimatum by partially accepting some of its 
requests and rejecting some of the points that Athens considered unacceptable. Still, 
the government was willing to compensate the families of the victims with 'fair 
compensation' – not necessarily the amount required by Italy (Anchieri, 1955a, 379). It 
is important to report that in its reply, the Greek government clarified that in the case 
that Italy was not satisfied with its reply – given that both countries were members – 
Athens would resort to the League of Nations, committing to accept its decisions 
regarding the dispute (see Documenti Diplomatici Italiani – DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 217, 
p. 144). 
In reaction to Athens's decision to comply with only some of the ultimatum’s requests, 
which Mussolini considered as a rejection of the Italian requests (Anchieri, 1955a, 379), 
on August 31st, Mussolini ordered Italian naval forces to Corfu to occupy the island 
(Milza, 2000, 448; Anchieri, 1955a, 378; DDI, serie VII, vol. 2, n. 216, p. 143). The 
military mission was composed of no more than 1000 Italian marines. Moreover, 
Mussolini – in his communication to the Italian representatives – presented this act as 
'peaceful and temporary', aimed at obtaining from Greece the requested compensations 
                                                
 
159	  For	  a	  complete	  list	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  ultimatum	  that	  Italy	  presented	  to	  the	  Greek	  government,	  see	  Documenti	  
Diplomatici	  Italiani	  (DDI),	  VII	  serie:	  1922-­‐1935,	  vol.	  II	  (27	  aprile	  1923	  –	  22	  febbraio	  1924).	  Document	  registered	  under	  
number	  195	  (DDI,	  n.	  195,	  p.	  133).	  	   	  
The	  Documenti	  Diplomatici	  Italiani	  were	  published	  in	  1955	  and	  are	  mentioned	  in	  this	  research	  with	  the	  acronym	  DDI,	  
followed	   by	   the	   number	   of	   the	   series,	   the	   number	   of	   the	   volume	   and	   the	   protocol	   number	   of	   the	   mentioned	  
document,	  and	  possibly	  the	  page.	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and at defending Italian prestige. For this reason, the act was not an act of war. 
Directly quoting from the 1923 communication,160  
"(…) Sono stati pertanto impartiti gli ordini per lo sbarco nell'isola di Corfù di un 
contingente di truppe italiane. Con questa misura di carattere temporaneo l'Italia 
non intende compiere un atto di guerra ma soltanto tutelare il proprio prestigio e 
manifestare la sua inflessibile volontà di conseguire le riparazioni dovutele in 
conformità delle consuetudini e del diritto delle genti" (Mussolini in Documenti 
Diplomatici Italiani, serie VII, vol. II, n. 216, p. 143). 
It also occurred that on the same day, during these operations, the Italian fleet 
guided by Admiral Solari opened fire on civilians – mainly refugees hosted on the 
island – and killed between ten and fifteen161 women and children (Papafloratos, 2015, 
265-266; Milza, 2000, 448). This was a turning point in the sequence of events that 
aggravated the Italian situation. The internal documentation and further studies on the 
case reveal that these events were the result of the decisions made autonomously by 
Admiral Solari, who "ordered the bombardment of two castles of the island relating to 
the Middle Ages" (Papafloratos, 2015, 265). This decision contravened the original 
orders to maintain calm and not open fire against a demilitarized island (Anchieri, 
1955a, 379; see also DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 216, n. 234, n. 414).  
However, it was difficult to interpret and present these military acts as something 
different from acts of aggression that violated the rules and spirit of the international 
system, since these aggressive acts were also directed at a country that was a 
member of the League of Nations (Milza, 2000, 448; Anchieri, 1955a, 380). It followed 
that this episode "aggravated the diplomatic position of Italy" (Papafloratos, 2015, 265) 
by also turning the international media – with the exception of the Soviet media – 
against Italy (Anchieri, 1955a, 380). 
Even considering that the forceful acts undertaken by Admiral Solari were not 
part of the Italian government’s original plans, other assertive actions undertaken by 
Italy remain to be explained: Italy did all in its power to prevent the League of Nations 
from intervening in the situation. 
                                                
 
160	  The	  telegram	  to	  the	  Italian	  representatives	  abroad	  is	  quoted	  in	  a	  communication	  that	  Mussolini	  sent	  to	  the	  Italian	  
King,	  Vittorio	  Emanuele	  III,	  who	  was	  in	  Racconigi.	  
161	  Anchieri	  (1955a)	  refers	  to	  ten,	  while	  Papafloratos	  (2015)	  reports	  fifteen.	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In fact, even before knowing about the bombardments on the island, Salandra, Italy’s 
representative in the League of Nations, considered suggesting to Rome how to 
prevent any possibility that Greece might recur to the General-Assembly first, which 
would have placed Italy in the position of being arraigned in the position of defendant. 
To prevent this possibility and to comply with article 15 of the Covenant, Salandra 
suggested that Italy must send an immediate and spontaneous communication to the 
Council in Geneva (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 216, p. 147). However, Mussolini's answer to 
this suggestion was clear: he had no intentions of allowing the League to intervene 
because, according to his view, the League had no jurisdiction over the issue. 
Therefore, his orders to Salandra asked the Italian representative in Geneva to 
postpone any decision from the League until the decision of the Conference of 
Ambassadors – which was leading the international commission with which the Italian 
personnel was cooperating when murdered (Anchieri, 1955a, 380; see also DDI, serie 
VII, vol. II, n. 227, p. 150). Conversely, to Mussolini's hopes, Greece appealed to the 
League on the bases of articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant – while making no 
mention of the bombardments on Corfu. It is presumed that the appeal was written 
before the bombardments occurred. In fact, the appeal makes no references to the 
application of article 16, which regulated sanctions, but insisted on the jurisdiction of 
the League.  
After the appeal was presented on September 1st, 1923, Mussolini "tried to postpone 
the discussion in the General Assembly, in which the representatives of the so-called 
'small-countries' (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes being prominent among 
them) had the majority" (Papafloratos, 2015, 266).   
At this point, it was Salandra's duty to defend the Italian position in Geneva. According 
to the available documentation and historical reports, he first tried to convince 
Mussolini of the legal difficulty of disqualifying the League’s jurisdiction and, after 
having failed in this, he also invited Mussolini to find someone else who might have 
supported these claims (Anchieri, 1955a, 381). However, in the end, the Italian diplomat 
accomplished his duty notwithstanding his awareness of the weakness of Italy’s 
argument supporting the League's lack of competence (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 248, p. 
162; Anchieri, 1955a, 381-385). Specifically, the Italian position was based on three 
arguments, as reported by Anchieri: 
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"1) la vertenza implicava l'onore ed il prestigio di uno stato sovrano e non poteva 
quindi esser assoggettata ad un arbitrio obbligatorio; 2) l'occupazione di Corfù non 
era da considerarsi nè come un atto di guerra nè come un pericolo di guerra; 3) 
fintantochè la Conferenza degli Ambasciatori era legalmente investita della 
questione col consenso della Grecia, non vi era luogo all'intromissione della 
[Società delle Nazioni], la quale aveva già riconosciuto, in precedenti casi analoghi, 
la priorità della Conferenza stessa" (Anchieri, 1955a, 384). 
To Salandra, it was clearly impossible to try to disqualify the jurisdiction of the League 
by claiming that the Corfu occupation – however peacefully it might be presented – 
was a matter of national honour and prestige. The third point was more reasonable, 
but still, the threat Italy posed to the League was not irrelevant. In fact, Italian 
representatives received the order to claim that had the League intervened in the 
situation, Italy would have left the League (Anchieri, 1955a, 382; DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 
269, p. 173). 
The inflexible Italian position was officialised in the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
that occurred on September 4th, 1923 (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 292, p. 190). As 
reported by Anchieri,  
"Una così recisa e pubblica dichiarazione, che suonava sfida alla Società, non era 
fatta né per attenuare fatta né per attenuare la generale ostilità della stampa 
straniera e dell'ambiente societario né per agevolare il compito del Salandra di 
ottenere dal consiglio una rinuncia di fatto della sua competenza" (Anchieri, 1955a, 
384). 
Along with this fall-out, the French government had an interest in maintaining 
Italian support with regard to the Ruhr issues and in preventing the League from 
confirming its jurisdiction for the Ruhr case. This aligned France with the Italian 
position, and Paris offered its friendly support to Mussolini and contributed to 
postponing the discussion in the General Assembly (Milza, 2000, 449-451; Anchieri, 
1955a, 382-287). Conversely, the British government, on the one hand, had interests in 
the Mediterranean area and feared Italian permanence on Corfu and, on the other 
hand, acted as the defender of the League's role and validity for both the Italian and 
French cases. In fact, London committed to hindering the Italian ambitions and 
accelerating and actualizing the Italian withdrawal from Corfu (Anchieri, 1955a, 382-
290). 
In the final result, French support and a general desire to avoid a definitive rupture in 
the League allowed Italy to obtain the League of Nations’s acquiescence not to 
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directly intervene in the issue, leaving it to the Conference of Ambassadors to mediate 
with Greece about the Italian requests. In fact, after the Italian military intervention on 
Corfu, the Conference of Ambassadors, which had been leading the international 
commission on which General Tellini and his colleagues had been serving, intervened 
to find a solution and offered Greece requests that were more reasonable but still 
close to the initial Italian ultimatum.  
Mussolini's plans were accomplished; as reported by Papafloratos in his study, 
"(…) Lord Curzon, then Foreign Minister of the British government, had accepted the 
French plan for the evacuation of Corfu. According to this, the Greek government 
was found guilty for the murder of the members of Italian delegation. The Greek 
government should compensate the Italian one without receiving any satisfaction for 
the murdered refugees from Asia Minor, who were killed by Italian bombs" 
(Papafloratos, 2015, 271). 
The French plan arrived on the day after the Italian government officialised its 
intransigence in front of the League and was accepted by Italian diplomatic personnel 
as an unexpected achievement, given the Italian position.  
However, it is reported that Mussolini was not satisfied with the resolution and 
maintained his inflexibility until the issue was completely resolved with the payment of 
the fifty million lire in exchange for Italian withdrawal from the island. In fact, he 
insisted on the fact that the Italian honour would have been restored only with the 
identification and punishment of the felons. Still, given the Greek insistence on the 
difficulty to find the murderers, in exchange Italy would have accepted the immediate 
payment of the 50million. Mussolini insisted on the difference between Greece's 
acceptance of this agreement and its enactment. Indeed, only the enactment of one of 
these solutions would have allowed Italy to retreat its troops from Corfu (see DDI, 
serie VII, vol. II, n. 183 and following, p. 123). 
This point in particular created tension in the relations with London that feared the 
possibility of an Italian intention to permanently remain on the island. In fact, London 
was pressing for Italy to leave the island, and under the potential threat of the British 
fleet (Anchieri, 1955a, 387-388) 
 On the 26th of September, after Athene declared its payment of the 50million 
as required by Italy, Mussolini confirmed that Italy was going to maintain its promise 
and evacuate the island on the following day. The evacuation took place in the set 
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terms, but further setbacks occurred since it emerged that the Greek order of payment 
was conditioned to the confirmation of the Aja Court. Mussolini protested and ordered 
the Italian fleet to turn back to Corfu and remain close to the island.  
The issue was officially resolved on the 29th of September, when a telegram 
from Athene confirmed that the Greek government had definitively completed the 
payment (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 411, p. 268).  
  
2.2.3	  –	  Current	  explanations	  for	  Italy’s	  assertive	  stance	  in	  the	  Corfu	  Incident	  
  
Papafloratos, while concluding his review of the Corfu crisis also adds that 
"Mussolini's new foreign policy appeared to be effective" (Papafloratos, 2015, 271).  
Conversely, this research, instead of focusing on investigating whether this aggressive 
strategy worked effectively, the following section will focus on understanding the 
features characterizing this deviant and assertive international stance and the 
intentions behind its adoption. 
Scholars have already offered some possible explanations for this act, which 
include Mussolini's inexperience regarding international politics and his personal style in 
conducting both foreign and domestic politics. 
Indeed, according to these references, Mussolini favoured 'direct action', and his 
decisions pursued 'immediate success' aimed at strengthening the internal consensus. A 
corollary to these tendencies was also the attitude to make a great show out of any 
undertaken action or decision (Milza, 2000, 442). 
A more detailed examination reports Pierre Milza's account of Mussolini's 
inexperience162. In fact, Milza (2000) reports that Mussolini had no idea of how the 
international system worked and no experience with diplomatic customs; indeed, once 
he took service as Prime and Foreign Minister, he was trained in diplomatic etiquette. 
However, according to the author, he meekly apprenticed under the guidance of Mario 
                                                
 
162	  The	  explanations	  reported	  here	  refer	  first	  to	  the	  personal	  style	  of	  foreign	  policy	  characterizing	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  
new	  Italian	  government	  and,	  in	  another	  variant,	  to	  Mussolini's	  lack	  of	  preparation	  on	  how	  to	  properly	  address	  foreign	  
policy.	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   first	   explanation	   can	   be	   brought	   back	   to	   what	   chapter	   2	   (section	   2.2.2)	   mentioned	   as	  
'mistakes'	  that	  the	  candidate	  makes	  during	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  recognition	  process.	  In	  this	  specific	  case,	  these	  
mistakes	  are	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  conception	  of,	  and	  perspective	  on,	  foreign	  policy	  but	  it	   is	  also	  possible	  to	  
assimilate	  them	  to	  mistakes	  in	  implementation	  (see	  chapter	  2,	  section	  2.2.2)	  because	  the	  Italian	  diplomatic	  personnel	  
and	  administrative	  staff	  are	  reported	  to	  have	  committed	  to	  avoiding	  or	  at	  least	  limiting	  Mussolini's	  actions	  as	  much	  
as	  possible.	  	  
 
 
202 
Pansa – a young official of the Italian Foreign Ministry known as arbiter elegantiarium – 
and of Paolucci de' Calboli, his private secretary (Milza, 2000, 442).  
Moreover, as already mentioned, Salvatore Contarini – as General Secretary of Italian 
Foreign Ministry – was a mentor to Mussolini until January 1926 (when he resigned). 
This combination and Contarini's experience on foreign policy strategies and 
management allowed the General Secretary to impose on the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister a foreign policy oriented towards international caution and prudence 
that favoured friendly relations with all countries, beginning with Yugoslavia and France, 
Italy's closest neighbours.  
On the other hand, this same combination showed its weaknesses, specifically during 
the Corfu crisis, when Mussolini did not listen to his advisors (Milza, 2000, 448; see 
also Guariglia, 1950, 12). 
With regard to this, the analysis of the diplomatic documents shows a discrepancy 
between the view of the leader and the view of its collaborators. Indeed, not only 
Salandra had difficulties in asserting the illegitimacy of the League of Nations on the 
issue, but also, when the Conference of Ambassadors was dealing with the issue, 
Romano Avezzana wrote to Mussolini to congratulate him on the results. Mussolini's 
reply showed his inflexibility and his insistence to obtain exactly what he asked for. 
Mussolini indeed, as reported above, insisted on the difference between Greece's 
acceptance of the agreement and its implementation, asking for this last option to be 
put into effect (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 379, p. 250). In this occasion, both Romano 
Avezzana and Contarini, agreed on the idea that Mussolini was insisting too much, was 
being excessively intransigent (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 384, p. 252). 
It is interesting to report that, in the upcoming days, Mussolini replied to these 
preoccupations, writing to Romano Avezzana to encourage him to hold on to the 
Italian position, 
"Quando alla rassicurazione greca per pagamento 50 milioni ci credo pochissimo. 
Essenziale è che V.E. tenga assolutamente duro altrimenti riparazioni greche 
ridurransi alle cerimonie simboliche del Pireo. E questa sarebbe una mistificazione 
inflitta alla buona fede italiana" (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 384, p. 252). 
Therefore, notwithstanding the different visions on the issue, it still emerges a sense of 
cooperation between the Italian diplomatic corps and it leader.  
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 Another explanation for the assertive Italian behaviours is given by Papafloratos 
(2015), who highlights the relation between the Fiume issue and the Corfu incident. In 
fact, the author conducts an interesting study that considers in parallel both issues 
and highlights the role of Mussolini's assertive and strong stance in the Corfu case as 
a useful instrument to convince Belgrade to concede the city of Fiume to Italy (see 
Papafloratos, 2015). 
Similarly, Ettore Anchieri (1955a) highlights that in the resolution of the Corfu crisis, 
Mussolini was the only one dissatisfied; his collaborators were extremely satisfied with 
what they viewed as Italy’s unexpected accomplishments. The author advances the idea 
that Mussolini was effectively aiming to gain more and that he was hoping to 
permanently occupy the island of Corfu, as his predecessors had done with the 
Dodecanese Islands (see Anchieri, 1955a, 393). 
With regard to these other two explanations, they can be read as an attempt 
by the Italian government to improve its power by gaining more possessions. In fact, in 
both cases, Italy is depicted as aiming at enlarging its borders and territorial 
possessions. According to Papafloratos, Italy was severe with Greece throughout the 
Corfu crisis in order to convince Belgrade to cede Fiume to Italy. Similarly, according 
to Anchieri, Mussolini's strong and inflexible behaviour during the Corfu crisis, and, in 
particular, his persistence in these behaviours even during the patently and 
unexpectedly favourable resolution for Italy, is a signal of his greater ambition to add 
Corfu to Italy’s domain. 
Not only it is not the intention of this research to attempt to disqualify these possible 
explanations, but it is possible to add that the Papafloratos interpretation could be 
extended by including also the relations between Rome and London in those years 
with regard to the Dodecanese issue. Indeed, many are the messages exchanged on 
the topic, and also, at the conclusion on the Corfu crisis, there is a certain attention 
to report on the status on the relations between the two countries and in particular 
on the Great Britain's reaction to the Italian standing in the situation (see DDI, serie 
VII, vol. II, n. 418 and following, p. 274). Therefore, the assertive Italian standing in the 
Corfu crisis could have served also as a way to measure a lean on Great Britain in 
favour of Italian requests.  
These last readings of the Corfu episode are here taken as good explanatory options 
that can be considered as compatible with the perspective here advanced: Mussolini 
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undertook a strong standing and maintained an assertive attitude on the issue, this in 
order to gain social status. Important element of this advanced perspective is that the 
assertive standing was accompanied with prosocial and conforming behaviours, and 
that was aiming at this social goal, to obtain the recognition of Italian great power 
status. 
 
2.2.4	  –	  Understanding	  the	  intentions	  behind	  the	  1923	  Corfu	  incident	  
 
Historiography presents the Corfu crisis as an example of the schizophrenic 
Italian foreign policy under Mussolini's government.  
In line with this, Milza (2000, 448) defines Corfu as the emblematic example of 
Mussolini's personal attitudes and of his short-sighted perspectives on foreign politics. 
This because his strong reaction interrupted for, some months, the good relations 
intercurrent between Rome and London163. Milza's perspective underlines that the 
representatives of the traditional diplomacy (Contarini in primis) suggested Mussolini to 
favour closer relations with Great Britain than with France – which instead contended 
the Italian interests in the Balkans (Milza, 2000, 447). Therefore, the overreaction to 
the killings of the Italian generals, represented a breach in these plans164.  
This episode, and in particular the Italian reaction and intransigence towards its 
resolution, is interesting to this research since it constitutes a public and official act of 
non-conformity and of assertiveness adopted by a status seeker. Apparently, it also 
represents a counterproductive decision for Italian foreign policy. This is why, it 
becomes interesting to investigate its underlying intentions.  
 It is possible to have a wider perspective on these events by taking into 
analysis the diplomatic documentation. Indeed, whether from the public discourses 
reported above it emerged that Mussolini associated this issue with an issue of 
national prestige and honour, from the diplomatic documents also emerges a peculiar 
attention on maintaining the situation as quiet as possible, on reassuring that Italy had 
                                                
 
163	  Example	  of	  these	  good	  relations	  is	  the	  the	  journey	  to	  Rome	  of	  King	  George	  V	  (Milza,	  2000,	  447).	  	  
164	  However,	  in	  reading	  these	  events	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  that	  in	  1923,	  Rome	  and	  London	  were	  discussing	  
about	  the	  Dodecanese	  and	  that	  Italy	  was	  still	  aspiring	  to	  get	  its	  international	  status	  as	  a	  great	  power	  which	  included	  
the	  extension	  of	  its	  possessions.	  Therefore,	  Italy	  had	  contended	  interests	  also	  with	  Great	  Britain.	  
 
 
205 
no conflictual intentions and that her occupation of Corfu was lawful since aimed at 
obtaining satisfaction from Greece.  
 Some examples can be found, going by order, in the documents Mussolini sent 
to his collaborators. 
On September 1st, 1923 Mussolini sends a telegram to all the Italian diplomatic 
representatives abroad and to Salandra (Italian delegate at the League of Nations). The 
message furtherly underlines both the peaceful and lawful characters of the Italian 
occupation of Corfu. Mussolini writes, "Nel mio telegramma n. 2945 (3) ho precisato il 
carattere pacifico e provvisorio dell'occupazione di Corfù. Reputo opportuno far 
presente a V.E. (V.S.) che tale occupazione è pienamente fondata nel diritto delle genti" 
(DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 244, p. 157). 
The lawfulness of this act, relates, according to Mussolini, to the fact that the 
temporary occupation of parts of the territory of the counterpart is listed among the 
coercive and non-military means available to obtain compensation for the incurred 
offense. 
"L'impossibilità per lo stato offeso di ottenere amichevolmente e con mezzi pacifici 
soddisfazione giustifica secondo la comune dottrina il ricorso alla violenza 
adottando mezzi che se pure possono avere apparenze di guerra non hanno affatto 
carattere bellico ma costituiscono una semplice autoprotezione dei propri interessi. 
Tra i vari mezzi coercitivi non bellici è compresa la temporanea occupazione di una 
parte di territorio straniero" (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 244, p. 157). 
But, most important, in his message Mussolini reports some historical precedents, 
"A tale mezzo ricorse nel 1901 la Francia impossessandosi dell'Isola di Mitilene e 
delle relative dogane per costringere la Turchia a soddisfare gli impegni assunti 
verso la ditta Turbini e Dorano"165 (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 244, p. 157).   
On the next day – September 2nd – he sends a telegram to Della Torretta (Italian 
Ambassador in London) and to Vannutelli (chargé d'affaires to Paris) asking both to 
convince the two governments to support the Italian position in Geneva – regarding the 
disqualification of the League's jurisdiction. In this occasion, he remarks that the 
offense suffered by Italy is equivalent to an offense for all the Great Powers – 
                                                
 
165	  Many	  other	  examples	  are	  reported;	  see	  DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  II,	  n.	  244,	  p.	  157.	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"Impegnai la dignità e l'onore d'Itali in seguito ad un'offesa che si estende d'altronde 
indiscutibilmente a tutte le Grandi Potenze" (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 244, p. 160). 
He also insists that,  
"Il R. Governo non può inoltre in alcun modo accettare una discussion da pari a 
pari in una questione di onore nazionale con un Governo che gli stessi Governi 
britannico e francese si sono finora rifiutati di riconoscere" (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 
244, p. 157).   
This clearly recalls the issue of equality between Rome, Paris and London, and 
confirms that the Italian stance on this case was related directly with an issue of 
international status standing. 
On the same day of September, Mussolini also sends instructions to his 
Minister to Athens (Mr. Montagna) advising on how to decrease the tension in the 
Italian relations to the Greek government (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 249, p. 162). 
Similarly, he also writes to his Minister of the Marine, Mr. Thaon di Revel, instructions 
in order to give the occupation of Corfu a non-warlike character and to provide for 
the families of the bombing (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 250, p. 163).  
Another example of this dedication to stabilize the situation and to avoid tension can 
also be found in the telegram he sent the same day to the king Vittorio Emanuele III, 
inviting him to send the usual greetings for Olga's (the Queen of Greece) birthday (DDI, 
serie VII, vol. II, n. 251, p. 163). 
Overall, it is possible to identify in Mussolini's messages to his colleagues an attempt 
to circumscribe the situation exclusively to the dispute. Indeed, a few days later, on 
the 6th of September he replies to a telegram by Montagna (Italian Minister to Athens), 
received on the 5th, regarding the Greek government's official announcements 
concerning the movement of their fleet in the area of Salamina (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 
289, p. 188). The Greek government did officially inform Italy about these movements, 
declaring also that this distancing of the fleets was done in order to avoid possible 
tensions with Italy. 
Mussolini's reply is interesting exactly because he underlines that there is no war-like-
status between Italy and Greece, 
"Voglia far conoscere al Governo greco nel modo che riterrà più opportuno che 
non essendovi né minaccia di guerra né tanto meno stato guerra fra Italia e 
Grecia, non comprendiamo in che cosa possano interessarci i movimenti della flotta 
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greca sempre che non abbiano carattere di ostilità contro di noi" (DDI, serie VII, 
vol. II, n. 296, p. 192). 
The last, and very interesting, example of the Italian commitment in circumscribing the 
situation as much as possible can be found in a telegram that Mussolini sent to 
Salandra on the 6th of September. The telegram contained instructions on how to 
behave in the upcoming meeting of the League of Nations.  
Recalling that Italy was threatening to leave the League in case its jurisdiction on the 
case was imposed, it is interesting to read that the Italian leader invites his 
representative to participate to the League's meeting, this in order not to give the 
impression that Italy was going to avoid, anyhow, the discussion with the League. The 
intention is, instead, to show participation and calmness. Indeed, the Italian 
representative is suggested to participate to the discussions and, if need be, to repeat 
the Italian intention to leave the League in the case of the imposition of its jurisdiction 
on the Corfu issue. But Mussolini clearly insists on the fact that the representative had 
not to add anything else to this content. Moreover, in case of harsh debates, Mussolini 
invites his delegate to simply leave the room – thus avoiding the exposition to fierce 
debates, 
"Circa seduta assemblea sembrami convenga nostro delegato vi assista in ogni 
caso per evitare impressione che Italia desideri comunque sottrarsi al dibattito. 
Nostro delegato Assemblea dovrà tuttavia, regolandosi sull'andamento della 
discussione, riferirsi serenamente soltanto alle dichiarazioni fatte da V.E. nel 
Consiglio e, se necessario ripeterle senza allargarle però con argomentazioni d'altro 
genere. In caso di intemperanza di linguaggio e di escandescenza da parte delegati 
altri Stati dovrà limitarsi a protestare abbandonando l'aula" (DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 
294, p. 191). 
In conclusion, the attention paid to these small details reveals an underlying 
intention to limit the Italian deviant behaviours as much as possible, and to delimit 
them. Indeed, as emerged from the analysis of the diplomatic documentation, the 
features of this Italian deviant behaviour are its being as limited and circumscribed as 
possible to the specific case, and its being balanced by compliant behaviours.  
Moreover, this combination of socially deviant behaviour and more general 
prosocial behaviours, was also accompanied by an Italian commitment to reconnect 
good relations between Italy and Greece. Indeed, a few months after the crisis, 
Mussolini writes to his representative in Athene to invite him to take contacts with the 
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Greek government to re-establish good relations between the two countries. This move 
can be considered as an example of a proactive reconciliatory strategy enacted 
towards Greece (See DDI, serie VII, vol. II, nn. 570; 574; 575, pp. 396; 398; 399). 
Similarly, at the beginning of 1924 Mussolini also normalized relations with Belgrade; 
the two countries signed a treaty on trade and navigation, which was followed, in July 
1925, by the Treaty of Nettuno (Milza, 2000, 457). 
In order to complete this analysis, it is possible to furtherly insist on the fact 
that this international standing adopted by Mussolini can be considered as a deviant 
behaviour adopted by Italy with strategic and functional intentions aimed being granted 
the coveted status of great power, this by building on the same declarations made by 
Mussolini who insists on the fact that this all was about Italian prestige.  
While having no intention to deal with the effectiveness of Italian behaviour but aiming 
at exclusively underlying that this Italian behaviour was about the recognition of Italian 
prestigious status, it is also possible to report that on September 23rd, 1923, a note is 
sent to Mussolini reporting Lord Graham's166 opinion on Mussolini. The reported 
declarations – reported by an unnamed source – are said to have been stated during 
a private meeting between the British Ambassador and some of his British colleagues.  
The Ambassador is said to have expressed a positive opinion about Mussolini167 and 
also to have expressed his perspective on the Italian situation after the Corfu and 
Fiume issues. 
"Come avete purtroppo osservato Mussolini ha saputo risolvere brillantemente il 
conflitto italo-greco secondo le sue aspirazioni e – bisogna convenirne – con nostro 
svantaggio morale. Prossimamente egli risolverà pure la questione di Fiume in pieno 
accordo con la Jugoslavia, ed allora l'Italia potrà andare superba per la sua 
posizione di forza e di sicurezza acquisite di fronte alle altre Nazioni di Europa" 
(DDI, serie VII, vol. II, n. 397; p. 260). 
Of course, the content of this note leaves some doubts concerning its originality – 
especially given the positive opinions reported in the beginning. However, what is 
interesting of this comment is not its authenticity, nor the fact that this comment is 
supposed to come from a British exponent. Even supposing that this note was 
                                                
 
166	  Lord	  Graham	  is	  the	  British	  Ambassador.	  	  
167	  The	  positive	  opinion	  reports	  that,	  "Mussolini	  non	  è	  impulsivo	  come	  tanti	  purtroppo	  credono"	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  II,	  
n.	  397;	  p.	  260).	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counterfeit with the purpose to please Mussolini, what is interesting is the perspective 
that emerges with regard to the Italian management of the Corfu and Fiume issues. 
The note indeed suggests that the Italian attitude in both these issues will grant Italy 
a stronger position in front of the European Powers. In other words, Italy will gain 
popularity status thanks to her behavioural strategy in dealing with both issues.  
In line with this evaluation, it is possible to conclude by quoting Milza (2000) who 
reports that, Antonio Salandra – who as mentioned above was very sceptical about the 
Italian arguments that the League had no jurisdiction over the Italian occupation of 
Corfu – is said to have recognized that the Italian threat to leave the League, though 
'excessive and impulsive', nevertheless helped Italy find a positive solution within the 
League itself.168  
Moreover, Salandra is also reported to have written in his memoirs that after Corfu, 
the Italian prestige had improved (Milza, 2000, 452; Anchieri, 1955a, 384). In his own 
words,  
"[il] prestigio del nome italiano si accrebbe, come sempre si accresce, per un atto 
di forza compiuto sia pure in difformità delle nuove norme" (Salandra reported in 
Milza, 2000, 452). 
Therefore, leaving aside the implicit evaluations of effectiveness, it is interesting to 
underline that these comments establish a relation between the assertive behaviours of 
the Italian foreign policy and the status seeking it was pursuing.  
 	  
                                                
 
168	  Reported	  in	  Anchieri,	  1955a,	  384.	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2.3	  –	  Italian	  revisionism	  
 
Attention will be devoted here to another crucial component of Italian 
international standing, the Italian revisionist policy. 
Between 1923 and 1924, different crucial events took place: at the domestic 
level the regime has progressed towards a more fascist political system, while at the 
international level, governments have changed bringing in alterations in the personal 
relations between leaders. In spring 1924, France saw the election of the radical and 
socialist left, whose exponents had hostile approach for the fascist regime and its 
leader. Mussolini himself didn't like the new French political leaders. Certainly, the 
murder of Matteotti (June 1924) didn't help but embittered the relations between the 
two countries; and the same was for France's reception of anti-fascist exponents (Milza, 
2000, 454-455). 
On the other side, with regard to the Italian relations with Great Britain, even if the 
end of 1923 there was a change in the British parliamentary majority, still the relations 
between Italy and the Labour party exponents remained positive. Moreover, at the end 
of 1924, the Conservatives were back in charge and, as Milza (2000) reports, among 
them numerous were the exponents who wished closer relations with Italy this because 
the Mussolini's government represented for Great Britain the main obstacle to 
communism in Europe (Milza, 2000, 455). However, contrasting interests distanced the 
two countries, indeed, Rome was still harbouring ambitions on the Mediterranean Sea 
and in the eastern Africa areas, and this clearly hindered its good relations with 
London, still, 1925 represented the year of closer relations between Italy and Great 
Britain (Milza, 2000, 455).  
More in general it is possible to report that the Italian ambitions collided with the 
interests of both Great Britain and France. 
According to Milza (2000), 1925 was also the year of Italian – superficial – 
adherence to international principles and plans for peace. In October 1925, Mussolini, 
after Contarini's firm insistence, arrived to Locarno – with four days of delay – in order 
to participate to the conference where the Locarno Treaties, that aimed at formulating 
a border guarantee agreement, were negotiated. 
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Mussolini's reticence came from the fact that these guarantee pacts did not include 
the Italian border of the Brenner, thus not responding to the Italian fear of a potential 
Anschluss (Milza, 2000, 457-458).  
On Contarini's perspective, notwithstanding the treaty's limitations with regard to the 
Italian security, still Italy couldn't be absenting from a negotiation that aimed at 
establishing the basis for the European equilibrium. Therefore, Mussolini joined the 
Conference169 but, as reported by Milza, never asked for reassurances on the Brenner 
borders, fearing to give any possible sign of weakness170 (Milza, 2000, 457-458). 
It is always Milza who reports that the Italian participation to Locarno and its signature 
of the treaties represented171, at the same time, 
"l'apogeo della breve fase di distensione e di cooperazione internazionale vissuta 
dall'Italia Fascista e il punto di partenza del suo rimettere in discussione i principi 
della sicurezza collettiva" (Milza, 2000, 457). 
Therefore, it is on these basis that 1926 represents, according to historiography, a 
sharp turning point in the Italian strategy for its international standing172. Since 1926 
on, Italy embraced a revisionist foreign policy which historians usually identifies having 
a double outline. Indeed, according to historical studies, Italian revisionism had, around 
1926, an imperial and expansionist characters oriented towards the renegotiation of 
the partition of colonies and mandates; while from 1927 on (until 1934), the Italian 
revisionism turned into the so-called continental revisionism which instead aimed at 
leading the group of dissatisfied states that hoped in the revision of peace treaties 
(Milza, 2000, 459-462). 
 
                                                
 
169	   The	   participation	   to	   this	   conference,	   was	   stressful	   to	   Mussolini	   because	   he	   was	   strongly	   contested	   by	   the	  
journalists	  (who	  didn't	  attend	  his	  speeches,	  but	  sent,	  in	  sign	  of	  protest,	  in	  the	  next	  room)	  and	  in	  general	  because	  of	  
his	  difficulties	   in	   setting	  with	   the	   international	  environment.	   This	  unpleasant	   convinced	   the	   Italian	   leader	   to	  never	  
travel	  abroad	  –	  and	  he	  will	  maintain	  this	  promise	  until	  the	  end	  of	  1930s	  (Milza,	  2000,	  457-­‐459).	  	  
170	   In	   February	   1926,	   take	   place	   some	   verbal	   clashes	   between	   Mussolini,	   the	   and	   South	   Tirol	   and	   the	   German	  
representatives,	  concerning	  the	  South	  Tyrol	  –	  and	  indirectly	  also	  the	  Italian	  fear	  of	  Anschluss.	  
171	  Again,	  on	  the	  same	  issue,	  he	  reports	  that,	  "Alla	  fine	  del	  1925	  sembrò	  dunque	  che	  l'Italia	  aderisse	  alla	  politica	  di	  
distensione	  e	  di	   sicurezza	   collettiva	  di	   cui	  Briand	  e	  Stresemann	  si	  erano	   fatti	  difensori.	  Nel	   corso	  dei	  due	  anni	   che	  
seguirono	  la	  crisi	  di	  Corfù,	  la	  politica	  estera	  mussoliniana	  fu	  posta,	  almeno	  nelle	  sue	  intenzioni	  ufficiali,	  sotto	  il	  segno	  
del	  'raccoglimento'	  e	  dell'amicizia	  internazionale"	  (Milza,	  2000,	  459).	  	  
172	  The	  domestic	  level	  had	  its	  importance,	  indeed,	  these	  were	  the	  years	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  
fascists	   characters	   of	   the	   regime.	   Referring	   with	   this	   to	   what	   in	   Italian	   is	   defined	   as	   'fascistizzazione	   del	   regime'	  
(Milza,	  2000,	  459-­‐460).	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The Italian revisionism was characterized by manifestations of assertive and aggressive 
behaviours that had different forms.  
In the first case, with regard to the imperial revisionism, it mostly manifested through 
an aggressive rhetoric – examples of which are the declarations of April 1926, when 
during Mussolini's tour in Tripolitania he made some strong announcements regarding 
the Italian destiny and willingness to become an empire.  
By recalling developmental psychological studies, these Italian behaviours of April 1926 
can be associated to examples of verbal aggressiveness173 manifested through a direct, 
aggressive and assertive rhetoric. 
While with regard to the Italian continental revisionism, the deviant behaviours can be 
identified precisely in the so-called Italian policy of encirclement of Yugoslavia. This 
Italian policy, recalls the cases of indirect–relational aggressiveness174, addressed by 
developmental psychological studies. It is indeed possible to identify in this Italian 
strategy a relational deviant behaviour that aims at harming the social relations of the 
contender, in this case – as supported by historical studies – the Italian behaviours 
aimed at harming the French interests in the Danube-Balkan area. 
 This research addresses these Italian behaviours, because, in contrast with the 
current IR theory on recognition process which expects status seekers to perform 
foreign policies in good citizen–style (Suzuki, 2008, Italy, that was officially seeking to 
be granted with the recognition of its great power status, adopted a foreign policy 
which manifests instead blatant episodes of socially deviant behaviours. 
Indeed, Italy under Mussolini's guidance was definitely not behaving as a good and 
complying citizen, on the opposite, Italian international behaviour was more similar to a 
rascal.  
The problems in the interpretation and analysis of Italian foreign policy are related to 
the fact that the Italian behaviour was not even conflicting in its entirety: there were 
some fits of temper, some deviant behaviours but, for years, Italy was neither a good 
citizen, nor a serious threaten to the system.  
The fact that Italian foreign policy, in the 1920s, was constituted by mixed features 
that don't allow to have a clear–cut understanding renders the Italian revisionism a 
                                                
 
173	  Corresponding	  to	  overt-­‐physical	  aggressiveness,	  see	  chapter	  3,	  types	  of	  aggressiveness.	  	  	  
174	  See	  chapter	  3,	  types	  of	  aggressiveness.	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vantage point from which to look at this blurred and confusing Italian international 
standing.  
This historical period and the episodes composing the Italian revisionism give the 
possibility to investigate the existence of a relation between deviant behaviours and the 
Italian status seeking ambitions. 
It is possible to interpret the episodes related to Italian revisionism, as aimed at 
revisionism in itself. Under this perspective, Mussolini threatens with the possibility of 
an Italian imperial expansion or tackles the Yugoslavian stability in the area because 
Italy is revisionist. Also, in a more articulated interpretation, Mussolini tackles 
Belgrade's stability in order to challenge the French interests and influence in the area, 
but again, the final explanation is that Italy does so because is a revisionist state. 
Again, another popular interpretation sees in the Italian assertive behaviours the first 
signals of the events that will bring to the Second World War, or in alternative it is 
also possible to simply point at the schizophrenic and contradictory characters of 
Italian foreign policy. 
On top of this, this research is interested in understanding why Italy behaved as a 
revisionist state, which were the intentions supporting these internationally deviant 
behaviours. indeed, the intent is to understand how do these deviant revisionist 
behaviours relate with Italian status seeking ambitions – if they were implemented in 
function to this aim.  
Since historiography distinguishes between the imperial revisionism of 1926 and 
the continental revisionism that began from 1927, the next sections will follow this 
articulation, by focussing separately on the two historical episodes. 
 
2.3.1	  –	  The	  1926	  Italian	  imperial	  revisionism	  
 
The Italian expansionist revisionism and its imperial aspirations have been 
characterized by what Milza has defined a strident rhetoric ("chiassosa retorica", Milza, 
2000, 464).  
This strident rhetoric constitutes the Italian verbal aggressiveness that will loudly 
manifest in the spring of 1926, with the famous speeches about Italian imperial destiny. 
However, this direct, aggressive and assertive rhetoric begins since the end of 1925, 
when Mussolini starts being more insistent in recalling the idea of an Italian empire, 
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and in using empire-related terminologies in his public speeches. This insistence is so 
much exasperated that in December 1925, in an interview released to the United Press, 
Mussolini is directly asked about these insistent Italian ambitions for an empire (see 
Susmel, 1958, 44).  
 
(I)	  –	  The	  1926	  declarations	  about	  the	  Italian	  imperial	  destiny	  
 
Still it is in spring 1926 that this rhetoric reached its peak, during Mussolini's travel to 
Libya. This episode was defined, after the Corfu crisis, as the 'second international 
explosion' for Mussolini175 (Moscati, 1963b, 101-102). 
Indeed, ahead of his travel to Libya, where Italy intended to extend its domain, on 
March 28th, Mussolini while in Rome, declared to a group of fascists that the Italian 
impatience will be satisfied and that on that day he will be ready to grab and follow 
the wheel of destiny176 (Milza, 2000, 467). 
Following on with this style, on the 8th of April, when he boarded on the Cavour 
flagship directed to Tripoli for a tour of the Tripolitania,177 he began his tour by 
addressing representatives of the National Fascist Party, with the following words 
"(…) Noi siamo mediterranei ed il nostro destino, senza copiare alcuno, è stato e 
sarà sempre sul mare" (Susmel, 1958, 112). 
Once in Tripoli, on the 11th of April, in the afternoon Mussolini, from the balcony of 
the Castle in the main square in Tripoli, had the occasion to talk to a group of 
people. Mussolini's words again insist on this rhetoric of the Italian need to have an 
empire, 
"Il mio viaggio non deve essere interpretato come un atto di ordinaria 
amministrazione. Intendo che esso sia come è nei fatti un'affermazione della forza 
del popolo italiano (acclamazioni), una manifestazione di potenza del popolo che 
da Roma ripete le proprie origini e porta il Littorio trionfante ed immortale di Roma 
sulle rive del mare africano.  
È il destino che ci spinge verso questa terra. Nessuno può fermare il destino e 
                                                
 
175	  "(…)	  venne	  definita,	  dopo	  Corfù,	  la	  'seconda	  esplosione	  estera'	  di	  Mussolini"	  (Moscati,	  1963b,	  101-­‐102).	  
176	   In	   his	   original	   words	   Mussolini	   declares	   "che	   egli	   sarebbe	   stato	   là	   per	   'afferrare	   la	   ruota	   del	   destino	   quando	  
passerà	  a	  portata	  delle	  nostre	  mani'"	  (Il	  Popolo	  d'Italia,	  29	  marzo	  1926;	  quoted	  in	  Milza,	  2000,	  467).	  
177	  A	  few	  days	  before	  Mussolini	  had	  survived	  to	  an	  attempt	  of	  assassination	  (Milza,	  2000,	  465).	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soprattutto nessuno può spezzare la nostra incrollabile volontà" (Susmel, 1958, 
114).   
From these speeches, the Italian strident rhetoric sounds quite challenging for the 
status quo. Mussolini mentions Italian strength and willingness, he defines them firm 
and steady. And he also talks about the Italian readiness to grasp the opportunity to 
realize the Italian imperial ambitions. 
The spirit of these declarations can be better understood when reporting that always 
in the first days of April 1926, Italian newspapers paid large attention to the news 
concerning some Italian military (naval) preparations in the ports of Ancona and Bari 
and also in Rhodes – in front of the eastern coasts of the Turkish Asia Minor (Milza, 
2000, 467). 
This news was officially denied by the Stefani press agency, on the 24th of April, but 
this didn't prevent Turkey from manifesting preoccupation (see, DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 
298, p. 215). Responding to these fears, on the 29th of April, Mussolini informed Ankara 
that they had no serious reasons why to fear the Italian foreign politics (Milza, 2000, 
466-467; Moscati, 1963b; 102). 
But still, on top of this, at the end of April 1926, Italo Balbo – then Secretary of State 
for the Air Forces – flew over Tunisia and visited the Italian colonies and schools, 
underlining at his return to Italy that the Italian patriotic love was higher than ever 
during his visit (Milza, 2000, 467). 
These were the main signals of the Italian assertive rhetoric on its imperial 
ambitions, and they were followed by signals of Italian withdrawal towards more 
peaceful attitudes, see for example the Senate speech on foreign politics held by 
Mussolini on the 28th of May, 1926. 
 
(II)	  –	  Contextualizing	  the	  Italian	  ambitions:	  Italy	  is	  a	  frustrated	  great	  power	  with	  a	  
revisionist	  foreign	  policy	  
 
 As mentioned above, this all has to be read from a perspective that considers 
the fact that Italy was still struggling with having her expansionist interests satisfied.  
This Italian situation persists also in the spring of 1926, when Italy committed into 
avoiding the concretization of her fear of being excluded from an eventual division of 
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the Turkish area – in case of a collapse of the central government in Ankara (see, 
DDI, serie VII, vol. IV).  
Moreover, in a situation in which the Ankara government was not stable, Italy had a 
clear clue about its being marginalized by France and Great Britain who shared 
common interest in the area.  
Della Torretta, the Italian Ambassador in London, on the 29th of May reports on the 
British perspective on the Turkish situation. He writes an interesting report to Mussolini 
explaining that Great Britain is taking advantage of Ankara's instability to negotiate its 
interests on Mosul (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 296; 320, pp. 211; 232). In his report, he 
recalls that the British representatives assert that for the moment the situation is calm 
and that it is everyone's interest to maintain a stable government in Ankara. But, what 
interests Italy is the case in which instability prevails and a crisis opens in Turkey. 
Della Torretta indeed, reports that he directly addressed his British colleague with this 
issue, 
"Essendomi state espresse anche da Tyrrell queste preoccupazioni [riguardanti la 
stabilità del governo turco], gli ho chiesto che cosa, secondo lui, sarebbe accaduto 
se dovesse aprirsi una grande crisi in Turchia ed in qual modo le potenze più 
interessate in oriente potrebbero far fronte ad una nuova grave situazione che 
sorgesse da un momento all'altro" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 320, p. 232). 
The answer that Della Torretta received from the British Undersecretary of State recalls 
an idea of balance and equality between the three European powers – Italy, France 
and Great Britain. Directly quoting from the report,  
"Sotto segretario di stato mi ha risposto che in tale eventualità Roma, Parigi e 
Londra dovrebbero subito concertarsi per trovare una linea di con- dotta, e che 
anche in vista dell'ipotesi, sia pure remota, da me prospettata, sia estremamente 
desiderabile che fra Roma e Parigi si consolidasse uno spirito di cordiale 
collaborazione.  
Tale risposta del signor Tyrrell contiene tutto il pensiero del Governo britannico, e 
che cioè le grandi questioni internazionali possono essere solo risolte mediante 
l'intesa e la collaborazione dei gabinetti di Londra, Roma e Parigi; e che 
specialmente per l'oriente, che involve così gravi interessi delle tre grandi potenze 
mediterranee, nulla è possibile fare senza un'intesa anglo-itala-francese" (DDI, serie 
VII, vol. IV, n. 320, p. 232). 
Yet this friendly answer that refers to a common intervention in the area leaves Della 
Torretta with some doubts this because, as he reports, from his point of view the 
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British and French interests are so aligned to each other, that it will be impossible for 
Italy to reach an agreement with London, without Paris's previous consensus178. 
 With regard to this interconnection between the three powers, and in order to 
better understand Della Torretta's opinion, it is possible to also recall another 
diplomatic document from the 20th of April, 1926.  
On that day, Mussolini wrote to Romano Avezzana – Italian Ambassador to Paris – 
reporting his opinions with regard to the possibilities of an agreement between Rome 
and Paris. Mussolini writes that,  
"Non è dubbio ·Che esiste possibilità accordo e intesa molto stretta e concreta 
purchè sia preceduta dalla favorevole soluzione delle questioni cui V. E. accenna e 
cioè Tunisi, Tangeri, Abissinia, mandati coloniali, fuorusciti, trattato commercio. 
Autorizzo quindi V. E. ad agire energicamente in tal senso" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 
303, p. 218). 
Therefore, from these internal documents it clearly emerges that Italy was in a 
situation in which it tried to convince both Great Britain and Paris to satisfy the Italian 
aspirations. 
Indeed, returning at Della Torretta's report of the 29th of May, it is possible to find a 
linearity between his analysis of the Italian situation and this emerging context.  
He indeed, reports on the situation of Italian interests and ambitions in Asia Minor, 
"Per quanto riguarda più particolarmente le aspirazioni italiane in Asia Minore 
riassumo risultato delle mie indagini compiute tanto nei vari circoli politici che al 
Foreign Office.   
È ormai entrato nella coscienza generale che l'Italia ha degli interessi vitali da far 
valere nel Mediterraneo Orientale, che il continuo aumento di popolazione l'obbliga 
fatalmente a procurarsi nuovi sbocchi ove dirigere la sua emigrazione - che le 
maggiori possibilità sono offerte dall'Anatolia - che in questa direzione sono rivolte 
le aspirazioni italiane e che queste aspirazioni meritano simpatia. 
Contemporaneamente, però, l'Inghilterra è dominata da un desiderio di pace e 
tranquillità, e sovrasta sopratutto una ferma volontà d'arrivare ad un 
consolidamento della vita internazionale che consenta lo svolgersi e l'attivarsi degli 
                                                
 
178	  "Da	  mia	  parte	  devo	  aggiungere	  che,	  per	  quanto	  riguarda	  Francia	  ed	  Inghilterra,	  esse	  hanno	  ormai	  tale	  una	  somma	  
di	   interessi	   comuni	   in	   oriente	  derivanti	   dalla	   lo.ro	   rispettiva	   situazione	  politica	   e	   geografica	   nei	   paesi	   a	  man-­‐	   dato	  
(Irak,	  Siria,	  Palestina)	  che	  ciò	   le	  obbliga	  ad	  una	  continua	  collaborazione	  ed	   intesa	  per	   far	   fronte	  a	  situazioni	  spesso	  
assai	  delicate.	  	   	  
Ne	  deriva	  come	  naturale	  conseguenza	  che	  oggi,	  così	  stando	  le	  cose,	  non	  sembrerebbe	  possibile,	  in	  linea	  di	  massima,	  
avviare	   una	   intesa	   particolare	   italo-­‐inglese	   per	   l'oriente,	   senza	   la	   contemporanea	   partecipazione	   del	   Governo	   di	  
Parigi.	  (Questa	  parte	  risponde	  agli	  accenni	  verbalmente	  fattimi	  in	  proposito	  da	  V.	  E.)"	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  IV,	  n.	  320,	  p.	  
232).	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scambi commerciali. Conseguentemente, malgrado le favorevoli disposizioni che 
senza dubbio esistono verso le nostre necessità ed aspirazioni, ogni azione o 
atteggiamento italiano che potesse essere causa di un perturbamento dell'ordine e 
della pace, solleverebbe tali correnti di opinione pubblica ostili all'Italia, da 
obbligare Governo ad assumere una attitudine a noi contraria. A conferma di 
quanto precede ho potuto constatare la viva soddisfazione provata dal Foreign 
Office quando ebbe notizia delle dichiarazioni ordinate da V. E. al R. ambasciatore 
a Costantinopoli intese a calmare le apprensioni turche" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 
320, p. 232). 
His conclusions report that, notwithstanding London's benevolence with regard to the 
Italian interests in the area, still the British main interest remains the maintenance of 
stability in the area. Therefore, any possible Italian action that may disrupt the stability 
and serenity in the areas is disregarded by London. Therefore, once more, it emerges 
that the Italian interests are subordinated both the British and French ones, and that 
they have not been satisfied yet. 
Undoubtedly the last lines of Della Torretta's report, refer to the strong declarations 
made by Mussolini in April – indeed, Della Torretta also mentions that Great Britain 
has greatly appreciated the Italian efforts to reassure Turkey about its peaceful 
intentions.  
By recalling the fact that Italy's main international ambition was to be 
recognized as a great power and that the possession of her own empire and the 
extension of her areas of interest were part of these ambitions; by building on 
historical reports and documents, it emerges that in 1926 the Italian ambitions were 
still pending. This because its ambitions to become a great power, to be recognized 
and treated as such, haven't been satisfied yet.  
Therefore, by adopting Suzuki's terminology179, it is possible to conclude that Italy in 
1926 was a frustrated great power that was still pursuing its status seeking ambitions – 
to become a great power, granted with her empire and respected by her peers. 
This all constitutes a contextual frame in which to understand the Italian 
assertive rhetoric on its imperial ambitions. 
The main point to this research is that, contrary to the current IR theoretical 
framework on recognition process, historical reports and documents show that Italy in 
order to pursue this ambition, did not commit into an exclusively compliant behaviour. 
                                                
 
179	  See	  Suzuki,	  2008.	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On the opposite, it clearly emerges that Italy was attempting to pursue its status 
seeking ambitions through a particular type of behavioural strategy which was quite 
different from social compliance. 
 
(III)	  –	  Understanding	  Italian	  assertive	  behaviours	  
 
Moving to the analysis, and understanding, of the Italian deviant behaviours it 
interesting to report that, departing from the current IR theoretical perspective on 
recognition process and status seeking, historians as well have recognized that the aim 
of this verbal aggressiveness was to test the reaction of the main actors of the 
international scene – this next to the intent of strengthening the internal consensus 
(Milza, 2000, 464). Indeed, Milza asserts that this could have been a plausible intent, 
this because, 
"Nel momento in cui vengono pronunciate queste parole, Mussolini non ha alcuna 
possibilità d'imporre alle due principali potenze coloniali l'inesorabile volontà del 
popolo italiano" (Milza, 2000, 464). 
Again, according to Milza (2000), in a similar situation what remained to Mussolini was 
to strengthen the Italian small possessions and to try to obtain colonial compensations 
by adopting a balancing game, with various means of pressure (Milza, 2000, 465). 
"[Mussolini] egli aveva avviato su parecchi fronti un'offensiva destinata ad agitare da 
un capo all'altro l'area mediterranea, in modo da approfittare di un eventuale 
mercanteggiamento tra le potenze coinvolte. Si trattava, con diverse pressioni e con 
manovre deterrenti, di ottenere compensazioni per i vantaggia territoriali concessi 
alla Gran Bretagna e alla Francia dai trattati di pace o, in altri termini, di indurrei 
due principali beneficiari del rimescolamento delle carte in Africa e nel Mediterraneo 
ad accettare la 'revisione' dello status quo che avevano imposto" (Milza, 2000, 
466). 
Therefore, historical studies as well contradict, with regard to this case, the 
expectations that want status seekers, even in a condition of frustration (see Suzuki, 
2008), to insist on performing exclusively conforming behaviours. On the opposite, Italy 
pursuing its imperial ambitions through a verbal aggressive rhetoric. 
 This research advances that, still in 1926, since Italy was a status seeker and 
was still aiming at the satisfaction of its expansive interests that where symbols of its 
great power status, in this situation, the Italian aggressive rhetoric on its desired and 
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deserved empire was a socially deviant behaviour that aimed at obtaining the 
recognition of this social status.  
To illustrate this, it is possible to underline two passages: first, that these deviant 
behaviours were limited in their extension and were combined with a more general 
complying attitude; and second, that this Italian aggressive rhetoric was functional to 
Italian status seeking. 
By building on the asserted Italian lack of material capacities180, it is possible 
to add that the above-mentioned Italian aggressive declarations on its imperial destiny, 
for how assertive may have sounded, still where set in a series of other declarations 
which aimed at underlining their rhetorical character181.  
Indeed, not only Italy manifested a reconciliatory behaviour182 in reassuring the Turkish 
fears with regard to the Italian intentions in the area, and also in stating in front of 
the Italian Senate an official profession of peaceful intentions.  
Furthermore, Mussolini himself made different declarations stressing what he 
called the real significance of the Italian imperial ambitions183. As an example, it is 
possible to mention two cases.  
The first one to be mentioned here is the foreign policy speech to the Senate that 
Mussolini gave on the 28th of May, 1926. 
Mussolini speaks in front of the Senate, reporting on foreign policy, and declaring that 
Italy was not pursuing any aggressive imperialism (Milza, 2000, 468). 
In Mussolini's own words, answering to the critics that have suspected that the Italian 
imperialist policy was aggressive, 
                                                
 
180	   By	   recalling	   the	   episode	   of	   the	   Italian	   military	   operations	   of	   April	   1926,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   threaten	   was	  
implemented	  mostly	  via	  newspapers'	  publications,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  advance	  that,	  it	  was	  precisely	  the	  lack	  
of	  material	  capacities	  that	  held	  Italy	  back	  from	  adopting	  more	  physically	  aggressive	  deviant	  behaviours.	  	  
181	  In	  line	  with	  this	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  mention	  that	  Bosworth	  (1991b)	  underlines	  that	  Italy	  has	  always	  been	  the	  weakest	  
great	   power	   among	   its	   European	   peers	   and	   that	   due	   to	   this	   structural	   weakens,	   Italian	   power	   and	   international	  
authority	  were	  built	  through	  the	  narrative.	  	  
182	   In	   line	  with	   this	   reconciliatory	   approach	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  mention	   that	   on	   September	   30th,	   1926,	  Mussolini	  will	  
meet	   Chamberlain	   in	   Livorno,	   and	   that	   the	   official	   press	   release	   will	   strongly	   underline	   the	   persistence	   of	   good	  
relations	  between	  Rome	  and	  London	  (Moscati,	  1963b,	  103).	  
	  	  
183	  These	  clarifications	  are	  valid	  exclusively	  for	  this	  precise	  moment,	  while	   Italian	  effective	  capture	  of	   its	  empire,	   in	  
1936,	  has	  to	  be	  specifically	  analysed.	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"(…) l'imperialismo italiano è un fenomeno di dignità del popolo italiano. Prima di 
tutto dignità morale. E poi è il bisogno di espansione economica e morale di una 
nazione che è arrivata un po' tardi. Quando un popolo entra dove tutti sono già 
sistemati suscita un po' di disagio. L'ospite inatteso è qualche volta ingrato" 
(Susmel, 1958, 151-152). 
Again, insisting on the fact that Italian imperialism is not aggressive184,  
"Ora il nostro imperialismo non esiste nel senso di un imperialismo aggressivo, 
esplosivo, che prepara la guerra. Debbo dichiarare, non per voi onorevoli senatori, 
che seguite da vicino la politica estera del Governo, ma per il mondo, per tutto il 
mondo, che il Governo fascista segue e non seguire che una politica di pace; (…). 
Ma il volere la pace non significa intanto essere disarmati" (Susmel, 1958, 151-152). 
Notwithstanding these loud declarations of this Italian profession of peace, it 
could be possible to maintain that, being this speech subsequent to the April's 
declarations and events, Mussolini may have lowered and decreased the content of its 
real intentions.  
In line with this view, it is possible to report Milza's analysis of these 1926 events. He 
writes that, 
"Abbandonato dagli inglesi che, ottenuta soddisfazione nell'affare di Mossul, gli 
prodigavano ormai consigli di moderazione (soprattutto durante il colloquio del 20 
aprile, a Roma, tra Dino Grandi e il segretario permanente del Foreign Office Sir 
William Tyrrel), criticato dai senatori americani in occasione del dibattito per la 
ratifica degli accordi italo-americani sui debiti di guerra, violentemente attaccato 
dalla stampa turca, Mussolini non impiegò molto a battere in ritirata" (Milza, 2000, 
467). 
Considering that these declarations were made in May, one month after all the 
aggressive rhetoric, it is credible to imagine that Mussolini may have lowered the 
aggressiveness of its rhetoric due to the public international reaction. 
This notwithstanding, there is another public declaration made by Mussolini that 
confirms this same content and that was made long before the April 1926 events. 
                                                
 
184	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   report	   that	   Moscati	   (1963b)	   asserts	   that	   this	   prevalence	   of	   Italian	   aggressive	   rhetoric	   on	  
effective	   actions	   towards	   any	   conquer	   of	   an	   Italian	   empire,	   was	   related	   to	   the	   internal	   and	   domestic	   situation.	  
Indeed,	  he	  writes,	  "[M]ai	  i	  fattori	  della	  politica	  interna	  si	  riverberano	  con	  tanta	  forza	  sui	  rapporti	  con	  l'esterno	  come	  
negli	   anni	   di	   assestamento	  di	   una	  dittatura,	   tutta	   intesa,	   per	  ovvie	   esigenze,	   a	   ricercare	  nel	   'rumore'	   derivante	  da	  
un'impostazione	  ambiziosa	  della	  propria	  politica	  estera	  una	  fonte	  di	  consenso	  all'interno.	  (…)	  Di	  qui	  una	  politica	  fatta	  
più	   di	   generiche	   affermazioni	   imperialistiche	   e	   di	   velleità	   di	   espansione	   che	   volta	   a	   perseguire	   concreti	   interessi"	  
(Moscati,	  1963b,	  104).	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Indeed, it is also possible to report here the above-mentioned interview that Mussolini 
released in December 1925 to the United Press (see Susmel, 1958, 44). 
In this interview, Mussolini was directly asked about his insistence on the Italian 
ambitions for an empire (see Susmel, 1958, 44).  
"Qual è il pensiero di V.E. circa l'impero italiano, cui V.E. ha alluso parecchie volte 
nei suoi discorsi? Quali sarebbero gli aspetti politici, geografici, militari ed 
economici dell'impero?" (Susmel, 1958, 44). 
Mussolini's answer is interesting because begins with a distinction on the meanings of 
the word 'empire'. Empire, says Mussolini, can refer to a form of governmental 
organization, but it can also refer to the strength and power of a country.  
"La parola 'impero' non ha un solo significato nella lingua italiana. Essa può 
designare una forma di Governo e più particolarmente quella meravigliosa 
organizzazione statale che da Roma, nei primi secoli dell'éra cristiana, dominò il 
mondo civile. Ma 'impero' significa anche forza possente, dominio, comando. 
L'impero, come volontà di vita e di potenza, è alla base di tutti gli organismi 
viventi" (Susmel, 1958, 44).  
Therefore, in his words, talking about an Italian empire does not refer to any territorial 
conquest, but instead it refers to a propensity, a tenacious and pugnacious (when 
needed) Italian aptitude in dealing with international issues.  
"Allorché si parla dunque di un'Italia imperiale, non si allude a nessuna determinata 
conquista territoriale, ma ad un'attitudine, a una norma di condotta virile, risoluta, 
combattiva se occorre, che l'Italia deve osservare nei grandi problemi" (Susmel, 
1958, 44). 
Mussolini himself links this Italian imperial aspiration to the Italian status seeking 
ambitions, 
L'importanza dell'Italia fra le altre nazioni d'Europa, i suoi grandi sacrifici nella 
guerra mondiale, la sua esuberante popolazione, tutto le dà diritti ad una maggiore 
espansione nel mondo. È stolto chi vede in tali direttive un proposito aggressivo: 
non mancano nella storia accordi di divisioni pacifiche, mediante le quali le potenze 
raggiunsero un più saldo e giusto equilibrio tra le forze rispettive e salvaguardarono 
la pace e la tranquillità dei loro popoli. Confido che non mancherà all'Italia, 
allorché se ne presenterà l'occasione, il mezzo di ottenere con transazioni la giusta 
parte che le spetta. Gli altri popoli assumerebbero una grave responsabilità, 
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opponendo una pervicace resistenza alle misurate aspirazioni dell'Italia perché sia 
garantito il suo avvenire di grande potenza"185 (Susmel, 1958, 44). 
In conclusion, to be clear, there is of course no intention to claim that the 
Italian imperialistic ambitions did not exist and were exclusively rhetoric.  
On the opposite, the intention of this research is to understand the adoption of Italian 
deviant and assertive behaviours. 
Under this perspective it is possible to understand Mussolini's insistence on the 
peaceful character of Italian imperialism not in a literal sense, but as a reference to 
the fact that the observed Italian deviant behaviours – which in this case are mostly 
manifested through an aggressive rhetoric – are functional to the Italian status seeking 
ambitions. Deviance is used in function of obtaining recognition, it aims at adjusting 
the system, but not at overturning it. 
The declarations made for this interview clearly refer to this, Italian assertive 
behaviours are part of the international standing it has to maintain, thus in order to 
convince its peers to grant Italy with the aimed great power status – "perché sia 
garantito il suo avvenire di grande potenza" (Susmel, 1958, 44). 
Coming full circle, this confirms that Italy seeks its prestige (reputational status) 
by incorporating its behaviour this aggressive rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
                                                
 
185	  Da	  il	  Popolo	  d'Italia,	  N.	  303,	  22	  dicembre	  1925,	  XII.	  See,	  Susmel,	  1958,	  44.	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2.3.2	  –	  The	  Italian	  continental	  revisionism	  	  
 
Historiography reports that from 1926-1927 until 1934, Italy stood in the 
international scene as a revisionist actor. Italian revisionism has been multifaceted, 
indeed next to the above-mentioned aggressive rhetoric on Italian imperialism Italy has 
also pursued other forms of assertive behaviours. Indeed, around the end of 1926 
Mussolini has started implementing a so-called continental revisionism that has 
challenged Belgrade's stability and caused a breach in the French alliance with the 
Little Entente (Milza, 2000, 468).  
Another important character of Italian revisionism consisted in the fact that Mussolini 
directly proposed Italy as the leader of revisionism in Europe, this by advancing a 
rhetoric that turned around the idea of the revisionism of treaties, and also by 
implementing behaviours that seemed to directly tackle the European stability. 
 
(I)	  –	  Italian	  revisionism	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  surrounding	  Yugoslavia	  and	  contrasting	  the	  Small	  
Entente	  
 
This strategy manifested mainly through a series of agreements concluded by 
Italy that directly tackled Belgrade's sphere of stability and security.  
Enlarging a bit the perspective, it is possible to state that the first signals of this 
strategy can be found in the closer relations that Italy developed with Albania since 
the spring of 1926, that, at the end of the same year, resulted into an agreement 
between the two.  
Yet the most important sign of Italian continental revisionism is usually identified in the 
signature of the amity and conciliatory treaty that Italy signed with Hungary on the 4th 
of April, 1927 (Moscati, 1963b, 109-110). Though this agreement was not a formal 
alliance, still it represented an important step in Mussolini's strategy. It represented the 
clearest signal of the Italian encirclement and isolation of Yugoslavia within the Balkan 
region also because ahead of its signature Mussolini made public his opposition to the 
constitution of the Small Entente.  
Relations between Rome and Belgrade continued being discordant, and in this situation 
Yugoslavia turned to Paris to negotiate an amity treaty that will be signed in 
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November 1927. Mussolini gave instructions to protest with Chamberlain that France 
was surrounding Italy with this agreement and its projects with the Little Entente.  
As more concrete reply to this treaty, on November 22nd, 1927, Mussolini signed the 
Second Treaty of Tirana that officially established a twenty-years 'unalterable defensive 
alliance' between the two countries. This turned Albania into an Italian satellite, and 
officially represented the Italian encirclement of Belgrade.  
1928 opened with the discussions between Italy and Yugoslavia on the possibility that 
Italy could grant Belgrade with more time in order to give its parliament the chance to 
ratify the Treaty of Nettuno. This agreement was confirmed on the 1st of February (DDI, 
serie VII, vol. VI, n. 77, p. 75). Italy kept on advancing its relations with Romania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (February (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 83; 88; 108; 116; 120; 
following). While Yugoslavia tried to associated the Italian–Yugoslav relations with the 
Italian–French negotiations (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 105). 
 Yet, the most paradigmatic episode that is usually associated to the Italian 
revisionism is the Senate speech on foreign policy that Mussolini held on the 5th of 
June, 1928 (Susmel, 1958, 158-193), in which he re-affirms the Italian official adhesion 
to revisionism by again insisting on the idea that though the peace treaties are 
inviolable, still they are not eternal, nor perfect and not even immutable (Susmel, 1958, 
1776-177). 
 
(II)	  –	  Current	  explanations	  to	  Italian	  revisionism	  
 
The Italian adhesion to revisionism remains a point of debate for scholars and 
analysts. What emerges from this debate is the difficulty to cope with the ambiguities 
of this Italian behaviour. Pillar to this discussion is the counter-productivity of this 
Italian strategy that will manifest on the long term – first of all with regard to Italian 
security itself186.  
                                                
 
186	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  historians	  underline	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contradictory	  elements	  of	  Italian	  international	  standing	  
ahead	  of	  1930s,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Mussolini's	  behaviour	  with	  regard	  to	  South	  Tyrol	  and	  the	  possibilities	  of	  Anschluss'	  
realization.	  The	   idea	   is	   that	  Mussolini	  called	   for	   the	   revisionism	  of	   treaties	  when	   it	  was	  about	   favouring	   the	   Italian	  
national	  interests,	  but	  this	  same	  principle	  has	  favoured	  the	  violation	  of	  Austrian	  borders.	  	   	  
Actually,	   in	  February	  1926,	  Mussolini	   took	  a	  very	  strong	  stance	  against	  any	  possibility	  of	  German	   interference	  with	  
the	  Italian	  borders.	  However,	  Mussolini's	  declaration	  that	  "L'Italia	  non	  subirà	  mai	  violazioni	  di	  quei	  trattati	  di	  pace	  che	  
le	  garantiscono	  le	  frontiere	  conquistate	  a	  prezzo	  di	  durissimo	  sangue"	  (Mussolini,	  quoted	  in	  Milza,	  2000,	  476),	  easily	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More in general, the debate on Italian revisionism builds on the idea that Italy should 
have favoured friendly relations with Yugoslavia. Various are the motivations that weigh 
in favor Italy's maintenance of good relations with Yugoslavia, and Milza reports some 
of them,  
"In linea di principio, una gran quantità di ragioni avrebbe dovuto indurre il Duce a 
mantenere con Belgrado rapporti di buon vicinato. Col trattato di Roma l'Italia 
aveva ottenuto soddisfazione su numerosi punti, e in particolar modo sulla 
questione di Fiume, risolta nel modo più conforme agli interessi dello Stato fascista. 
Benché dovesse tener conto dell'irredentismo sloveno, il governo del re Alessandro 
appariva disposto a riconoscere in modo definitivo le frontiere italo-jugoslave, ad 
accordarsi con Mussolini per una difesa comune dell'Adriatico e per ostacolare 
eventuali pressioni tedesche sulle frontiere settentrionali dei due paesi, a 
intensificare le relazioni commerciali con l'Italia e a riconoscere a questa potenza 
una posizione economica dominante in Albania. In cambio si aspettava dalla sua 
vicina che cessasse di sostenere il revisionismo ungherese e bulgaro, come pure il 
movimento separatista croato e quello macedone" (Milza, 2000, 469). 
On top of this, Milza concludes that "saggezza avrebbe voluto che Mussolini giocasse 
con Belgrado la carta del do ut des; e questo implicava che si schierasse dalla parte 
degli Stati rispettosi dei trattati" (Milza, 2000, 469). But, on the opposite, Mussolini 
chose not to do so and to opt for the revisionist path in his foreign policy. 
This research is interested in understanding why did Italy at that time undertake a 
similar behaviour towards its neighbours – how to understand this apparently 
schizophrenic behaviour?  
With regard to this, it is possible to begin by reporting here some of the 
explanations that have been articulated in the historical studies.  
The first one, and one of the most popular, builds on the idea that since Contarini left 
his office, the gap between Mussolini and the traditional diplomacy became permanent, 
implicating the definitive absence of a strategy in the subsequent Italian foreign policy. 
Other options that can be mentioned concern the effectiveness of Italian economic 
interests and the prevalence of the domestic level on the international one, thus 
implying that Mussolini was looking for international actions that could have immediate 
effect on the Italian public opinion.  
                                                                                                                                          
 
appears	  as	  contradictory.	  On	  this	  point,	  Milza	  writes	  that,	  "Era	  impossibile	  appellarsi	  con	  più	  cinismo	  o	  incoscienza	  al	  
rispetto	  dell'ordine	  internazionale	  in	  un	  caso,	  alla	  sua	  revisione	  e	  alla	  sua	  sovversione	  nell'altro"	  (Milza,	  2000,	  476).	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Finally, the last perspective here reported identifies a relation between Italian attitude 
towards Belgrade and the Balkans, and Italian relations with Paris. The general idea, 
that will be extensively dealt in the following sections, is that Italy tackled Belgrade in 
order to put pressure on Paris.  
 Moving from the first explanation, under this perspective, 1926 is reported as 
the year of a growing distance between fascism and the Italian traditional diplomacy 
(Moscati, 1963b, 100). Contarini himself resigned from his position preferring to retire 
from politics, therefore this years is reported also the year of a growing distance 
between fascism and the Italian traditional diplomacy (Moscati, 1963b, 100). 
The break between Contarini and Mussolini implied, under this perspective, serious 
repercussions on the Italian foreign policy.  
"[V]enne a mancare, nel corso del 1926, un orientamento preciso per i rapporti 
dell'Italia con le altre potenze, si accentuò l'idea generica dell'espansione dell'Italia 
in qualsiasi direzione e in qualsiasi momento, senza obiettivi preordinati e ben 
definiti, prese corpo una speciale forma di revisionismo, per il momento ancora 
pacifico, come manifestazione di velleità insoddisfatte e di ambizioni troppo a lungo 
inculcate e represse" (Moscati, 1963b, 103-104). 
Milza explains this historical crossroad, by recalling that since Contarini was not 
Mussolini's mentor anymore, and since Mussolini resented the idea of following the 
liberal political tradition – perfectly expressed in the Contarini and Sforza style (Milza, 
2000, 469-470) – this was the definitive occasion for a change of Italian diplomatic 
style.  
The Sforza and Contarini approach to the Balkan-area provided that the Italian 
economic interests in the area had to be achieved through friendly relations and 
agreements with Yugoslavia, this in order to contend the French primacy in the area. 
In line with this, the traditional approach to the Adriatic relations was to avoid that 
any other agreement, and especially the Italian-Albanian relations, could alter and 
irritate the relation between Rome and Belgrade (Moscati, 1963b, 108). 
1926, indeed represents the moment in which the Contarini–style approach to Balkans 
was put aside in favour of a more revisionist approach (Moscati, 1963b, 100). 
"Alla politica che faceva perno sull'amicizia e collaborazione con la Jugoslavia si va 
sostituendo, nel corso del 1926, la politica che mira a stringere alleanze con gli 
altri Stati balcanici in funzione anti-jugoslava" (Moscati, 1963b, 100). 
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A role was also played by Mussolini's 'personal inclination for action', and by his 
strong anti-Slovenian feeling187 (Milza, 2000, 469-470).  
It is possible to claim that this perspective sees a crossroad in Contarini's 
resignation, and that, more in general, this builds on a perspective that distinguishes 
two lines of action within the same foreign policy: Contarini on the one side and 
Mussolini on the other. With regard to this it is possible to Moscati's analysis that 
challenges this binomial perspective,  
"(…) il binomio Mussolini-Contarini. Giacché, è bene precisarlo sin da ora, non è 
esatto ed è troppo comodo scindere le due responsabilità e definire come 
'contariniano' tutto quel che di buono vi poté essere nella politica estera del primo 
periodo fascista, e come 'mussoliniano' tutto il male. Naturalmente in Mussolini, 
preminente era l'interesse per il successo immediato, anche soltanto apparente, che 
servisse a consolidare con un prestigio, sia pure formale, acquisito all'estero, le 
posizioni interne del fascismo; nei suoi collaboratori c'era invece uno sforzo 
continuo e più meditato per convogliare l'esuberante attività del ministro degli esteri 
verso risultati permanenti. Ma mai disaccordo palese: la politica estera di quegli 
anni (…) appariva all'esterno un insieme organico, in cui potevano fondersi ed 
integrarsi diverse passioni, ben diversa preparazione, contrastanti attitudini che, 
sotto forme diverse, perseguivano un identico fine" (Moscati, 1963°, 81). 
Perfectly in line with this, also Biagini insists on elements of continuation between the 
two. In his own words,  
"Con l'allontanamento di Contarini la storiografia tende a datare l'inizio di una 
politica estera 'fascista', ma anche nel periodo contariniano si erano manifestati gli 
orientamenti e i metodi propri del fascismo rivolti a una revisione generale della 
politica italiana: dall'incontro di Territet alla crisi della Ruhr all'episodio di Corfù" 
(Biagini, 1980, 181). 
Therefore, it emerges that there was a certain unitary character in the Italian foreign 
policy and that this was pointing at a common aim. Returning to Moscati, he clearly 
asserts that his common aim was represented by the pursuing of Italian prestige, 
"Tale [identico] fine era una rivalutazione dell'azione diplomatica italiana, una 
maggiore libertà d'azione, una politica estera di più ampio respiro, che, pur 
basandosi in effetti sull'accordo con l'Inghilterra e con la Francia, ne sfruttasse di 
volta in volta i contrasti e, propugnando al tempo stesso il reinserimento degli Stati 
                                                
 
187	  As	  further	  contributing	  factors	  are	  also	  reported:	  the	  behavior	  of	  fascists	  from	  Istria	  and	  Veneto	  that	  was,	  since	  
the	  beginning,	  very	  warmongering.	  Milza	  also	  says	  that	  the	  Italian	  General	  Staff	  did	  press	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  military	  
spending	  and	  army	  personnel,	  and	  that	  this	  too	  had	  a	  role	  (Milza,	  2000,	  469-­‐470)	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vinti nell'economia europea, desse all'Italia un maggior prestigio specie nei Balcani 
e nel Medio Oriente e più ampie possibilità nel continente africano" (Moscati, 1963°, 
81-82). 
Biagini as well underlines that the harmony between the two components of Italian 
diplomacy, can also be seen in the fact that, during Contarini's years as well, 
"Mussolini non aveva tralasciato occasione per porre il problema della ridefinizione del 
ruolo e degli interessi dell'Italia come grande potenza mediterranea nell'ambito dei 
rapporti con gli alleati e con la Società delle nazioni" (Biagini, 1980, 181). 
Therefore, it is possible to underline a certain harmony, at least in the final intents of 
Italian foreign policy.  
 Another element that is reported to have influenced the Italian behaviours 
towards Yugoslavia, refers to the effective existence of Italian economic interest in the 
Balkan area, in general. With regard to this, Moscati reports that the main reason that 
induced Italy to sign the treaty with Hungary relates to its interests to extend the 
Italian political and economic influence in the Balkans.  
Moreover, the author also recalls that, in the area, there was an economic competition 
between Rome and Paris, which was quite relevant. Indeed, France at that time had 
established an important level of economic influence in the area, and Italy aspired to 
content it (Milza, 2000, 469-470).  
Moreover, adding to this perspective, Yugoslavia, represented for Mussolini an obstacle 
to the Italian influence over Albania – that Mussolini wanted to turn into an influence 
that went behind the economic level (Milza, 2000, 469-470).  
 Next to this, it is also possible to mention another issue that constitutes a 
pivotal debate: the prevalence of domestic politics on foreign politics. This perspective 
points at the fact that the Italian–fascist revisionist approach to foreign affairs was 
suitable to support nationalistic exaltations. This is to say that the Italian foreign policy 
had these assertive features because they were easily expendable with the propaganda. 
The debate on the prevalence of domestic affairs on the international one, is quite 
substantial.  
Certainly, it is understandable the idea that national affairs proved important in the 
establishment of a regime, and in order to provide a more balanced perspective that 
includes these to – only apparently alternative – options, it is possible to refer to 
Moscati who underlines the virtuous circle that characterized this approach. Indeed, 
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what Mussolini pursued for domestic reasons, still payed back at the international level 
by assigning to Italy the role of leader of the revisionist countries, which again had a 
further positive effect on internal politics by strengthening the nationalistic perception 
of the central Italian role on the international arena (Moscati, 1963b, 110). 
 Finally, it is possible to insert the Italo–Yugoslavian relations in a wider 
framework that includes Italo–French relations and their contrasting interests.  
This perspective builds on the idea that Italy and France had competitive interests, and 
on top of this, the better way to destabilize the French interests was to establish, in 
the Danube-Balkan area a series of agreements that tackled the Yugoslavian stability 
as proxy way to tackle the French interests. 
Above it was mentioned that Rome and Paris had common economic interests in the 
Balkan area; this last perspective asserts that competitive interests between the two 
were more than economic. 
The context in which this perspective is inserted provides that the relations 
between Italy and France had been friendly until 1925, when they have started 
worsening for various reasons among which there was the ideological and personal 
incompatibility between the two governments – the aversion between the leftist French 
governments and the Italian fascism. Directly related was also the issues with the 
Italian antifascist exponents that found hospitality in France, from where they were able 
to continue their political engagement (Moscati, 1963b, 105); the anti-French attitude of 
the Italian press, and vice versa; and also, Paris' refusal to grant Italy with the any 
minimal colonial concession (Milza, 2000, 471; Moscati, 1963b, 105).  
Adding to this perspective, it is possible to advance that – even though it was 
reported above that the tensions between Rome and Paris with regard to the Balks 
grew after the signature of the Italian treaty with Hungary, and the following one 
between Yugoslavia and France, to which followed, in a sort of escalation, the one 
between Italy and Albania – still this escalating conflictual relation can be dated back 
to the beginning of 1926, when Italy strongly protested any possibility of an agreement 
between Paris and Belgrade (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 262; 271, p. 186; 196). 
Indeed, it is since March 1926 that Mussolini gives instructions to the Italian 
representatives in Paris, London and Belgrade to inform Chamberlain, Briand and 
Nincich,  
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"che qualora si addivenga subito alla firma dell'accordo franco-jugoslavo mi troverei 
costretto procedere ad un esame delle ripercussioni che tale accordo potrà avere 
sulla situazione dell'Italia rispetto agli altri stati d'Europa legati dal patto di Locarno 
e riservarmi quindi ogni definitiva decisione anche nei riguardi del carattere da dare 
ai rapporti italo-jugoslavi dopo un tale patto" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 271, p. 196). 
This clarification does not aim at finding the origins of these difficult relations, but 
aims instead at pointing at the interconnectedness of the relations between Rome, 
Paris and Belgrade, and also at the common interests that counterposed Italy and 
France.  
Therefore, this perspective while considering the existence of contrasting 
interests between Rome and Paris, understands Mussolini's continental revisionism as 
implemented in an anti-French perspective.  
Before moving to the next section, it is important to recall that the 
interpretative perspectives here reported are not antithetical to one another, and also 
that in reporting them there is no intention to disqualify any of them. These 
perspectives are indeed compatible to one another and it is also possible to assert 
that each of them underlines one of the multifaceted elements that did constitute the 
Italian international interactions and its behavioural standing in the international arena.  
However, since the intent of this research is to focus on investigating the existence of 
a common point between the Italian assertive international standing and the process of 
status seeking that Italy pursued in order to have its prestige recognized, this section 
will focus on a closer investigation of this last option that takes into consideration a 
wider framework in which Italo–French relations are included.  
This focus on the relations between Italy and France is motivated by of two reasons. 
First, this anti-French perspective allows to read the Italian assertive behaviours 
addressed at Belgrade in primis, and towards the Balkan area more in general, as an 
example of the relational aggressiveness that was advanced in chapter 3 – when 
dealing with the different types of aggressiveness. Indeed, as mentioned above, whether 
the adoption of an aggressive rhetoric can be assimilated to the verbal type of 
aggressiveness, this Italian challenging the Balkan French network, via Belgrade in 
 
 
232 
primis, is comparable to the concept of indirect/relational aggression with which Italy 
aims at tackling French interests and relations in the area188. 
Secondly, the research will focus on understanding the interconnections between 
Italian–French relations because by looking at diplomatic documentations it emerges 
the idea that not only Italy implemented the continental revisionism in an anti-French 
perspective, but also that this assertive standing towards France was in itself aiming at 
obtaining that France granted Rome with the recognition of the Italian great power 
status.  
Therefore, the Italian-French relations constitutes a good angle from which to look at 
the status seeking process that Italy implemented in order to seek for its recognition.  
 To furtherly develop this this perspective, it is possible to identify three different 
variants in this anti-French Italian behaviour. Certainly, these variations are more 
distinguishable in theory than in practice, yet pointing them out helps to understand 
some implicit but important variations.  
In the first variation, the Italian behaviour in the Balkans is somehow reactive to French 
behaviours. This first variant identifies that one of the reasons behind Italian assertive 
behaviours in the Balkan area rises from the Italian desire to payback France by 
contrasting its extension and influence in the Danube-Balkan area in the same way 
Paris had contrasted Italy's extension on the Mediterranean Sea and in Africa (Milza, 
2000, 469-470). 
Another variant sees this Italian expansion in the Balkan as an attempt to find its own 
space: once Italy didn't have the colonial compensations it looked for, it turned to the 
Balkans looking for a different area of influence. In other words, having failed in the 
aspiration for colonial compensations, Mussolini opted for the continental revisionism, 
thus avoiding to directly clash with Paris over the Mediterranean Sea and the African 
area (Milza, 2000, 471). 
The last variant of this anti-French perspective finds some elements of 
functionality in this Italian projection of interests in the Danube–Balkan area. 
                                                
 
188	  Child	  developmental	  psychology	  defines	  indirect/relational	  aggressiveness	  those	  behaviours	  "that	  are	  more	  covert	  
and	  are	  usually	  aimed	  at	  harming	  another	  person's	  social	  status,	  friendships,	  or	  reputation	  (e.g.	  Crick,	  1996).	  Some	  
behaviors	  classified	  as	  indirect	  or	  relational	  include	  malicious	  gossip,	  exclusion	  from	  activities	  and	  groups,	  and	  giving	  
someone	  'the	  silent	  treatment'	  [ignoring]"	  (Cillessen,	  Mayeux,	  2007,	  146).	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This idea that the Italian interests in the Balkans are anti-French in a functional way, 
emerges both from historical studies and also from the historical documentation.  
Ruggero Moscati (1963b) identifies a certain synchrony between the progress in the 
Italian continental revisionism and the Italo-French negotiations for the general amity 
agreement that was discussed between the two countries. To briefly state it: when the 
Italo-Albanian treaty was followed by the French-Yugoslav agreements, at the end of 
1927, Italy protested the Paris' behaviour. This, and the already difficult relations 
between the two countries, induced exponents of the French right to question the 
French government about its approach with Italy, and also to stand in favour of more 
friendly relations with Rome. Briand, replying to these pressures, declared his 
availability and willingness to concretely pursue more friendly relations with Italy, and 
opened to the possibility of negotiations for a general agreement between the two 
(Moscati, 1963, 111-112). Therefore, Mussolini, after the first steps of more friendly 
relations with France, slows down its projection into the Balkans, and resumes it when 
it is clear that negotiations are not giving results, in spring 1928 (Moscati, 1963, 111-
112). Indeed, in May 1928 Italy signed an agreement with Turkey, on the 5th of June 
Mussolini held the Senate speech on foreign policy in which declared that Italy was a 
revisionist country and in September 1928 another agreement was signed with Greece, 
thus extending the Italian penetration in the area (Moscati, 1963, 112-113). 
The main idea upon which this last perspective builds is that, Italy used its 
extension on the Balkans as a leverage on Paris. Therefore, this perspective proves 
fundamental in advancing the question upon which this research builds: what was Italy 
seeking from France?  
As mentioned above, diplomatic documentations suggest that Italy was seeking 
for the recognition of its status. Therefore, repeating it again, the Italian-French 
relations constitutes a good angle from which to look at the status seeking process 
that Italy implemented in order to seek for its recognition.  
 
(III)	  –	  Understanding	  Italian	  status	  seeking	  behavioural	  strategy	  in	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  of	  the	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French	  relations:	  the	  negotiations	  for	  the	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  to	  the	  Tangier	  issue	  
 
When looking at the French–Italian relations, it is usual to underline the role 
played by the material contrasting interest that contraposed the two countries. It is 
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indeed typical to report, as an example, that Italy and France had different points of 
competition, among which the issues of Tunis, Tangier and the colonial compensations 
(Moscati, 1963b, 105). 
The prevalence of this perspective is understandable since it was fostered, in primis, by 
the official declarations made at that time by the Italian government. Indeed, in the 
declarations made ahead of the negotiations for the Italian-French general agreement, 
the Italian government itself had focussed the attention on the list of the pending, 
competing, issues that were dividing the two countries. And this list has usually 
referred at very concrete issues. 
To report some examples, ahead of the beginning of the Italo–French 
negotiations, Virgilio Gayda – a filo-government Italian journalist – articulated and 
publicized an article that well-listed all the issues pending between Italy and France. 
This list, basically and implicitly, turned around the issue of the colonial mandates, 
and built on the Italian request for the revision of the treaties (Moscati, 1963, 112). 
The close sympathy between the journalist and the Mussolinian government is proven 
by the fact that similar contents result from the Italian diplomatic documents. Indeed, 
numerous are the telegrams from 1926 in which Mussolini insists (usually with the 
Italian ambassadors to Paris), on the fact that any agreement between Rome and Paris 
should be preceded by resolutions of the pending issues between the two countries.  
On the 20th of April, 1926, Mussolini writes,  
"concernente i rapporti franco-italiani (…) [n]on è dubbio che esiste possibilità 
accordo e intesa molto stretta e concreta purché sia preceduta dalla favorevole 
soluzione delle questioni cui V. E. [Avezzana] accenna e cioè Tunisi, Tangeri, 
Abissinia, mandati coloniali, fuoriusciti, trattato commercio" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 
303; p. 219; see also DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 505; p. 395). 
One year after, on the 14th of April 1927, Mussolini writes to the new Italian 
Ambassador to Paris, Manzoni, 
"Per conto mio non vedo pertanto altra possibilità di giungere ad un risultato 
soddisfacente se non prendendo in considerazione contemporaneamente alle 
proposte di un patto di amicizia, la questione di Tunisi in relazione anche alla 
posizione mediterranea dell'Italia e quella dei fuoriusciti" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 
137; p. 145).  
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In November, 1927, the tension between Italy and France was revived by the signatures 
of the French-Yugoslavian treaty, and of the Italo-Albanian treaty. As mentioned above 
this induced both governments to reopen to the possibilities of an Italo–French 
agreement. Ahead of this, on December 4th, 1927, Mussolini takes some personal notes 
concerning what he defines as the indispensable conditions for an improvement of 
Italian-French relations. The note is very brief and lists these conditions, 
"1) Accoglimento benevolo delle richieste italiane per Tangeri,  
2) Rinnovo per 20 anni delle Convenzioni Tunisine del 1896,  
3) Confini meridionali ed occidentali della Tripolitani,  
4) Mano libera nei Balcani e nel Mediterraneo Orientale in modo che la espansione 
politica, economica italiana non trovi impacci diretti o indiretti francesi,  
5) Questione snazionalizzazione.  
6) Questione diritto di asilo,  
7) Revisione 'Mandati'" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 653 p. 601). 
The indispensability of these conditions is reiterated in dialogues between Rome and 
Paris in January 1928, and Mussolini insists on defining these issues as 'minor' issues 
to be resolved before further talking for an agreement189 (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 68 p. 
68).  
In March, 1928, there are good signals of a positive resolution for the Tangier issue, 
and on the 13th of April, Mussolini writes to Manzoni, concerning the remaining issues 
pending between the two governments, 
"Scartata la questione di Tangeri (…) [il contenuto del negoziato italo-francese] si 
riduce ora essenzialmente a quattro punti: 1) Rinnovo delle convenzioni del '96 
circa Tunisi per un periodo corrispondente a quello che verrà fissato per la prima 
scadenza del patto di amicizia italo-francese, cioè presumibilmente cinque anni. 2) 
Delimitazione dei confini meridionali ed occidentali della Libia. 3) Assicurazione 
francese per il riconoscimento delle priorità italiane nel caso di revisione dei 
mandati. 4) Patto di amicizia italo-francese" DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 248 p. 213).  
These issues are still presented as minimum requirement for further negotiations.  
These messages help to illustrate that since 1926 until 1928 Mussolini keeps on 
constantly reminding the existence of pending issues between Rome and Paris, and on 
                                                
 
189	  In	  March	  1928,	  a	  few	  days	  after	  Italy	  was	  invited	  to	  participate	  to	  the	  Conference	  for	  Tangier	  –	  in	  its	  own	  terms	  –	  
France,	   on	   the	   19th	   of	   March,	   will	   propose	   to	   deal	   separately	   with	   the	   pending	   issues	   on	   the	   one	   side	   and	   the	  
negotiations	  for	  a	  general	  agreement	  on	  the	  other	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  VI,	  n.	  167	  p.	  146).	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underlying the importance of these issues to the Italian government and the 
indispensability of their resolution.  
The emphasis put on this list of indispensable minimum conditions, gives the 
impression that the Italian ambitions turned around very practical and material issues: 
mandates and colonial compensations, redefinition of borders, etc. 
Yet, by furtherly looking at internal diplomatic documents, some contradictions 
emerge with regard to this Italian orientation to material–issues and compensations.  
It is indeed interesting to report that in an internal document190 of June 1927, 
reporting on the Italian situation with regard to mandates, it is clearly asserted that, 
notwithstanding the Italy ambition and the Italian right to be conferred with colonial 
mandates, the Italian government (under the suggestion of Scialoja) had a clear clue 
of the fact that mandates were expensive and that Italy couldn't afford to manage 
them under the economic aspect. The report also states that the Italian approach to 
the issue is to continue claiming the Italian right for colonies, this while hoping that 
Italy will not be assigned with any colony soon. 
"Per quanto riguarda la eventuale concessione di un mandato coloniale all'Italia 
viene riconosciuta innanzitutto la necessità di continuare a mantenerci fermi in linea 
di principio sul nostro diritto ad avere un mandato. (…). S. E. Scialoja fa presenti le 
inevitabili e ingenti spese a cui si andrebbe incontro, una volta ottenuto un 
mandato; perciò, mentre da un lato dobbiamo continuare ad insistere sul nostro 
diritto in general, sarebbe preferibile che la questione non venisse sul tappeto 
troppo presto" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 275; p. 272). 
The realistic evaluation and the consciousness of the fact that Italy was not 
momentarily able to manage colonies, and its strong insistence, anyway, on its colonial 
rights, suggests that colonial mandates had for Italy a further – intrinsic – value that 
overcome the material one. 
Indeed, what emerges from the internal memorandum of June 1927 is that Italy, by 
insisting in pursuing its right to be assigned with colonies, was already pursuing 
                                                
 
190	   This	   document	   in	   reported	   in	   the	   collection	   of	   Italian	   diplomatic	   documents	  with	   the	   title	   "Promemoria".	   The	  
document	   is	  specified	  to	  be	  anonymous	  and	  with	  no	  date,	  and	  the	   it	  was	  recognized	  as	  pertaining	  to	  Dino	  Grandi,	  
and	  dated	  on	  the	  13th	  of	  June,	  1927.	  See,	  DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  V,	  n.	  275;	  p.	  272.	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something in itself – this insistence on the Italian colonial rights, was an aim in 
itself.191 
This suggests and implies the need to investigate on this implicit value. 
 A closer look at diplomatic documents and messages that Mussolini exchanged 
with Italian representatives suggest two important conclusions. 
First, that the implicit aim behind the Italian insistence on the pending issues between 
Rome and Paris was related to the recognition and conferral of Italian great power 
status. In other words, Italy wanted Paris to concede her with these practical/material 
issues because they represented an implicit recognition of the Italian prestige, or also, 
Italy insisted on tis rights to be conceded with these requests because the insistence 
in itself was part of the status seeking strategy. 
Italy pursued the recognition of its great power status, by pursuing more concrete 
issues that had a symbolic and intrinsic value to its social status, and by insisting on 
these issues. 
The second finding concerns the process with which the Italian government was 
pursuing its status seeking recognition. Indeed, documents show that Italy was seeking 
for its great power status by consciously and functionally adopting an assertive 
international standing that was adopted in function to this strategy of insistence. 
                                                
 
191	  With	  regard	  to	  this,	  building	  on	  Stefanachi	  (2015),	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  report	  that	  in	  the	  traditional	  IR	  approaches,	  the	  
role	  of	  prestige	  is	  restricted	  to	  a	  functional–material	  perspective.	  Simplifying	  the	  concept,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  state	  that	  in	  
this	   traditional	   approach,	   a	   state	   pursues	   prestige	   in	   order	   to	   gain	  more	   power.	   By	   departing	   from	   the	  Waltzian	  
interpretation	  of	  Rousseau,	   and	  by	   returning	   instead	   to	   the	   'original'	   Rousseau,	   the	   author	   advances	   the	  need	   for	  
International	  Relations	  to	  reconsider	  the	  role	  of	  prestige	  without	  restricting	   it	  to	  a	  functional–material	  perspective.	  
The	   idea	  that	   is	  advanced	  by	  the	  author	   is	   that	  seeking	  for	  prestige	  means	  more	  than	  aiming	  to	  gain	  reputation	   in	  
order	   to	   gain	   further	   power	   (Stefanachi,	   2015).	   Instead,	   by	   building	   on	   the	   sociological	   Rousseau,	   it	   results	   that	  
aiming	  at	  prestige	   can	  be	  an	  aim	   in	   itself.	   This	   implies	   an	  overturning	  of	   the	   traditional	   relation	  between	  material	  
power	  and	  prestige.	  Directly	  quoting	  the	  author,	  "[Q]uella	  teoria	  ricettiva	  della	  lezione	  rousseauiana	  si	  chiederebbe	  
se	   il	  prestigio	  non	  sia	  a	  volte	   la	   verità	  del	  desiderio	   stesso	  di	  potenza	   –	   se	   la	  potenza	  non	  venga	  accumulata	  per	   il	  
prestigio	  che	  promette	  di	  assegnare	  (rispetto,	  timorosa	  ammirazione)	  piuttosto	  che	  il	  contrario	  (il	  prestigio	  ricercato	  
per	  il	  potere-­‐influenza	  che	  promette	  di	  assicurare)"	  (Stefanachi,	  2015,	  34).	   	  
Therefore,	  the	  Rousseauvian	  perspective	  advances	  that	  it	  material	  ambitions	  are	  pursued	  in	  function	  of	  the	  symbolic	  
significance	  they	  carry,	  which	   in	  turn	  contribute	  to	  the	  pursue	  of	  prestige.	  Directly	  quoting	  the	  author,	  "Una	  teoria	  
sensibile	   alla	   lezione	   rousseauiana	   proverebbe	   a	   [mettere]	   a	   fuoco	   le	   dinamiche	   emulative	   e	  mimetiche	   dell'amor	  
proprio	  –	  si	  terrebbe	  pronta	  a	  cercare	  nella	  richiesta	  di	  riconoscimento	  e	  prestigio	  'la	  verità	  di	  altri	  desideri',	  per	  dirla	  
con	  T.	  Todorov	   interprete	  di	  Rousseau,[191]	  ovvero	   la	   verità	  della	   ricerca	  di	  beni	  magari	   trascurabili	   sul	  piano	  della	  
cura	   di	   sé	   (sicurezza)	   ma	   investiti	   di	   valenza	   simbolica	   dai	   membri	   della	   società	   internazionale	   (una	   colonia	  
d'oltremare	   in	  un	  teatro	  periferico	  può	  divenire	   il	   simbolo	  di	  un	   'posto	  al	   sole',	   senza	  scartare	   l'ipotesi	  che	  anche	   i	  
beni	  militari	   o	   economici	   normalmente	   associati	   a	   una	   spassionata,	   utilitaristica	   politica	   di	   potenza/sicurezza	   (una	  
flotta	   d'oltre	   mare	   o	   la	   tecnologia	   nucleare)	   possono	   assumere	   un	   significato	   ulteriore	   e	   simbolico	   (emblemi	   di	  
maturità,	   o	   'civiltà'	   degli	   attori),	   e	   come	   tali	   inseguiti	   fino	   a	  mettere	   in	   pericolo	   la	   stessa	   sicurezza	   nazionale	   (ieri	  
appunto	  della	  Germania	  guglielmina,	  oggi	  magari	  dell'Iran)"	  (Stefanachi,	  2015,	  34).	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 It is possible to retrace these two elements by looking at the documents 
concerning the negotiations for the Tangier statute.  
As mentioned above, the Tangier issue was listed among the pending issues between 
Italy and France. It is indeed since the beginning of 1920s that Italy asked to be 
included in the talking–negotiations for the revision of the statute of Tangier. In 
October 1923, with an official note directed at Great Britain, France and Spain, 
Mussolini formally asked to be admitted to these negotiations. This request was, 
however, turned down on the basis of the fact the Italy had no legal rights to 
participate to negotiations, this because, the other agreements concerning Tangier have 
also been concluded among the other three nations, without a direct Italian 
participation. Italy, in 1906, did participated to the Algeciras Conference, but with the 
role of signatory, as all the other European powers, along with the United States and 
Morocco. 
Therefore, the Italian request was not legally supported. Yet, the Italian stance on her 
decision was very persistent, to the point that Italy connect the resolution of this issue 
– together with the other above-mentioned pending issues – to the possibility of further 
negotiations and agreements with Paris.  
The internal messages that Mussolini exchanged with his collaborators are 
useful to shed light upon the importance associated to this issue, its intrinsic value 
and also the way in which Italy pursues these aims. 
Going by order, on the 28th of August 1926, Mussolini sends a telegram addressed to 
Romano Avezzana, in Paris192. In his message Mussolini underlines his disapproval of 
the French intention to negotiate exclusively with Spain as a first step, and to share 
the conclusions with Italy and Great Britain only afterwards. The reasons for this 
opposition are related to the difficulties that Italy will encounter in order to advance 
any modification to their first conclusions.  
Next to this Mussolini expresses another fundamental reason: Italy is mostly interested 
in establishing the principle of its rights to intervene on each Mediterranean issue. In 
his own words, 
                                                
 
192	  The	  telegram	  was	  also	  sent	  to	  the	  Italian	  Embassies	  in	  London,	  Madrid	  and	  Tangier.	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"a V.E. [Avezzana] è noto che quanto maggiormente ci interessa è di far accettare 
e stabilire chiaramente che l'Italia deve essere chiamata a decidere su tutte le 
questioni mediterranee, e che a questo titolo deve intervenire nella questione di 
Tangeri, anche indipendentemente dalla sua qualità di firmataria dell'atto di 
Algesiras" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 399 p. 308). 
Mussolini, then continues by reminding to Avezzana that Italy is supporting the Spanish 
position on the issues, this precisely in order to be able to establish this principle,  
"questa è stata una delle principali ragioni che ci hanno persuasi a considerare 
benevolmente le domande spagnole perché esse potrebbero darci modo di far 
sancire questo principio, e di riaprire in certo senso la questione marocchina 
cercando di far valere alcuni nostri interessi anche al di fuori di Tangeri" (DDI, serie 
VII, vol. IV, n. 399 p. 308). 
Mussolini invites Avezzana to, politely, communicate to Paris the Italian interests and 
intentions on the issue, 
"se il governo francese si ostinerà in tale atteggiamento, esso si urterà molto 
probabilmente nelle stesse difficoltà che ha sollevato la mancata nostra adesione 
allo statuto [del 1923], e che non sarebbero ora sorte (né si sarebbe data 
occasione alle attuali domande spagnuole) se la Francia avesse accettato la 
partecipazione dell'Italia alla conferenza suddetta [del 1923]. Rilevo con 
rincrescimento che [la Francia non ha] ancora compreso che l'Italia non rinuncerà 
mai a fare energicamente ed assiduamente valere i diritti che le conferisce la sua 
qualità di grande potenza mediterranea, e di cui dopo la guerra ha acquisito una 
sicura e perfetta coscienza" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 399 p. 308). 
In this message Mussolini continuously insists on the Italian role as a great power, and 
on the need for the Italian government to establish its prestigious role. 
In the message, Mussolini makes also reference to the contextualization of this Italian 
verbal aggressiveness, if France positively responds to the Italian requests, Italy will well 
behave, on the opposite problems may arise if France persists misrecognizing the 
Italian great power status requests. 
*l'Italia nell'esame di questi problemi porterà una serena comprensione degli 
interessi altrui e non soltanto una egoistica e ristretta visione dei propri e che in 
tali condizioni la Francia non ha nulla da temere per effetto della partecipazione 
dell'Italia, ma piuttosto della sua esclusione ove persistesse a ripetere l'errore del 
1923" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 399 p. 308). 
Always with regard to the methods implemented in this status seeking strategy, it is 
possible to mention that on the 1st of September 1926, Mussolini writes to Avezzana 
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confirming his support to Avezzana's suggestion to momentarily suspend Italian 
insistence on the Tunisi issue explaining that, "Credo anch'io che non convenga per il 
momento insistere sulle questioni di Tunisi. Non bisogna avere aria di mendicare 
concessioni mediocri" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 402 p. 310). 
This telegram shows that the Italian aims were subordinated to the appropriateness of 
the context in which were advanced.  
On the same day, Mussolini also addresses the Italian Ambassadors in London, 
Paris and Madrid and diplomatic officer in Tangier, expressing his opinion with regard 
to the possibility that Italy participates to negotiating–conversations that should involve 
the four involved countries. Mussolini confirms that he is in favour of this proposal, but 
specifically insists that these negotiations have to be common and not parallel, 
otherwise it would still imply the Italian exclusion.  
Mussolini wanted indeed to participate to the negotiations on the statute of 
Tangier with a role equal to the other three powers. 
He then invites his ambassadors to insist on the host governments with the following 
words – again insisting on the Italian rights, 
"Raccomando a V. E. di insistere energicamente presso Briand dimostrandogli tutti 
gli inconvenienti che deriverebbero per la Francia dalla ripetizione dell'errore del 
1923 e soprattutto facendogli rilevare la grave ripercussione che si verificherebbe 
nell'opinione pubblica italiana qualora risultasse chiaro che la Francia ancora una 
volta si rifiuta per le meschine vedute dei suoi governanti, di dare all'Italia una 
soddisfazione che le è assolutamente dovuta per la sua situazione mediterranea di 
diritto e di fatto" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 403 p. 310). 
 
In the following months, while tension between Italy and France continues also 
because of issues related to the Italian anti-fascist exponents that lived in France, 
Mussolini turned to Spain in order to implement the Italian strategy on the issue. The 
idea was to support an initiative that would confer the management of Tangier to the 
Spanish government – instead of leaving it to France, or turning it into an international 
common management193.  
                                                
 
193	  Italy	  preferred	  to	  favour	  the	  Spanish	  management	  in	  order	  not	  to	  give	  room	  to	  a	  further	  French	  extension	  in	  the	  
Mediterranean	  area.	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The strategy provided that Italy would support Spain in exchange for the Spanish 
support on the Italian request to have common negotiating–conversations in which Italy 
had to participate with an equal role with France, Spain and Great Britain.  
On the 15th of September, 1926, Mussolini addresses the Spanish government insisting 
on the extreme importance that this issue had for Italy (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 421 p. 
325). 
 It is interesting to report that this Italian insistence on the important value that 
Italy associated to this issue, was confirmed by Chamberlain himself. Indeed, in the 
private (non-official) meeting, of the 30th of September, that he had with Mussolini while 
in Livorno, when talking about issues concerning Morocco–Tangier, is Chamberlain 
himself to express to Mussolini that, in support of his requests, London suggest to opt 
for a solution in which Spain and France have a first round of negotiating–
conversations, and that after they have reached a draft of agreement, the negotiations 
are opened to Italy and Great Britain, thus resulting in a Conference for Tangier where 
all four countries are invited to participate and negotiate.  
Chamberlain takes this opportunity to clearly mention to Mussolini that "L'interesse 
morale e di prestigio dell'Italia è evidente ed è perfettamente riconosciuto dal Foreign 
Office"194 (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 444 p. 342). 
 With this declaration, Chamberlain is pointing at the heart of the matter.  
Indeed, it is Mussolini himself who explicitly addresses this precise point in a telegram 
he sent to Avezzana and Della Torretta, on the 24th of October, 1926. 
Mussolini is addressing the possibilities that Italy may join the prospective conference 
on Tangier thanks to its being among the states signatory to the 1906 Algeciras 
Conference.  
Mussolini opposes the idea to reunite the states signatory to the Algeciras Conference, 
because this runs contrary to the Italian intentions. Mussolini writes,  
"[C]hiarire a Chamberlain che ragioni per cui sono poco favorevole riunione 
conferenza di tutti gli stati firmatari dell'atto di Algesiras sono essenzialmente 
determinate dalla tesi che il R. Governo ha sempre sostenuto e continuerà a 
sostenere malgrado che in buona o mala fede si persista purtroppo a non 
comprenderla" (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 470 p. 362). 
                                                
 
194	  The	  content	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  of	  the	  exchanges	  between	  Mussolini	  and	  Chamberlain	  are	  reported	  by	  Mussolini	  
in	  an	  extensive	  note	  about	  the	  meeting.	  See,	  DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  IV,	  n.	  442-­‐444	  p.	  341-­‐342)	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The reason, he explains, relates to the fact that being Italy a state with direct interests 
and influence on the Mediterranean area, it cannot be listed among a large number of 
states signatory195 that have no direct interests in the area. Italy is a Mediterranean 
great power, and it is its right and duty to be involved in all the issues relating to the 
Mediterranean area., as a Mediterranean power – and not as a simple signatory of the 
Algeciras Conference. Mussolini indeed writes that, 
"L'Italia ritiene di avere diritto a partecipare ad ogni decisione circa Tangeri non 
soltanto come firmataria dell'atto di Algesiras, ma come grande potenza 
mediterranea alla stessa stregua della Francia, dell'Inghilterra e della Spagna, 
giacché la questione di Tangeri è una questione mediterranea che deve essere in 
primo luogo decisa dalle grandi potenze mediterranee"196 (DDI, serie VII, vol. IV, n. 
470 p. 362).   
Therefore, the insists on obtaining the recognition of its equal role in the area and in 
order to achieve this end Italy focussed on its strategy that turned around an 
agreement with Spain. Italy supports the Spain's rights of management of Tangier, and 
Spain has to support the Italian right to enter into negotiations on an equal level with 
France, Spain and Great Britain197 (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 320 p. 310). 
To contextualize these events, it is possible to report that, in the meanwhile, 
Italy has signed the first agreement with Albania at the end of 1926, and in the first 
months of 1927 has kept on developing its relations with the Balkan area, and also 
the negotiating–conversations concerning an eventual agreement with France (see, for 
example, DDI, serie VII, vol. V, nn. 3; 5; 19; 23; 24; 29; 50; 137).  
 
                                                
 
195	  The	  states	  signatory	  to	  the	  Algeciras	  Conference	  include	  the	  US	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  European	  countries.	  
196	  This	  same	  orientation	  results	  from	  an	  anonymous	  internal	  memorandum	  that	  historians	  have	  traced	  back	  to	  May	  
1927.	  The	  document	  is	  supposed	  to	  have	  been	  written	  by	  the	  Italian	  governmental	  Office	  of	  Europe	  and	  Levant	  –	  also	  
identified	   as	   Office	   V.	   The	   document	   reports	   considerations	   upon	   the	   behaviour	   that	   Italy	   should	   maintain	   with	  
regard	  to	  the	  Tangier	  issue196	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  V,	  n.	  230	  p.	  232).	  
197	   This	   request	   is	   reiterated	   to	   Spain	   on	   the	   11th	   of	   July,	   1927,	   when	   it	   seems	   that	   Spain,	   in	   its	   first	   round	   of	  
negotiations	  with	  Paris,	   is	  not	  probably	  going	   to	  stand	   for	   the	   Italian	   requests.	  Mussolini	   telegrammed	  Medici,	   the	  
Italian	  ambassador	  to	  Madrid,	  to	  invite	  him	  to	  protest	  to	  the	  Spanish	  representatives	  about	  this	  possibility.	  Mussolini	  
reminds	   to	   Madrid	   that	   the	   Italian	   support	   is	   subordinated	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   Italy	   has	   to	   be	   clearly	   invited	   to	  
negotiations	   in	   its	   role	   of	   Mediterranean	   great	   power.	   "[È]	   indispensabile	   che	   il	   governo	   di	   Madrid	   si	   renda	  
chiaramente	   conto	   come	   il	   nostro	  appoggio	  debba	  essere	   in	   tutto	   subordinato:	  1)	   all'adesione	  esplicita	   che	   l'Italia	  
deve	  essere	  ufficialmente	  chiamata	  a	  dare	  ad	  eventuali	  accordi	   franco	  spagnoli,	  non	  semplicemente	  come	  Potenza	  	  	  
firmataria	  dell'Atto	  di	  Algesiras,	  ma	  come	  Grande	  Potenza	  Mediterranea,	  interessata	  alla	  soluzione	  della	  questione	  di	  
Tangeri	  sullo	  stesso	  piede	  della	  Francis,	  dell'Inghilterra	  e	  della	  Spagna"	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  V,	  n.	  320	  p.	  310).	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 The Italian international standing – in the Tangier issue, but also in other 
pending issue with France – has been characterized by a particular behavioural 
attitude, which can be retraced through some internal documents. 
In line with this, it is interesting to report that in the above-mentioned internal 
memorandum of June 1927, which focussed on the status of the Italian colonial 
mandates198, reports that according to Grandi, Italy should in the Commission of 
Mandates, continue to adopt the strategy of 'repeatedly bothering the mandatory 
powers' – "Grandi ritiene utile che venga continuata la tattica di 'dar noia 
continuamente' alle potenze mandatarie" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 275 p. 272). 
Moreover, with regard to the tactics that the Italian government and representatives 
have implemented in order to achieve success in the Tangier issue, on August 23rd, 
1927, Grandi writes to Bastianini, the Italian diplomatic officer in Tangier, that it is a 
priority for Italy to protest, each and every time, against the applications of the statute 
of Tangier that don't respect its Italian interpretation. Grandi notes that, though 
protesting may not have immediate effects, still it is fundamental for Italy to keep in 
reaffirms its rights and to avoid any acquiescent stance on violations. 
"Non ci si può illudere che le nostre proteste e le nostre opposizioni a riserve 
abbiano sempre e immediatamente degli effetti pratici favorevoli ma è indispensabile 
affermare in ogni possibile occasione il nostro buon diritto ed evitare di far 
risultare in apparenza od in sostanza una qualsiasi acquiescenza da parte nostra 
alle violazioni di esso" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 275 p. 272). 
On the 17th of September, 1927, is Mussolini to express upon the approach that Italy 
should adopt against the French denationalisation of Italian citizens living in Tunisia. 
He writes – to Manzoni, the Italian ambassador to Paris – that,  
"Occorre invece cercare di dare continuamente alla Francia la chiara impressione 
della sensibilità italiana di fronte ad ogni questione che tocca la Tunisia in modo 
che essa se vuol proseguire in un programma che poi non ha obbiettivi vitali da 
raggiungere debba rendersi conto di tutta la gravità del problema e delle 
ripercussioni sulle relazioni italo-francesi" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 472 p. 412). 
Once more, Mussolini underlines the importance of insisting on the issues. Moreover, 
he continues but stating that, contrary to what Briand suggests – to not involve the 
                                                
 
198	  The	  memorandum	  was	  mentioned	  above,	  and	  is	  reported	  as	  an	  anonymous	  document	  which	  has	  been	  identified	  
as	  presumably	  written	  by	  Dino	  Grandi.	  See,	  DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  V,	  n.	  275	  p.	  272).	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public opinions – Mussolini instead insists on the importance to use this tool in order 
pressure on France. 
"La tesi prospettata a V. E. [Manzoni] dal signor Briand di condurre le questioni 
tunisine in modo da non esacerbare il sentimento delle due opinioni pubbliche non 
è esatta, poiché i provvedimenti che in Tunisia la Francia va prendendo, essendo a 
solo nostro danno, la reazione dell'opinione pubblica può essere soltanto italiana e 
può e deve servire come ammonimento al governo francese. D'altra parte poiché è 
necessario che una intesa sulla questione tunisina sia pregiudiziale ad ogni nostra 
eventuale intesa generale con la Francia, mi sembra chiara la convenienza che la 
questione stessa sia tenuta il più possibile viva" (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 472 p. 
412). 
In October 1927, Mussolini reporting on the main aspects of the Italian politics in the 
Tangier issue, writes the it is in the Italian interest to leave the Tangier issue open as 
long as possible (see, DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 465 p. 454). 
Therefore, these documents show that Italy was instrumentally using an 
assertive behaviour, which also took advantage of the role of the Italian public 
opinion199.  
Again, contextualizing the events, autumn and winter are marked by the 
international turbulence that followed the French-Yugoslavian and Italo-Albanian treaties. 
On December 4th, Mussolini writes down the abovementioned list of minimum 
indispensable conditions to improve Italo–French relations (see, DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 
653 p. 601). 
On the 8th of December, Scialoja (the Italian Officer at the League of Nations) reports 
to Mussolini about his meeting with Briand, informing about the positive impressions 
that Briand gave him about the French desire to improve relations with Italy (DDI, serie 
VII, vol. V, n. 6539 p. 603).  
Mussolini's reply, on the 8th of December, shows the Italian resolute aim to have more 
concrete signals on the French side in order to be able to make progresses on their 
relations (DDI, serie VII, vol. V, n. 662 p. 605). 
In the beginning of 1928 there are still some debates with Spain concerning the 
opportunity that Spain may not insist on supporting the Italian requests. Also in this 
                                                
 
199	   This	   contributes	   to	   frame	   the	  debate	  on	   the	  prevalence	  of	  domestic	  policy	  upon	   the	   international	  one	   into	   an	  
overturned	  perspective.	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case, Mussolini strongly intervenes with messages of protest to the Spanish government 
(see, DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 94 p. 87).   
 
The Tangier issue finds its first positive resolution for Italy in March, 1928.  
Italy has finally been invited to participate to the second round of negotiating–
conversations on Tangier, together with Great Britain, but most of all, under equal 
terms. The invitation indeed prescribed the possibility for both countries to participate 
to the extended conference together with France and Spain, where they all would have 
been able to deliberate on the Franco-Spanish decisions and to express their 
conditions upon their participation to the Tangier's statute (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 151 
p. 132).   
On the 9th of March, Mussolini replies to this invitation addressing Manzoni, the Italian 
Ambassador in Paris. 
This is definitely the most important document to this research since it gives a clear 
internal perspective on the Italian intentions and on the methods with which Italy 
pursued its ambitions. 
Mussolini writes indeed that, it was thanks to the Italian attitude in the entire situation 
that Italy has, finally, been invited to participate, on equal terms. 
"Tale invito significa che grazie al fermo contegno mantenuto dall'Italia è stato 
riconosciuto il nostro buon diritto di aver veste e voce nel regolamento di una 
questione così interessante l'equilibrio mediterraneo, e quindi tale che nonostante i 
miopi cavilli precedentemente addotti l'Italia non poteva esserne esclusa" (DDI, serie 
VII, vol. VI, n. 151 p. 132).   
A few lines below, he more specifically defines this Italian attitude as obstructionist. 
Mussolini indeed, informs Manzoni that in the upcoming negotiations, though Italy has 
no great possibilities to continue with the obstructionist attitude adopted until now, still 
has no interest in abandoning its legitimate requests. 
"V. E. terrà infine presente che in tali conversazioni R. Governo pur non avendo allo 
stato attuale delle cose possibilità né convenienza politica generale di continuare 
nel contegno ostruzionistico finora mantenuto non ha in realtà alcun interesse a 
raggiungere a tutti i costi un accordo e tanto meno ad ottenerlo col sacrificio delle 
nostre legittime richieste" (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 151 p. 132).  
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Indeed, this obstructionist attitude was adopted even during the negotiations of the 
extended Conference on Tangier.  
In conclusion, the obstructionist attitude provided Italy with the confirmation of its 
Mediterranean role. The most interesting passage of this document follows when 
Mussolini asks Manzoni to find a proper occasion to furtherly stress to the French 
government that the Italian government has formally taken note of the fact that, the 
Italian right to deliberate on the Mediterranean issues, was finally recognized200.  
"Mi sembra opportuni che, malgrado la soddisfazione praticamente da noi ottenuta, 
V. E. Manzoni] trovi modo ed occasione di far rilevare nelle riunioni che il R. 
Governo ha preso formalmente atto del riconoscimento del diritto dell'Italia di 
deliberare circa ogni questione relativa al Mediterraneo, nella sua qualità di grande 
potenza mediterranea" (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 151 p. 132). 
These passages clearly establish a conscious association between the Italian status 
seeking intentions and the assertive behaviours that have been implemented 
functionally to this aim. 
 The Italian intransigence, or its obstructionist attitude, continues also during the 
conference on Tangier. Indeed, on March 27th, 1928, Mussolini provides Manzoni with 
further instructions on the attitude that Manzoni and the Italian staff will have to adopt 
in the extended Conference on Tangier. 
In this telegram Mussolini insists on the fact that Italy aims at an Italian participation 
to the management of Tangier equal if not proportional to the other three powers 
(DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 190 p. 166).   
The next day, in another telegram – addressing the Italian representatives to London, 
Paris and Tangier – concerning the Italian request to be assigned with an equal part in 
the participation to the surveillance on the smuggling of weapons in Tangier201, 
Mussolini invited the Italian representatives to assert that202 this specific Italian request 
was important because Italy was pursuing in this request a political, not a technical, 
significance203 (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 192 p. 167). 
                                                
 
200	  Mussolini	  also	  	  informed	  Manzoni	  that	  he	  has	  already	  written	  to	  Paris	  and	  Madrid	  to	  accept	  the	  invitation.	  	  	  
201	  This	  Italian	  request	  had	  difficulties	  to	  be	  accepted	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  VI,	  n.	  192	  p.	  167).	  	  
202	  When	  talking	  to	  the	  Spanish	  government,	  whose	  support	  Italy	  was	  trying	  to	  obtain.	  	  
203	  "[L]a	  richiesta	  ha	  valore	  politico	  e	  non	  tecnico"	  (DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  VI,	  n.	  192	  p.	  167).	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 The negotiations in the extended conference on Tangier continue while Italy 
continues its negotiations for an agreement with Turkey and Greece, which, on the 30th 
of March, 1928, are also fastened in exact correspondence with the oppositions that 
the Italian requests met at the Conference on Tangier204 (see, DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 
206 p. 175).  
Italy also continued its relations with Yugoslavia – Italy opened to the possibility to 
grant the Belgrade government with more time to ratify the Treaty of Neptune. 
The negotiations in the Conference for Tangier are going well and in July 1928, will 
arrive at a positive conclusion for Italy – on the 25th of July Mussolini receives the 
confirmation of the signature of the agreements, and of Briand's satisfaction for the 
positive conclusion (DDI, serie VII, vol. VI, n. 516 p. 452). 
 Yet, before the official conclusion on the 5th of June 1928, Mussolini held the 
famous Senate speech on the Italian foreign policy.  
This speech is usually seen as the definitive and official affirmation of Italian 
revisionism. Mussolini indeed confirms his adherence to the idea that no treaty, for 
how inviolable may be, still they are not immutable (Susmel, 1958, 176-177). He also 
insists with verbal aggressiveness by claiming that, 
"Complicazioni gravi saranno evitate se rivedendo i trattati di pace laddove 
meritano di essere riveduti, si darà nuovo e più ampio respiro alla pace. Questa è 
l'ipotesi che io accarezzo e alla quale è ispirata la politica veramente, sanamente, 
schiettamente pacifica del governo fascista e del popolo italiano" (Mussolini's 
Senate speech of June 1928; quoted in Moscati, 1963, 113). 
Some considerations can be advanced with regard to the content of this speech. The 
speech begins with a list of all the results achieved by the fascist foreign policy, and a 
long report of the Italian relations with the other global nations, mentioned one by 
one.  
When talking about the Italian relations with France, Mussolini states that relations are 
gradually improving and that he is optimist about future relations. He then takes this 
opportunity to also, and very extensively, mention the positive and successful 
negotiations of the conference on Tangier. Mussolini declares to be positive about their 
                                                
 
204	  On	   the	   30th	   of	  March,	  Mussolini	  writes	   to	   the	   Italian,	   Deputy	   Secretary-­‐General	   of	   the	   Society	   of	   the	  Nations,	  
Paulicci	  De'	  Calboli	  Barone,	   inviting	  him	   to	   speed	  up	   the	  negotiations	   for	   the	  agreements	  with	  Greece	  and	  Turkey	  
(DDI,	  serie	  VII,	  vol.	  VI,	  n.	  206	  p.	  175).	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upcoming conclusion and publicly mentions the meaning that this conference had for 
Italy. The content is perfectly in line with the document here analyzed. Mussolini 
indeed says, that "l'Italia come grande potenza mediterranea, riteneva di aver diritto 
d'intervenire al regolamento di ogni questione mediterranea" (Susmel, 1958, 168). 
Again, Mussolini clearly reports the significance this issue had to Italy: the recognition 
of its being a Mediterranean great power. 
"L'accoglimento delle nostre richieste (…) costituisce l'esplicito riconoscimento che 
la qualità di grande potenza essenzialmente mediterranea conferisce all'Italia il 
diritto ad una speciale considerazione, tanto nei riguardi della sistemazione, dal 
punto di vista internazionale, della zona tangerina del Marocco, quanto nei riguardi 
dell'amministrazione della zona stessa" (Susmel, 1958, 168). 
This again confirms the intrinsic intention behind Italian requests and behaviour. 
Therefore, for how revisionist the speech may have been, when looking at it on top of 
the conclusions emerging from the diplomatic document, it is still possible to see the 
limits of the Italian revisionism itself. 
Italy is a revisionist country, and it is also adopting assertive behaviours ahead of the 
fulfilment of these aims, but yet, the Italian revisionism is always subordinated to the 
social international boundaries. In line with this, treaties are not immutable (therefore 
they can be changed), but still are inviolable, which implies that they have to be 
changed.  
It could be possible to assert that Italian revisionism was relational (see chapter 1), 
since, though the verbal threatens, still it pursued its requests with the interaction of 
the social relational environment.  
 The next conclusive section will focus on a brief analysis of the Italian 
international approach during the last years of the periodization here considered, when 
Mussolini shared its leading role with Dino Grandi who was nominated FM in September 
1929. 
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2.3.3	  –	  Mussolini	  and	  Grandi:	  a	  combined	  revisionist	  duet	  
 
This last section will focus on analysing the Italian international standing (and 
its behavioural strategy) during the last years of 1920s.  
In order to contextualize the events, it is possible to report that, according to 
Moscati (1963b), 1929 saw the enhancement of more global issues: the economic 
crisis, the necessity to deal with the disarmament and the reparation issues. In these 
years, Italy had to leave its nationalistic perspective and to deal with more 
global/international issues. It is indeed, under this perspective that Moscati supports 
that the goal assigned to Grandi, as the new foreign minter, was to grant Italy with an 
autonomous international standing (Moscati, 1963b, 113).  
Indeed, 1929 was also the year in which Mussolini left its FM office in favour of Dino 
Grandi.  
Historiography has looked at these years by trying to understand how did Mussolini 
and Grandi work together and how did they contribute to Italian foreign policy.  
With regard to this, historical studies, assert that, it is now commonly understood that 
the Italian foreign policy objectives (for example, the abovementioned autonomous 
international standing) were pursued with both Grandi and Mussolini working in perfect 
combination (Moscati, 1963b, 114).  
Indeed, usually, Grandi is represented as the pacifist half, and Mussolini as the 
spoilsport. This because Mussolini kept on giving aggressive-style speeches, while 
Grandi worked on formulating the Italian standing with a more politically correct 
language. As reported by Moscati, 
"l'azione di Grandi si svolgeva con piena moderazione, con pacatezza e secondo 
l'usuale procedere diplomatico; quella di Mussolini si esplicava in discorsi, interviste 
e dichiarazioni roboanti secondo il tipo stile fascista" (Moscati, 1963b, 114). 
Yet these two strands were clearly and consciously implemented towards the same 
objective.  
""[M]a i due ruoli diversi, le due parti diverse appartengono visibilmente ad una 
stessa rappresentazione, ad uno stesso lavoro. Una sola politica, dunque, ed una 
sola volontà nell'azione diplomatica italiana: (Moscati, 1963b, 114). 
Milza (2000) as well, underlines that, notwithstanding this apparent double nature of 
the Grandi and Mussolini's approaches, still they both acted in concert with each other 
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(Milza, 2000, 681) producing a functional duet – that aimed at the pursuing of Italian 
great power status. 
Grandi was Foreign Minister from 1929 until 1932. During these years he dealt 
with the negotiations for the Conference of Disarmament205, and also with the 
negotiations for the war compensations206.  
Grandi participated to these international negotiations and conferences by accurately 
reflecting the stance of the Italian government, but he did so by translating in more 
diplomatic terms what Mussolini said in more fascist tone (Moscati, 1963b, 115). 
In this context, the issue that caught most of the Italian attention between 
1929 and 1932 were the negotiations for disarmament. 
Italy, perfectly in line with its great power status ambitions, already manifested in all 
the issues concerning the Mediterranean area (as emerged from the previous sections), 
approached the negotiations on naval disarmament by advancing one simple request, 
"si scegliesse qualsiasi limitazione agli armamenti terrestri, purché l'Italia non fosse 
in tal campo seconda a nessuna delle altre potenze europee; si limitasse 
l'armamento navale a qualsiasi livello, purché all'Italia fosse consentito di avere una 
flotta non inferiore a quella della Francia" (Moscati, 1963b, 115).  
Again, in another international occasion, Italy kept on asking the establishment of a 
principle of equality between Italy and France. This Italian request, with regard to naval 
armament, was actually advanced since the Washington Conference of 1922207.  
 The disarmament issue was then reopened between 1927 and 1928, when 
France and Great Britain pursued bilateral negotiations with regard to the subdivision 
of units for which tonnage was limited (Moscati, 1963b, 115).  
In this new occasion, Italy tried to conclude a preliminary agreement with France in 
which equality between the two was established, but, notwithstanding the commitment 
of both Grandi and Mussolini, successful results were difficult to obtain.  
Since this research is not interested in the effectiveness of the behavioural 
strategies, but instead is interested in understanding the processes and the pursued 
                                                
 
205	  The	  negotiations	  begun	  in	  1928	  and	  the	  conference	  took	  place	  in	  1932.	  	  
206	  	  	  Meant	  as	  'riparazioni'.	  
207	  The	  conference	  had	  established,	  with	  regard	  to	  battleships,	  the	  equality	  between	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain	  
on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  Italy	  and	  France	  on	  the	  other.	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aims, what is most interesting here is to point out that, in this case too, it was 
extremely important to the Italian government to establish a principle of equality with 
France. This because, on the contrary, Italy would have been officially assigned with a 
role in the Mediterranean, secondary to France (and Great Britain).  
Therefore, also in this case it was fundamental for Italy to insist on its rights, indeed, 
perfectly reflecting the Italian position and interests with regard to the Tangier issue, it 
was extremely important for Italy not to endorse, in the disarmament negotiations, 
similar conclusions that would have constituted a definitive breach in its status seeking 
ambitions – and in its great power status narrative (Moscati, 1963b, 115-116).  
"L'accettazione di una condizione d'inferiorità [rispetto alla Francia] avrebbe (…) 
significato riconoscersi una funzione di secondi piano nel Mediterraneo, e di 
conseguenza rinunciare a quella politica di espansionismo che era stata perseguita 
negli anni precedenti" (Moscati, 1963b, 116).     
In conclusion, once more it is possible to underline that, also when addressing 
the disarmament issue, Italy was pursuing its great power status.  
Therefore, it is interesting for this research to understand how did Italy pursue the 
recognition of its status. With regard to this, it is possible to furtherly report on the 
concerted duet carried out by Mussolini and Grandi. 
In January 1930, when in Geneva for a meeting of the Leagues on Nations, and also 
when in London for the first meetings of the Disarmament Conference, Grandi adopted, 
in both cases, reassuring declarations (Milza, 2000, 683). 
In April, 1930, the Disarmament Conference closed with no agreement between Rome 
and Paris (Milza, 2000, 683). 
While Grandi continued adopting its peaceful declarations, Mussolini kept on adopting a 
verbal aggressiveness. In May 1930, while in Florence, he made some declarations 
concerning the naval disarmament, 
"Desidero affermare qui ora che il nostro programma sarà completato fino all'ultima 
tonnellata, e che ciascuna delle trentanove unità da battaglia sarà varata. La 
volontà del fascismo è una volontà ferrea. È matematica. (…) il popolo italiano, 
piuttosto che restare prigioniero del mare che una volta apparteneva a Roma, farà 
tutti i sacrifici possibili (…).  
Le parole cono una bella cosa, ma fucili, cannoni, navi, aeroplani, sono anche più 
belli. All'alba di domani lo spettacolo delle nostre forze armate rivelerà al mondo il 
volto calmo e guerriero dell'Italia" (Mussolini, quoted in Milza, 2000, 683). 
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Milza himself underlines that, though these declarations208 do contradict with the 
language adopted by Grandi, still, "questa apparente discordanza non rispecchia al 
momento alcuna divergenza di fondo" (Milza, 2000, 683).  
Milza continues reporting that,  
"Nel 'duetto' che il Duce e il suo ministro eseguono, niente è veramente lasciato 
all'improvvisazione dell'uno e dell'altro. A Ginevra, Grandi si dedica con un certo 
successo a rassicurare la comunità internazionale circa le reali intenzioni dell'Italia. 
A Roma, il Duce mobilita l'opinione pubblica sul tema della nazione proletaria che 
non ha timore dei ricchi e che è pronta a venire alle mani con il mondo intero, 
qualora la sua 'indipendenza' e il suo 'avvenire' risultino minacciati" (Milza, 2000, 
683). 
In it also interesting to report that Milza insists on the fact that, with the exception of 
France – who had a competitive relation with Italy due to contrasting interests – 
"nessuno in Europa attribuisce un'importanza eccessiva alle sue minacce" (Milza, 2000, 
683). 
Once more, it is possible to identify in the Italian verbal aggressiveness an 
instrumental role that contributed to the Italian strategy for status seeking.  
Similar to the insistence on reaffirming the Italian rights to colonial mandated – which 
Italy couldn't actually afford – also in this case Mussolini threatens by referring to the 
Italian willingness to show its real power and capacities.  
And, even more interesting is to read about the existence of a common understanding 
of this strategy; not only the Italian government and its collaborators knew about it, 
but also the other countries – and Chamberlain, when in Livorno, confirmed it. 
 
  
                                                
 
208	  Milza	  advances	  that	  these	  declarations	  were	  mostly	  aimed	  at	  internal	  politics	  (Milza,	  2000,	  683).	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3	  –	  Conclusions	  
 
 This thesis has moved from the conceptualization of the current IR conception 
of the recognition process that status seekers implement in order to obtain the 
recognition of their aimed status.  
The aim was to confront this theoretical framework with the empirical observations of 
status seeking processes for recognition, this in order to address the mismatch that is 
possible to identify between the theoretical formulations on how the recognition 
process is accomplished and the empirical observations.  
Indeed, according to the current IR theory, status seekers that aim to be granted with 
the recognition of their self-advanced status, are expected to perform exclusively 
complying behaviours. Behaving as conformingly as possible, performing the so-called 
'good citizen' behaviours, responds to the relational aspects of social interaction and 
of the identity formation process.  
The fundamental assumption at the basis of the current IR theory on recognition 
process is that, as for identity, also the recognition of status is relational since it 
takes place within a social interaction.  
This all brings to the idea that states seeking for the recognition of their self-advanced 
status tend to perform socially compliant behaviours.  
Yet, a problem occurs when the candidate (the status seeker) is not immediately 
conferred with its self-advanced identity.  
The IR literature outlines, for these cases of misrecognition, a spectrum of behavioural 
options that are clear-cut and alternative. Reporting it in a few words, frustrated 
candidates can opt between further compliance (in order to socially and conformingly 
convince its audience), or can opt for a conflictual option which instead implies a 
direct challenge to the misrecognizers – in order to oblige them to concede the 
status's recognition or to punish them (see chapter 1). 
In front of these alternative behavioural strategies, two are the main perspectives 
frustrated status seeker comply with the system or on the opposite challenge the 
system with conflictual behaviours. 
 The main problem relates precisely to this clear-cut and almost dichotomous 
perspective. Indeed, the problem is how to understand the foreign policies of those 
status seekers that perform deviant behaviours next to compliant ones. 
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Indeed, empirical observations of the international standing of status seekers instead of 
manifesting clear cut behavioural strategies, do manifest symptoms and signals of both 
behaviours. How to understand this compresence of behaviours? 
The IR literature focussed on foreign policy analysis, offers two main options. Building 
on concepts outlines by Friedberg (see chapter 2) it is possible to report these two 
options in the following terms: the optimistic perspective expects frustrated status 
seekers to persist in their social compliance – this basically because of the assumption 
that status is relational and socially conferred – therefore this interpretative analysis 
focusses its mostly on the manifestations of complying behaviours, and justifies instead 
the presence of deviant/assertive behaviours observed in the foreign policy of status 
seekers. On the opposite, the pessimistic perspective gives more relevance to the 
manifestations of deviant and assertive behaviours, while downplaying the presence of 
complying behaviours, this because sees in these observations the symptoms of a 
conflictual approach on the side of the status seeker. 
 Moving from this and approaching this puzzle of compresence of behaviours, 
the intent of this thesis is to address this complex combination aiming at a 
comprehensive understanding of these manifestations. 
Following in the steps of IR literature that has already borrowed from the sociological 
field, the thesis builds on the findings achieved by child developmental psychology at 
the end of 1990s. Chapter 3 deals with the reasons and advantages of this borrowing, 
and also extensively reports on the concepts and the developments that brought peer 
relation studies (in child developmental psychology) to revise their traditional 
conception of social interactions and behavioural strategies.  
Briefly reporting it, since when child developmental psychology studies started building 
on the distinction between two different dimensions of status (popularity status and 
likeability status), new findings were reached by furtherly investigating this distinction. 
The main point turned around the fact that popularity and likeability are different types 
of statuses, with different characteristics: popularity relates to the status-rank, social 
standing of the individual among its peers, while likeability relates to social acceptance 
and the degrees of liking that an individual receives. Therefore, these dimensions 
measure two different types of status, which – peer relations scholars discover that – 
are related with different associations. Indeed, while likeability is associated with 
 
 
255 
prosocial characteristics, popularity results being associated with both prosocial and 
antisocial characteristics and behaviours. 
This opened space for further investigations on the relation existing between popularity 
status and this compresence of opposed features that brought to the conclusions that, 
kids when seeking for popularity status implement a bistrategic combination of deviant 
and compliant behaviours. In this strategy, the two alternative behaviours are combined 
since deviant behaviours (e.g., different types of aggressiveness) are functionally 
adopted in order to obtain the popularity status.  
 By building on this, the thesis advances that this perspective can be useful to 
understand the presence of deviant/assertive behaviours in the foreign policy of status 
seekers. 
The idea is that, status seekers that are clearly not challenging the system (they are 
not revolutionary systems) may implement deviant behaviours on purpose in order to 
accomplish the recognition of their self-advanced status.  
This hypothesis, builds on a translation into IR terms of the main concepts, findings 
and implications derived from child developmental psychology – that is completed in 
the last part of chapter 3.  
This section asserts that, by distinguishing between different types of status, and by 
considering that international status standing recalls the popularity status type 
identified in kid's studies (indeed both are reputational types of status that refer to the 
social rank/standing of the individual in the group), it is possible to advance a 
functional relation between deviant behaviours and international status seeking.  
This section also advances the need to formulate a more nuanced outline of the 
concept of deviance also in the IR literature. Deviance is what is deviant from social 
norms and rules, and this has to be considered together with the distinction between 
what is socially undesirable (deviant) and what is socially dysfunctional. Indeed, the 
traditional perspectives on social interactions have built on a tacit overlap between 
these two distinct elements.  
The updated version of child developmental psychology opens the way to the 
possibility of conceiving that deviant behaviours (those behaviours that are socially 
undesired) may still prove socially functional. 
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 It is by building on these elements that chapter 4 addressed and analyses the 
behavioural strategies that Italy, under Mussolini's government (in the 1920s), adopted 
in order to pursue its great power status.  
The selection of this case study was motivated by the fact that Italy in those years 
officially presented itself as a status seeker, but notwithstanding this its international 
standing was far from being as socially compliant as possible.  
Indeed, the Italian foreign policy of those years is commonly known for its fits of 
temper – that literature has tried to understand and justified in different ways, by 
recalling various reasons. 
The analysis of the case study, by focussing on some of the more debated and 
discusses episodes (e.g. the Corfu crisis; the 1926 declaration of the Italian imperial 
ambitions) and also on the main features of Italian foreign policy (e.g. Italian 
revisionism), allows to closely investigate the behavioural strategies that Italy has 
adopted to accomplish its recognition process. 
The analysis builds on historical literature, but also and especially on internal 
documents concerning speeches and also diplomatic documents in which it is possible 
to find the messages exchanged between Mussolini and the Italian diplomatic corp. 
The investigation of the diplomatic documents in particular has allowed to highlight 
that Mussolini and his colleagues had consciously adopted (and suggested to adopt) 
an assertive standing in the Italian foreign policy, this in function of its status seeking 
aims.  
Italy was indeed looking to be recognized as a great power – Mussolini continuously 
insisted on the importance of the Italian prestige – and the Italian government pursued 
this aim by adopting what was defined an obstructionist attitude.  
Mussolini was intransigent, adopted verbal aggressiveness and also relational 
aggressiveness (see section 2.3.2 of chapter 4), and continuously insisted on the Italian 
rights to have its compensations, this all, in order to establish the principle that Italy 
was a great power (a Mediterranean great power) and that it had to be treated as an 
equal by the other European great powers (France and Great Britain in primis). 
Therefore, the main contribution of this work is that, by building on the 
conclusions achieved by developmental psychology, and supported by the results of 
the case study analysis, it is possible to advance that, contrary to the current 
theoretical expectations that want the status seeker to perform exclusively compliant 
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behaviours in its status seeking process, there are good reasons to claim that, in the 
international arena as well, states seeking for reputational status type do perform a 
combination of deviant and compliant behaviours. Moreover, hints emerging from Italian 
diplomatic documents suggest that not only Italy was conscious of its behavioural 
strategy, but also its European interactors.  
These conclusions contribute to the literature concerning the recognition, the 
status seeking and the socialization processes. All the three literatures address the 
same interaction process from different perspectives.  
What is interesting of these conclusions is the fact that they challenge the 
normative feature intrinsically characterizing the current IR theory on recognition 
process. indeed, as it was for developmental psychology that for years was 
characterized by a tacit social engineering ethos, similarly in IR literature it is possible 
to find an overlap between what the international society recommends its status 
seeking candidates to do (to perform behaviours that are as conforming as possible to 
international social norms and expectations) and how the theory describes the effective 
status seeking processes (what states actually do). The aim of this research was to 
focus primarily on understanding what states actually do in order to obtain their status 
recognition. the thesis has indeed favoured a perspective focussed on the status 
seeker.   
 It is important to also underline that in the IR literature it is possible to find 
studies that already went in the same direction that this thesis pointed at. An 
important example is the study by Bátora (2013) in which the author underlines that, 
observing Slovakia's behaviour during its process to gain membership to NATO and 
after the process was successful it emerged that, Slovakia, one entered NATO started 
adopting more assertive behaviours on the issues upon which wanted to be more 
autonomous.  
In line with these results from Bátora's study, this thesis addresses social interactions 
which take place in an environment different from an international institution, and adds 
to Bátora's conclusions the idea that – outside from international institutions – the 
more assertive behaviours are implemented also before the positive accomplishment of 
the status seeking process. More precisely, they are implemented specifically in 
function on this process.  
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The contribution of this research, open more room for further investigation in this 
direction. Indeed, it would be interesting to directly investigate the differences between 
the socialization/recognition process that takes place within international institutions 
and the one that takes pale in the international arena in general. 
Another interesting contribution of this work is the emerging suggestion that – 
as it was asserted by developmental studies with regard to kids – in the international 
arena as well there is the consciousness that status seeking is a process that has 
articulated components. In other words, some studies showed that kids had a clue on 
how the process to seek popularity worked, this consciousness was common both to 
the kids that aimed and obtained popularity and also to the kids that didn't (it is 
possible to say that they constituted the audience). 
In the analysis of the Mussolinian foreign policy and the Italian status seeking of its 
great power status, it clearly emerged that Mussolini and his government collaborates 
were conscious of their strategy and of the tactics they were adopting ahead of this 
aim. But it also emerged that Chamberlain had a clear understanding of the Italian 
strategy. Similarly, it could be possible to advance the idea that France's resistance to 
the Italian requests, somehow suggests that Paris too had an idea of what Italy was 
seeking for, and France was playing its same game.  
Therefore, this opens room for a further investigation on the distinction between types 
of socializations that take place at the level of individuals and the one that take place 
in the international arena. This relates to the fact that in their outline of the 
socialization process Long and Hadden (1985) insist on the fact that the aim of 
socialization between individuals is to select and prepare new candidates. Yet, on the 
opposite, it seems that international socialization is characterized by a further feature 
of competition. 
 Another contribution recalls the fact that the Italian case study here analysed, 
confirms that Italy was seeking for material compensations because of their intrinsic 
value that would have contributed to increase the Italian prestige. This contributes to 
the need to revise the relation between status/prestige and material power. Do states 
seek for prestige in order to gain material power, or do states seek for material 
achievements in order to improve their social status and prestige?  
The conclusions of this research support the second option (see Stefanachi 2015). 
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 In conclusion, this research calls for further studies on a point that it is not 
addressed here but that is still interesting to understand: the case study here analysed 
corresponds to a particular type of political system. Indeed, Mussolini was guiding aa 
fascist government and, with years, turned Italy into a fascist regime. It is legitimate to 
wonder if these Italian assertive behaviours were related to this. In other words, did 
Italy adopt this type of behavioural strategy because it was leaded by an authoritarian 
regime? 
The answer that this work advances is that, there is continuity in the Italian foreign 
policy ambitions and also strategies since its reunification at the end of the 19th 
century; as an example, it is possible to report that Italy pursued its colonial extension 
also during the liberal governments. Yet, further research in this direction would be 
useful to clarify this doubt.  
  
 It is also important to mention some of the limits of this research.  
The first limit to mention here, is a conscious and voluntary limitation that this 
research has had since its beginning. This study indeed is limited to identifying the 
compresence of behaviours and to identify a relation between deviant behaviours and 
status seeking strategies and aims. It doesn't aim at analysing more in details the 
functionality of these behaviours. Indeed, another suggestion for further research is to 
focus also on investigating the effectiveness of these behavioural strategies 
 Moreover, an important limitation relates also to the fact that the research has 
focussed exclusively on understanding the Italian behavioural strategy adopted in order 
to pursue its status seeking ambition. The problem is that when analysing foreign 
policies, it is always difficult to clearly cut a distinction between domestic and foreign 
affairs. Indeed, in line with this, it is possible to recall that historiography has 
advanced different reasons to explain the apparent schizophrenia characterizing the 
Italian foreign policy in those years, among these explanations, various mentions have 
addressed the absence of a real strategy in foreign policy, and also the prevalence of 
national politics on foreign one (see for example the relation between propaganda and 
the strong assertive international declarations).  
With regard to this, it is possible to say that, this research has no intention to turn 
down these explanations. Yet, the focus of the research was specific and aimed at 
investigating the relation between deviant behaviours and status seeking strategy. 
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Moreover, the reference to internal documents help to support also the validity of the 
conclusions here achieved.  
 The last clarification to be made here is that, as it was advanced by peer 
relation scholars, there is no intention to support with the thesis the idea that 
aggressiveness is a good or positive behaviours. The sole purpose of this research was 
to understand how international interactions are characterized.  
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